Flynn v. Fairview Village Retirement , 2013 Ohio 569 ( 2013 )

[Cite as Flynn v. Fairview Village Retirement, 2013-Ohio-569.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 95695
JOHN T. FLYNN, ET AL.
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES
vs.
FAIRVIEW VILLAGE RETIREMENT,
ETC., ET AL.
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
JUDGMENT:
REVERSED AND REMANDED
Civil Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CV-715680
BEFORE: Boyle, J., Stewart, A.J., and S. Gallagher, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 21, 2013
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS SABER HEALTHCARE
GROUP, L.L.C., ET AL.
James P. Myers
Paul-Michael Lafayette
Brant Poling
Poling Petrello
1100 Superior Avenue
Suite 1110
Cleveland, Ohio 44114
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
For John T. Flynn, et al.
David H. Krause
Joyce E. Carlozzi
Seaman Garson, L.L.C.
1600 Rockefeller Building, 16th Floor
614 West Superior Avenue
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
For Michael Francus
Dirk E. Riemenschneider
Buckingham, Doolittle & Burroughs
One Cleveland Center, #1700
1375 East Ninth Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44114
MARY J. BOYLE, J.:
{¶1} This appeal is before this court on remand from the Ohio Supreme Court
for application of Havel v. Villa St. Joseph, 131 Ohio St.3d 235, 2012-Ohio-552, 963
N.E.2d 1270.
{¶2} The underlying case involves a nursing home negligence action filed by
plaintiffs-appellees, John T. Flynn and Judy Gordon, executors of the estate of Gladys F.
Feran, deceased, against appellants, Fairview Village Retirement Community, Ltd.,
d.b.a. Larchwood Village Retirement Community, Saber Healthcare Group, L.L.C., and
Saber Management, Inc., as well as Michael Francus, owner of Larchwood Village
Retirement Community, and several unknown entities and individuals. Appellees’
complaint alleges negligence, violation of the Ohio Nursing Home Patients’ Bill of
Rights, violation of federal law under C.F.R., Title 42, wrongful death, and falsification
of medical records. Appellees request both compensatory and punitive damages.
{¶3} Appellants moved to bifurcate the trial to separate appellees’ claims for
compensatory damages from their claims for punitive damages, pursuant to R.C.
2315.21(B)(1). The common pleas court denied the motions, and appellants appealed.
{¶4} This court sua sponte dismissed the appeal for lack of a final, appealable
order under R.C. 2505.02. The Ohio Supreme Court accepted the appellants’ appeal of
our dismissal and ultimately concluded that a denial of a motion to bifurcate under R.C.
2315.21(B) is a final, appealable order under R.C. 2505.02(B)(6). Flynn v. Fairview
Village Retirement Community, Ltd., 132 Ohio St.3d 199, 2012-Ohio-2582, 970 N.E.2d
927, ¶ 8. The court noted that under R.C. 2505.02(B)(6), “an order is a final,
appealable order if it is ‘[a]n order determining the constitutionality of * * * any changes
made by Sub.S.B. 80 of the 125th general assembly, including the amendment of section
* * * 2315.21 of the Revised Code.’” Id. at ¶ 6. The court further explained that “by
denying appellants’ motion to bifurcate under R.C. 2315.21(B), the trial court implicitly
determined that the S.B. 80 amendment to the statutory provision is unconstitutional, i.e.,
that Civ.R. 42(B) prevails over the conflicting statutory provision.” Id. at ¶ 7.1
{¶5} We now turn to the application of Havel, 131 Ohio St.3d 235,
2012-Ohio-552, 963 N.E.2d 1270, to the appellants’ appeal of the trial court’s denial of
their motions to bifurcate under R.C. 2315.21(B). In Havel, the Ohio Supreme Court
answered a certified question as to the constitutionality of R.C. 2315.21(B), holding that
R.C. 2315.21(B) creates a substantive right to bifurcation in tort actions where both
compensatory and punitive damages are sought, and therefore, it does not violate the
separation of powers required by the Ohio Constitution. Id. at ¶ 5. In reaching this
conclusion, the court expressly rejected the idea that a trial court could refuse to
bifurcate punitive damages from compensatory damages in a tort action pursuant to
Civ.R. 42(B); instead, the court held that “R.C. 2315.21(B) supersedes Civ.R. 42(B).”
We note that whereas R.C. 2315.21(B) provides for mandatory bifurcation of
1
compensatory and punitive damages in a tort action upon the motion of any party, Civ.R. 42(B) vests
a trial court with discretion to order a separate trial of any claim or issue when doing so would
promote convenience, avoid prejudice, or when it would be economically prudent or efficient to do so.
Id.
{¶6} Applying Havel to the instant case, we find that the trial court erred in
denying appellants’ motions to bifurcate. Under R.C. 2315.21(B), the trial court has no
discretion to deny a motion to bifurcate the punitive damages issue in a tort case when a
party files a motion requesting bifurcation. Havel at ¶ 26. Indeed, “R.C. 2315.21(B)
creates a substantive right to bifurcation in tort actions when claims for compensatory
and punitive damages have been asserted.” Id. at ¶ 36. Here, appellants filed a
motion requesting bifurcation, which appellees did not oppose. Given that Civ.R.
42(B) is superseded by R.C. 2315.21(B), the trial court’s decision denying the motion to
bifurcate constitutes reversible error.
{¶7} Accordingly, we sustain appellants’ sole assignment of error, reverse the
judgment of the trial court, and remand for further proceedings.
It is ordered that appellants recover from appellees costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment
into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
MARY J. BOYLE, JUDGE
MELODY J. STEWART, A.J., and
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR