Jackson v. Jackson , 2015 Ohio 3825 ( 2015 )


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  • [Cite as Jackson v. Jackson, 2015-Ohio-3825.]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    LAKE COUNTY, OHIO
    BRIAN R. JACKSON,                                :      OPINION
    Plaintiff-Appellant/            :
    Cross-Appellee,                        CASE NOS. 2013-L-035
    :            and 2013-L-037
    - vs -
    :
    ROBIN S. JACKSON,
    :
    Defendant-Appellee/
    Cross-Appellant.                :
    Appeals from the Lake County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division,
    Case No. 07 DR 000384.
    Judgment: Affirmed.
    James R. Skirbunt and Sharon A. Skirbunt, Skirbunt & Skirbunt Co., L.P.A., One
    Cleveland Center, Suite 3150, 1375 East Ninth Street, Cleveland, OH 44114 (For
    Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee).
    Joseph G. Stafford, Stafford Law Co., L.P.A., 55 Erieview Plaza, 5th Floor, Cleveland,
    OH 44115 (For Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant).
    CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J.
    {¶1}     Appellant, Brian R. Jackson, appeals the judgment of the Lake County
    Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, adopting the decision of its
    magistrates on Brian’s motion to modify spousal support and child support. Appellee,
    Robin S. Jackson, cross-appeals the same judgment. The principal issue in this appeal
    is whether the trial court had jurisdiction to modify the court’s prior order of spousal
    support.   This is the second appeal arising out of the Jacksons’ divorce.         For the
    reasons that follow, we affirm.
    {¶2}   The Jacksons were married in 1996, and have one son who was born in
    1998. Brian was an executive with Lincoln Electric. Robin did not work during the
    marriage. Brian filed for divorce in 2007. Trial was held on July 13, 2009; October 9,
    2009; and November 30, 2009, before a magistrate. The parties eventually resolved
    most issues and, at the final hearing on November 30, 2009, they entered an
    agreement regarding the remaining issues involving child support, spousal support, and
    Brian’s bonus and stock options. On that date, Brian’s counsel read the agreement into
    the record.     On May 10, 2010, the trial court journalized the divorce decree
    incorporating the parties’ in-court agreement.
    {¶3}   According to the    agreement, Brian was to continue paying temporary
    spousal support until December 31, 2009. Effective January 1, 2010, he was to pay
    spousal support for 48 months at $4,700 per month. Brian’s retirement plans subject to
    ERISA were to be divided equally by QDROs. His various other retirement benefits,
    including various stock options, were also to be divided equally. Child support was set
    at $1,250 per month, a 38% downward deviation, to which the parties agreed, as their
    son spent half of his time with Brian, who was also the child’s residential parent for
    school purposes.     It was contemplated in the agreement that Brian would retire in
    January 2011. He suffers from a severe vision impairment. The trial court retained
    jurisdiction to modify support.
    {¶4}   The trial court ordered Robin’s counsel to prepare the QDROs regarding
    Brian’s defined benefit plan with Lincoln Electric and his 401(k) plan. He failed to do so.
    2
    Thus, Brian’s counsel prepared proposed QDROs and submitted them to Robin’s
    counsel for approval on June 15, 2010. Robin filed various objections with the trial court
    to the QDROs. On January 5, 2011, the trial court entered two judgments adopting
    Brian’s proposed QDROs.       Robin appealed, and on February 21, 2012, this court
    affirmed the trial court’s judgment in Jackson v. Jackson, 11th Dist. Lake Nos. 2011-L-
    016 and 2011-L-017, 2012-Ohio-662, ¶23, 46.
    {¶5}   On March 5, 2011, Brian retired from Lincoln Electric. A few days later, he
    filed a motion to modify spousal support and child support. Trial was held before two
    magistrates on October 3, 2011; May 30, 2012; and May 31, 2012, on Brian’s motion to
    modify. On August 29, 2012, the magistrates issued an exhaustive, 23-page decision
    ruling on Brian’s motion to modify.     Initially, the magistrates noted the parties had
    stipulated Brian was owed a credit of $39,800 against his support arrearages, and the
    magistrates ordered the Lake County Child Support Enforcement Agency (“CSEA”) to
    adjust its records accordingly. This credit originated from Brian’s bankruptcy, which
    occurred during the divorce proceedings. This was the amount of money Brian paid to
    the bankruptcy trustee to be paid toward his support arrearages as a priority claim.
