State v. Smith , 2019 Ohio 4645 ( 2019 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Smith, 
    2019-Ohio-4645
    .]
    COURT OF APPEALS
    MUSKINGUM COUNTY, OHIO
    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    STATE OF OHIO                                  :   JUDGES:
    :
    :   Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.
    Plaintiff-Appellee                      :   Hon. William B. Hoffman, J.
    :   Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
    -vs-                                           :
    :   Case No. CT2019-0005
    :
    MONTE SMITH                                    :
    :
    :
    Defendant-Appellant                     :   OPINION
    CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                            Appeal from the Muskingum County
    Court of Common Pleas, Case No.
    CR2018-0507
    JUDGMENT:                                           REVERSED AND REMANDED
    DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                             November 7, 2019
    APPEARANCES:
    For Plaintiff-Appellee:                            For Defendant-Appellant:
    D. MICHAEL HADDOX                                  JAMES A. ANZELMO
    MUSKINGUM CO. PROSECUTOR                           446 Howland Dr.
    TAYLOR P. BENNINGTON                               Gahanna, OH 43230
    27 North Fifth Street, P.O. Box 189
    Zanesville, OH 43702-0189
    Muskingum County, Case No. CT2019-0005
    2
    Delaney, J.
    {¶1} Appellant Monte Smith appeals from the January 2, 2019 Entry of the
    Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas. Appellee is the state of Ohio.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    {¶2} The instant case arose when the Central Ohio Drug Enforcement Task
    Force made a series of controlled buys of methamphetamine and marijuana from
    appellant between April 4 and May 25, 2018, in Muskingum County.
    {¶3} Appellant was charged by indictment with multiple counts of drug trafficking,
    permitting drug abuse, and drug possession. The charges were accompanied by juvenile,
    major drug offender, and forfeiture specifications. On November 5, 2018, appellant
    appeared before the trial court to change his previously-entered pleas of not guilty to ones
    of no contest to the following amended charges: Count I, trafficking in methamphetamine
    pursuant to R.C. 2925.03(A)(1), a felony of the third degree; Count III, trafficking in
    methamphetamine pursuant to R.C. 2025.03(A)(1), a felony of the first degree with a
    major drug offender specification pursuant to R.C. 2941.1410; and Count V, possession
    of marijuana pursuant to R.C. 2925.11(A), a felony of the fifth degree with a forfeiture
    specification.
    {¶4} Sentencing was deferred and a pre-sentence investigation (P.S.I.) was
    ordered.
    {¶5} Appellant appeared for sentencing on December 28, 2018, and the trial
    court imposed an aggregate prison term of fifteen years.
    {¶6} Appellant now appeals from the trial court’s Entry dated January 2, 2019.
    {¶7} Appellant raises five assignments of error:
    Muskingum County, Case No. CT2019-0005
    3
    ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    {¶8} “I.   THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING
    SMITH’S MOTIONS FOR A CONTINUANCE, IN VIOLATION OF SMITH’S DUE
    PROCESS RIGHTS PURSUANT TO THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE
    UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.”
    {¶9} “II. SMITH DID NOT KNOWINGLY, INTELLIGENTLY AND VOLUNTARILY
    ENTER A NO CONTEST PLEA, IN VIOLATION OF HIS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
    UNDER THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES
    CONSTITUTION       AND    SECTION     SIXTEEN,    ARTICLE     ONE        OF   THE   OHIO
    CONSTITUTION.”
    {¶10} “III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ORDERING SMITH TO PAY FINES.”
    {¶11} “IV. SMITH RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, AS
    GUARANTEED        BY   THE    SIXTH   AMENDMENT        TO   THE         UNITED   STATES
