Yeager v. Mansfield , 2012 Ohio 2908 ( 2012 )

[Cite as Yeager v. Mansfield, 2012-Ohio-2908.]
COURT OF APPEALS
RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
CARL YEAGER : JUDGES:
:
: Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, P.J.
Plaintiff-Appellant : Hon. William B. Hoffman, J.
: Hon. John W. Wise, J.
-vs- :
: Case No. 2011 CA 0085
CITY OF MANSFIELD, ET AL. :
:
:
Defendants-Appellees : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Richland County Court of
Common Pleas, Case No. 2011 CV 0450
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: June 25, 2012
APPEARANCES:
For Appellant: For Appellees:
BYRON D. CORLEY JOHN R. SPON
3 North Main Street LAW DIRECTOR
Suite 714 City of Mansfield
Mansfield, OH 44902 30 N. Diamond St.
Mansfield, OH 44902
Delaney, P.J.
{¶1} Plaintiff-Appellant Carl Yeager appeals the August 24, 2011 judgment
entry of the Richland County Court of Common Pleas adopting the July 25, 2011
Magistrate’s Decision dismissing Yeager’s administrative appeal for lack of
jurisdiction.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶2} On December 24, 2007, the City of Mansfield issued a demolition order
for the property located at 462 Lily Street in Mansfield, Ohio. Yeager is the owner of
the property. Yeager appealed the demolition order to the Mansfield City Planning
Commission.
{¶3} On March 11, 2011, the Mansfield City Planning Commission denied
Yeager’s appeal of the demolition order.
{¶4} Yeager filed a Complaint for Preliminary Injunction on April 8, 2011 with
the Richland County Court of Common Pleas. The administrative appeal named the
Appellants City of Mansfield and the members of the Mansfield City Planning
Commission as defendants. The Richland County Clerk of Courts served the City of
Mansfield with the administrative appeal on April 13, 2011.
{¶5} The City of Mansfield filed a Motion to Dismiss on April 18, 2011. The
motion argued pursuant to R.C. 2505.04 and R.C. 2505.07, Yeager did not properly
perfect his appeal because the administrative agency was served with the appeal on
April 13, 2011, 33 days after the final order of the Mansfield City Planning
Commission. This was not within 30 days of the final order of the Mansfield City
Planning Commission; therefore, Yeager’s administrative appeal should be dismissed
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The City’s argument was based in part on the
Ohio Supreme Court decision, Welsh Dev. Co. v. Warren Cty. Regional Planning
Comm., 128 Ohio St.3d 471, 2011-Ohio-1604, 946 N.E.2d 215, issued March 29,
2011.
{¶6} Yeager filed a response on April 26, 2011. Yeager argued Welsh was
not applicable to his case because the final order was issued on March 11, 2011 and
Welsh was decided on March 29, 2011.
{¶7} The case was assigned to the magistrate. On March 25, 2011, the
magistrate held an evidentiary hearing on the City’s Motion to Dismiss.
{¶8} The magistrate issued his magistrate’s decision on July 25, 2011. The
magistrate applied Welsh and found Yeager did not comply with R.C. 2505.07. The
magistrate recommended the City’s Motion to Dismiss be granted for lack of
jurisdiction of the administrative appeal. The magistrate’s decision contained the
requisite Civ.R. 53 language notifying the parties of the right to file objections to the
decision.
{¶9} No objections were filed. On August 24, 2011, the trial court adopted the
July 25, 2011 magistrate’s decision and entered judgment.
{¶10} It is from this decision Yeager now appeals.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶11} Yeager raises one Assignment of Error:
{¶12} “WHETHER YEAGER IS ENTITLED TO RELIEF FROM THE TRIAL
COURT’S DENIAL OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.”
ANALYSIS
{¶13} Yeager argues in his sole Assignment of Error the trial court erred in
dismissing his administrative appeal. We disagree.