    {¶6}   The magistrates further concluded that Brian was entitled to a modification
    of both spousal support and child support. They conducted a detailed analysis of the
    reduction in Brian’s income due to his retirement. They concluded his retirement was a
    “triggering event,” allowing for modification of his support obligations. They reduced his
    spousal support obligation from $4,700 per month to $3,300 per month, effective March
    9, 2011. They further reduced it to $1,100 per month, effective January 1, 2012, until
    the end of the 48-month-spousal-support term set forth in the divorce decree. Brian’s
    3
    child-support obligation was also reduced, taking into consideration Brian’s lower
    income and applying the previously-established 38% downward deviation to the
    reduced child-support calculation.
    {¶7}   Both parties filed objections to the magistrates’ decision. By its judgment,
    filed March 29, 2013, after making a detailed analysis of the parties’ objections, the trial
    court adopted the magistrates’ decision. Brian timely filed an appeal, assigning two
    errors, and Robin filed a cross-appeal, assigning seven errors.
    {¶8}   For Brian’s first assigned error, he alleges:
    {¶9}   “The trial court erred when it did not specifically order Lake County CSEA
    to credit [Brian] with $39,800.00 [Robin] received from the Bankruptcy Trustee in
    satisfaction of [Robin’s] priority bankruptcy claim for support.”
    {¶10} A trial court’s decision to adopt, reject, or modify a magistrate’s decision is
    reviewed for an abuse of discretion. In re Gochneaur, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2007-A-
    0089, 2008-Ohio-3987, ¶16. This court has stated that the term “abuse of discretion” is
    one of art, connoting judgment exercised by a court, which does not comport with
    reason or the record. Gaul v. Gaul, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2009-A-0011, 2010-Ohio-
    2156, ¶24.
    {¶11} Brian argues the trial court erred in not ordering CSEA to credit him with
    the $39,800 Robin received from the bankruptcy trustee in satisfaction of Brian’s
    support arrearages. However, the magistrates and, by adoption of the magistrates’
    decision, the trial court decided that Brian was to receive a credit in this amount against
    his support arrearages and ordered CSEA to adjust its records accordingly. In fact,
    Brian concedes that by adopting the magistrates’ decision, the trial court ordered CSEA
    4
    to credit him with $39,800. The trial court ordered CSEA to make an adjustment in its
    calculation of the support arrearages; prepare an account summary; and submit it to the
    parties and their counsel.    Thus, contrary to Brian’s argument, there is no realistic
    concern he will have to pay this amount twice if the court does not enter another order
    repeating the court’s original order that CSEA adjust its records to give him credit for
    this amount.
    {¶12} Since the trial court adopted the magistrates’ decision, which includes the
    order Brian seeks, he has failed to demonstrate an abuse its discretion by the trial court.
    {¶13} Brian’s first assignment of error is overruled.
    {¶14} For his second assignment of error, Brian alleges:
    {¶15} “The trial court erred by including stock option proceeds as income
    attributable to [Brian] when those stock options were property of [Robin], who received
    the proceeds from exercise of the options.”
    {¶16} Brian argues the trial court abused its discretion by including the proceeds
    he realized from his exercise of Lincoln Electric stock options in 2011 in his 2011 gross
    income for support purposes because he turned over the proceeds, i.e., $56,137, to
    Robin. He asks that the proceeds be allocated to Robin’s income, rather than to his.
    {¶17} Brian argues the proceeds from his exercise of these stock options
    constituted “nonrecurring” income and thus were not includable as part of his gross
    income for support purposes. “Nonrecurring * * * income * * *’ means an income * * *
    item the parent receives in any year or for any number of years not to exceed three
    years that the parent does not expect to continue to receive on a regular basis.” R.C.
    5
    3119.01(C)(8). Such income is not part of gross income for support purposes. R.C.
    3119.01(C)(7)(e).
    {¶18} In support of its finding that these proceeds were part of Brian’s gross
    income, the trial court noted that the stock options accrued to Brian over the years and
    were exercised by him in multiple years prior to 2011. Moreover, Brian exercised other
    stock options in 2012. Thus, Brian received such income in more than three years.
