State v. Carnes , 2015 Ohio 4429 ( 2015 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Carnes, 
    2015-Ohio-4429
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    TRUMBULL COUNTY, OHIO
    STATE OF OHIO,                                  :         OPINION
    Plaintiff-Appellee,            :
    CASE NO. 2014-T-0120
    - vs -                                  :
    MARK E. CARNES,                                 :
    Defendant-Appellant.           :
    Criminal Appeal from the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas.
    Case No. 2014 CR 00395.
    Judgment: Affirmed.
    Dennis Watkins, Trumbull County Prosecutor, and LuWayne Annos, Assistant
    Prosecutor, Administration Building, Fourth Floor, 160 High Street, N.W., Warren, OH
    44481-1092 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
    Michael A. Partlow, 112 South Water Street, Suite C, Kent, OH 44240 (For Defendant-
    Appellant).
    TIMOTHY P. CANNON, P.J.
    {¶1}     Appellant, Mark E. Carnes, appeals the sentence of the Trumbull County
    Court of Common Pleas following his guilty plea to 21 felony sex offenses. At issue is
    whether the trial court committed plain error in imposing consecutive sentences. For
    the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court’s decision.
    {¶2}     On May 16, 2014, appellant was indicted by appellee, the state of Ohio,
    on five counts of rape, felonies of the first degree, in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2) and
    (B); five counts of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, felonies of the third degree, in
    violation of R.C. 2907.04(A) and (B)(3); five counts of compelling prostitution, felonies of
    the third degree, in violation of R.C. 2907.21(A)(2)(a) and (C); and eleven counts of
    illegal use of a minor in nudity-oriented material or performance, felonies of the second
    degree, in violation of R.C. 2907.323(A)(1) and (B). Specifically, the indictments stated
    that appellant had engaged in this conduct with two female minors from 2009 through
    2014. In 2009, the victims were 11 and 13 years old. Appellant entered a plea of not
    guilty to all charges in the indictment.
    {¶3}   A change of plea hearing was held on October 2, 2014. At the hearing,
    the trial court advised appellant of the following:
    Mr. Carnes, you understand also that all of the counts that you’ve
    been charged with, they can be ordered, at sentencing, to be
    served concurrently, which means you serve them all at one time,
    or they could be ordered to be served consecutively, some of them,
    whatever the Court would deem appropriate, could stack them on
    top of each other, which could result in a rather lengthy sentence. *
    * * The potential for you, if the court were to add all the charges on
    top of each other that you pled to, could result in a 128-year
    sentence; do you understand that?
    {¶4}   Appellant affirmed he understood, and no objection was raised at that
    time. He then signed a written plea of guilty to five counts of unlawful sexual conduct
    with a minor, five counts of compelling prostitution, and eleven counts of illegal use of a
    minor in nudity-oriented material or performance.        The written plea contained the
    following language: “The underlying agreement upon which this plea is based is as
    follows: * * * The State will recommend a prison term that will include consecutive
    sentence time.” The trial court accepted the plea on October 3, 2014, and a nolle
    2
    prosequi was entered on the remaining five counts of rape. The trial court deferred
    sentencing and ordered a presentence investigation report.
    {¶5}   Appellee filed a “sentencing memorandum: motion for consecutive
    sentences” on October 18, 2014, to which appellant did not file a response.         On
    November 13, 2014, the trial court held a sentencing hearing.         Pursuant to the
    November 20, 2014 sentencing entry, the trial court found the five counts of unlawful
    sexual conduct with a minor were subject to merge with the five counts of compelling
    prostitution, respectively, as they were allied offenses of similar import.   Appellee
    elected to sentence on the five counts of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor.
    Appellant was sentenced to 60 months imprisonment for each count of unlawful sexual
    conduct with a minor, to be served consecutively to each other. Appellant was also
    sentenced to eight years imprisonment for each of the eleven counts of illegal use of a
    minor in nudity-oriented material or performance, to be served concurrently with each
    other but consecutively to the sentences for unlawful sexual conduct with a minor. This
    resulted in an aggregate prison term of 33 years. Appellant was also fined $10,000 and
    classified as a Tier II Sex Offender.
    {¶6}   Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal from this sentencing entry and
    assigns one assignment of error for our review:
    {¶7}   “The trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences upon the appellant
    was both contrary to law and not supported by the evidence.”
    {¶8}   Appellant did not raise an objection to the imposition of consecutive
    sentences at his sentencing hearing nor did he file a response in opposition to
    appellee’s motion for consecutive sentences. Therefore, under the circumstances of
    3
    this case, appellant has forfeited all but plain error on review. State v. Rogers, Slip
    Opn. 
    2015-Ohio-2459
    , ¶21.
    {¶9}   “Crim.R. 52(B) affords appellate courts discretion to correct ‘[p]lain errors
    or defects affecting substantial rights’ notwithstanding the accused’s failure to meet his
    obligation to bring those errors to the attention of the trial court.”    Id. at ¶22.   To
    constitute plain error, an error must be an obvious deviation from a legal rule that
    affected the outcome.    Id., quoting State v. Barnes, 
    94 Ohio St.3d 21
    , 27 (2002).
