State v. Lampley ( 2011 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Lampley, 
    2011-Ohio-1204
    .]
    COURT OF APPEALS
    RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO
    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    STATE OF OHIO                                 :      JUDGES:
    :
    :      Hon. John W. Wise, P.J.
    Plaintiff-Appellee     :      Hon. Julie A. Edwards, J.
    :      Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
    -vs-                                          :
    :      Case No. 10-CA-106
    THOMAS LAMPLEY                                :
    :
    :
    Defendant-Appellant     :      OPINION
    CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                          Appeal from the Richland County Court of
    Common Pleas Case No. 09-CR-650 D
    JUDGMENT:                                         AFFIRMED
    DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                           March 9, 2011
    APPEARANCES:
    For Plaintiff-Appellee:                              For Defendant-Appellant:
    JAMES J. MAYER, JR.                                  THOMAS J. LAMPLEY, pro se
    Richland County Prosecutor                           Inmate No. 582-243
    38 S. Park St.                                       Lorain Correctional Institution
    Mansfield, Ohio 44902                                2075 S. Avon Belden Rd.
    Grafton, Ohio 44044
    BRENT ROBINSON 0063166
    Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
    Counsel of Record
    [Cite as State v. Lampley, 
    2011-Ohio-1204
    .]
    Delaney, J.
    {¶1}     Defendant-Appellant, Thomas Lampley, appeals the judgment and
    conviction of the Richland County Court of Common Pleas, denying his post-conviction
    petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.
    {¶2}     Appellant was originally indicted on and convicted of murder with a gun
    specification, having a weapon under disability, and tampering with evidence.            On
    March 2, 2010, Appellant was sentenced to 15 years to life with a three year gun
    specification, plus three years for the weapon under disability charge and two years for
    the tampering with evidence charge, all to be run consecutively.
    {¶3}     On March 10, 2010, Appellant filed a notice of Appeal with this Court in
    case no. 10-CA-30. Subsequently, on April 26, 2010, Appellant filed in the trial court a
    petition to vacate or set aside his sentence with accompanying motions for appointment
    of counsel and expert witnesses.
    {¶4}     The motion for post-conviction relief did not contain any affidavits in
    support of his petition. The hearing was set for June 15, 2010.
    {¶5}     On August 10, 2010, the trial court overruled Appellant’s petition for post-
    conviction relief. On October 29, 2010, this Court dismissed Appellant’s direct appeal
    for failure to prosecute because Appellant failed to submit a brief.
    {¶6}     Appellant now appeals the trial court’s August 10, 2010, denial of his
    motion for post-conviction relief.
    {¶7}     Appellant raises one Assignment of Error, though he does not couch it as
    an “ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR.” Appellant repeatedly argues throughout his brief that
    trial counsel was ineffective for numerous reasons, which he attempts to discuss in his
    Richland County, Case No. 10-CA-106                                                      3
    brief. Accordingly, we will address Appellant’s assignment of error as though he is
    raising a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
    I.
    {¶8}   In Appellant’s assignment of error, he argues that trial counsel was
    ineffective in representing Appellant at trial. We disagree.
    {¶9}   Ohio R.C. 2953.21 governs the filing of post-conviction petitions as
    follows:
    {¶10} “(A)(1)(a) Any person who has been convicted of a criminal offense or
    adjudicated a delinquent child and who claims that there was such a denial or
    infringement of the person's rights as to render the judgment void or voidable under the
    Ohio Constitution or the Constitution of the United States, and any person who has
    been convicted of a criminal offense that is a felony, who is an inmate, and for whom
    DNA testing that was performed under sections 2953.71 to 2953.81 of the Revised
    Code or under section 2953.82 of the Revised Code and analyzed in the context of and
    upon consideration of all available admissible evidence related to the inmate's case as
    described in division (D) of section 2953.74 of the Revised Code provided results that
    establish, by clear and convincing evidence, actual innocence of that felony offense or,
    if the person was sentenced to death, establish, by clear and convincing evidence,
    actual innocence of the aggravating circumstance or circumstances the person was
    found guilty of committing and that is or are the basis of that sentence of death, may file
    a petition in the court that imposed sentence, stating the grounds for relief relied upon,
    and asking the court to vacate or set aside the judgment or sentence or to grant other
    Richland County, Case No. 10-CA-106                                                       4
    appropriate relief. The petitioner may file a supporting affidavit and other documentary
    evidence in support of the claim for relief.