    {¶19} In these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
    adopting the magistrates’ decision to include the proceeds realized by Brian from his
    2011 exercise of stock options in his 2011 gross income.
    {¶20} Brian’s second assignment of error is overruled.
    {¶21} As noted above, for her cross-appeal, Robin asserts seven assignments
    of error. She consolidates her first three assignments of error for argument and, thus,
    we shall review them together. They allege:
    {¶22} “[1.] The trial court erred and/or abused its discretion in its analysis
    relating to spousal support, in finding the court had jurisdiction to modify the spousal
    support, and its modification of spousal support.
    {¶23} “[2.] The trial court erred and/or abused its discretion in its analysis
    relating to the circumstances known at the time of the divorce, the circumstances in
    regard to the parties’ settlement, and its analysis of Mandelbaum v. Mandelbaum, 
    121 Ohio St. 3d 433
    (2009), and Ohio case law in regard to a voluntary retirement, especially
    one that was contemplated at the time of the prior support order.
    {¶24} “[3.] The trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by denying [Robin’s]
    motion to dismiss.”
    6
    {¶25} Robin argues the trial court did not have jurisdiction to modify the
    provision in the parties’ in-court agreement that Brian would pay her $4,700 per month
    for four years in spousal support, effective January 1, 2010. As grounds, she argues
    that Brian failed to prove the second element of the Mandelbaum test because the
    parties contemplated Brian’s retirement at the time they entered their agreement.
    {¶26} The Supreme Court of Ohio in 
    Mandelbaum, supra
    , held:
    {¶27}   A trial court lacks jurisdiction to modify a prior order of spousal
    support unless the decree of the court expressly reserved
    jurisdiction to make the modification and unless the court finds (1)
    that a substantial change in circumstances has occurred and (2)
    that the change was not contemplated at the time of the original
    decree. (Emphasis added.) Mandelbaum at second paragraph of
    the syllabus.
    {¶28} The term “contemplated” in the Mandelbaum test has been defined to
    mean that the matter was “taken into account” by the parties or the court in resolving an
    issue.    Piliero v. Piliero, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 10AP-1142, 2012-Ohio-1153, ¶18.
    Here, Brian’s retirement was contemplated by the parties in reaching their settlement
    agreement because the agreement itself provided it was anticipated Brian would retire
    in one year, i.e., in January 2011. Thus, the parties clearly took Brian’s retirement into
    account in settling the spousal support issue.
    {¶29} However, while Brian’s retirement was obviously contemplated by the
    parties, the trial court found that Brian’s retirement income was not taken into account
    because that income was not fully determinable at the time of their separation
    7
    agreement.    In support, the court noted that Brian’s retirement income included a
    Supplemental Executive Retirement Plan (“SERP”) payment, which was available to
    some Lincoln Electric executives on retirement, but which was discretionary and not
    guaranteed as of the time of the parties’ agreement. Also, Brian’s retirement income
    included a substantial social security disability payment of which he was unaware at the
    time of the agreement.
    {¶30} The trial court’s finding that Brian’s retirement income was not
    contemplated by the parties is supported by 
    Piliero, supra
    , in which the Tenth District
    stated:
    {¶31} Although both the trial court and the parties may have been aware
    of appellant’s probable future cost-of-living raises and anticipated
    the eventual termination of child support, neither the trial court nor
    the parties “contemplated,” or took into account, these factors in
    fashioning the spousal support award in the original decree
    because the extent of change over a significant period of time is not
    ascertainable. Instead, the trial court chose to retain jurisdiction to
    reconsider and modify, if necessary, the spousal support amount as
    these   circumstances     presented    themselves     in   the   future.
    (Emphasis added.) 
    Id. at ¶18.
    {¶32} In Piliero, the Tenth District stated that even if a divorce decree identifies a
    specific change of circumstances, such as a party’s bankruptcy, loss of job, poor health,
    or the termination of child support, the consequences of such change will allow for a
    8
    modification of spousal support if such consequences were not ascertainable at the time
    of the original decree. 
    Id. at ¶9-10,
    12.
    {¶33} While Brian may not have been aware of the exact value of his retirement
    income when he entered the agreement, Lincoln Electric informed him of his retirement
    benefits and their estimated value two years before the agreement. Moreover, he was
    aware of his vision problems before he entered the agreement, and they have
    apparently not worsened since that time. It therefore appears that the parties also took
    Brian’s retirement income into account in reaching their settlement agreement.