    Further, the defendant has the burden of demonstrating plain error by proving the
    outcome would have been different absent the error. State v. Payne, 
    114 Ohio St.3d 502
    , 
    2007-Ohio-4642
    , ¶17.
    {¶10} Appellate review of non-forfeited alleged error in felony sentences is
    governed by R.C. 2953.08(G), which provides in pertinent part:
    (2) The appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a
    sentence that is appealed under this section or may vacate the
    sentence and remand the matter to the sentencing court for
    resentencing. The appellate court’s standard for review is not
    whether the sentencing court abused its discretion. The appellate
    court may take any action authorized by this division if it clearly and
    convincingly finds either of the following:
    (a) That the record does not support the sentencing court’s findings
    under division * * * (C)(4) of section 2929.14 * * *;
    (b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.
    We note, therefore, that even if appellant had not forfeited his argument regarding
    consecutive sentences, the result would be the same on appeal. For if the trial court
    made such an obvious error in sentencing appellant that it amounted to plain error, it
    would be contrary to law under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).
    4
    {¶11} Judicial fact-finding under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) is “required to overcome the
    statutory presumption in favor of concurrent sentences” found in R.C. 2929.41(A). State
    v. Bonnell, 
    140 Ohio St.3d 209
    , 
    2014-Ohio-3177
    , ¶23. Appellant essentially argues that
    the trial court did not overcome this presumption.
    {¶12} Pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), consecutive sentences may be imposed if
    the court finds “[1.] the consecutive service is necessary to protect the public from future
    crime or to punish the offender and that [2.] consecutive sentences are not
    disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the danger the
    offender poses to the public.” In addition, the trial court must also find [3.] that any of
    the following apply to the offender being sentenced:
    (a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses
    while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a
    sanction imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18
    of the Revised Code, or was under post-release control for a prior
    offense.
    (b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of
    one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or
    more of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual
    that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part
    of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the
    seriousness of the offender’s conduct.
    (c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that
    consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from
    future crime by the offender.
    {¶13} The Ohio Supreme Court has stated that “[i]n order to impose consecutive
    terms of imprisonment, a trial court is required to make the findings mandated by R.C.
    2929.14(C)(4) at the sentencing hearing and incorporate its findings into its sentencing
    entry, but it has no obligation to state reasons to support its findings.” Bonnell, 
    supra, ¶37
    .   The Supreme Court also held that the trial court’s imposition of consecutive
    5
    sentences will be upheld even if it does not use the exact “words of the statute, provided
    that the necessary findings can be found in the record and are incorporated into the
    sentencing entry.” 
    Id.
    {¶14} Here, the findings mandated by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) are present in both the
    sentencing transcript and sentencing entry. In one statement at the sentencing hearing,
    the trial court efficiently satisfied each of the three requirements of R.C. 2929.14(C)(4):
    The Court finds that pursuant to Ohio Revised Code, Section
    2929.14, that the harm caused to the victim in this matter is so
    great that a single prison term would not adequately reflect the
    seriousness of the conduct of the defendant, and that the criminal
    behavior of the defendant over a long period of time with the victim
    shows consecutive sentences are needed to protect the public.
    The sentencing entry incorporates these exact factual findings in writing.
    {¶15} Appellant’s specific contention is that the trial court made no finding as to
    the “proportionality analysis whatsoever.” Although it would have been ideal for the trial
    court to have explicitly stated the sentence was “proportionate” or “not disproportionate,”
    as we noted, use of the exact words contained in the statute is not required. Bonnell,
    supra, ¶37.     It is clear that, although the trial court did not explicitly mention
    “proportionality,” it considered the imposition of sentence in relation to the seriousness
    of appellant’s conduct and the danger posed to the public. At the sentencing hearing
    the trial court outlined the facts that informed its finding of great harm suffered by the
    victims, to wit: appellant is the uncle of the two victims; appellant acted as loco parentis
    to the victims on many occasions; appellant used food and other necessities to
    manipulate the victims; the older victim has suffered great mental injury; and appellant
    has shown no genuine remorse for his conduct.
    6
    {¶16} Appellant has not demonstrated that the trial court’s imposition of
    consecutive sentences constitutes plain error. In fact, appellant has not demonstrated
    that the trial court committed any error. The trial court satisfied the requirements of R.C.
    2929.14(C)(4) by finding that consecutive sentences were necessary to protect the
    public, proportionate to the seriousness of appellant’s conduct, and that one single
    prison term would not adequately reflect the seriousness of appellant’s multiple
    offenses.
    {¶17} For all of the foregoing reasons, appellant’s assignment of error is without
    merit. The judgment of the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
    THOMAS R. WRIGHT, J., concurs,
    COLLEEN MARY O’TOOLE, J., dissents with a Dissenting Opinion.
    ____________________
    COLLEEN MARY O’TOOLE, J., dissents with a Dissenting Opinion.
    {¶18} I disagree with the majority that the trial court properly imposed
    consecutive sentences upon appellant based on my dissenting opinion in a similar
    matter involving R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). State v. Koeser, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2013-P-
    0041, 
    2013-Ohio-5838
    , ¶35-44 (O’Toole, J., dissenting with a Dissenting Opinion).
    Finding merit in appellant’s assignment of error, I would reverse and remand for
    resentencing.
    {¶19} I respectfully dissent.
    7