Helfrich v. Madison , 2012 Ohio 551 ( 2012 )

[Cite as Helfrich v. Madison, 2012-Ohio-551.]
COURT OF APPEALS
LICKING COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
JAMES HELFRICH JUDGES:
Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P. J.
Plaintiff-Appellant Hon. John W. Wise, J.
Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
-vs-
Case No. 11 CA 26
TIMOTHY G. MADISON, et al.
Defendants-Appellees OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil Appeal from the Court of Common
Pleas, Case No. 07 CV 394
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: February 13, 2012
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellant For Defendants-Appellees
CHRISTOPHER M. CORRIGAN KRISTIN E. ROSAN
19041 Lake Road TIMOTHY G. MADISON
Rocky River, Ohio 44116 DARCY A. SHAFER
MADISON & ROSAN
39 East Whittier Street
Columbus, Ohio 43206
Licking County, Case No. 11 CA 26 2
Wise, J.
{¶1} Appellant, James Helfrich, appeals a judgment of the Licking County
Common Pleas Court finding him to be a vexatious litigator. Appellees are Timothy
Madison, Madison & Rosan L.L.P., Carol Strickland, David Garner and N.R.T.
Columbus Inc. D.B.A. Coldwell Banker King Thompson Realty.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND CASE
{¶2} Appellant filed the instant action on March 16, 2007, for abuse of process,
tortious interference with a business relationship and fraud.
{¶3} On April 13, 2007, Appellees filed a Counterclaim, alleging that Appellant
was a vexatious litigator as defined by R.C. 2323.52(A)(2).
{¶4} Appellees moved for summary judgment on their counterclaim. The trial
court granted summary judgment and declared Appellant to be a vexatious litigator.
{¶5} In a Judgment Entry filed November 25, 2008, the trial granted Appellee’s
motion for summary judgment. The trial court found that the instant case arose out of a
dispute during a previous suit filed by Appellant. In its conclusions of law, the trial court
stated that in February of 2004, Appellant filed suit in Licking County Municipal Court
against Appellees Strickland, Garner and Coldwell Banker over the sale of property to
Appellant. Appellant dismissed the municipal court case and brought suit for the same
claims in Licking County Common Pleas Court (Case No. 05 CV 00120) in January of
2005, “inexplicably seeking $27,000.00 in damages.” The trial court stated that
Appellees were granted summary judgment when Appellant failed to present any
evidence of damages. In that case, Appellant sought to amend to join the defendants’
Licking County, Case No. 11 CA 26 3
counsel, Timothy Madison, as a defendant. The motion was denied, and Appellant
brought the instant action (Case No. 07-CV-00394) including claims against Madison.
{¶6} The trial court noted that Appellees had cited numerous instances of
vexatious conduct in the instant case and in Case No. 05 CV 00120, as well as
numerous instances of “similarly frivolous and malicious behavior” in cases filed by
Appellant against other defendants. The trial court held that the many instances of
Appellant’s behavior in this case and in 05CV00120 were more than sufficient to
constitute vexatious behavior. The trial court stated:
{¶7} “While plaintiff is entitled to criticize the justice system, he is not entitled to
abuse process, waste the Court’s time, and use repeated frivolous filings to do so.
Plaintiff mistakenly believes his First Amendment rights include using civil actions as a
vehicle to express his disenchantment with the legal processes. The evidence
submitted by defendant shows habitual and persistent conduct on the part of plaintiff
that consists of impugning defendants, opposing counsel, judges, and the judicial
system. Plaintiff even continues this conduct in his memorandum contra defendants’
motion for summary judgment, maligning defendants Strickland and Madison and
raising issues that this Court and the Supreme Court have already ruled upon. This
conduct rises to the level of harassment and is a strain on the Court’s time and
patience.”
{¶8} The trial court declared Appellant to be a vexatious litigator as defined in
R.C. §2323.52(A). The trial court held that unless Appellant has leave of court, he is
prohibited from instituting legal proceedings in the court of claims or in a court of
Licking County, Case No. 11 CA 26 4
common pleas, municipal court, or county court, and from continuing any legal
proceedings that he had instituted in any of these courts prior to the entry of the order.
{¶9} Appellant filed an appeal from this decision to this Court.
