State v. Jarrett , 2013 Ohio 1663 ( 2013 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Jarrett, 
    2013-Ohio-1663
    .]
    Court of Appeals of Ohio
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    No. 98759
    STATE OF OHIO
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
    vs.
    KENNETH L. JARRETT
    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
    JUDGMENT:
    AFFIRMED
    Criminal Appeal from the
    Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
    Case Nos. CR-554504, CR-558789, CR-559105,
    CR-559365, CR-559433, CR-559935, CR-562138, and CR-562549
    BEFORE: Stewart, A.J., Boyle, J., and Kilbane, J.
    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED:                      April 25, 2013
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
    Ronald A. Skingle
    2450 St. Clair Avenue
    Cleveland, OH 44114
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Timothy J. McGinty
    Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
    BY: Holly Welsh
    Assistant County Prosecutor
    The Justice Center
    1200 Ontario Street, 9th Floor
    Cleveland, OH 44113
    MELODY J. STEWART, A.J.:
    {¶1} Defendant-appellant Kenneth Jarrett pleaded guilty to counts of fraud and
    forgery. He was granted bond pending sentencing, but failed to appear for sentencing.
    While on violation of bond, he committed crimes in seven more cases involving fourth
    and fifth degree grand theft, attempted aggravated theft, forgery, identity theft, identity
    fraud, and possession of criminal tools. He pleaded guilty and appeared before the court
    for sentencing on all eight cases. Noting that Jarrett had 16 prior felony offenses in
    addition to the eight presently before it, the court imposed consecutive sentences totaling
    eight years and six months, finding in particular that Jarrett’s conduct was so great that a
    single prison sentence would not adequately reflect the seriousness of his conduct.
    Jarrett concedes that his sentences were within the statutory range and that the court made
    the required factual findings necessary to impose consecutive sentences. He argues on
    appeal, however, that the finding regarding the seriousness of his conduct found no
    support in the record because the total financial harm he caused the victims — $22,590 —
    was not so great or unusual to justify consecutive sentences.
    {¶2} R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) permits the court to impose sentence on multiple prison
    terms consecutively if it finds that (1) a consecutive sentence is necessary to protect the
    public from future crime or to punish the offender and (2) that consecutive sentences are
    not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the danger the
    offender poses to the public. In addition to these two factors, the court must find any of
    the following:
    (a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the
    offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed
    pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or
    was under post-release control for a prior offense.
    (b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or
    more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the
    multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single
    prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses
    of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s conduct.
    (c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that
    consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime
    by the offender.
    
    Id.
    {¶3} When reviewing consecutive sentences imposed under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4),
    we “review the record, including the findings underlying the sentence or modification
    given by the sentencing court” to determine whether (1) the record does not support the
    court’s findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) or (2) “the sentence is otherwise contrary to
    law[.]” See R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).
    {¶4} There is no question that the court made the required findings under R.C.
    2929.14(C)(4): it determined that consecutive sentences were necessary to protect the
    public from future crime, that consecutive sentences were not disproportionate to the
    harm Jarrett caused, and that no single term would adequately reflect the seriousness of
    his conduct.
    {¶5} We have held, consistent with nearly every other district to consider the issue,
    that a sentencing judge need only make the required statutory findings under R.C.
    2929.14(C)(4) — there is no need for the court to state the reasons underlying those
    findings. State v. Goins, 8th Dist. No. 98256, 
    2013-Ohio-263
    ; State v. Blackburn, 8th
    Dist. Nos. 97811 and 97812, 
    2012-Ohio-4590
    , ¶ 35. See also State v. Alexander, 1st Dist.
    Nos. C-110828 and C-110829, 
    2012-Ohio-3349
    ; State v. Wells, 2d Dist. No. 2012-CA-12,
    
    2012-Ohio-5529
    ; State v. McKenzie, 3d Dist. No. 15-12-07, 
    2012-Ohio-6117
    ; State v.
    Midlam, 4th Dist. No. 12CA2, 
    2012-Ohio-6299
    ; State v. Patterson, 5th Dist. No.
    CT2012-0029, 
    2012-Ohio-5600
    ; State v. Nowlin, 6th Dist. No. CT2012-0015,
    
    2012-Ohio-4923
    ; State v. Galindo-Barjas, 7th Dist. No. 12 MA 37, 
    2013-Ohio-431
    .
    {¶6} The rationale for these holdings is that, although the prior statutory version of
    consecutive sentencing invalidated in State v. Foster, 
    109 Ohio St.3d 1
    , 
    2006-Ohio-856
    ,
    
    845 N.E.2d 470
    , required the court to make findings and state its reasons in support of
    those findings, the current consecutive sentencing statute contained in H.B. 86 does not.
    Goins at ¶ 11. The General Assembly’s omission of language requiring the court to state
    its reasons for making findings constitutes an amendment of the prior version and
    indicates an intent to change the prior meaning of the statute. State ex rel. Mager v. State
    Teachers Ret. Sys. of Ohio, 
    123 Ohio St.3d 195
    , 
    2009-Ohio-4908
    , 
    915 N.E.2d 320
    , ¶ 23,
    citing Malone v. Indus. Comm., 
    140 Ohio St. 292
    , 299, 
    43 N.E.2d 266
     (1942).
    {¶7} The next question we consider is whether the record does not support the
    court’s finding that consecutive sentences were not disproportionate to the seriousness of
    Jarrett’s conduct. He argues that the $22,590 in financial harm he caused in eight cases
    was not as serious as it would have been in a single case involving $22,590 of financial
    harm; therefore, consecutive sentences were unwarranted.
    {¶8} We do not need to get into a discussion of what amount of monetary loss
    constitutes “seriousness” for purposes of R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) in order to find that the
    court did not err by concluding that consecutive sentences were proportionate to Jarrett’s
    conduct.    The “seriousness” of one’s conduct goes beyond mere monetary loss.
    Although we have no difficulty concluding that Jarrett’s eight different counts of theft
    and fraud involving thousands of dollars of losses to his individual victims constituted
    “serious” conduct, the court had more than that to justify consecutive sentences. Jarrett
    has 16 prior felony convictions.        Those prior convictions, coupled with the eight
    convictions in this case, show him to be incorrigible. And to make matters worse, Jarrett
    displayed a flagrant disregard for the court by committing seven offenses while on bond
    awaiting sentencing in another case.            The consecutive sentences were thus not
    disproportionate to the seriousness of his conduct.
    {¶9} Judgment affirmed.
    It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed.
    The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Cuyahoga
    County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s
    conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated.       Case remanded
    to the trial court for execution of sentence.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
    the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    MELODY J. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
    MARY J. BOYLE, J., and
    MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., CONCUR