State v. Blackmon , 2012 Ohio 5854 ( 2012 )

[Cite as State v. Blackmon, 2012-Ohio-5854.]
COURT OF APPEALS
STARK COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO JUDGES:
Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, P. J.
Plaintiff-Appellee Hon. John W. Wise, J.
Hon. Julie A. Edwards, J.
-vs-
Case No. 2012 CA 00110
SEAN JOSEPH BLACKMON
Defendant-Appellant OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal Appeal from the Court of Common
Pleas, Case No. 2012 CR 00184
JUDGMENT: Reversed and Vacated
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: December 10, 2012
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
JOHN D. FERRERO KENNETH W. FRAM
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY ASSISTANT PUBLIC DEFENDER
RONALD MARK CALDWELL 220 West Tuscarawas
ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR Suite 200
110 Central Plaza South, Suite 510 Canton, Ohio 44702
Canton, Ohio 44702-1413
Stark County, Case No. 2012 CA 00110 2
Wise, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Sean Joseph Blackmon appeals his conviction on
one count of domestic violence entered in the Stark County Court of Common Pleas.
{¶2} Plaintiff-appellee is the State of Ohio.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
{¶3} On January 28, 2012, Appellant Sean Joseph Blackmon punched
Darshanae Lucius several times and choked her, causing visible injuries. From her birth
until she was sixteen years old, Darshanae Lucius was presumed to be the natural
daughter of Appellant's brother, as well as the natural niece of Appellant. When
Darshanae was sixteen years old, a blood test was performed and it was determined
that Appellant’s brother was not Darshanae's father, and that her natural father was a
man who had died.
{¶4} Regardless of the blood test results, Darshanae continued to live with the
Blackmon family, moving out only briefly when she was twenty for about three months
from May to August, 2011. On January 28, 2012, when Appellant assaulted her,
Darshanae was living with the Blackmon family in their Canton residence.
{¶5} The Stark County Grand Jury indicted Appellant on one count of domestic
violence, in violation of R.C. 2911.25(A), a felony of the fourth degree.
{¶6} At his arraignment on March 9, 2012, appellant entered a plea of not guilty
to the charges.
{¶7} Subsequently, on April 18, 2012, appellant withdrew his former not guilty
plea and entered a plea of no contest.
Stark County, Case No. 2012 CA 00110 3
{¶8} Prior to pleading no contest, however, Appellant moved the trial court to
dismiss the charge against him, arguing that one of the essential elements of the
charged offense, i.e. that the victim of the assault was a household or family member,
was absent in this case. He claimed that while the victim had been raised in his family
since her birth, under the mistaken assumption that she was the natural daughter of
Appellant's brother, that assumption was dispelled by a subsequent blood test.
{¶9} The trial court, after entertaining argument from the prosecution, overruled
the motion to dismiss. Based upon a recitation of facts provided by the prosecution, the
trial court found Blackmon guilty of the charged offense, but deferred sentencing
pending the completion of a presentence investigation report. In so ruling, the trial court
found that this recitation showed that the victim qualified as a household or family
member under R.C. §2919.25(A):
{¶10} “THE COURT: So then the question becomes under that statute and the
reason that statute was established to deal with domestic issues that seem to be
repeating themselves over and over so that the legislators said hey, if in fact one has
done this once and it happens again, we're now going to treat this as a felony. When
they were establishing that, they were establishing it for those matters that they
understood dealt with domestic.
{¶11} “So then they went about trying to define all that, and it is clear that
looking at this from a strict statutory analysis you are correct, it does not fit any of the
definitions when reviewed strictly, but as with rape shield cases sometimes you have to
look at the reason for the statute, and this Court is not going to strictly interpret it when
in fact there's no question but for a blood test this in fact was a family member that
Stark County, Case No. 2012 CA 00110 4
would have been, uh, within the statute, would violate the spirit and the reason for the
statute to view otherwise. So the Court is overruling your motion to dismiss this as a
felony under the domestic violence statute.” (T. at 8).
