Ohiotelnet.com, Inc. v. Windstream Ohio, Inc. , 2012 Ohio 5969 ( 2012 )


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  • [Cite as Ohiotelnet.com, Inc. v. Windstream Ohio, Inc., 
    2012-Ohio-5969
    .]
    COURT OF APPEALS
    LICKING COUNTY, OHIO
    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    JUDGES:
    OHIOTELNET.COM, INC., ET AL                          :       Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, P.J.
    :       Hon. W. Scott Gwin, J.
    Plaintiff-Appellant          :       Hon. William B. Hoffman, J.
    :
    -vs-                                                 :
    :       Case No. 2012-CA-29
    WINDSTREAM OHIO, INC.                                :
    :
    Defendant-Appellee              :       OPINION
    CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                                 Civil appeal from the Licking County Court
    of Common Pleas, Case No. 11CV00485
    JUDGMENT:                                                Affirmed
    DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                                  December 14, 2012
    APPEARANCES:
    For Plaintiffs-Appellants                                For Defendant-Appellee
    JAMES COOPER                                             WILLIAM ADAMS
    MATTHEW J. KUNSMAN                                       Bailey Cavalieri LLC
    Morrow, Gordon & Byrd, Ltd                               10 West Broad Street, Suite 2100
    33 W. Main Street, P.O. Box 4190                         Columbus, OH 43215
    Newark, OH 43058-4190
    [Cite as Ohiotelnet.com, Inc. v. Windstream Ohio, Inc., 
    2012-Ohio-5969
    .]
    Gwin, J.,
    {¶1}   Plaintiffs Ohiotelnet (OTN) and Midwest Service Management (MSM)
    appeal two judgments, a partial dismissal and a summary judgment, of the Court of
    Common Pleas of Licking County, Ohio, finding lack of jurisdiction. Defendant-appellee
    is Windstream Ohio, Inc. formerly known as ALLTEL Ohio, Inc. Appellants assign two
    errors:
    {¶2}   “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GRANTING WINDSTREAM'S
    MOTION TO DISMISS BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT HAD SUBJECT MATTER
    JURISDICTION OVER THE CLAIMS IN APPELLANTS' COMPLAINT.
    {¶3}   “II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING WINDSTREAM'S
    MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE SEVERAL GENUINE ISSUES OF
    MATERIAL FACT EXIST AND REASONABLE MINDS CANNOT COME TO BUT ONE
    CONCLUSION IN FAVOR OF WINDSTREAM.”
    {¶4}   The record indicates Windstream, the successor in interest of ALLTEL
    Ohio, Inc. is an Ohio public utility providing wholesale telephone, telecommunications,
    and broadband services. Windstream is subject to various state and federal laws and
    regulations, including marketing opening provisions and tariffs. OTN is an Ohio
    corporation that provides local telephone service to Licking County, Ohio. MSM is an
    Ohio corporation which provides telecommunications and information services
    technology.
    {¶5}   OTN entered into an agreement with Windstream for the interconnection
    of the parties’ telecommunications networks within the state of Ohio. Windstream was to
    provide wholesale services to OTN, which in turn would supply services to local
    Licking County, Case No. 2012-CA-29                                                         3
    customers. Subsequently, the parties have engaged in billing disputes, leading to this
    action as well as an action filed with the PUCO. At the time of this writing, an appeal
    from the decision of the PUCO was pending before the Ohio Supreme Court.
    {¶6}    In its judgment entry of August 30, 2011, the court found appellants raised
    four claims.    The first claim alleges breach of the interconnection agreement and
    includes statements that the court found are presumably meant to allege interference
    with the business relationship.    The second claim alleges Windstream had made false
    statements to OTN’s customers, inducing them to terminate their business relationships
    with OTN. The court presumed these allegations were intended to state a claim for
    interference with business relationships, although they were not labeled as such. The
    trial court characterized the third claim as a claim for breach of the interconnection
    agreement, various unfair billing practices, prices, and service complaints. The court
    found the fourth claim alleged Windstream breached an agreement with MSM. In the
    August 30, 2011 entry, the court dismissed appellants’ first, second and third claims, but
    found under the allegations set forth, it could not determine whether the fourth claim
    was a pure contract claim over which it could take jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court did
    not dismiss the fourth claim at that time.
    {¶7}    Subsequently, on February 27, 2012, the trial court found the fourth claim
    must also be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
    I.
    {¶8}    In their first assignment of error, appellants argue the trial court should not
    have dismissed claims one, two and three because it had jurisdiction over the matter.
    Licking County, Case No. 2012-CA-29                                                         4
    Appellants correctly note this court reviews the issue de novo because it involves a
    question of law. Helfrich v. City of Patalaska, 5th Dist. No. 02-CA-38, 
    2003-Ohio-847
    .
    {¶9}   R.C. 4905.26 confers exclusive jurisdiction on the PUCO to review any
    service rendered by a public utility to determine if it is unjust or unreasonable, or
    violates the law. PUCO also has exclusive jurisdiction over complaints regarding the
    termination of service by public utilities. The Supreme Court has held, however, that
    courts retain limited subject matter jurisdiction over a matter that is pure common-law
    tort or contract action involving utilities that are regulated by the PUCO. State ex rel.
    Illuminating Company v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, 
    97 Ohio St. 3d 69
    ,
    (2002). In cases involving public utilities, jurisdiction is not conferred based solely on the
    pleadings. State ex rel. Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc. v. Henson, 
    102 Ohio St. 3d 349
    ,
    
