In re Z.S. ( 2013 )


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  • [Cite as In re Z.S., 
    2013-Ohio-1042
    .]
    Court of Appeals of Ohio
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    No. 99082
    IN RE: Z.S.
    A Minor Child
    [Appeal By N.S.]
    JUDGMENT:
    DISMISSED
    Civil Appeal from the
    Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
    Juvenile Division
    Case No. PR-10700292
    BEFORE:             E.T. Gallagher, J., Keough, P.J., and E.A. Gallagher, J.
    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED:                     March 21, 2013
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
    Jeffrey F. Slavin
    1810 The Standard Building
    1370 Ontario Street
    Cleveland, Ohio 44113
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE, C.J.F.S., F.K.A. C.S.E.A
    Timothy J. McGinty
    Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
    BY: Joseph C. Young
    Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
    Cuyahoga Job & Family Services
    P.O. Box 93894
    Cleveland, Ohio 44101-5984
    EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J.:
    {¶1} This cause came to be heard on the accelerated calendar pursuant to App.R.
    11.1 and Loc.R. 11.1.
    {¶2} Plaintiff-appellant N.S. (“appellant”) appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his
    complaint without prejudice. Because we conclude that the order granting the motion to
    dismiss is not a final, appealable order, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
    {¶3} In January 2010, appellant filed a complaint to vacate his paternity
    acknowledgment and attached a copy of genetic test results dated April 11, 2005. He
    alleged that when Z.S. was born on September 9, 2004, he believed he was Z.S.’s father
    and signed an affidavit acknowledging paternity. Approximately seven months after
    Z.S.’s birth, results from a genetic test indicated that appellant could not be Z.S.’s
    biological father.   Yet, appellant did not file a complaint to vacate his paternity
    acknowledgment until nearly five years later.
    {¶4} Shortly after filing the complaint, appellant filed a motion to compel the
    mother, N.B. (“mother”), and Z.S. to submit to genetic testing. Following a hearing, a
    magistrate dismissed the case without prejudice because appellant failed to submit
    “genetic test results from a genetic test administered no more than six months prior to the
    filing of the motion for relief,” as required by R.C. 3119.962(A)(1)(a). The magistrate
    concluded that the juvenile court lacked authority to order the parties to submit to genetic
    testing under the facts presented in the case, based on this court’s decision in State ex rel.
    Rojas v. Guilfu, 8th Dist. No. 84145, 
    2004-Ohio-6707
    . The trial court adopted the
    magistrate’s decision, overruled appellant’s objections, and dismissed the case without
    prejudice, and appellant appealed. This court dismissed the appeal for lack of a final,
    appealable order. In re Z.S., 8th Dist. No. 96500, 
    2011-Ohio-3269
    , ¶ 23.
    {¶5} On remand, appellant filed a second complaint and motion to vacate paternity
    determination pursuant to R.C. 3119.961 and a motion for genetic testing pursuant to R.C.
    2151.231. A magistrate issued a decision denying the motions for failure to state a claim
    upon which relief could be granted because the genetic test results did not comply with
    R.C. 3119.962(A)(1)(a). The court overruled appellant’s objections, adopted the
    magistrate’s report, and dismissed the case without prejudice. Appellant now appeals
    and raises one assignment of error.
    {¶6} We are unable to reach the merits of appellant’s appeal because we do not
    have jurisdiction. Appellate jurisdiction is limited to reviewing a lower court’s final
    judgment.    Section 3(B)(2), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution.            To be a final,
    appealable order, a judgment entry must meet the requirements of R.C. 2505.02 and, if
    applicable, Civ.R. 54(B). Chef Italiano Corp. v. Kent State Univ., 
    44 Ohio St.3d 86
    , 88,
    
    541 N.E.2d 64
     (1989).
    {¶7} R.C. 2505.02 defines a final order for purposes of appeal. Under R.C.
    2505.02(B)(1), “[a]n order is a final order that may be reviewed, affirmed, modified, or
    reversed, with or without retrial, when it is * * * [a]n order that affects a substantial right
    in an action that in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment.” A “substantial
    right” is “a right that the United States Constitution, the Ohio Constitution, a statute, the
    common law, or a rule of procedure entitles a person to enforce or protect.” R.C.
    2505.02(A)(1). For purposes of this case, we will assume that the trial court’s dismissal
    for failure to state a claim upon which relief might be granted affected a substantial right
    — i.e., the right to be relieved of paternal obligations, including child support for another
    man’s child.
    {¶8} To be final, however, “an order must also determine an action and prevent a
    judgment.” Natl. City Commercial Capital Corp. v. AAAA At Your Serv., Inc., 
    114 Ohio St.3d 82
    , 
    2007-Ohio-2942
    , 
    868 N.E.2d 663
    , ¶ 7; R.C. 2505.02(B)(1). “For an order to
    determine the action and prevent a judgment for the party appealing, it must dispose of
    the whole merits of the cause or some separate and distinct branch thereof and leave
    nothing for the determination of the court.” 
    Id.,
     quoting Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Mental
    Retardation & Dev. Disabilities v. Professionals Guild of Ohio, 
    46 Ohio St.3d 147
    , 153,
    
    545 N.E.2d 1260
     (1989).
    {¶9} Ordinarily, a dismissal without prejudice constitutes “an adjudication
    otherwise than on the merits” with no res judicata bar to refiling the suit.1 Thomas v.
    Freeman, 
    79 Ohio St.3d 221
    , 225, 
    1997-Ohio-395
    , 
    680 N.E.2d 997
    , fn. 2. A dismissal
    without prejudice leaves the parties in the same position they were in prior to the action
    being filed.     
    Id.,
     citing Johnson v. H&M Auto Serv., 10th Dist. No. 07AP-123,
    The “double dismissal rule” contained in Civ.R. 41(A)(1) provides that plaintiff’s second
    1
    voluntary dismissal constitutes an adjudication on the merits. The double dismissal rule is
    inapplicable in the instant case, which involves an involuntary dismissal of appellant’s complaint by
    the court.
    
    2007-Ohio-5794
    , ¶ 7.     Thus, in most cases, such as this one, “a dismissal without
    prejudice is not a final appealable order because a party may refile or amend a
    complaint.” 
    Id.
     See also Thorton v. Montville Plastics & Rubber, Inc., 
    121 Ohio St.3d 124
    , 
    2009-Ohio-360
    , 
    902 N.E.2d 482
    , ¶ 24. In other words, appellant may file yet
    another complaint to seek relief of his paternity acknowledgment by complying with the
    requirements set forth in R.C. 3119.962(A)(1)(a) or, in the alternative, by demonstrating
    that mother willfully refused to submit Z.S. to genetic testing as provided in R.C.
    3119.963(B).    State ex rel. Rojas v. Guilfu, 8th Dist No. 84145, 
    2004-Ohio-6707
    , ¶ 16.
    {¶10} Because the juvenile court’s order was not final, this court lacks jurisdiction
    and must dismiss the appeal.
    {¶11} Appeal dismissed.
    It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
    the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
    KATHLEEN A. KEOUGH, P.J., and
    EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 99082

Judges: Gallagher

Filed Date: 3/21/2013

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021