FAILURE TO OBJECT TO MAGISTRATE’S DECISION
{¶14} The underlying case was assigned to the magistrate. On March 25, 2011,
the magistrate held an evidentiary hearing on the City’s Motion to Dismiss. The
magistrate issued his decision on July 25, 2011, recommending the motion to dismiss
be granted. The magistrate’s decision included the requisite Civ.R. 53 language, which
stated: “Within fourteen (14) days of the filing of a magistrate’s order, a party may file
written objections to the magistrate’s order. Objections shall be specific and state with
particularity the grounds of objection. A party shall not assign as error on appeal the
court’s adoption of any finding of fact or conclusion of law in that decision unless the
party timely and specifically objects to that finding or conclusion as required by Civ.R.
53(E)(3).”
{¶15} Yeager did not file an objection to the magistrate’s decision. On August
24, 2011, the trial court adopted the decision of the magistrate and entered judgment
in the case.
{¶16} When a party fails to file objections to a magistrate's decision, Civ.R.
53(D)(3)(b)(iv) provides that “a party shall not assign as error on appeal the court's
adoption of any factual finding or legal conclusion * * * unless the party has objected to
that finding or conclusion as required by Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b).” Postel v. Koksal, 5th Dist.
No. 08–COA–0002, 2009–Ohio–252, ¶ 25.
{¶17} We note, however, that authority exists in Ohio law for the proposition that
Yeager’s failure to object to the magistrate's decision does not bar appellate review for
“plain error.” In re Lemon, 5th Dist. No. 2002 CA 00098, 2002–Ohio–6263. The
doctrine of plain error is limited to exceptionally rare cases in which the error, left
unobjected to at the trial court, “rises to the level of challenging the legitimacy of the
underlying judicial process itself.” See Goldfuss v. Davidson, 79 Ohio St.3d 116, 122,
1997–Ohio–401, 679 N.E.2d 1099.
{¶18} We will review Yeager’s Assignment of Error under the plain error
doctrine.
COMPLIANCE WITH R.C. 2505.04 AND R.C. 2505.07
{¶19} “[W]hen the right to appeal is conferred by statute, an appeal can be
perfected only in the manner prescribed by the applicable statute.” Welsh, 128 Ohio
St.3d 471, 2011-Ohio-1604, 946 N.E.2d 215, ¶ 14 citing McCruter v. Bur. Of Emp.
Servs. Bd. Of Review, 64 Ohio St.2d 277, 279, 415 N.E.2d 259 (1980).
{¶20} R.C. 2504.04 governs the manner in which an administrative appeal is
perfected. The statute reads:
An appeal is perfected when a written notice of appeal is filed, in
the case of an appeal of a final order, judgment, or decree of a court, in
accordance with the Rules of Appellate Procedure or the Rules of
Practice of the Supreme Court, or, in the case of an administrative-
related appeal, with the administrative officer, agency, board,
department, tribunal, commission, or other instrumentality involved.
{¶21} R.C. 2505.07 requires a party wishing to appeal an administrative
decision to perfect his appeal within 30 days after the administrative body enters that
decision.
{¶22} “The requirements of R.C. 2505.04 and 2505.07 are jurisdictional rather
than merely procedural.” Deaconess Hosp. v. Ohio Dept. Job & Family Servs., 10th
Dist. No. 11AP-259, 2012-Ohio-95, ¶ 15 citing Roberts v. Pleasant Local School Dist.
Bd. of Edn., 3rd Dist. No. 9–11–04, 2011–Ohio–4560, ¶ 13.
{¶23} The issue of how an administrative appeal is perfected was discussed in
Welsh Dev. Co. v. Warren Cty. Regional Planning Comm., 128 Ohio St.3d 471, 2011-
Ohio-1604, 946 N.E.2d 215. The Ohio Supreme Court held:
An administrative appeal is considered filed and perfected for
purposes of R.C. 2505.04 if the clerk of courts serves upon the
administrative agency a copy of the notice of the appeal filed in the court
of common pleas and the administrative agency is served within the time
period prescribed by R.C. 2505.07.
Welsh, supra, at the syllabus.