    2004-Ohio-3208
    , 
    810 N.E.2d 953
    , ¶ 19.
    {¶10} The Supreme Court has set out a test courts should apply to determine
    whether the PUCO has exclusive jurisdiction. “‘First, is PUCO’s administrative expertise
    required to resolve the issue in dispute? Second, does the act complained of constitute
    a practice normally authorized by the utility?’ If the answer to either question is in the
    negative, the claim is not within PUCO’s exclusive jurisdiction.”         Allstate Insurance
    Company v. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, 
    119 Ohio St. 3d 301
    , 2008-Ohio-
    3917, 
    893 N.E.2d 824
     ¶5.
    {¶11} The Allstate opinion sets out examples of common law claims over which
    the common pleas court has jurisdiction: Milligan v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 
    56 Ohio St.2d 191
    , 195, 
    383 N.E.2d 575
     (1978) (claim that the telephone company invaded its
    customer's privacy was actionable in common pleas court); Kohli v. Pub. Util. Comm.,
    Licking County, Case No. 2012-CA-29                                                    5
    
    18 Ohio St.3d 12
    , 14, 18 OBR 10, 
    479 N.E.2d 840
     (1985) (failure to warn landowners
    of dangers regarding voltage can be litigated in common pleas court.) The Supreme
    Court also cautioned that the PUCO is not a court and has no power to judicially
    ascertain and determine legal rights and liabilities.
    {¶12} The court found OTN’s contract claims and tort claims were not pure
    common-law claims, but had to do with providing services that were regulated by the
    PUCO. We agree with the trial court appellants’ claims are subject to the PUCO’s
    exclusive jurisdiction.
    {¶13} The first assignment of error is overruled.
    II.
    {¶14} In their second assignment of error, appellants argue the court improperly
    awarded summary judgment in favor of Windstream because there are genuine issues
    of material fact, and because reasonable minds could come to different conclusions.
    {¶15}    In finding the matter was appropriate for summary judgment, the trial
    court found the disputes related to practices authorized by the utility, namely providing
    lines and services. The court found the issues of tariffs are regulated by the PUCO, and
    require the expertise of the PUCO to construe.
    {¶16}    We agree all of appellants’ causes of action are directly related to the
    provision of utility services, which is vested exclusively in the PUCO
    {¶17} The second assignment of error is overruled.
    Licking County, Case No. 2012-CA-29                                              6
    {¶18} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of
    Licking County, Ohio, is affirmed.
    By Gwin, J.,
    Delaney, P.J., and
    Hoffman J., concur
    _________________________________
    HON. W. SCOTT GWIN
    _________________________________
    HON. PATRICIA A. DELANEY
    _________________________________
    HON. WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN
    WSG:clw 1119
    [Cite as Ohiotelnet.com, Inc. v. Windstream Ohio, Inc., 
    2012-Ohio-5969
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR LICKING COUNTY, OHIO
    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    OHIOTELNET.COM, INC., ET AL                            :
    :
    Plaintiffs-Appellants         :
    :
    :
    -vs-                                                   :       JUDGMENT ENTRY
    :
    WINDSTREAM OHIO, INC.                                  :
    :
    :
    Defendant-Appellee             :       CASE NO. 2012-CA-29
    For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion, the judgment of
    the Court of Common Pleas of Licking County, Ohio, is affirmed. Costs to appellants.
    _________________________________
    HON. W. SCOTT GWIN
    _________________________________
    HON. PATRICIA A. DELANEY
    _________________________________
    HON. WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2012-CA-29

Citation Numbers: 2012 Ohio 5969

Judges: Gwin

Filed Date: 12/14/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/3/2016