{¶10} Up to this point, Appellant had also filed at least six separate requests to
disqualify Judge Marcelain. On December 18, 2008, the Supreme issued a Judgment
Entry stating the statutory right to seek disqualification of a judge is an extraordinary
remedy not to be used in a frivolous manner. The Supreme Court warned Appellant
“that the filing of any further frivolous, unsubstantiated, or repeated affidavits of
disqualification may result in the imposition of appropriate sanctions.”
{¶11} By Opinion dated September 28, 2009, this Court found that the trial court
relied on improper evidentiary material from Case No. 05 CV 00120 in granting
summary judgment. The decision of the trial court was vacated and the matter was
remanded back to the trial court for further proceedings. Helfrich v. Madison, Licking
County Case No. 08-CA-150, 2009-Ohio-5140.
{¶12} Upon remand, on October 20, 2009, Appellees refiled their summary
judgment motion on the vexatious litigator counterclaim.
{¶13} On October 28, 2009, Appellant filed a document entitled Plaintiffs
Memorandum Contra to Judge Thomas Marcelain's Motion to Quash. Attached to the
Memorandum Contra as Exhibit N is a copy of a Certified Check to Federal Court Judge
Greg Frost dated October 8, 2003. The statement following the check indicates the
check is offered to Judge Frost if he will swear on the Bible that he has never done
anything unethical and has no reason to believe there is corruption or unethical practice
within the judicial system.
Licking County, Case No. 11 CA 26 5
{¶14} On December 15, 2009, Judge Marcelain petitioned the Supreme Court
for the appointment of a visiting judge and Judge Richard Markus was assigned to the
case.
{¶15} From November 18, 2010, through November 23, 2010, the trial court
commenced, but did not conclude, a bench trial on Appellees’ counterclaim. The trial
was recessed until January 5, 2011. The parties completed presentation of evidence
and oral arguments on the counterclaim on January 7, 2011.
{¶16} Between November 23, 2010 and January 5, 2011, Appellant filed a
number of documents, including nine subpoenas. Appellant filed three “Notices” to the
Court and one motion to have the judge pick up a video-taped deposition from the
Clerk's Office. On December 7, 2010, Appellant sent facsimile correspondence to the
presiding judge and Appellees' trial counsel containing what has been characterized as
a threat to the judge concerning a voicemail recording left the previous day.
{¶17} The trial court filed its Judgment entry on March 4, 2011.
{¶18} Appellant now assigns eight errors on appeal:
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
{¶19} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION TO COMPEL
THE DEPOSITION OF KRISTIN ROSAN.
{¶20} “II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE [SIC] JAMES
HELFRICH A TRIAL BY JURY WHEN THE STATUTE IS A DECLARATORY
JUDGMENT ACTION AND THERE ARE ISSUES OF FACT THAT A JURY MUST
DETERMINE.
Licking County, Case No. 11 CA 26 6
{¶21} “III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TAKING JUDICIAL NOTICE OF
DOCUMENTS IN THE RECORD PURSUANT TO EVIDENTIARY RULE 201(E)
WITHOUT INFORMING THE PARTIES OF WHAT INFORMATION WAS BEING
REVIEWED AND FOR WHAT PURPOSE THE DOCUMENTS WERE TO BE
CONSIDERED.
{¶22} “IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TAKING JUDICIAL NOTICE OF
DOCUMENTS IN THE RECORD PURSUANT TO EVIDENTIARY RULE 201(E) WHEN
THERE WAS TESTIMONY THAT CERTAIN DOCUMENTS HAD BEEN IMPROPERLY
PLACED IN THE RECORD BY A THIRD-PARTY.
{¶23} “V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING HELFRICH THE RIGHT
TO CALL WITNESSES WHO WOULD TESTIFY AS TO DISCUSSIONS HE HAD
ABOUT APPROPRIAE [SIC] COURT DECORUM.
{¶24} “VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN QUASHING THE SUBPOENA OF
JUDGE MARCELAIN WHEN EVIDENCE SHOWED THAT CERTAIN DOCUMENTS
HAD BEEN PLACED IN THE RECORD BY HIM.
{¶25} “VII. THE COURT ERRED IN RELYING ON EXCERPTS OF CASES
INSTEAD OF REVIEING [SIC] THE ENTIRE RECORD OF EACH CASE TO
DETERMINE WHETHER APPELLANT HAD ENGAGED IN VEXATIOUS CONDUCT IN
PREVIOUS SUITS.
{¶26} “VIII. THE COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE [SIC] HELFRICH WAS A
VEXATIOUS LITIGATOR WHEN THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
SUCH DETERMINATION.”
