State v. Harris ( 2012 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Harris, 
    2012-Ohio-2185
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    PICKAWAY COUNTY
    STATE OF OHIO,                  :
    :
    Plaintiff-Appellee,        :     Case No. 11CA15
    :
    vs.                        :
    :
    DERRICK L. HARRIS,              : DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
    :
    Defendant-Appellant.       :     RELEASED 05/14/12
    :
    ________________________________________________________________
    APPEARANCES:
    Derrick L. Harris, Chillicothe, Ohio, Appellant pro se.
    Judy C. Wolford, Pickaway County Prosecuting Attorney, Circleville, Ohio, for
    Appellee.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Harsha, J.
    {¶1}     Derrick L. Harris appeals the trial court’s decision that denied his
    motion for de novo sentencing. He contends that he is entitled to a new
    sentencing hearing because the trial court’s sentencing entry failed to state that
    the parole board could impose up to one-half of Harris’ originally-imposed prison
    term if he violated post-release control. Because the trial court notified Harris at
    the sentencing hearing that he could be subject to up to one-half of his originally-
    imposed prison term if he violated post-release control, Harris is not entitled to a
    new sentencing hearing. However, because the trial court failed to incorporate
    this mandated language into its sentencing entry, we remand to the trial court for
    the limited purpose of correcting the sentencing entry. Accordingly, we sustain
    Harris’ assignment of error in limited part and remand to the trial court.
    Pickaway App. No. 11CA15                                                               2
    I. FACTS
    {¶2}   On December 20, 2005, the trial court convicted Harris of
    aggravated robbery with a firearm specification, felonious assault with a firearm
    specification, and having a weapon while under a disability. The court sentenced
    Harris to a total of fifteen years in prison. The court additionally notified Harris
    that he would be subject to post-release control for five years. Its sentencing
    entry states: “The Court has further notified the defendant that he will be subject
    to a period of post-release control of Five (5) years, to be imposed by the Parole
    Board after his release from imprisonment, as well as the consequences for
    violating conditions of post release control imposed by the Parole Board under
    [R.C.] 2967.28. The defendant is ordered to serve as part of this sentence any
    such term of Five (5) years of post release control imposed by the Parole Board
    and any prison term for violation of that post release control.”
    {¶3}   On May 4, 2011, Harris filed a pro se motion for “de novo
    sentencing.” He argued that he was entitled to resentencing because the trial
    court’s sentencing entry failed to specify that the parole board may impose up to
    one-half of Harris’ originally-imposed prison term if he violates post-release
    control.
    {¶4}   The trial court denied Harris’ motion. The court determined that its
    sentencing entry complied with the applicable statutes, because it informed
    Harris that he would be subject to post-release control for five years and that he
    may have to serve “any prison term for violation of that post release control.”
    The court further noted that it had verbally informed Harris “of the consequences,
    Pickaway App. No. 11CA15                                                               3
    including the prison term of up to one-half of the prison term originally imposed.”
    The court explained: “[Harris] is correct that a court speaks only through its
    journal entry. However, this Court’s December 20, 2005, Entry clearly states that
    [Harris] is subject to five years of post release control and that he may have to
    serve ‘any prison term for violation of that post release control.’ This Court orally
    advised and explained to [Harris] of what that prison term may consist. Ohio law
    never intended for a court’s entry to state verbatim that which is stated in open
    court and placed on the record.”
    II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
    {¶5}   Harris raises one assignment of error:
    “The court erred when it failed to impose post-release control as
    required by the Ohio Statutes.”
    III. ANALYSIS
    {¶6}   In his sole assignment of error, Harris argues that the trial court
    erred when it denied his motion for de novo sentencing. He asserts that the
    court should have conducted a new sentencing hearing, because its original
    sentencing entry failed to inform Harris that violating his post-release control
    conditions could result in the imposition of up to one-half of his originally-imposed
    stated prison term.
    {¶7}   Former R.C. 2929.19(B)(3)(c) and (e), which were in effect when
    the court sentenced Harris (the present versions are codified at R.C.
    2929.19(B)(2)(c) and (e)), required a trial court to notify certain felony offenders
    at the sentencing hearing that: (1) the offender is subject to statutorily mandated
    post-release control; and (2) the parole board may impose a prison term of up to
    Pickaway App. No. 11CA15                                                               4
    one-half of the offender’s originally-imposed prison term if the offender violates
    post-release control conditions. State v. Singleton, 
    124 Ohio St.3d 173
    , 2009-
    Ohio-6434, 
    920 N.E.2d 958
    , ¶11; State v. Triplett, 4th Dist. No. 10CA35, 2011-
    Ohio-4628, ¶4 The Ohio Supreme Court has made it clear that the trial court not
    only must give the offender both notifications at the sentencing hearing, but it
    also must incorporate both notifications into its sentencing entry. State v. Qualls,
    Slip Opinion No. 
