State v. Cameron ( 2011 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Cameron, 
    2011-Ohio-4602
    .]
    COURT OF APPEALS
    TUSCARAWAS COUNTY, OHIO
    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    STATE OF OHIO                                       JUDGES:
    Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.
    Plaintiff-Appellee                           Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, J.
    Hon. Julie A. Edwards, J.
    -vs-
    ROBERT CAMERON                                      Case No. 10AP120048
    Defendant-Appellant                          OPINION
    CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                       Appeal from the New Philadelphia
    Municipal Court, Case Nos. CRB1001262
    & CRB1001315
    JUDGMENT:                                      Affirmed
    DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                         September 12, 2011
    APPEARANCES:
    For Plaintiff-Appellee                          For Defendant-Appellant
    JAMES A. RANGE                                  DAVID C. HIPP
    177 South Broadway Avenue                       300 East High Avenue
    P.O. Box 1007                                   P.O. Box 90
    New Philadelphia, OH 44663                      New Philadelphia, OH 44663
    Tuscarawas County, Case No. 10AP120048                                                   2
    Farmer, J.
    {¶1}    On September 16, 2010, appellant, Robert Cameron, was charged with
    two counts of domestic violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25(B). Said charges arose
    from an incident between appellant and the mother of their two sons, Susan Erwin, and
    one of the sons.
    {¶2}    On October 28, 2010, appellant's trial counsel filed a motion to withdraw
    due to the deterioration of the attorney/client relationship. A hearing before a magistrate
    was held on December 2, 2010. By order filed December 7, 2010, the magistrate
    denied the motion.
    {¶3}    A jury trial commenced on December 13, 2010. Just prior to the start of
    the trial, the complaints were amended to change the charged subsections to R.C.
    2919.25(A).   The jury found appellant guilty as charged.        By judgment entry filed
    December 21, 2010, the trial court sentenced appellant to an aggregate term of one
    hundred eighty days in jail, ninety days suspended in lieu of twenty-four months of
    community control.
    {¶4}    Appellant filed an appeal and this matter is now before this court for
    consideration. Assignments or error are as follows:
    I
    {¶5}    "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO APPOINT SUBSTITUTE
    COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT WHEN THE ATTORNEY/CLIENT RELATIONSHIP WITH
    INITIALLY APPOINTED COUNSEL WAS IRREPARABLY DESTROYED."
    Tuscarawas County, Case No. 10AP120048                                                  3
    II
    {¶6}   "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AMENDING THE COMPLAINT
    IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO TRIAL TO SPECIFY A DIFFERENT OFFENSE."
    III
    {¶7}   "TRIAL COUNSEL PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE IN THE
    DEFENSE OF HIS CLIENT."
    I
    {¶8}   Appellant claims the trial court erred in denying his trial counsel's request
    to withdraw and not appointing him new counsel. We disagree.
    {¶9}   The decision as to whether to grant a motion to withdraw by counsel rests
    in the trial court's sound discretion. Bennett v. Bennett (1993), 
    86 Ohio App.3d 343
    . In
    order to find an abuse of discretion, we must determine the trial court's decision was
    unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable and not merely an error of law or judgment.
    Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983) 
    5 Ohio St.3d 217
    .
    {¶10} In his motion to withdraw filed October 28, 2010, defense counsel
    supported his request with the following two reasons:
    {¶11} "1. Defendant has asked that counsel be removed from these matters.
    {¶12} "2. Counsel and his staff have suffered repeated harassment and verbal
    abuse and occasional treats (sic) from Defendant and his family, which has clouded
    Counsel's judgment and made it nearly impossible to work with Defendant."
    {¶13} During the December 2, 2010 hearing on the motion, the reasons were
    more fully developed as follows:
    Tuscarawas County, Case No. 10AP120048                                                   4
    {¶14} "MR. PERLAKY: The basis on which I filed my motion, it was twofold and I
    do recall being told by Mr. Cameron on multiple occasions actually that he did not wish
    me to represent him in these matters any further.
    {¶15} "It is my understanding from my secretaries that there's been repeated
    phone calls from Mr. Cameron and his family members and I'll grant him that it's
    stopped. But when the motion was filed that there was just repeated tangents and
    verbal abuse and profanity, repeated profanity, and I know Mr. Cameron denies all of
    this. And basically trying to prepare his defense has been made very difficult. I've
    come to a fundamental disagreement about - - with Mr. Cameron about proceeding with
    this case if my employees are just going to be subject to that kind of abuse. It's just
    become unworkable. I don't think Mr. Cameron wants to talk with me at this point and I
    certainly am trying to be extremely patient and I told the Court I don't want to file these
    motions. I don't like filing these motions but you know, I think at this point it's just
    become a matter of the more we continue to work together the more our office gets
    called especially when I'm not there and my secretaries are yelled at, screamed at,
    profanity used. And he disagrees with that." December 2, 2010 T. at 6-7.
