State v. Whitten ( 2019 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Whitten, 
    2019-Ohio-4199
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    LUCAS COUNTY
    State of Ohio                                     Court of Appeals Nos. L-18-1053
    L-18-1062
    Appellee
    Trial Court No. CR0201702919
    v.
    Johnathan Whitten                                 DECISION AND JUDGMENT
    Appellant                                 Decided: October 11, 2019
    *****
    Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and
    Lauren Carpenter, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
    W. Alex Smith, for appellant.
    *****
    SINGER, J.
    {¶ 1} In this consolidated appeal, appellant, Johnathan Whitten, appeals from the
    March 2, 2018 judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas convicting him of
    two counts of robbery, R.C. 2911.02(A)(1) and (B), with both counts including a firearm
    specification, R.C. 2941.141, following acceptance of his guilty plea entered pursuant to
    North Carolina v. Alford, 
    400 U.S. 25
    , 
    91 S.Ct. 160
    , 
    27 L.Ed.2d 162
     (1970) (an “Alford”
    guilty plea). For the reasons which follow, we reverse.
    {¶ 2} Appellant asserts the following assignment of error on appeal:
    I. THE DEFENDANT’S PLEA WAS NOT KNOWINGLY AND
    VOLUNTARILY MADE.
    {¶ 3} Appellant was indicted in a multi-count indictment on November 3, 2017,
    alleging two counts of aggravated robbery, R.C. 2911.01(A)(1) and (C), with both counts
    including a firearm and a repeat violent offender specification. The indictment also
    alleged a third count of having a weapon while under a disability, R.C. 2923.13(A)(2).
    On February 15, 2018, appellant entered an Alford guilty plea to the lesser included
    offense of robbery, R.C. 2911.02(A)(1) and (B), for both Counts 1 and 2, with only one
    count also carrying a firearm specification (which required a mandatory one-year prison
    term). Count 3 was dismissed. The plea agreement indicated that appellant could be
    sentenced to a maximum prison term of 17 years, of which 3-17 years were mandatory.
    Appellant also stipulated that he had been found guilty of a first-degree felony in Lucas
    County Court of Common Pleas case No. CR0201701892. Appellant appealed.
    {¶ 4} On appeal, appellant asserts in his single assignment of error that the trial
    court erred in accepting his plea, which was not knowingly and voluntarily entered.
    Appellant asserts the trial court failed to notify appellant he faced mandatory terms of
    imprisonment because he had previously pled guilty to a first-degree felony.
    {¶ 5} At the Crim.R. 11 hearing, the trial court conducted a colloquy with
    appellant, who indicated he was able to understand the plea process, understood the rights
    he was waiving, was satisfied with the advice of his counsel, and had freely entered into
    2.
    the plea agreement. The plea agreement clearly set forth the fact that the prison terms in
    this case would be mandatory. However, when the court was explaining the maximum
    penalties appellant faced by entering the plea, the court stated “the maximum sentence
    could be up to nine years, one year of which was mandatory [for Count 1]” and “could be
    up to eight years” for Count 2. Furthermore, when explaining postrelease control, the
    trial court used the phrase, “[i]f you’re sentenced to prison.” In the sentencing judgment
    entry, appellant was sentenced to six-year terms of imprisonment on each offense, with
    an additional mandatory and consecutive prison term of one year for the firearm
    specification, for an aggregate sentence of a mandatory seven years of imprisonment.
    {¶ 6} Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) requires that the court accept a guilty plea after
    “[d]etermining that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with understanding of
    the nature of the charges and of the maximum penalty involved, and if applicable, that the
    defendant is not eligible for probation or for the imposition of community control
    sanctions at the sentencing hearing.” The maximum penalty includes whether there is a
    mandatory prison term. State v. Sarkozy, 
    117 Ohio St.3d 86
    , 
    881 N.E.2d 1224
    , 2008-
    Ohio-509, ¶ 22; State v. Tutt, 
    2015-Ohio-5145
    , 
    54 N.E.3d 619
    , ¶ 31 (8th Dist.); State v.
    Pitts, 6th Dist. Ottawa No. OT-05-036, 
    2006-Ohio-3182
    , ¶ 21-22. Because this is a non-
    constitutional right, substantial compliance satisfies the Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) requirement.
    State v. Clark, 
    119 Ohio St.3d 239
    , 
    2008-Ohio-3748
    , 
    893 N.E.2d 462
    , ¶ 32. Substantial
    compliance exists where “under the totality of the circumstances the defendant
    3.
    subjectively understands the implications of his plea and the rights he is waiving.” State
    v. Nero, 
    56 Ohio St.3d 106
    , 108, 
    564 N.E.2d 474
     (1990).
    {¶ 7} In this case, the trial court attempted to comply with Crim.R. 11 and gave
    appellant notice of the maximum sentence. However, the court misled appellant by
    indicating that only one year for the specification would be a mandatory term. While the
    plea agreement correctly set forth the maximum prison term and indicated that the terms
    would be mandatory, the trial court’s statements confused the issue. Therefore, we
    cannot find the trial court substantially complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a). Clark at
    ¶ 39; State v. Dailey, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107554, 
    2019-Ohio-356
    , ¶ 15-17; State v.
    Colvin, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 15 MA 0162, 
    2016-Ohio-5644
    , 
    70 N.E.3d 1012
    , ¶ 38.
    We find the trial court erred by accepting appellant’s Alford plea because it could not
    have been knowingly made under the circumstances. Appellant’s sole assignment of
    error is found well-taken.
    {¶ 8} Having found the trial court did commit error prejudicial to appellant and
    that substantial justice has not been done, the judgment of the Lucas County Court of
    Common Pleas convicting and sentencing appellant is vacated. This case is remanded to
    the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this decision. Appellee is ordered
    to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24.
    Judgment reversed,
    vacated and remanded.
    4.
    State v. Whitten
    C.A. Nos. L-18-1053
    L-18-1062
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
    See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
    Mark L. Pietrykowski, J.                       _______________________________
    JUDGE
    Arlene Singer, J.
    _______________________________
    Thomas J. Osowik, J.                                       JUDGE
    CONCUR.
    _______________________________
    JUDGE
    This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
    Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
    version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
    http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
    5.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: L-18-1053

Judges: Singer

Filed Date: 10/11/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/11/2019