Freels v. Powers-Freels , 2015 Ohio 3915 ( 2015 )

[Cite as Freels v. Powers-Freels, 2015-Ohio-3915.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
CLARK COUNTY
JASON R. FREELS :
:
Plaintiff-Appellee : C.A. CASE NO. 2015-CA-9
:
v. : T.C. NO. 14DR112
:
PAULA C. POWERS-FREELS : (Civil Appeal from Common Pleas
: Court, Division of Domestic Relations)
Defendant-Appellant :
:
:
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OPINION
Rendered on the ___25th___ day of ____September____, 2015.
...........
MICHAEL A. HOCHWALT, Atty. Reg. No. 0017688, 500 Lincoln Park Blvd., Suite 216,
Dayton, Ohio 45429
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
CRAIG M. SAMS, Atty. Reg. No. 0089716, 130 W. Second Street, Suite 840, Dayton,
Ohio 45402
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
.............
FROELICH, P.J.
{¶ 1} Paula Powers-Freels appeals from a judgment of the Clark County Court of
Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, which denied her motion to dismiss a
complaint for divorce filed by her husband, Jason Freels. The motion had asserted that
Freels was not a resident of Ohio, and thus that the court lacked jurisdiction to entertain
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his complaint for divorce.
{¶ 2} For the following reasons, the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.
{¶ 3} Freels filed a complaint for divorce in Clark County, Ohio in February 2014.
At that time, Freels was on active duty in the United States Air Force, stationed in
Maryland, and did not live in Ohio; Powers-Freels lived in the Netherlands. Powers-
Freels filed an answer in which, among other things, she stated that the complaint did
“not meet the requirements under 3105.01 [sic] of the Ohio Revised Code.” In August
2014, Freels filed an amended complaint with leave of the court. The amended
complaint differed from the original complaint only in the correction of one typographical
error. In October 2014, Powers-Freels filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on
jurisdictional grounds, because “the parties do not meet the minimum residency
requirements of R.C. 3105.03.”
{¶ 4} A hearing was held on November 4, 2014. Powers-Freels was not present
at the hearing, but she was represented by counsel; Powers-Freels’s attorney stated that
she lived in the Netherlands and did not have the resources to attend. Freels was the
only witness to testify with respect to the motion to dismiss. After hearing the evidence,
the trial court overruled the motion to dismiss from the bench. The hearing continued
that same day to address issues related to the divorce. The decree of divorce was
entered in November 2014. A judgment entry overruling the motion to dismiss was filed
on January 29, 2015.
{¶ 5} Powers-Freels appeals from the trial court’s denial of her motion to dismiss,
raising one assignment of error.
The trial court erred in denying Appellant’s motion to dismiss for lack
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of jurisdiction over the divorce.
{¶ 6} The grounds and procedures for obtaining a divorce in Ohio are purely
statutory. “Divorce is a creature of state statute, and the power of the General Assembly
over the entire subject of marriage, as a civil status, and its dissolution, is unlimited except
as restricted by the state and federal constitutions.” Barth v. Barth, 113 Ohio St. 3d 27,
2007-Ohio-973, 862 N.E.2d 496, ¶ 9, citing Coleman v. Coleman, 32 Ohio St. 2d 155, 159,
291 N.E.2d 530 (1972).
{¶ 7} R.C. 3105.03 provides, in pertinent part, that the plaintiff in an action for
divorce “shall have been a resident of the state at least six months immediately before
filing the complaint.” The Supreme Court of Ohio has stated that the word “resident” in
R.C. 3105.03 “means one who possesses a domiciliary residence, a residence
accompanied by an intention to make the state of Ohio a permanent home.” (Emphasis
sic.) Barth at ¶ 12, citing Coleman; Glassman v. Glassman, 75 Ohio App. 47, 51, 60
N.E.2d 716 (1st Dist.1944). This court has similarly held that the word “residence”
means “domiciliary residence,” a concept which has two components: (1) an actual
residence in the jurisdiction, and (2) an intention to make the state of jurisdiction a
permanent home. (Citations omitted.) Hager v. Hager, 79 Ohio App. 3d 239, 244, 607
N.E.2d 63 (2d Dist.1992).