    {¶16} The magistrate denied the motion for the following reasons:
    {¶17} "THE MAGISTRATE: Listen, Mr. Cameron, here's what we're going to do.
    If your family hires Mr. Jackimedes then I think that would be a satisfactory outcome for
    everybody and I certainly would be fine with it because he's a good lawyer. But you
    have a good lawyer right now and I'm telling you that you do because he's in my
    courtroom every day and I'm not going to leave you at this stage of the proceeding
    without a lawyer. I think that that is a really, really dumb idea and I think it would be
    Tuscarawas County, Case No. 10AP120048                                                  5
    disastrous for you to be without a lawyer. I do not see any benefit to me removing Mr.
    Perlaky and then appointing some other lawyer.          But, it sounds to me like maybe
    somebody has gotten through to you. Either the jail has restricted your phone calls or
    somebody has gotten some sense into your head that you don't bite the hand that feeds
    you. You know what I mean by that?
    {¶18} "THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
    {¶19} "***
    {¶20} "THE MAGISTRATE:***So I am going to deny Mr. Perlaky's request to
    withdraw as your attorney at this time. If Mr. Jackimedes is hired, fine, but I can not
    think of any reason other than you are making - - you're distracting and taking all of his
    time and attention away from trying to prepare a defense for you. You're allowed to
    participate in that but you gotta listen to what the guy says. He knows what he's doing."
    Id. at 10-12.
    {¶21} We note the motion was heard less than eleven days prior to the trial date.
    The case had been pending since September.             We further note defense counsel's
    effectiveness was not raised again during the trial.
    {¶22} While an accused has a right to counsel, he does not have the right to
    appointed counsel of his own choosing. State v. Marinchek (1983), 
    9 Ohio App.3d 22
    ;
    State v. Haberek (1988), 
    47 Ohio App.3d 35
    .
    {¶23} Upon review, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
    defense counsel's motion to withdraw and not appointing appellant new counsel.
    {¶24} Assignment of Error I is denied.
    Tuscarawas County, Case No. 10AP120048                                                  6
    II
    {¶25} Appellant claims the trial court erred in permitting the state to amend the
    complaints just prior to the start of the trial. We disagree.
    {¶26} Crim.R. 7(D) governs amendments to the complaint and states the
    following:
    {¶27} "The court may at any time before, during, or after a trial amend the
    indictment, information, complaint, or bill of particulars, in respect to any defect,
    imperfection, or omission in form or substance, or of any variance with the evidence,
    provided no change is made in the name or identity of the crime charged.            If any
    amendment is made to the substance of the indictment, information, or complaint, or to
    cure a variance between the indictment, information, or complaint and the proof, the
    defendant is entitled to a discharge of the jury on the defendant's motion, if a jury has
    been impaneled, and to a reasonable continuance, unless it clearly appears from the
    whole proceedings that the defendant has not been misled or prejudiced by the defect
    or variance in respect to which the amendment is made, or that the defendant's rights
    will be fully protected by proceeding with the trial, or by a postponement thereof to a
    later day with the same or another jury.***No action of the court in refusing a
    continuance or postponement under this division is reviewable except after motion to
    grant a new trial therefor is refused by the trial court, and no appeal based upon such
    action of the court shall be sustained nor reversal had unless, from consideration of the
    whole proceedings, the reviewing court finds that a failure of justice resulted."
    {¶28} The original complaints alleged a violation of R.C. 2919.25(B) which
    states, "[n]o person shall recklessly cause serious physical harm to a family or
    Tuscarawas County, Case No. 10AP120048                                                     7
    household member." The complaints were amended to allege a violation of a different
    subsection, subsection (A) which states, "[n]o person shall knowingly cause or attempt
    to cause physical harm to a family or household member."
    {¶29} We note the actual offense of domestic violence, the date and time of the
    incident, and the name of the victims were not changed, just the culpable mental state
    and the degree of physical harm.
    {¶30} The trial court informed appellant that it would consider a continuance
    request in light of the amendment, but evidently a request was not made:
    {¶31} "THE COURT: The Court will grant the motion. It does change the - -
    doesn't change the overall domestic. It changes the subsection. It does change the
    mental element and it changes the physical harm to serious physical harm. If you feel
    that you've been misled and have prepared (inaudible) and need a continuance further I
    could consider that. Do you request that at this time?
    {¶32} "MR. PERLAKY: (Inaudible).
    {¶33} "THE COURT: Then I will grant the motion of the State and we'll proceed
    on those two charges." T. at 4-5.
    {¶34} In addition, defense counsel did not object to the amendment. An error
    not raised in the trial court must be plain error for an appellate court to reverse. State v.
