State v. Taysom , 2014 Ohio 2838 ( 2014 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Taysom, 
    2014-Ohio-2838
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    HURON COUNTY
    State of Ohio                                     Court of Appeals Nos. H-13-031
    H-13-032
    Appellee
    Trial Court Nos. 13TRD06893A & B
    v.                                                                 13CRB01861
    Erick L. Taysom                                   DECISION AND JUDGMENT
    Appellant                                 Decided: June 27, 2014
    *****
    G. Stuart O’Hara, Jr., City of Norwalk Law Director, and
    Scott M. Christophel, Assistant Law Director, for appellee.
    Paul D. Dolce, for appellant.
    *****
    SINGER, J.
    {¶ 1} Appellant appeals his conviction for driving under suspension, failing to stop
    after an accident and obstructing official business entered following a trial to the bench in
    the Norwalk Municipal Court. Because we conclude that appellant’s conviction was not
    against the manifest weight of the evidence, we affirm.
    {¶ 2} On the morning of October 26, 2013, Christopher Grady emerged from his
    Norwalk home to discover a one foot-long scratch on the driver’s side of his car. Grady
    noted teal colored paint transfer on the scratch and remembered a teal colored car parked
    in his neighbor’s yard the night before. Grady called police.
    {¶ 3} The police officer investigating noted that the scratch contained a sticky
    substance, consistent with colored duct tape. After speaking to the neighbor, the officer
    visited the home of appellant, Erick L. Taysom, where he found a teal Ford Escort in the
    parking lot. The rear bumper of the car was covered with teal colored duct tape.
    Appellant told police he had not driven the car in months and denied taking it to Brady’s
    neighbor.
    {¶ 4} Appellant’s statement to police conflicted with that of Brady’s neighbor.
    The neighbor had reported that appellant asked his permission to leave the car at the
    neighbor’s house and had parked it there at approximately 6:00 p.m. on October 25. The
    neighbor would later testify that at approximately 2:30 a.m. on October 26 he heard the
    car start and saw appellant driving away.
    {¶ 5} Police charged appellant with failing to stop after an accident in violation of
    R.C. 4549.02, driving under suspension in violation of R.C. 4510.11(A), and obstructing
    official business in violation of R.C. 2921.31. Appellant pled not guilty to all charges
    and the matter proceeded to a trial before the bench.
    2.
    {¶ 6} At trial, Brady and his neighbor testified. The investigating officer also
    testified as to the statements appellant made and identified a computerized check that
    revealed that on October 26, 2013, appellant’s license was under suspension.
    {¶ 7} Appellant testified in his own defense that another person had driven the car
    to the neighbor’s and drove the car and appellant home at 5:30 a.m. Appellant denied
    striking any car while leaving the neighbor’s yard, but admitted to making false
    statements to the investigating officer.
    {¶ 8} The trial court found appellant guilty of all three charges and sentenced him
    90 days (suspended) jail time for driving under suspension; 90 days (80 suspended) for
    failing to stop; and, 90 concurrent days (80 suspended) for obstructing official business.
    From these judgments of conviction, appellant now brings this appeal. Appellant sets
    forth a single assignment of error:
    The verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence[.]
    {¶ 9} In a criminal appeal, a verdict may be overturned if it is either against the
    manifest weight of the evidence or because there is an insufficiency of evidence. In the
    former, the appeals court acts as a “thirteenth juror” to determine whether the trier of fact
    lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be
    overturned and a new trial ordered. State v. Thompkins, 
    78 Ohio St.3d 380
    , 387, 
    678 N.E.2d 541
    (1997). In the latter, the court must determine whether the evidence
    submitted is legally sufficient to support all of the elements of the offense charged. Id. at
    386-387. Specifically, we must determine whether the state has presented evidence
    3.
    which, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a
    reasonable doubt. The test is, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
    prosecution, could any rational trier of fact have found the essential elements of the crime
    proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 390 (Cook, J., concurring); State v. Jenks, 
    61 Ohio St.3d 259
    , 
    574 N.E.2d 492
     (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. See also State v.
    Eley, 
    56 Ohio St.2d 169
    , 
    383 N.E.2d 132
     (1978); State v. Barnes, 
    25 Ohio St.3d 203
    , 
    495 N.E.2d 922
     (1986).
    {¶ 10} Appellant argues that, with respect to obstructing official business, the state
    never introduced evidence to indicate how his false statements hampered or impeded the
    investigation. Appellant suggests that, since this investigating officer did not believe
    appellant’s statements, the investigation would have proceeded in the same manner had
    he told the truth. With respect to the other two charges, appellant insists there was no
    direct evidence that he had hit Brady’s car.
    {¶ 11} R.C. 2921.31(A) provides:
    No person, without privilege to do so and with purpose to prevent,
    obstruct, or delay the performance by a public official of any authorized act
    within the public official’s official capacity, shall do any act that hampers
    or impedes a public official in the performance of the public official’s
    lawful duties.
    {¶ 12} Making an unsworn false oral statement to a public official with the
    purpose to mislead, hamper or impede the investigation of a crime is punishable conduct
    4.
    within the meaning of R.C. 2921.31(A). State v. Lazzaro, 
    76 Ohio St.3d 261
    , 
    667 N.E.2d 384
     (1996), syllabus.
    {¶ 13} Appellant admitted that he lied to police and there is little doubt that his
    purpose was to avoid the consequences of his own criminal culpability. This constitutes
    a purposeful intent to prevent or obstruct the investigation. Had appellant been truthful,
    the officer could have written two citations and been finished. Consequently, appellant’s
    false statement, in fact, impeded the investigation.
    {¶ 14} Direct evidence is evidence based on personal observation. State v. Rister,
    6th Dist. Lucas No. L-09-1191, 
    2012-Ohio-516
    , ¶ 12. Circumstantial evidence is that
    which can be inferred from reasonably and justifiably connected facts. State v.
    Fairbanks, 
    32 Ohio St.3d 34
    , 
    289 N.E.2d 352
     (1972), paragraph five of the syllabus.
    Circumstantial evidence is to be given the same weight and deference as direct evidence.
    State v. Jenks, 
    61 Ohio St.3d 259
    , 272, 
    574 N.E.2d 492
     (1991). The weight to be given to
    the evidence and credibility of witnesses is within the province of the trier of fact. State
    v. Maxwell, 
    139 Ohio St.3d 12
    , 
    2014-Ohio-1019
    , 
    9 N.E.3d 930
    , ¶ 55.
    {¶ 15} There was testimony, and later an admission, that appellant’s teal colored
    car with teal colored duct tape on the bumper was in Brady’s neighbor’s yard. The
    neighbor testified that appellant drove away in the middle of the night. The morning
    after, Brady observed a scratch on his car with teal colored paint transfer and residue
    consistent with duct tape. This is circumstantial evidence by which a reasonable trier of
    fact could find that appellant’s car, driven by appellant, caused the scratch in Brady’s car.
    5.
    {¶ 16} We have thoroughly reviewed the record and the transcript of the trial in
    this matter and fail to find any suggestion that the trier of fact lost its way or that any
    manifest miscarriage of justice occurred. Accordingly, appellant’s sole assignment of
    error is not well-taken.
    {¶ 17} On consideration, the judgment of the Norwalk Municipal Court is
    affirmed. It is ordered that appellant pay the court costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R.
    24.
    Judgment affirmed.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
    See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
    Mark L. Pietrykowski, J.                          _______________________________
    JUDGE
    Arlene Singer, J.
    _______________________________
    James D. Jensen, J.                                           JUDGE
    CONCUR.
    _______________________________
    JUDGE
    This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
    Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
    version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
    http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/newpdf/?source=6.
    6.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: H-13-031, H-13-032

Citation Numbers: 2014 Ohio 2838

Judges: Singer

Filed Date: 6/27/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014