{¶ 8} “ ‘Domicile’ ordinarily has a broader meaning than residence. Domicile
conveys a fixed, permanent home. It is the place to which one intends to return and from
which one has no present purpose to depart. * * * Domicile has been described as the
relationship which the law creates between an individual and a particular locality. A
party’s domicile generally coincides with his place of residence. However, while an
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individual may have several residences, he can be domiciled in only one place at a given
time.” (Citations omitted.) Id.; McMaken v. McMaken, 96 Ohio App. 3d 402, 404-405,
645 N.E.2d 113 (2d Dist.1994).
{¶ 9} The burden of proving domiciliary residence rests upon the plaintiff, and the
plaintiff must prove it by a preponderance of the evidence. Hager at 244; McMaken at
405. The fact of residence in a location is prima facie evidence of domicile there, but is
rebuttable by proof to the contrary. McMaken at 405, citing 36 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d,
Domicile, Section 19 (1982). However, an intention to make a permanent home is known
only by the individual concerned and is, therefore, largely a subjective determination. Id.,
citing Coleman.
{¶ 10} Every person must have a domicile somewhere, and that domicile is not lost
until a new one is acquired. Holtz v. Holtz, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2005-CA-43, 2006-Ohio-
1812, ¶ 18, citing E. Cleveland v. Landingham, 97 Ohio App. 3d 385, 390, 646 N.E.2d 897
(8th Dist.1994). “A person abandons his old domicile and acquires a new one only when
he chooses a new domicile, establishes an actual residence in the chosen domicile, and
demonstrates a clear intent that the new domicile become his primary and permanent
residence.” Id. In a divorce action, a plaintiff’s domicile is a question of intent and the
plaintiff’s representation will be accepted unless facts and circumstances indicate that his
or her claimed intent cannot be accepted as true. Holtz at ¶ 19, citing Polakova v. Polak,
107 Ohio App. 3d 745, 748, 669 N.E.2d 498 (1st Dist.1995).
{¶ 11} In the case of a military service member, his or her domicile remains as it
was prior to enlistment throughout the course of military service, unless a new domicile
is voluntarily selected. Holtz at ¶ 18-20, citing Heiney v. Heiney, 157 Ohio App. 3d 775,
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777, 813 N.E.2d 738 (6th Dist.2004). “Every person must have a domicile somewhere,
and that domicile is not lost until a new one is acquired. A person abandons his old
domicile and acquires a new one only when he chooses a new domicile, establishes an
actual residence in the chosen domicile, and demonstrates a clear intent that the new
domicile become his primary and permanent residence.” (Internal citations omitted.) Id.
at ¶ 18.
{¶ 12} The domiciliary residence of a person in the military is a question of intent.
Id., citing Spires v. Spires, 7 Ohio Misc. 197, 201, 214 N.E.2d 691 (Meigs C.P.1966). A
military person’s actual residence does not operate to change his pre-enlistment
domiciliary residence, because his actual residence is not the result of his own volition.
Id.; Prudential Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co. v. Koby, 124 Ohio App. 3d 174, 705 N.E.2d 748
(11th Dist.1997). “A military person’s designation of a state other than Ohio as his or her
domiciliary residence on a military form required for tax purposes is not determinative of
that person’s true intent to make or keep Ohio as his or her domiciliary residence.” Holtz
at ¶ 20, citing Hager, 79 Ohio App. 3d 239, 244-245, 607 N.E.2d 63.
{¶ 13} A trial court’s decision as to whether it has jurisdiction is a legal
determination, which is reviewed on appeal de novo; its weighing of the evidence as to a
party’s intent to establish a domiciliary residence in the state is a factual question, which
we review for an abuse of discretion.
{¶ 14} Freels testified at the hearing that his address was a specific location in New
Carlisle, Ohio, and that New Carlisle had been his home for his “entire life,” but he was
currently on active duty in the U.S. Air Force and was then stationed in Maryland. Freels
and Powers-Freels had married in 2004 and had moved numerous times during the
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marriage. They had lived in Arizona, England, Florida, Texas, Louisiana, Saudi Arabia,
the Netherlands, and Turkey. They were separated by the time Freels was assigned to
Maryland, so Powers-Freels had never lived there with Freels. At no time during their
marriage or during Freels’s active duty had he lived in Ohio.
{¶ 15} Freels testified that he grew up in New Carlisle, Ohio, and considered it his
“home.” He spent his entire life in New Carlisle prior to joining the Air Force, and he
enlisted in Ohio. At the time of the hearing, he had a bank account and was a member
of a church in New Carlisle, and he received mail at his New Carlisle address. Freels
stated that, unless he were promoted to Lieutenant Colonel, he would soon be required
to retire with 20 years of active service; he was beginning to plan for that eventuality, and
he planned to return to New Carlisle, where his parents and many family members and
friends still live. Freels had no plans to stay in Maryland, because he had no ties there,
it was significantly more expensive than Ohio, and the taxes were higher as well. He
usually spends his leaves in New Carlisle, Ohio, and had been to Ohio on leave three
times in 2014.