    Long (1978), 
    53 Ohio St.2d 91
    ; Crim.R. 52(B). In order to prevail under a plain error
    analysis, appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that the outcome of the trial
    clearly would have been different but for the error. Long. Notice of plain error "is to be
    taken with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a
    manifest miscarriage of justice." 
    Id.
     at paragraph three of the syllabus.
    Tuscarawas County, Case No. 10AP120048                                                    8
    {¶35} Upon review, we find no substantive change in the nature of the offenses
    or any undue prejudice to appellant. Both Ms. Erwin and one of the sons testified to
    being struck by appellant and observing appellant strike the other. T. at 67, 88.
    {¶36} As for the cases appellant cites in support, State v. Corrill (1999), 
    133 Ohio App.3d 550
    , and State v. Rihm (1995), 
    101 Ohio App.3d 627
    , both cases involved
    an amendment from subsection (A) to subsection (C), not subsection (B) to subsection
    (A) as in this case. In Corrill, the amendment was made at the conclusion of the trial. In
    Rihm, the defendant did not consent to the amendment and made an objection. We
    find these cases to be distinguishable from the case sub judice.
    {¶37} Assignment of Error II is denied.
    III
    {¶38} Appellant claims he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel as
    his counsel did not properly subpoena witnesses, did not call any witnesses in his
    defense, and failed to object to the amendment of the complaints. We disagree.
    {¶39} The standard this issue must be measured against is set out in State v.
    Bradley (1989), 
    42 Ohio St.3d 136
    , paragraphs two and three of the syllabus, certiorari
    denied (1990), 
    497 U.S. 1011
    . Appellant must establish the following:
    {¶40} "2. Counsel's performance will not be deemed ineffective unless and until
    counsel's performance is proved to have fallen below an objective standard of
    reasonable   representation    and,   in   addition,   prejudice   arises   from   counsel's
    performance. (State v. Lytle [1976], 
    48 Ohio St.2d 391
    , 
    2 O.O.3d 495
    , 
    358 N.E.2d 623
    ;
    Strickland v. Washington [1984], 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 
    104 S.Ct. 2052
    , 
    80 L.Ed.2d 674
    ,
    followed.)
    Tuscarawas County, Case No. 10AP120048                                                    9
    {¶41} "3. To show that a defendant has been prejudiced by counsel's deficient
    performance, the defendant must prove that there exists a reasonable probability that,
    were it not for counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have been different."
    {¶42} We note this court must accord deference to defense counsel's strategic
    choices made during trial and "requires us to eliminate the distorting effect of hindsight."
    State v. Post (1987), 
    32 Ohio St.3d 380
    , 388.
    {¶43} As we addressed in Assignment of Error II, the amendment of the
    complaints did not create any substantive changes to the nature of the charges, the
    time and place of the incident or the names of the victims. Both Ms. Erwin and one of
    the sons testified to appellant's actions during the incident. We fail to find that the
    failure to object demonstrates any deficiency by defense counsel or establishes that the
    result of the trial would have been different.
    {¶44} Defense counsel subpoenaed four witnesses, Randi Quiroga, Robert A.
    Cameron, Josh Cameron, and Beth Kaser. They were delivered by certified mail and
    were returned unclaimed on January 3, 2011.
    {¶45} Although defense counsel served subpoenas pursuant to Crim.R. 17(D),
    we do not find the failure to call these witnesses to testify was error. The incidents on
    September 16, 2010 occurred at appellant's residence late at night when only Ms. Erwin
    and the couple's two sons were present.          T. at 116-117.     We fail to find that the
    subpoenaed witnesses would have added anything to the fact finding inquiry of the jury
    on the domestic violence charges.
    {¶46} Assignment of Error III is denied.
    Tuscarawas County, Case No. 10AP120048                                     10
    {¶47} The judgment of the New Philadelphia Municipal Court of Tuscarawas
    County, Ohio is hereby affirmed.
    By Farmer, J.
    Gwin, P.J. and
    Edwards, J. concur.
    _s/ Sheila G. Farmer_______________
    _s/ W. Scott Gwin__________________
    _s/ Julie A. Edwards________________
    JUDGES
    SGF/sg 810
    [Cite as State v. Cameron, 
    2011-Ohio-4602
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR TUSCARAWAS COUNTY, OHIO
    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    STATE OF OHIO                                     :
    :
    Plaintiff-Appellee                 :
    :
    vs-                                               :           JUDGMENT ENTRY
    :
    ROBERT CAMERON                                    :
    :
    Defendant-Appellant                :           CASE NO. 10AP120048
    For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion, the
    judgment of the New Philadelphia Municipal Court of Tuscarawas County, Ohio is
    affirmed. Costs to appellant.
    s/ Sheila G. Farmer_______________
    _s/ W. Scott Gwin__________________
    _s/ Julie A. Edwards________________
    JUDGES
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 10AP120048

Judges: Farmer

Filed Date: 9/12/2011

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014