{¶12} As memorialized in a Judgment Entry filed May 16, 2012, appellant was
sentenced to a community control sanction (Intensive Supervision Probation) for a
period of three (3) years under specified terms and conditions.
{¶13} Appellant now raises the following Assignment of Error on appeal:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶14} “I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR WHEN IT FOUND
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT GUILTY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE WITHOUT
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE.”
I
{¶15} Appellant, in his sole Assignment of Error, argues that his conviction was
based upon insufficient evidence because the victim in this case was not a family or
household member within the meaning of the domestic violence statute. We agree.
{¶16} When an appellate court reviews a record upon a sufficiency challenge,
“ ‘the relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” State v. Leonard, 104 Ohio St.3d 54, 2004-
Ohio-6235, 818 N.E.2d 229, ¶ 77, quoting State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259,
574 N.E.2d 492, paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶17} In the instant case, Appellant was convicted of Domestic Violence
pursuant to R.C. §2919.25(A), which states,
Stark County, Case No. 2012 CA 00110 5
{¶18} "No person shall knowingly cause or attempt to cause physical harm to a
family or household member." 1
{¶19} The term "family or household member" is defined in R.C. §2919.25 (F),
which provides:
{¶20} “(1) "Family or household member" means any of the following:
{¶21} “(a) Any of the following who is residing or has resided with the offender:
{¶22} “(i) A spouse, a person living as a spouse, or a former spouse of the
offender;
{¶23} “(ii) A parent, a foster parent, or a child of the offender, or another person
related by consanguinity or affinity to the offender;
{¶24} “(iii) A parent or a child of a spouse, person living as a spouse, or former
spouse of the offender, or another person related by consanguinity or affinity to a
spouse, person living as a spouse, or former spouse of the offender.
{¶25} “(b) The natural parent of any child of whom the offender is the other
natural parent or is the putative other natural parent.”
{¶26} “Physical harm” is defined as any injury, illness, or other physiological
impairment, regardless of its gravity or duration. R.C. §2901.01(A)(3).
{¶27} Appellant herein does not dispute the sufficiency of the evidence
regarding physical harm. What he does dispute is that there was sufficient evidence to
determine that Ms. Lucius was a family or household member within the meaning of
R.C. §2919.25.
1
The offense was charged as a fourth degree felony pursuant to R.C. 2919.25(D)(3).
Stark County, Case No. 2012 CA 00110 6
{¶28} As set forth above, a victim's status as a “family or household member” is
a required element of the offense of domestic violence. State v. Hannon, 4th Dist. No.
04CA20, 2005-Ohio-874, 2005 WL 477858{¶29} The domestic-violence statute is specifically designed to protect two
people who are more than merely roommates, enabling such a victim of assault
additional protection. Domestic violence is a crime quite different from a general assault,
precisely because of the special intimacy of the parties.
{¶30} R.C. §2901.04(A) directs that “sections of the Revised Code defining
offenses or penalties shall be strictly construed against the state, and liberally construed
in favor of the accused.” See also State v. Jordan (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 488, 492, 733
N.E.2d 601.
{¶31} Here, in strictly construing, R.C. §2919.25, we find that such statute does
not provide that a person who once thought to be a blood relative remains a family or
household member after such blood relationship is determined to have been mistaken.
{¶32} Based on the foregoing, Appellant’s sole Assignment of Error is sustained.
{¶33} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of
Stark County, Ohio, is reversed and vacated.
By: Wise, J.
Farmer, P. J., and
Edwards, J., concur.
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JUDGES
JWW/d 1119
Stark County, Case No. 2012 CA 00110 7
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR STARK COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO :
:
Plaintiff-Appellee :
:
-vs- : JUDGMENT ENTRY
:
SEAN JOSEPH BLACKMON :
:
Defendant-Appellant : Case No. 2012 CA 00110
For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion, the
judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Stark County, Ohio, is reversed and
vacated.
Costs assessed to Appellee.
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JUDGES