{¶24} In Welsh, the Ohio Supreme Court recognized there was a conflict in the
appellate districts as to whether an administrative appeal is perfected through a clerk
of courts’ service of a notice of appeal on an agency or whether the party must file the
notice of the appeal directly with the administrative agency. The question before the
Court in Welsh was: “Is a service of summons by a clerk of courts upon an
administrative agency, together with a copy of a notice of appeal filed in the common
pleas court, sufficient to perfect an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2504.04 as
long as the agency receives the notice within the time prescribed by R.C. 2505.07?”
Welsh, supra at ¶ 13. As stated above, the Court answered the question affirmatively.
Id. The question in Welsh went directly to the method of delivery of the notice of
appeal pursuant to R.C. 2504.04.
{¶25} Welsh, however, did not address the time requirement in R.C. 2505.07.
Welsh made no clarification or adjustment to R.C. 2505.07, which states an appeal
must be perfected within 30 days from the date of the final order.
{¶26} The Court stated:
We are not redefining the word “filing” in holding that an
administrative appeal may be perfected when a party files a notice of
appeal with the clerk of courts accompanied by a praecipe for the clerk
to serve the complaint and notice of the appeal on the administrative
agency. Filing does not occur until there is actual receipt by the agency
within the time prescribed by R.C. 2505.07. Filing and service are still
distinct terms.
Practitioners should not be confused or think that filing under R.C.
2505.04 is accomplished only if the clerk of courts serves upon the
administrative agency a copy of the notice of the appeal filed in the court
of common pleas. The administrative agency must still receive the
appropriate complaint and notice within 30 days after entry of the final
administrative order. The appellant may use any method reasonably
certain to accomplish delivery to the agency within the required 30 days,
which is filing that satisfies the jurisdictional requirement for an
administrative appeal.
Welsh, supra at ¶ 39-40.
{¶27} Yeager argues that Welsh is not applicable to his administrative appeal
because it was decided on March 29, 2011, which was after the final order was
entered in this case on March 11, 2011. The record shows that Yeager in fact
complied with Welsh by having the Richland County Clerk of Courts serve the notice
of appeal upon the City. A close examination of this case reveals we are not
presented with the question of whether Welsh is applicable to Yeager. The issue in
this case is whether Yeager complied with the time requirement found in R.C.
2505.07.
{¶28} In this case, the final order was entered on Friday, March 11, 2011.
Thirty days from Friday, March 11, 2011 was Sunday, April 10, 2011. Under R.C.
1.14, “[t]he time within which an act is required by law to be done shall be computed
by excluding the first and including the last day; except that, when the last day falls on
Sunday or a legal holiday, the act may be done on the next succeeding day that is not
Sunday or a legal holiday.” Therefore, Yeager was required to perfect his appeal by
Monday, April 11, 2011. The City received service of Yeager’s administrative appeal
on April 13, 2011.
{¶29} The record shows that the City did not receive the administrative appeal
within 30 days of the March 11, 2011 final order as required by R.C. 2505.07. Thus,
Yeager did not properly invoke the jurisdiction of the common pleas court. We find no
plain error in the trial court’s decision to dismiss Yeager’s administrative appeal.
CONCLUSION
{¶30} For the foregoing reasons, Yeager’s sole Assignment of Error is
overruled.
{¶31} The judgment of the Richland County Court of Common Pleas is
affirmed.
By: Delaney, P.J.
Hoffman, J. and
Wise, J. concur.
HON. PATRICIA A. DELANEY
HON. WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN
HON. JOHN W. WISE
PAD:kgb
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
:
CARL YEAGER :
:
Plaintiff - Appellant : JUDGMENT ENTRY
:
:
-vs- :
: Case No. 2011 CA 0085
CITY OF MANSFIELD, et al. :
:
Defendants-Appellees :
:
For the reasons stated in our accompanying Opinion on file, the judgment of the
Richland County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Costs assessed to Appellant.
HON. PATRICIA A. DELANEY
HON. WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN
HON. JOHN W. WISE