Licking County, Case No. 11 CA 26 7
I.
{¶27} In his first assignment of error, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in
denying his motion to compel the deposition of Kristen Rosan. We disagree.
{¶28} Appellant herein deposed Attorney Kristen Rosan on May 28, 2010.
During the deposition, Appellant questioned Attorney Rosan regarding her affidavit
which was attached to Appellees’ Reply in Support of their Motion for Summary
Judgment. Attorney Rosen responded to a number of questions by stating that she did
not have any personal knowledge outside of her capacity as a lawyer in the case. On
June 21, 2010, Appellant filed a motion to compel.
{¶29} The trial court herein found that Attorney Rosen is not a fact witness in this
case, that the summary judgment motion which the affidavit supported had been
abandoned, that Attorney Rosen was not filing an affidavit in support of a renewed
motion for summary judgment, and finally that there was no evidence that Attorney
Rosen’s client had waived the attorney-client privilege.
{¶30} Revised Code 2317.02(A) provides for testimonial privilege. It prevents an
attorney from testifying concerning communications made to the attorney by a client or
the attorney's advice to a client. A testimonial privilege applies not only to prohibit
testimony at trial, but also to protect the sought-after communications during the
discovery process.
{¶31} Upon review, we find the trial court did not err in denying Appellant’s
motion to compel.
{¶32} Appellant’s first assignment of error is overruled.
Licking County, Case No. 11 CA 26 8
II.
{¶33} In his second assignment of error, Appellant argues that he had the right
to jury trial on the issue of whether he is a vexatious litigator pursuant to R.C. §2323.52.
We disagree.
{¶34} Appellant’s argument fails to take into account that the right to a jury trial is
not absolute. Section 5, Article I applies only to those causes of action to which the right
attached at common law when Section 5 was adopted. See Arrington v.
DaimlerChrysler Corp., 109 Ohio St.3d 539, 2006-Ohio-3257, 849 N.E.2d 1004; see
also, Belding v. State ex rel. Heifner (1929), 121 Ohio St. 393, 169 N.E. 301, paragraph
one of the syllabus.
{¶35} The vexatious litigator statute by its own terms clearly indicates that it
provides a form of declaratory judgment, and that certain consequences flow from the
trial court's declaration that a person is a vexatious litigator.
{¶36} A civil action under the statute constitutes a specific statutory and legal
action with statutorily prescribed remedies which did not exist at common law.
{¶37} Appellant’s second assignment of error is overruled.
III., IV.
{¶38} In his third and fourth assignments of error, Appellant argues that the trial
court erred in taking judicial notice of certain documents in the record. We disagree.
{¶39} Evid.R. 201 governs the trial court's ability to take judicial notice of
adjudicative facts, or the facts of the case. Further, the court has the power to take
judicial notice of its own records and judicial notice of its own actions in earlier
Licking County, Case No. 11 CA 26 9
proceedings of the same case. Diversified Mortgage Investors, Inc. v. Athens Cty. Bd. of
Revision (1982), 7 Ohio App.3d 157, 159, 454 N.E.2d 1330.
{¶40} In the instant action, the trial court took judicial notice of the entire record
of the matter herein, all of which was known to Appellant.
{¶41} This Court has stated in dicta that we agreed with the proposition that the
trial court can take judicial notice of prior lawsuits filed in its own court. Lansing v.
Hybud Equipment Co., Stark App.No. 002CA00112, 2002-Ohio-5869, ¶ 16. A trial court
can take judicial notice of the court's docket. State v. Washington (August 27, 1987,
Cuyahoga App. Nos. 52676, 52677, 52678 at 15. However, a court does not have the
authority to take judicial notice of the proceedings in another case, including its own
judgment entries. Eg., State v. LaFever, Belmont App. No. 02 BE 71, 2003-Ohio-6545,
¶ 27; State v. Blaine, Highland App. No. 03CA9, 2004-Ohio-1241, ¶ 17; Diversified
Mortgage Investors, Inc. v. Athens Cty. Bd. of Revision (1982), 7 Ohio App.3d 157, 454
N.E.2d 1330; NorthPoint Properties, Inc. v. Petticord, 179 Ohio App.3d 342, 2008-Ohio-
5996, ¶ 16. The rationale for this holding is that if a trial court takes notice of a prior
proceeding, the appellate court cannot review whether the trial court correctly
interpreted the prior case because the record of the prior case is not before the
appellate court. Eg. Blaine, supra, ¶ 17; LaFever, supra, ¶ 27; Buoscio, supra, ¶ 34.
