State v. Locke ( 2012 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Locke, 
    2012-Ohio-444
    .]
    COURT OF APPEALS
    MORGAN COUNTY, OHIO
    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    STATE OF OHIO
    Plaintiff-Appellee
    -vs-
    VINCENT ANDREW LOCKE
    Defendant-Appellee
    JUDGES:
    Hon. John W. Wise, P. J.
    Hon. Julie A. Edwards, J.
    Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
    Case No. 11 CA 2
    OPINION
    CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                       Criminal Appeal from the Court of Common
    Pleas, Case No. 10 CR 26
    JUDGMENT:                                      Affirmed
    DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                         February 6, 2012
    APPEARANCES:
    For Plaintiff-Appellee                         For Defendant-Appellant
    CINDY M. O'NEIL                                STEPHENIE N. LAPE
    ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR                           BLEILE, WITTE & LAPE
    19 East Main Street                            810 Sycamore Street, Fifth Floor
    McConnelsville, Ohio 43756                     Cincinnati, Ohio 45292
    Wise, P. J.
    {¶1}   Appellant Vincent Andrew Locke appeals his sentence following a
    conviction on five drug-related offenses..
    {¶2}   Appellee is the State of Ohio.
    {¶3}   This case comes to us on the accelerated calendar. App.R. 11.1, which
    governs accelerated calendar cases, provides, in pertinent part:
    {¶4}   “(E) Determination and judgment on appeal. The appeal will be
    determined as provided by App.R. 11.1. It shall be sufficient compliance with App.R.
    12(A) for the statement of the reason for the court’s decision as to each error to be in
    brief and conclusionary form. The decision may be by judgment entry in which case it
    will not be published in any form.”
    {¶5}   This appeal shall be considered in accordance with the aforementioned
    rule.
    STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
    {¶6}   On August 25, 2010, Appellant Vincent Andrew Locke was indicted on
    seven counts of Trafficking in Drugs in violation of R.C. §2925.03 and two counts of
    Possession of Drugs in violation of R.C. §2925.11.
    {¶7}   On February 23, 2011, Appellant entered a guilty plea to Count II
    Trafficking in Cocaine, in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1)(C)(4)(c), a felony of the fourth
    degree; Count III Trafficking in Marijuana, in violation of R.C. 2925.02(A)(1)(C)(3)(b), a
    felony of the fourth degree; Count IV Trafficking in heroin, in violation of R.C.
    2925.03(A)(1)(C)(6)(d), a felony of the second degree; Count V Trafficking in Marijuana
    in violation of R.C. 2925,03(A)(1)(C)(3)(b), a felony of the fourth degree; and Count IX
    Possession of Heroin, in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A)(C)(6)(d), a felony of the second
    degree.
    {¶8}   On April 20, 2011, at the sentencing hearing, the prosecuting attorney
    spoke for the State, setting forth the purpose and principles of sentencing and the
    seriousness of the convictions. The prosecuting attorney addressed the seriousness of
    Appellant's crimes, pointing out that at the time of the arrest, Appellant had over 100
    units of heroin, 13-1/2 grams of cocaine, and over 80 grams of marijuana in his
    possession. The heroin alone had been purchased for $900.00 and it had a resale value
    of $2,000.00, a profit of $1,100.00 to Appellant had he been successful in selling same.
    (T. at 3-4). It was further noted that similar offenders were given sentences ranging from
    six to sixteen years and eleven months by the trial court. (T. at 5-6).
    {¶9}   Appellant's attorney and his mother also spoke on Appellant’s behalf at
    the sentencing hearing, attributing his behavior to his age and the actions of a co-
    defendant. (T. at.15-16, 19-24). Appellant also addressed the court, acknowledging his
    youth and stated that there was nothing the co-defendant did that made him commit the
    crimes. He stated he had other motives. Appellant also apologized and expressed his
    sympathy for his family. (T. at 27).
    {¶10} The trial court sentenced Appellant to one year on each of Counts II, III,
    and V, four years on count IX, and 3 years on Count IV. (T. at 32-33). Counts III and IV
    were ordered to be served concurrently, but consecutive to Count II; and Counts V and
    IX were to be served concurrently but consecutive to Counts II, III, and IV for a total of
    eight years. Id. The trial court pointed out, Count IX required mandatory prison time, and
    the trial judge imposed four years mandatory term. Id
    {¶11} Appellant now appeals, assigning the following errors for review:
    ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    {¶12} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING MR. LOCKE TO A
    MANDATORY TERM OF FOUR YEARS ON COUNT IX.
    {¶13} “II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING MR. LOCKE TO
    CONSECUTIVE TERMS.”
    I., II.
    {¶14} We shall address Appellant’s assignments of error together as they both
    assign error to Appellant’s sentencing.
    {¶15} In his first and second assignments of error, Appellant claims that the trial
    court erred in sentencing Appellant to a mandatory term on Count IX and further erred
    in ordering his sentences be served consecutively. We disagree.
    {¶16}    In a plurality opinion, the Supreme Court of Ohio established a two-step
    procedure for reviewing a felony sentence. State v. Kalish, 
    120 Ohio St.3d 23
    , 2008-
    Ohio-4912, 
    896 N.E.2d 124
    . The first step is to “examine the sentencing court's
    compliance with all applicable rules and statutes in imposing the sentence to determine
    whether the sentence is clearly and convincingly contrary to law.” Kalish at ¶ 4. If this
    first step “is satisfied,” the second step requires the trial court's decision be “reviewed
    under an abuse-of-discretion standard.” 
    Id.
    {¶17} The relevant sentencing law is now controlled by the Ohio Supreme
    Court's decision in State v. Foster, i.e. “ * * * trial courts have full discretion to impose a
    prison sentence within the statutory range and are no longer required to make findings
    or give their reasons for imposing maximum, consecutive, or more than the minimum
    sentences.” 
    109 Ohio St.3d 1
    , 30, 
    2006-Ohio-856
     at ¶ 100, 
    845 N.E.2d 470
    , 498.
    {¶18} In the first step of our analysis, we review whether the sentence is
    contrary to law. In the case sub judice, Appellant was sentenced for two counts of
    trafficking in marijuana, each a felony of the fourth degree, one count of trafficking in
    heroin, a second degree felony, one count of trafficking in cocaine, a fourth degree
    felony, and one count of possession of heroin, a second degree felony.
    {¶19} Upon conviction for a felony of the second degree, the potential sentence
    that the trial court can impose is two, three, four, five, six, seven or eight years. The
    potential sentence for a fourth degree felony is six to eighteen months. Here, appellant
    was sentenced to a term of one year on each of the fourth degree felony counts, four
    years on the possession of heroin charge and three years on the trafficking in heroin
    charge, both second degree felonies.      Appellant’s aggregate prison term was eight
    years.
    {¶20} Upon review, we find that the trial court's sentencing on the charges
    complies with applicable rules and sentencing statutes. The sentences were within the
    statutory sentencing range. Furthermore, the record reflects that the trial court
    considered the purposes and principles of sentencing and the seriousness and
    recidivism factors as required in Sections 2929.11 and 2929.12 of the Ohio Revised
    Code and advised Appellant regarding post release control. Therefore, the sentences
    are not clearly and convincingly contrary to law.
    {¶21} Having determined that the sentence is not contrary to law we must now
    review the sentence pursuant to an abuse of discretion standard. Kalish at ¶ 4; State v.
    Firouzmandi, supra at ¶ 40. In reviewing the record, we find that the trial court gave
    careful and substantial deliberation to the relevant statutory considerations.
    {¶22} We find the trial court properly considered the purposes and principles of
    sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11, as well as the applicable factors set forth in R.C.
    2929.12, along with all other relevant factors and circumstances. While Appellant may
    disagree with the weight given to these factors by the trial judge, Appellant's sentence
    was within the applicable statutory range for a felonies of the second and fourth degree
    and therefore, we have no basis for concluding that it is contrary to law.
    {¶23} Similarly, the trial court's consecutive sentence cannot be said to be an
    abuse of discretion given the circumstances here. See Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983),
    