    2012-Ohio-1111
    , ¶¶18-19 (stating that court must provide
    “statutorily compliant notification to a defendant regarding postrelease control at
    the time of sentencing, including notifying the defendant of the details of the
    postrelease control and the consequences of violating postrelease control” and
    that court must incorporate these notifications into its sentencing entry but also
    recognizing that the “main focus” is “on the notification itself and not on the
    sentencing entry”); State v. Lang, 
    129 Ohio St.3d 512
    , 
    2011-Ohio-4215
    , 
    954 N.E.2d 596
    , ¶¶308-309 (remanding to trial court to correct sentencing entry when
    entry failed to specify that if Lang violated post-release control, the parole board
    could impose a maximum prison term of up to one-half of the prison term
    originally imposed); State v. Ketterer, 
    126 Ohio St.3d 448
    , 
    2010-Ohio-3831
    , 
    935 N.E.2d 9
    , ¶77 (stating that trial court’s language in sentencing entry that “[t]he
    defendant is ordered to serve as part of this sentence any term of post-release
    control imposed by the Parole Board, and any prison term for violation of that
    post-release control” did not comply with mandate to inform offender that the
    parole board could impose an additional prison term of up to one-half of his
    prison sentence for violating post-release control) (emphasis sic); Singleton
    Pickaway App. No. 11CA15                                                             5
    (affirming remand to trial court when trial court’s sentencing entry failed to specify
    that the parole board could impose an additional prison term of up to one-half of
    his prison sentence for a violation of post-release control). We also have
    recognized that a trial court must inform the offender at the sentencing hearing of
    the “up to one-half” prison term penalty for violating post-release control and
    must repeat that information in its sentencing entry. State v. Evans, 4th Dist. No.
    10CA33, 
    2011-Ohio-4630
    , ¶8. When a court fails to comply with either the
    sentencing hearing or sentencing entry notification, “the offending portion of the
    sentence is void, must be set aside, and is subject to review and correction.”
    Triplett at ¶4, citing State v. Fischer, 
    128 Ohio St.3d 92
    , 2010–Ohio–6238, 
    942 N.E.2d 332
    , ¶27–29.
    {¶8}   Here, no one disputes that the trial court’s sentencing entry failed to
    state that the parole board could impose up to one-half of Harris’ originally-
    imposed prison term if he violated post-release control. The trial court reasoned
    that it complied with this sentencing entry mandate by stating that Harris would
    have to serve “any prison term for violation of that post-release control.”
    However, this is the exact language that the Ohio Supreme Court determined did
    not comply with the sentencing entry mandate. Ketterer, supra. Consequently,
    we must likewise conclude that the trial court did not comply with the mandate to
    incorporate into its sentencing entry a notification that Harris could serve up to
    one-half of his originally-imposed prison term for violating post-release control.
    {¶9}   Although we agree with Harris that the trial court did not comply
    with the sentencing entry notification regarding the “up to one-half” prison term
    Pickaway App. No. 11CA15                                                                 6
    for violating post-release control, we do not agree that this failure entitles Harris
    to a de novo sentencing hearing. An offender is entitled to a new sentencing
    hearing only when the trial court failed to provide the statutorily required
    notification at the sentencing hearing. Qualls at ¶24 (stating that “when the
    notification of postrelease control was properly given at the sentencing hearing,
    the essential purpose of notice has been fulfilled and there is no need for a new
    sentencing hearing to remedy the flaw”). If the trial court provided the proper
    notifications at the sentencing hearing but failed to carry over those notifications
    to its sentencing entry, the proper remedy is for the trial court to enter a nunc pro
    tunc entry. Id. at ¶15. A trial court may use a nunc pro tunc entry to correct a
    failure to include in its sentencing entry a post-release control notification that it
    properly provided at the sentencing hearing but failed to incorporate into the
    sentencing entry. Id. Thus, “when a defendant is notified about postrelease
    control at the sentencing hearing, but notification is inadvertently omitted from the
    sentencing entry, the omission can be corrected with a nunc pro tunc entry and
    the defendant is not entitled to a new sentencing hearing.” Id. at 30. Under
    these circumstances, we may either remand the matter to the trial court so that it
    may correct its sentencing entry or correct the entry ourselves. See Fischer at
    ¶¶29-30 (stating that “[c]orrecting a defect in a sentence without a remand is an
    option” when trial court “does not impose postrelease control in accordance with
    statutorily mandated terms”); Triplett at ¶6 (noting that appellate court “authorized
    to correct certain errors without remanding for resentencing”). Here, we think the
    better practice would be to remand this matter to the trial court for the limited
    Pickaway App. No. 11CA15                                                                           7
    purpose of correcting its sentencing entry to specifically state that the parole
    board may impose up to one-half of Harris’ originally-imposed prison term if he
    violates post-release control. Because Harris has not disputed that the trial court
    provided the statutorily mandated notice at the sentencing hearing,1 the trial court
    need not hold another sentencing hearing.
    {¶10} Accordingly, we sustain Harris’ assignment of error to the limited
    extent discussed and remand to the trial court so that it may enter a nunc pro
    tunc entry that incorporates the required language into its sentencing entry.
    JUDGMENT REMANDED.
    1
    A transcript of the sentencing hearing was not provided on appeal, but the trial court noted in its
    decision denying Harris’ motion for de novo sentencing that at the original sentencing hearing, it
    had orally informed Harris that the parole board could impose up to one-half of his originally-
    imposed sentence for violating post-release control. Without a transcript, we can only presume
    Pickaway App. No. 11CA15                                                                      8
    JUDGMENT ENTRY
    It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS REMANDED. Appellee shall pay the
    costs.
    The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the
    Pickaway County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
    IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON BAIL
    HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR THIS
    COURT, it is temporarily continued for a period not to exceed sixty days upon the
    bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to allow Appellant to
    file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency
    of proceedings in that court. If a stay is continued by this entry, it will terminate at
    the earlier of the expiration of the sixty day period, or the failure of the Appellant
    to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the forty-five day
    appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme
    Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal
    prior to expiration of sixty days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such
    dismissal.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule
    27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions.
    Abele, P.J. & Kline, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
    For the Court
    BY: ________________________
    William H. Harsha, Judge
    NOTICE TO COUNSEL
    Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final
    judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the
    date of filing with the clerk.
    th
    the regularity of the sentencing hearing. E.g., State v. Delong, 4 Dist. No. 05CA815, 2006-Ohio-
    2753, ¶6.