State v. Bradley , 2020 Ohio 30 ( 2020 )

[Cite as State v. Bradley, 2020-Ohio-30.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
No. 108294
v. :
YAPHET J. BRADLEY, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: January 9, 2020
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-18-627432-A
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
Attorney, and Carl Mazzone, Carson Strang, and Blaise D.
Thomas, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee.
Mark A. Stanton, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and
Francis Cavallo, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.:
Yaphet Bradley, on the morning of his trial, pleaded guilty to
aggravated murder with prior calculation and design, along with attendant firearm
specifications, gross abuse of a corpse, and tampering with evidence. Before the trial
court sentenced Bradley to an aggregate term of imprisonment of life without the
possibility of parole, Bradley sent the trial court a letter announcing his desire to
withdraw his plea. Following the sentencing hearing, which included a hearing on
Bradley’s motion to withdraw the guilty plea, Bradley appealed.
Neither of the parties provides a recitation of the facts underlying the
criminal conduct, and as a result, we must conclude that the facts are irrelevant to
the outcome of this appeal. The sole issue advanced in this appeal is determining
whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Bradley’s motion to
withdraw his guilty plea.
A motion to withdraw a guilty plea is governed by Crim.R. 32.1, which
provides that a “motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest may be made only
before sentence is imposed; but to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence
may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his
or her plea.” A defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a plea prior
to sentencing, and it is within the sound discretion of the trial court to determine
what circumstances justify granting such a motion. State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St. 3d 521,
527, 584 N.E.2d 715 (1992).
Some appellate courts have recognized a nonexhaustive set of factors
for consideration of a motion to withdraw a plea. See, e.g., State v. Walcot, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 99477, 2013-Ohio-4041, ¶ 19. Those factors include the reasons for
the motion, whether the state will be prejudiced by the withdrawal, whether the
timing of the motion was reasonable, whether the defendant understood the nature
of the charges and potential sentences, and whether the accused was perhaps not
guilty or had a complete defense to the charge. Id., citing State v. Fish, 104 Ohio
App.3d 236, 240, 661 N.E.2d 788 (1st Dist.1995); State v. Moore, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga
No. 98132, 2012-Ohio-5734, ¶ 13.
The sole assignment of error asks this court to consider the
aforementioned factors without regard to the trial court’s decision. Bradley is
essentially seeking de novo review of the factors a trial court may consider in
determining whether the circumstances justify withdrawal of the plea. Xie at 527.
Appellate review is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its
discretion in denying the motion to withdraw the plea. Courts of review cannot
substitute their judgment for that of the trial court by independently weighing the
factors that inform the trial court’s consideration of whether the offender justified a
request to withdraw a plea. An appellate panel must defer to the trial court’s
judgment in evaluating the “good faith, credibility and weight” of the offender’s
motivation and assertions in entering and attempting to withdraw his plea. See Xie
at 525, quoting State v. Smith, 49 Ohio St. 2d 261, 361 N.E.2d 1324 (1977). A trial
court does not abuse its discretion in overruling a motion to withdraw a plea: (1)
where the accused is represented by highly competent counsel; (2) where the
accused was afforded a full hearing, pursuant to Crim.R. 11, before he entered the
plea; (3) when, after the motion to withdraw is filed, the accused is given a complete
and impartial hearing on the motion; and (4) where the record reveals that the court
gave full and fair consideration to the plea withdrawal request. State v. Peterseim,
68 Ohio App. 2d 211, 428 N.E.2d 863 (8th Dist.1980), paragraph three of the
syllabus.
The single reason offered for withdrawing his guilty plea was
Bradley’s self-serving claim that his attorneys coerced him into pleading guilty by
promising that the trial court would impose the minimum sentence in exchange for
the plea. In his motion, Bradley did not discuss any other reason for his request. In
order to substantiate the claim of coercion, a defendant “must submit supporting
material containing evidence that the guilty plea was induced by false promises.”
State v. Thomas, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 85294, 2005-Ohio-4145, ¶ 5, citing State
v. Kapper, 5 Ohio St. 3d 36, 448 N.E.2d 823 (1983). A mere change of heart
regarding a guilty plea and the possible sentence is insufficient justification for the
withdrawal of a guilty plea. State v. Drake, 73 Ohio App. 3d 640, 645, 598 N.E.2d
115 (8th Dist.1991); State v. Lambros, 44 Ohio App. 3d 102, 103, 541 N.E.2d 632 (8th
Dist.1988).
Instead of offering evidence of the alleged coercion at the hearing, and
after conceding that he told the trial court during the plea colloquy that he was
satisfied with his counsel’s performance and he was not promised anything in return
for the guilty plea, Bradley reiterated his self-serving statement that his attorneys
induced the guilty plea with promises of leniency. Importantly, during the hearing
on Bradley’s motion to withdraw his plea, Bradley’s attorneys both specifically
disclaimed ever attempting to predict the ultimate sentence when offering their
advice and counsel to Bradley. Thus, Bradley’s claim of coercion was
unsubstantiated.
After considering the preeminent qualifications of Bradley’s attorneys
and the fact that the withdrawal request was based on a mere change of heart, the
trial court denied Bradley’s motion. Upon our review, the record indicates that the
trial court complied with all the requirements of Crim.R. 11 in accepting Bradley’s
guilty plea that was made the morning of trial and gave full consideration to
Bradley’s motion at the hearing conducted immediately before the sentencing. In
accordance with the foregoing, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying Bradley’s request to withdraw his plea. The assignment of
error is overruled. We affirm.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue of this court directing the common
pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction having
been affirmed, any bail pending is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for
execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, P.J., and
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR