Waite v. Mahalaxmi, Inc. ( 2012 )


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  • [Cite as Waite v. Mahalaxmi, Inc., 
    2012-Ohio-15
    .]
    COURT OF APPEALS
    FAIRFIELD COUNTY, OHIO
    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    JUDGES:
    LYNN H. WAITE                                       :       Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.
    :       Hon. John W. Wise, J.
    Plaintiff-Appellant         :       Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
    :
    -vs-                                                :
    :       Case No. 2011-CA-00028
    MAHALAXMI, INC.                                     :
    :
    Defendant-Appellee             :       OPINION
    CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                                Civil appeal from the Fairfield County Court
    of Common Pleas, Case No. 2009CV1308
    JUDGMENT:                                               Reversed and Remanded
    DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                                 January 3, 2012
    APPEARANCES:
    For Plaintiff-Appellant                                 For Defendant-Appellee
    MARK A. CHUPARKOFF                                      CLARE E. KRUMLAUF
    CHUPARKOFF LAW OFFICE                                   280 N. High Street, Ste. 1010
    Box 3775                                                Columbus, OH 43215
    Dublin, OH 43016
    [Cite as Waite v. Mahalaxmi, Inc., 
    2012-Ohio-15
    .]
    Gwin, P.J.
    {1}    Plaintiff-appellant Lynn H. Waite appeals a judgment of the Court of
    Common Pleas of Fairfield County, Ohio, which found her claim against defendant-
    appellee Mahalaxmi, Inc. was barred by the statute of limitations. Appellant assigns a
    single error to the trial court:
    {2}    “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN GRANTING
    APPELLEE’S MOTION TO DISMISS/MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
    TO THE EXTENT THAT OHIO LAW PERMITS SERVICE OF A COMPLAINT OUTSIDE
    OF ONE YEAR.”
    {3}    The record indicates appellant stayed at a Best Western Hotel owned and
    operated by appellee. Appellant alleges during her stay she was the victim of a bed bug
    attack, resulting in numerous personal injuries to her.
    {4}    Appellant filed suit against appellee on October 7, 2009, and on the same
    day requested service by certified mail. The certified mail was unclaimed, and appellant
    issued a praecipe on April 13, 2010 to the clerk of courts for certified mail. Service was
    not perfected again. On October 14, 2010, appellant requested service by ordinary U.S.
    Mail.
    {5}    On February 2, 2011, appellees filed a motion to dismiss alleging appellant
    had failed to commence her suit within the applicable statute of limitations. The trial
    court found appellant had one year from the filing to obtain service on appellee and
    commence the action, but failed to do so. The court found under Goolsby v. Anderson
    Concrete Company (1991), 
    61 Ohio St. 3d 549
    , 
    575 N.E. 2d 801
    , appellant’s issuing of
    a praecipe for ordinary mail service on October 14, 2010 was the equivalent of
    Fairfield County, Case No. 2011-CA-00028                                                        3
    dismissing and re-filing her action. The court found the re-filing did not occur during the
    statute of limitations or within one year of the filing date, and for this reason, the savings
    statute did not allow appellant to re-file her complaint.
    {6}   For the reasons stated below, we do not agree.
    {7}   In Goolsby, and the subsequent case of Sisk & Associates, Inc. v.
    Committee to Elect Timothy Grendell, 
    123 Ohio St. 3d 447
    , 
    2009-Ohio-5591
    , the Ohio
    Supreme Court explained the law establishing the filing and service of a complaint. In
    Goolsby, the plaintiff filed a complaint on February 6, 1986, and asked the clerk to hold
    service of the summons and complaint. Two days before the statute of limitations ran,
    on July 17, 1987, plaintiff directed the clerk to issue a summons, and service was
    obtained on July 23, 1987. The Supreme Court cited Civ. R. 3 (A), which provides a
    civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court if service is obtained within
    one year after such filing upon a named defendant. The Supreme Court explained one
    clear consequence of this provision is that it is not necessary to actually serve the
    defendant within the statute of limitations. A plaintiff could arguably file her complaint on
    the last day of the limitations period and still have a full year in which to obtain service.
    {8}   The court found while technically, it could find plaintiff had not commenced
    her action, she could dismiss her case and re-file an identical complaint. The Supreme
    Court found if service has not been obtained within one year of filing of the complaint,
    and the subsequent re-filing of an identical complaint within rule would provide an
    additional year within which to obtain service and commence an action under Civ. R. 3
    (A), an instruction to the clerk to attempt service on the complaint would be the
    equivalent of dismissing and re-filing the complaint.
    Fairfield County, Case No. 2011-CA-00028                                                    4
    {9}    The Goolsby court also noted Civ. R. 4 (E) permits the court to dismiss a
    case without prejudice if service is not made within six months after filing the complaint.
    This provision allows courts to clear their dockets of cases in which plaintiffs have not
    pursued service on a defendant, and would be applied if a plaintiff has neglected to
    attempt service after original service of process fails. The Supreme Court found the trial
    court should have dismissed the complaint without prejudice because service was not
    attempted, and then, the plaintiff would have been required to re-file her complaint. The
    Supreme Court found the original complaint, however, was never dismissed by the
    court, so the filing of the new praecipe constituted a voluntary dismissal and re-filing.
    {10} In Sisk, 
    supra,
     the Supreme Court found if a plaintiff files an instruction for
    a clerk to attempt service of a complaint that was filed more than a year prior, the
    instruction is a notice of voluntary dismissal of the claims, but if the plaintiff has
    previously filed a dismissal of a complaint making the same claim, then by action of law
    the two dismissal rule results in dismissal of the case with prejudice.
    {11}   The situation is complicated by R.C. 2305.19, commonly known as the
    savings statute. The savings statute provides; “ in an action commenced, or attempted
    to be commenced, if in due time *** the plaintiff fails otherwise than upon the merits, and
    the time limited for further commencement of such action at the date of *** failure has
    expired, the plaintiff *** may commence a new action within one year after such date.”
    {12} Civ. R. 3 provides an action is commenced if service is perfected within
    one year of filing. Formerly, the more problematic area was whether the action is
    “attempted to be commenced” if the plaintiff files the action but fails to serve the
    defendant within one year. In Thomas v. Freeman, 79 Ohio State 3d 221, 1997-Ohio-
    Fairfield County, Case No. 2011-CA-00028                                                  5
    395, 
    680 N.E. 2d 997
    , the Ohio Supreme Court explained that Ms. Thomas filed her
    initial complaint and demanded service before the two-year statute of limitations
    expired. She did not perfect service and the court dismissed her case. The Supreme
    Court held a dismissal for failure to accomplish service is otherwise than on the merits
    and without prejudice. Syllabus by the court, paragraph 1. The court concluded if a case
    is dismissed for lack of service, the saving statute permits a plaintiff to re-file the case
    within one year if all other procedural requirements have been met. Syllabus, paragraph
    2.
    {13} In Abel v. Safety First Industries, Cuyahoga App. No. 80550, 2002-Ohio-
    6482, the court found prior to the Thomas decision, courts had found an action is
    commenced or attempted to be commenced, for purposes of R.C. 2305.19, only if
    effective service of process is obtained upon a defendant. Abel at paragraph 40,
    citations deleted. The court of appeals concluded that after Thomas, the applicability of
    R.C. 2305.19 is not limited only to circumstances where effective service of process has
    been obtained. Rather, by its express language, the savings statute also applies where
    there has been an attempt to commence an action. Abel at paragraph 42.
    {14} The Abel court also found technically the suit failed otherwise than on the
    merits on the date one year after the first lawsuit was filed, following which the lawsuit
    could no longer be commenced. However, the court of appeals reasoned that to liberally
    construe the Rules in order to resolve cases on their merits, the time should run from
    the date the court actually dismissed the case, which was some time after the year had
    expired. Id at paragraph 45.
    Fairfield County, Case No. 2011-CA-00028                                                    6
    {15} In Goolsby, the Supreme Court noted the plaintiff had not attempted
    service within six months, and the trial court could have dismissed her case for failure to
    prosecute pursuant to Civ. R. 4. In the case before us, the record shows appellant
    attempted service with the filing of the complaint. Appellant should not be in a worse
    situation than the plaintiff in Goolsby because she actively attempted to pursue her
    claim. After the initial failure of service, appellant made further attempts to serve the
    complaint during the year following the filing. We conclude she “attempted to
    commence” the action by filing her complaint and her original praecipe for service within
    the two year statute of limitations. Because she had attempted to commence her case,
    the saving statute applies to extend the time for filing past the statute of limitations.
    {16} We also find appellant’s April 13, 2010 praecipe does not constitute a
    dismissal and re-filing, because if service had been successful then, it would have been
    made within the one year of filing, and neither the Goolsby rule nor the savings statute
    would be necessary to preserve appellant’s action.
    {17} We conclude the trial court erred in finding the statute of limitations barred
    appellant’s claim.
    {18} The assignment of error is sustained.
    Fairfield County, Case No. 2011-CA-00028                                         7
    {19} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of
    Fairfield, Ohio, is reversed, and the cause is remanded to that court for further
    proceedings in accord with law and consistent with this opinion.
    By Gwin, P.J.,
    Wise, J., and
    Delaney, J., concur
    _________________________________
    HON. W. SCOTT GWIN
    _________________________________
    HON. JOHN W. WISE
    _________________________________
    HON. PATRICIA A. DELANEY
    WSG:clw 1212
    [Cite as Waite v. Mahalaxmi, Inc., 
    2012-Ohio-15
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR FAIRFIELD COUNTY, OHIO
    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    LYNN H. WAITE                                       :
    :
    Plaintiff-Appellant      :
    :
    :
    -vs-                                                :       JUDGMENT ENTRY
    :
    MAHALAXMI, INC.                                     :
    :
    :
    Defendant-Appellee          :       CASE NO. 2011-CA-00028
    For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion, the judgment of
    the Court of Common Pleas of Fairfield, Ohio, is reversed, and the cause is remanded
    to the court for further proceedings in accord with law and consistent with this opinion.
    Costs to appellee.
    _________________________________
    HON. W. SCOTT GWIN
    _________________________________
    HON. JOHN W. WISE
    _________________________________
    HON. PATRICIA A. DELANEY
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2011-CA-00028

Judges: Gwin

Filed Date: 1/3/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014