{¶42} Appellant’s third and fourth assignments of error are overruled.
V., VI.
{¶43} In his fifth and sixth assignments of error, Appellant argues that the trial
court erred in quashing the subpoena of Judge Marcelain and in denying him the right to
Licking County, Case No. 11 CA 26 10
call witnesses to testify as to discussions he had concerning “appropriate court
decorum”. We disagree.
{¶44} In the instant case, Appellant subpoenaed Judge Marcelain, the judge
who had presided over Appellant’s case before Judge Markus was appointed.
Appellant argues that the purpose for subpoenaing Judge Marcelain was to have him
testify as to private conversations which took place between him and Appellant
regarding “how the legal system works” and “issues of courtroom decorum”. Appellant
wanted to offer this testimony in support of his actions in these legal proceedings.
{¶45} A trial court is vested with broad discretion in determining the admissibility
of evidence in any particular case, so long as such discretion is exercised in line with
the rules of procedure and evidence. The admission of relevant evidence rests within
the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Sage (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 173, 31,
paragraph two of the syllabus. An appellate court that reviews the trial court's admission
or exclusion of evidence must limit its review to whether the lower court abused its
discretion. State v. Finnerty (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 104, 107. As this Court has noted
many times, the term ‘abuse of discretion’ connotes more than an error of law; it implies
that the court acted unreasonably, arbitrarily or unconscionably. E.g., Blakemore v.
Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 5 OBR 481, 482, 450 N.E.2d 1140, 1142.”
{¶46} A reviewing court should be slow to interfere unless the court has clearly
abused its discretion and a party has been materially prejudiced thereby. State v.
Maurer (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 239, 264, 473 N.E.2d 768, 791. The trial court must
determine whether the probative value of the evidence and/or testimony is substantially
Licking County, Case No. 11 CA 26 11
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, or of confusing or misleading the jury. See
State v. Lyles (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 98, 537 N.E.2d 221.
{¶47} Upon review, we do not find that the trial court abused its discretion by
quashing the subpoena for Judge Marcelain. We find that even if Judge Marcelain had
personal knowledge as to Appellant’s motivation for his comment or comments, which is
very unlikely, such knowledge is irrelevant in that it is the effect of Appellant’s conduct
and/or actions which is required for a finding of vexatious litigation, not the motivation.
{¶48} Appellant’s fifth and sixth assignments of error are overruled.
VII., VIII.
{¶49} In his seventh and eighth assignments of error, Appellant argues that the
trial court erred in determining that Appellant is a vexatious litigator. We disagree.
{¶50} Appellant argues that the trial court failed to review the entire record in
making its determination.
{¶51} Vexatious litigator is defined in R.C. § 2323.52(A) as:
{¶52} “[A]ny person who has habitually, persistently, and without reasonable
grounds engaged in vexatious conduct in a civil action or actions, whether in the court of
claims or in a court of appeals, court of common pleas, municipal court, or county court,
whether the person or another person instituted the civil action or actions, and whether
the vexatious conduct was against the same party or against different parties in the civil
action or actions. “Vexatious litigator” does not include a person who is authorized to
practice law in the courts of this state under the Ohio Supreme Court Rules for the
Government of the Bar of Ohio unless that person is representing or has represented
self pro se in the civil action or actions.”
Licking County, Case No. 11 CA 26 12
{¶53} Additionally, “vexatious conduct” is defined as the conduct of a party in a
civil action that “obviously serves merely to harass or maliciously injure another party to
the civil action,” “is not warranted under existing law and cannot be supported by a good
faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law,” or “is imposed
solely for delay.” R.C. § 2323.52(A)(2)(a) through (c).
{¶54} Said section further provides:
{¶55} “(D)(1) If the person alleged to be a vexatious litigator is found to be a
vexatious litigator, subject to division (D)(2) of this section, the court of common pleas
may enter an order prohibiting the vexatious litigator from doing one or more of the
following without first obtaining the leave of that court to proceed:
{¶56} “(a) Instituting legal proceedings in the court of claims or in a court of
common pleas, municipal court, or county court;
{¶57} “(b) Continuing any legal proceedings that the vexatious litigator had
instituted in any of the courts specified in division (D)(1)(a) of this section prior to the
entry of the order;
{¶58} “(c) Making any application, other than an application for leave to proceed
under division (F)(1) of this section, in any legal proceedings instituted by the vexatious
litigator or another person in any of the courts specified in division (D)(1)(a) of this
section.
