Massa v. Westfield , 2014 Ohio 2805 ( 2014 )

[Cite as Massa v. Westfield, 2014-Ohio-2805.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
ROBERT MASSA, : APPEAL NO. C-130639
TRIAL NO. A-1207242
Plaintiff-Appellant, :
O P I N I O N.
vs. :
WESTFIELD GROUP, :
Defendant-Appellee. :
Civil Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: June 27, 2014
Lindhorst & Dreidame Co., LPA, Jay R. Langenbahn and Thomas J. Blatz, Jr.,
for Plaintiff-Appellant,
McCaslin, Imbus & McCaslin, Thomas J. Gruber and Michael P. Cussen, for
Defendant-Appellee.
Please note: this case has been removed from the accelerated calendar.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
HILDEBRANDT, Presiding Judge.
{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant Robert Massa appeals from the trial court’s judgment
granting summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee Westfield Group
(“Westfield”). For the following reasons, we affirm.
{¶2} Massa was injured in an automobile accident while he was a passenger in
a car driven by his son-in-law, Peter Hammer. The accident was caused by another
driver, Eric Rozier. Rozier’s insurance paid Massa the limits of Rozier’s policy. Rozier’s
policy limit of $100,000, however, did not fully compensate Massa for his injuries.
Massa therefore was awarded underinsured motorist (“UIM”) coverage through his
own insurance policy. Believing that he still had not been fully compensated for his
injuries, Massa then sued Hammer’s insurance company, Westfield, seeking to recover
UIM coverage under Hammer’s automobile and umbrella insurance policies. Westfield
moved for summary judgment on the ground that Massa did not meet the definition of
an “insured” and was therefore not entitled to coverage. The trial court granted
Westfield’s motion and entered judgment in its favor. This appeal followed. In one
assignment of error, Massa argues that the trial court erred in its interpretation of the
Westfield policy.
{¶3} Our review of summary judgment is de novo. Brown v. Lincoln Hts., 195
Ohio App.3d 149, 2011-Ohio-3551, 958 N.E.2d 1280, ¶ 7 (1st Dist.), citing Grafton v.
Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241 (1996). Under Civ.R. 56(C),
summary judgment is appropriate when, construing the evidence most strongly in favor
of the nonmoving party, no genuine issues of material fact remain and the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d
317, 327, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977).
2
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶4} In pertinent part, the Westfield automobile policy defines “insured” as
“[a]ny other person occupying your covered auto who is not a named insured or insured
family member for underinsured motorist coverage under another policy.” Westfield’s
umbrella policy provides that umbrella coverage as it pertains to UIM is excluded
unless the underlying automobile insurance affords UIM coverage.
{¶5} Here, it is undisputed that Massa does not meet the definition of “family
member” under the Westfield policy. Massa argues that, applying the last antecedent
rule of construction, the phrase “for underinsured motorist coverage under another
policy” only modifies “family member.” Since he is not a family member, Massa argues,
the Westfield policy should be construed to include UIM coverage for him even though
he had UIM coverage through his own insurance policy. Interpreting the exact same
language, and analyzing the language using the exact argument that Massa now
advances, the Ohio Supreme Court in Wohl v. Slattery, 118 Ohio St.3d 277, 2008-Ohio-
2334, 888 N.E.2d 1062, held otherwise. In Wohl, the court determined that, viewing
the insurance policy as a whole, the definition of “insured” at issue was unambiguous
and narrowly defined, and that therefore the last antecedent rule did not apply. Id. at ¶
23. The court determined that “for underinsured motorist coverage under another
policy” modified both “family member” and a “named insured.”
{¶6} Likewise, in this case, and viewing the policy as whole, it is evident that
the definition of “insured” for purposes of UIM coverage is unambiguous and narrowly
defined. The last antecedent rule does not apply. Massa does not meet the definition of
“insured” because he was a named insured in another insurance policy that provided
UIM coverage.
3
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶7} Because there are no issues of material fact, and because Westfield was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law under Wohl, Massa’s sole assignment of error is
overruled. The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
HENDON and DEWINE, JJ., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.
4