{¶ 16} Freels acknowledged that his December 2012 Defense and Accounting
Service Military Leave and Earning Statement listed Arizona as his residence. He stated
that he was actually stationed in Turkey at that time, but that active duty servicemen can
list any state as their residence, and he had listed Arizona “for financial purposes”
because Arizona did not require active duty members of the military to pay income tax.
By the time this form was filed, Freels had not lived in Arizona since 2004. Freels’s
January 2014 Leave and Earning Statement listed Ohio as his state of residence.
{¶ 17} On cross examination, Freels acknowledged that his most recent driver’s
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license, an Ohio license, had been issued in February 2014, only two weeks before the
filing of his first complaint. He testified, however, that the issuance of his Ohio license
had been treated as “a renewal,” because the “DMV” had been able to access the record
of his prior Ohio license. He had Arizona and Ohio licenses in the intervening years.
Freels also stated that, before being assigned to Maryland, he had not lived stateside
since 2008. He had been registered to vote in Arizona until recently, when he switched
his voter registration to Ohio; he did not state when he had last voted in Arizona, if ever.
Freels testified that his recruiter’s office was in Dayton and that he took his military
physical and entrance test in Columbus. Freels also testified that, when he lived in
Arizona from 2000 until 2003, while he was attending Arizona State University, he
considered Arizona to be his domicile, but that when he subsequently went to England,
he again considered Ohio his home.
{¶ 18} Based on this evidence, the trial court made the following finding:
* * * In this case, the only evidence presented to the Court, and in my opinion
it was credible evidence, suggests that Mr. Freels has considered the State
of Ohio, and in particular Clark County, Ohio to be his domiciliary residence
other than for a brief period of time in the early 2000s concerning the State
of Arizona. His intent is [of] foremost importance in the case, not where he
physically lands. It doesn’t matter that he is physically living here; it’s
understandable that he is not because he is serving this country pursuant
to orders and is stationed elsewhere. That is why the law is set up the way
it is. * * *
The court also noted that Freels’s amended complaint, filed in August 2014, states that
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Freels had been a resident of Ohio for the previous six months, and the court found this
assertion to be credible. Accordingly, the court overruled Powers-Freels’s motion to
dismiss.
{¶ 19} The determination of the residence of a military service member may
involve different considerations than non-military individuals. As noted above, an “actual
residence” is generally one component of a “domiciliary residence,” and we have held
that the “domiciliary residence of a person in the military is simply a question of intent,”
and that a military person’s current physical residence does not operate to change his
pre-enlistment domiciliary residence. Holtz at ¶ 20. These holdings and other cases
involving active-duty military service members recognize that the actual physical
residence of a military serviceperson does not necessarily align with his or her domiciliary
residence for jurisdictional purposes.
{¶ 20} Freels’s testimony about his intent to remain domiciled in Clark County
throughout most of his years of military service was largely undisputed. Freels was
unequivocal that he had considered New Carlisle to be his home, except for a period prior
to 2004 when he had been in school in Arizona. Prior to his most recent assignment to
Maryland, Freels had not lived stateside since 2008. Powers-Freels’s attorney elicited
testimony from Freels about having alternated between Ohio and Arizona driver’s
licenses between 2000 and early 2014, at which time he changed his driver’s license from
Arizona to Ohio. This evidence was probative, but it did not compel the conclusion that
Freels intended to be domiciled in Arizona, considering his lengthy deployments overseas
during this period. Based on the evidence presented, particularly with respect to Freels’s
intent and his long-term and ongoing connections to Clark County, the trial court did not
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abuse its discretion in concluding that Freels was a resident of Ohio under R.C. 3105.03
at the time of the filing of his complaint, and it did not err in finding that the court had
jurisdiction to entertain his complaint for divorce.
{¶ 21} Powers-Freels argues that the amended complaint, filed six months after
Freels’s initial complaint, did not cure any jurisdictional problem with the initial complaint.
In light of our conclusion that the trial court did not err in finding that Freels was domiciled
in Ohio at the time of the original complaint, we need not address this issue. The trial
court found that “Mr. Freels ha[d] considered the State of Ohio, and in particular Clark
County, Ohio, to be his domiciliary residence other than for a brief period of time in the
early 2000s * * *,” and that Freels’s intent, not his physical presence, was determinative.
The evidence did not suggest that there had been any change in Freels’s intent to make
Ohio his home between the filing of the original complaint and the filing of the amended
complaint.
{¶ 22} The assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 23} The judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.
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DONOVAN, J. and WELBAUM, J., concur.
Copies mailed to:
Michael A. Hochwalt
Craig M. Sams
Hon. Thomas J. Capper