    {¶34} However, our standard of review regarding whether Brian’s retirement
    income was contemplated is limited. In 
    Piliero, supra
    , the Tenth District stated that
    “review of such a determination as to whether something was contemplated at the time
    of divorce would be subject to an abuse of discretion standard.” 
    Id. at ¶19,
    citing Hines
    v. Hines, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-10-15, 2010-Ohio-4807, ¶18, and Ballas v. Ballas, 7th
    Dist. Mahoning No. 08 MA 166, 2009-Ohio-4965, ¶44.
    {¶35} Thus, while the trial court’s finding that Brian’s retirement income was not
    contemplated is subject to debate, since the trial court, in adopting the magistrates’
    decision, provided reasons for this finding, which are supported by the record, our
    standard of review does not warrant reversal of the modification of spousal support.
    {¶36} Robin also argues that Brian was not entitled to a modification of spousal
    support because he voluntarily retired early to defeat his spousal support obligation.
    However, we agree with the trial court’s finding that this argument is defeated by the
    determination of the Social Security Administration following Brian’s retirement that he is
    disabled. Further, Robin knew about Brian’s planned retirement when the settlement
    9
    and divorce decree were entered, and Brian retired after a lengthy career at Lincoln
    Electric at a point when his retirement benefits were available to him. Allan v. Allan, 6th
    Dist. Sandusky Nos. S-12-017 and S-12-023, 2013-Ohio-1475, ¶20. Moreover, there is
    no evidence in the record that Brian retired simply to defeat his spousal-support
    obligation. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting this argument.
    {¶37} We therefore hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in adopting the
    magistrates’ decision finding Brian was entitled to a modification of spousal support.
    {¶38} Robin’s first, second, and third assignments of error are overruled.
    {¶39} For her fourth assignment of error, Robin alleges:
    {¶40} “The trial court erred and/or abused its discretion in the factual finding
    relating to the parties’ incomes and circumstances, and in regard to the retirement
    benefits.”
    {¶41} Robin argues the magistrates and the trial court erred in adding to her
    income for purposes of calculating child and spousal support her half of Brian’s various
    retirement benefits, which, she argued, she has not received. Aside from those funds
    subject to the two QDROs, Brian has various other retirement benefits from Lincoln
    Electric that are non-qualified.    According to the parties’ in-court agreement, all of
    Brian’s retirement benefits were to be divided equally between the parties.
    {¶42} Robin argues that, because Brian has failed to pay her one-half of his
    retirement benefits as ordered, the magistrates and the trial court should not have
    imputed the income from her half of these benefits to her, but, instead, should have
    imputed it to Brian to recalculate spousal support and child support.           However, in
    determining spousal support, the trial court is required to consider the income of the
    10
    parties from all sources, including income derived from property awarded in a property
    division. R.C. 3105.18. Robin was awarded one-half of Brian’s retirement assets as
    part of her property division in the divorce decree. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its
    discretion in adopting the magistrates’ decision imputing this income to Robin.
    {¶43} Further, in the trial court’s March 29, 2013 judgment, the court found the
    magistrates’ calculations as to what Brain was paid and what he actually paid to Robin
    are accurate. However, the court found that Brian failed to follow the court’s orders as
    to payouts owed to Robin from annual bonuses, the SERP plan, and spousal support.
    The trial court found:
    {¶44} Pursuant to CSEA’s audit, the total child support and spousal
    support arrearage [Brian] owes [Robin] as of February 28, 2013 is
    the sum of $172,906.34, exclusive of processing fees. Frankly, the
    arrearage due [Robin] at the time of trial is shocking, along with
    [Brian’s] unilateral decision-making after his retirement in parceling
    out what he determined was due [Robin] as and for property
    division in the decree of divorce filed May 10, 2010.
    {¶45} As a result, the trial court, in adopting the magistrates’ decision, entered
    an order requiring Brian to pay his enormous arrearages at a set rate.            Thus, the
    retirement benefits owed to Robin will be paid to her. For this additional reason, Robin
    has not demonstrated the trial court abused its discretion in adopting the magistrates’
    decision regarding Brian’s retirement benefits.