    CONSTITUTION AND SECTION 10, ARTICLE I OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.”
    {¶12} “V. THE TRIAL COURT IMPOSED AN EXCESSIVE BAIL ON SMITH, IN
    VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED
    STATES      CONSTITUTION      AND     SECTION    9,   ARTICLE       I   OF    THE   OHIO
    CONSTITUTION.”
    ANALYSIS
    II.
    {¶13} For ease of analysis, we will address appellant’s assignments of error out
    of order.
    Muskingum County, Case No. CT2019-0005
    4
    {¶14} In his second assignment of error, appellant argues that his plea of no
    contest was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered. Appellee concedes
    appellant was not advised appropriately as to the effect of his no-contest plea. For the
    following reasons, we agree and therefore sustain appellant’s second assignment of
    error.
    {¶15} Appellant asserts that he was not adequately informed that a plea of no
    contest is not an admission of guilt but is an admission of the facts contained in the
    indictment. We reviewed a similar argument in State v. Gibson, 5th Dist. Muskingum No.
    CT2017-0094, 
    2018-Ohio-4013
    , appeal not allowed, 
    154 Ohio St.3d 1500
    , 2019-Ohio-
    345, 
    116 N.E.3d 154
    . Crim.R. 11(B) explains the effect of a no-contest plea and provides,
    in relevant part:
    With reference to the offense or offenses to which the plea is
    entered:
    ***
    (2) The plea of no contest is not an admission of defendant's
    guilt, but is an admission of the truth of the facts alleged in the
    indictment, information, or complaint, and the plea or admission shall
    not be used against the defendant in any subsequent civil or criminal
    proceeding.
    {¶16} Pursuant to Crim. R. 11, a trial court must follow distinct procedures in
    accepting a plea, with the procedures varying based upon whether the offense involved
    is a misdemeanor that is a petty offense, a misdemeanor that is a serious offense, or a
    felony. State v. Jones, 
    116 Ohio St.3d 211
    , 
    877 N.E.2d 677
    , 
    2007-Ohio-6093
    , ¶ 11.
    Muskingum County, Case No. CT2019-0005
    5
    Appellant pled no contest to felonies of the first, third, and fifth degrees. Accordingly, the
    trial court was required to follow the procedure set forth in Crim. R. 11(C)(2), which
    provides:
    In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty
    or a plea of no contest, and shall not accept a plea of guilty or no
    contest without first addressing the defendant personally and doing
    all of the following:
    (a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea
    voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charges and of
    the maximum penalty involved, and if applicable, that the defendant
    is not eligible for probation or for the imposition of community control
    sanctions at the sentencing hearing.
    (b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the
    defendant understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no contest,
    and that the court, upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with
    judgment and sentence.
    (c) Informing the defendant and determining that the
    defendant understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving the
    rights to jury trial, to confront witnesses against him or her, to have
    compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in the defendant's favor,
    and to require the state to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a
    reasonable doubt at a trial at which the defendant cannot be
    compelled to testify against himself or herself.
    Muskingum County, Case No. CT2019-0005
    6
    {¶17} Advising the defendant that a guilty plea is a complete admission of guilt,
    along with the other information required by Crim.R. 11, ensures that defendants enter
    pleas with knowledge of rights that they would forgo and creates a record by which
    appellate courts can determine whether pleas are entered voluntarily. State v. Griggs,
    