    5 Ohio St.3d 217
    , 219 (an abuse of discretion “implies that the court's attitude is
    unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.”).
    {¶24} The Supreme Court of Ohio held in State v. Hodge, 
    128 Ohio St.3d 1
    ,
    
    2010-Ohio-6320
    , “[f]or all the foregoing reasons, we hold that the decision of the United
    States Supreme Court in Oregon v. Ice [ (2009), 
    555 U.S. 160
    , 
    129 S.Ct. 711
    , 
    172 L.Ed.2d 517
    ], does not revive Ohio's former consecutive-sentencing statutory
    provisions, R.C. 2929.14(E)(4) and 2929.41(A), which were held unconstitutional in
    State v. Foster. Because the statutory provisions are not revived, trial court judges are
    not obligated to engage in judicial fact-finding prior to imposing consecutive sentences
    unless the General Assembly enacts new legislation requiring that findings be made.”
    See, State v. Fry, Delaware App. No. 10CAA090068, 
    2011-Ohio-2022
     at ¶ 16–17.
    {¶25} Appellant’s assignments of error are overruled.
    {¶26} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas
    Morgan County, Ohio, is affirmed.
    By: Wise, P. J.
    Edwards, J., and Delaney, J., concur.
    ___________________________________
    ___________________________________
    ___________________________________
    JUDGES
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR MORGAN COUNTY, OHIO
    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    STATE OF OHIO                             :
    :
    Plaintiff-Appellee                 :
    :
    -vs-                                      :        JUDGMENT ENTRY
    :
    VINCENT ANDREW LOCKE                      :
    :
    Defendant-Appellee                 :        Case No. 11 CA 2
    For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion, the
    judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Morgan County, Ohio, is affirmed.
    Costs assessed to Appellant.
    ___________________________________
    ___________________________________
    ___________________________________
    JUDGES
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 11 CA 2

Judges: Wise

Filed Date: 2/6/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021