    {¶46} Robin also argues the trial court erred in not attributing the social security
    benefits paid to the Jacksons’ son due to Brian’s disability to Brian’s income for child
    11
    support purposes. However, contrary to Robin’s argument, the magistrates’ decision,
    approved by the trial court, does, in fact, include the derivative social security benefits
    received by the parties’ son as part of Brian’s income for child support purposes.
    {¶47} Robin’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.
    {¶48} For her fifth assigned error, Robin contends:
    {¶49} “The trial court erred and/or abused its discretion in regard to the
    determination and calculation of child support, and the tax dependency exemptions.”
    {¶50} Robin argues the magistrates and, by adoption of their decision, the trial
    court abused their discretion in applying a downward deviation in calculating Brian’s
    child support because the parties never agreed to a downward deviation based on
    extended parenting time.
    {¶51} R.C. 3119.22 mandates that when a deviation in the amount of child
    support is ordered, the trial court must make “findings of fact supporting that
    determination.” R.C. 3119.23 sets forth factors a trial court may consider when granting
    such a deviation. These include “[e]xtended parenting time.” R.C. 3119.23(D). In this
    case, by agreement of the parties, Brian was granted a downward deviation of 38% in
    the divorce decree filed on May 10, 2010.        This was due to the fact that the couple’s
    son lives with Brian half of the time. In support of this downward deviation, in the
    divorce decree, the parties referenced an exhibit attached to the decree entitled, “Child
    Support Deviation Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.” Item four of this document
    sets forth the reason for the deviation in this case as “extended parenting time.” Thus,
    contrary to Robin’s argument, the parties entered an agreement with respect to the 38%
    downward deviation in the amount of child support based on extended parenting time.
    12
    {¶52} Because the parties in fact agreed to the downward deviation due to
    extended parenting time and the trial court found there was no evidence presented that
    the child’s parenting time schedule with Brian had changed since the 2010 divorce
    decree, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the downward deviation
    would continue as originally ordered.
    {¶53} Regarding Robin’s claim to the tax dependency exemption, Robin makes
    no argument in her brief, and cites neither the record nor any authority in support.
    Thus, we do not consider this issue, pursuant to App.R. 16(A)(7).            Hammond v.
    Cleveland, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97174, 2012-Ohio-494, ¶24. In any event, the trial
    court found no evidence was presented to the magistrates regarding the allocation of
    the tax exemption. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Robin’s
    objection to the magistrates’ decision regarding the tax exemption.
    {¶54} Robin’s fifth assignment of error is overruled.
    {¶55} For her sixth assignment of error, Robin alleges:
    {¶56} “The trial court erred and/or abused its discretion in various evidentiary
    issues, to the prejudice of [Robin].”
    {¶57} We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion.
    State v. Golding, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2008-L-049, 2009-Ohio-1437, ¶21; Dzina v. Dzina,
    8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 90936, etc., 2009-Ohio-136, ¶54.
    {¶58} First, Robin argues that the magistrates improperly excluded certain
    records from Lincoln Electric in evidence, which she had received prior to the November
    2009 in-court settlement and the May 10, 2010 divorce decree.           Robin argued the
    documents would show Brian was aware of his retirement benefits prior to the divorce,
    13
    but she did not explain how these documents would support her argument.            The
    magistrates concluded the documents at issue were not relevant to the issues before
    them. The magistrates found these documents could not be used to show Brian’s
    knowledge of his benefits prior to the divorce decree because there were no records in
    evidence to which the proffered documents could be compared to show Brian’s prior
    knowledge. The trial court found the proffered documents were immaterial based on
    the transcript of the original proceeding.
    {¶59} Second, Robin argues the trial court abused its discretion regarding
    certain e-mails between the parties concerning the exercise of stock options because
    Brian’s counsel failed to offer them in evidence despite his agreement to do so. Robin
    does not explain how opposing counsel’s inaction could equate to an abuse of
    discretion by the trial court. Nor does she explain how her own failure to offer these
    exhibits in evidence, which were in her possession, could evidence an abuse of
    discretion by the trial court. In any event, Robin does not explain why these documents
    were material or how their absence prejudiced her. Moreover, the court found the e-
    mails were irrelevant because they did not address any disputed issues.