{¶59} “(2) If the court of common pleas finds a person who is authorized to
practice law in the courts of this state under the Ohio Supreme Court Rules for the
Government of the Bar of Ohio to be a vexatious litigator and enters an order described
in division (D)(1) of this section in connection with that finding, the order shall apply to
Licking County, Case No. 11 CA 26 13
the person only insofar as the person would seek to institute proceedings described in
division (D)(1)(a) of this section on a pro se basis, continue proceedings described in
division (D)(1)(b) of this section on a pro se basis, or make an application described in
division (D)(1)(c) of this section on a pro se basis. The order shall not apply to the
person insofar as the person represents one or more other persons in the person's
capacity as a licensed and registered attorney in a civil or criminal action or proceeding
or other matter in a court of common pleas, municipal court, or county court or in the
court of claims. Division (D)(2) of this section does not affect any remedy that is
available to a court or an adversely affected party under section 2323.51 or another
section of the Revised Code, under Civil Rule 11 or another provision of the Ohio Rules
of Civil Procedure, or under the common law of this state as a result of frivolous conduct
or other inappropriate conduct by an attorney who represents one or more clients in
connection with a civil or criminal action or proceeding or other matter in a court of
common pleas, municipal court, or county court or in the court of claims.”
{¶60} Declaring a plaintiff to be a vexatious litigator is “an extreme measure” that
should be granted only “when there is no nexus” between “the filings made by the
plaintiff and [his or her] intended claims.” McClure v. Fischer Attached Homes, 145 Ohio
Misc.2d 38, 882 N.E.2d 61, 2007-Ohio-7259 at ¶ 33.
{¶61} In the case at bar, after hearing days of testimony on the vexatious
litigator counterclaim, the trial court found by “clear and convincing evidence that Mr.
Helfrich has ‘habitually, persistently, and without reasonable grounds engaged in
vexatious conduct’ in multiple civil actions.” See Judgment Entry, March 4, 2011, at
page 19. In reaching this conclusion, the trial court thoroughly reviewed Appellant’s
Licking County, Case No. 11 CA 26 14
history of filing complaints, motions, and affidavits for disqualification in that Court, in
addition to Appellant’s conduct in connection with said cases. The trial court found that
Appellant’s “conduct ‘obviously serves merely to harass or maliciously injury another
party’ and/or ‘is not warranted under existing law and cannot be supported by a good
faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; and/or the
described conduct was “imposed solely for delay’.” Id. at 18-19.
{¶62} Based on our review of the record and Appellant’s numerous lawsuit and
copious filings, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding in favor of Appellees
on their vexatious litigator counterclaim. Upon review of the record, we find
overwhelming evidence that Appellant habitually files unnecessary, inappropriate, or
supernumerary pleadings and motions. Further, the record shows that Appellant insists
on raising and re-raising arguments which have been rejected by the trial court, and this
Court, sometimes repeatedly.
{¶63} While this Court is sympathetic to a party who feels he has suffered an
injustice, and takes all measures within the law to correct such, we find that Appellant's
actions have long passed this stage. His conduct in the various matters before the
Licking County Common Pleas Court are “vexatious,” within the meaning of the statute,
in that “[t]he conduct is not warranted under existing law and cannot be supported by a
good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.” R.C. §
2323.52(A)(2)(b). His conduct is also “vexatious” insofar as some of it “is imposed solely
for delay.” As such, the trial court properly declared him a vexatious litigator.
Licking County, Case No. 11 CA 26 15
{¶64} Appellant’s seventh and eighth assignments of error are overruled.
{¶65} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas,
Licking County, Ohio, is affirmed.
By: Wise, J.
Gwin, P. J., and
Delaney, J., concur.
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JUDGES
JWW/d 0124
Licking County, Case No. 11 CA 26 16
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR LICKING COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
JAMES HELFRICH :
:
Plaintiff-Appellant :
:
-vs- : JUDGMENT ENTRY
:
TIMOTHY G. MADISON, et al. :
:
Defendants-Appellees : Case No. 11 CA 26
For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion, the
judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Licking County, Ohio, is affirmed.
Costs assessed to Appellant.
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JUDGES