    103 Ohio St.3d 85
    , 
    2004-Ohio-4415
    , 
    814 N.E.2d 51
    , ¶ 11, citing State v. Nero, 
    56 Ohio St.3d 106
    , 107, 
    564 N.E.2d 474
     (1990) and State v. Ballard, 
    66 Ohio St.2d 473
    , 479–480,
    
    423 N.E.2d 115
     (1981). “Pursuant to Crim. R. 11(C), felony defendants are entitled to be
    informed of various constitutional and non-constitutional rights, prior to entering a plea.”
    Id., ¶ 6. Among the non-constitutional rights, Crim. R. 11(C)(2)(b) requires the trial court
    to inform the defendant of the effect of his guilty or no-contest plea and to determine
    whether he understands that effect. State v. Jones, supra at ¶ 12; Griggs, supra at ¶ 10–
    12.
    {¶18} In the instant case, before accepting appellant's guilty plea, the trial court
    asked whether he understood that he would plead guilty to three separate counts.
    Appellant said he “thought it was no contest.” The trial court asked, “You understand that
    a plea of no contest is probably going to end up today with—with a finding of guilty? Do
    you realize that?” Appellant said yes, but then said he didn’t understand what the trial
    court meant by “guilty” because his plea was “no contest.” T. I, 5-6. We agree with
    appellant that the trial court did not inform him that his no-contest plea was not an
    admission of guilt, but was an admission of the truth of the facts alleged in the indictment.
    Therefore, we must conclude that the requirements of Crim. R. 11(C)(2)(b) were not met.
    Gibson, supra, 
    2018-Ohio-4013
     at ¶ 11.
    Muskingum County, Case No. CT2019-0005
    7
    {¶19} The right to be informed a no contest plea is a not an admission of guilt, but
    is an admission of the truth of the facts alleged in the indictment is non-constitutional;
    therefore, the trial court's failure to inform a defendant of the effect of a no contest plea is
    subject to review under a standard of substantial compliance. Gibson, 
    supra at ¶ 12
    , citing
    Nero, supra, 56 Ohio St.3d at 108. While the failure to adequately inform a defendant of
    his constitutional rights would invalidate a no contest plea under a presumption it was
    entered involuntarily and unknowingly, the failure to substantially comply with non-
    constitutional rights will not invalidate a plea unless the defendant thereby suffered
    prejudice. See, id. The test for prejudice is “whether the plea would have otherwise been
    made.” Id.
    {¶20} Having found that the trial court did not inform appellant of the effect of his
    no contest plea, we further find a trial court is required to substantially comply with all
    three subsections of Crim. R. 11(C)(2). Because the trial court's failure to do so invalidates
    appellant's plea, we need not reach the issue of whether appellant suffered prejudice. Id.
    {¶21} Appellant’s second assignment of error is sustained.                   Appellant's
    convictions and sentence are vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings
    consistent with the law and this opinion. Gibson, 
    supra, at ¶ 15
    .
    I., III., and IV.
    {¶22} In his first assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court should have
    granted his second motion to continue the jury trial.
    {¶23} In his third assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court erred in
    ordering him to pay fines.
    Muskingum County, Case No. CT2019-0005
    8
    {¶24} In his fourth assignment of error, appellant argues he received ineffective
    assistance of counsel because defense trial counsel was “suspended in the middle of
    proceedings”. The record indicates that, after appellant entered his no-contest pleas,
    defense trial counsel filed a motion to continue the sentencing hearing and to withdraw
    from the case, in part because counsel “ha[d] been suspended from the practice of law
    for the next six months and is unable to attend the sentencing hearing.”
    {¶25} These assignments of error are rendered moot by our resolution of
    appellant’s second assignment of error vacating the convictions and sentence, and
    accordingly are overruled.
    V.
    {¶26} In his fifth assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court imposed
    excessive bail.
    {¶27} In general, persons accused of crimes are bailable by sufficient sureties,
    and “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required.” Section 9, Article I, Ohio Constitution. The
    proper remedy for excessive bail is habeas corpus, not appeal from the defendant’s
    conviction.
    {¶28} Habeas corpus is the proper remedy to raise the claim of excessive bail in
    pretrial-release cases. Chari v. Vore, 
    91 Ohio St.3d 323
    , 
    2001-Ohio-49
    , 
    744 N.E.2d 763
    ,
    citing State ex rel. Smirnoff v. Greene, 
    84 Ohio St.3d 165
    , 168, 
    702 N.E.2d 423
     (1998);
    In re DeFronzo, 
    49 Ohio St.2d 271
    , 273, 
    361 N.E.2d 448
     (1977), citing State v. Bevacqua,
    
    147 Ohio St. 20
    , 
    67 N.E.2d 786
     (1946); Bland v. Holden, 
    21 Ohio St.2d 238
    , 
    257 N.E.2d 397
     (1970); Davenport v. Tehan, 
    24 Ohio St.2d 91
    , 
    264 N.E.2d 642
     (1970).
    {¶29} Thus, appellant may not raise this issue on direct appeal.
    Muskingum County, Case No. CT2019-0005
    9
    {¶30} Appellant’s fifth assignment of error is overruled.
    CONCLUSION
    {¶31} Appellant’s second assignment of error is sustained and his remaining
    assignments of error are overruled. Appellant’s no-contest pleas, convictions, and
    sentence are vacated and this matter is remanded to the trial court for further
    proceedings.
    By: Delaney, J.,
    Gwin, P.J. and
    Hoffman, J., concur.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: CT2019-0005

Citation Numbers: 2019 Ohio 4645

Judges: Delaney

Filed Date: 11/7/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/12/2019