    {¶60} Third, Robin challenges the magistrates’ decision not to admit certain
    other documents, which Robin had requested from Brian in discovery, but which he
    never produced. However, Robin’s attorney did not file a motion to compel discovery
    pursuant to Civ.R. 37. For this reason, the magistrates refused to allow the documents
    into evidence. “The party seeking discovery must take ‘affirmative action’ by filing a
    motion to compel discovery. Staff Notes to Civ.R. 37.” Kurtz Bros. v. Ace Demo, Inc.,
    14
    11th Dist. Portage No. 2014-P-0027, 2014-Ohio-5184, ¶60. Thus, Robin failed to
    properly raise this issue by filing a motion to compel.
    {¶61} In light of the forgoing analysis, we hold the trial court did not abuse its
    discretion in adopting the magistrates’ decision regarding these evidentiary rulings.
    {¶62} Robin’s sixth assignment of error is overruled.
    {¶63} For Robin’s seventh and final assignment of error, she contends:
    {¶64} “The trial court’s decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence.”
    {¶65} Robin argues that the errors and abuses of discretion recounted in her first
    six assigned errors render the trial court’s judgment against the manifest weight of the
    evidence.
    {¶66} In C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Constr. Co., 
    54 Ohio St. 2d 279
    , the Supreme
    Court of Ohio held: “Judgments supported by some competent, credible evidence going
    to all the essential elements of the case will not be reversed by a reviewing court as
    being against the manifest weight of the evidence.” 
    Id. at syllabus.
    An appellate court
    should not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court when there exists competent
    and credible evidence supporting the findings of fact and conclusions of law rendered
    by the trial judge. Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 
    10 Ohio St. 3d 77
    , 80 (1984). In
    determining whether the trial court’s judgment is against the manifest weight of the
    evidence in civil cases, a court of appeals must be guided by a presumption that the
    findings of the trier-of-fact were correct. 
    Id. {¶67} Applying
    this highly-deferential standard, we cannot find the trial court’s
    judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence. We agree with the trial court’s
    finding that Robin’s manifest-weight objections were broad and ambiguous and failed to
    15
    provide any specific ground in support. Further, the magistrates painstakingly reviewed
    the complex legal and financial issues involved, and the trial court gave a thorough
    review to the parties’ objections to the magistrates’ decision.
    {¶68} Robin’s seventh assignment of error is overruled.
    {¶69} For the reasons stated in this opinion, the assignments of error and cross-
    assignments of error lack merit and are overruled. It is the order and judgment of this
    court that the judgment of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic
    Relations Division, is affirmed.
    THOMAS R. WRIGHT, J., concurs,
    COLLEEN MARY O’TOOLE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with a
    Concurring/Dissenting Opinion.
    _____________________
    COLLEEN MARY O’TOOLE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with a
    Concurring/Dissenting Opinion.
    {¶70} I concur with the majority’s well-reasoned disposition of Robin’s
    assignments of error. However, finding merit in Brian’s assignments of error, I would
    reverse and remand on those.
    {¶71} By his first assignment of error, Brian objects to the trial court’s failure to
    order the Lake County CSEA to credit him specifically with the money he paid to his
    bankruptcy trustee for support purposes.           The majority notes the magistrates
    recognized the parties stipulated to this, and ordered the CSEA to adjust its records,
    and that in adopting the magistrates’ decision, the trial court adopted this finding as well,
    16
    and ordered the CSEA to adjust its account, and submit the account to the parties’
    counsel. However, it is impossible to tell from the record before us whether this has
    occurred. I would remand, with instructions that the trial court specifically order the
    CSEA to adjust its account, and verify that the adjustment has been made.
    {¶72} By his second assignment of error, Brian contends the trial court
    improperly included the exercise of certain stock options in his gross income for support
    purposes, since they were “nonrecurring income.” The majority notes Brian exercised
    these options in more than three years, and concludes this removed the options from
    the definition of nonrecurring income under R.C. 3119.01(C)(8). However, nothing in
    the record contradicts Brian’s testimony that Robin received the monies from her half of
    the 2011 options he exercised on her behalf. She should not receive a windfall from
    double counting. I would remand for the trial court to determine the value of any stock
    options exercised by Brian on Robin’s behalf, and adjust the parties’ incomes
    accordingly.
    {¶73} I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.
    17
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2013-L-035, 2013-L-037

Citation Numbers: 2015 Ohio 3825

Judges: Rice

Filed Date: 9/21/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021