    {¶11} “(b) As used in division (A)(1)(a) of this section, “actual innocence” means
    that, had the results of the DNA testing conducted under sections 2953.71 to 2953.81 of
    the Revised Code or under section 2953.82 of the Revised Code been presented at
    trial, and had those results been analyzed in the context of and upon consideration of all
    available admissible evidence related to the inmate's case as described in division (D)
    of section 2953.74 of the Revised Code, no reasonable factfinder would have found the
    petitioner guilty of the offense of which the petitioner was convicted, or, if the person
    was sentenced to death, no reasonable factfinder would have found the petitioner guilty
    of the aggravating circumstance or circumstances the petitioner was found guilty of
    committing and that is or are the basis of that sentence of death.
    {¶12} “(2) Except as otherwise provided in section 2953.23 of the Revised
    Code, a petition under division (A)(1) of this section shall be filed no later than one
    hundred eighty days after the date on which the trial transcript is filed in the court of
    appeals in the direct appeal of the judgment of conviction or adjudication or, if the direct
    appeal involves a sentence of death, the date on which the trial transcript is filed in the
    supreme court. If no appeal is taken, except as otherwise provided in section 2953.23 of
    the Revised Code, the petition shall be filed no later than one hundred eighty days after
    the expiration of the time for filing the appeal.
    {¶13} * * *
    {¶14} “(4) A petitioner shall state in the original or amended petition filed under
    division (A) of this section all grounds for relief claimed by the petitioner. Except as
    Richland County, Case No. 10-CA-106                                                        5
    provided in section 2953.23 of the Revised Code, any ground for relief that is not so
    stated in the petition is waived.”
    {¶15} Having had a prior opportunity to litigate all of the claims that Appellant
    sets forth in his latest motion, via a timely direct appeal, Appellant's most recent round
    of arguments are barred under the doctrine of res judicata. State v. Perry (1967), 
    10 Ohio St.2d 175
    , 
    226 N.E.2d 104
    . The Perry court explained the doctrine as follows:
    {¶16} “Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment of conviction bars the
    convicted defendant from raising and litigating in any proceeding, except an appeal from
    that judgment, any defense or any claimed lack of due process that was raised or could
    have been raised by the defendant at the trial which resulted in that judgment of
    conviction or on an appeal from that judgment.”
    {¶17} The trial court determined that the doctrine of res judicata applies in the
    instant case, as Appellant did not set forth competent, credible, relevant and material
    evidence from outside the record. The trial court further determined that Appellant’s
    complaints were available to raise both at the time of trial and on direct appeal.
    {¶18} Because post-conviction relief is a collateral attack on judgment, and
    provided there was no substantive grounds for relief, Appellant was not entitled to court-
    appointed counsel, an expert, or a hearing. Trial courts may dismiss petitions for post-
    conviction relief without a hearing “where the petition, the supporting affidavits, the
    documentary evidence, the files, and the records do not demonstrate that petitioner set
    forth sufficient operative facts to establish substantive grounds for relief.”       State v.
    Calhoun (1999), 86 Ohio.St.3d 279, 286, 
    1999-Ohio-102
    , 
    714 N.E.2d 905
    ,
    Richland County, Case No. 10-CA-106                                                    6
    {¶19} In State v. Wilcox, the court held that constitutional issues cannot be
    considered in post-conviction proceedings when they could have been litigated prior to
    or during trial or on direct appeal. State v. Wilcox (1984), 
    16 Ohio App.3d 273
    , 276, 
    475 N.E.2d 516
    .
    {¶20} Res judicata applies even though Appellant never pursued his direct
    appeal. “The res judicata bar applies even where, as here, no direct Appeal was taken.”
    State v. Barfield, 6th Dist. No. Nos. L-06-1262, L-06-1263, 
    2007-Ohio-1037
    , ¶6.
    {¶21} In his post-conviction petition, Appellant argues various reasons that trial
    counsel was ineffective. The basis for his claims revolve around trial counsel’s alleged
    failure to investigate mitigating circumstances, to examine other lines of defense (self-
    defense), to investigate “all evidence within the scope of his duty proceeding to trial,”
    and the Court’s declination to order a PSI prior to sentencing.
    {¶22} To succeed on a claim of ineffectiveness, a defendant must satisfy a two-
    prong test. Initially, a defendant must show that his trial counsel acted incompetently.
    Strickland v. Washington (1984), 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 
    104 S.Ct. 2052
    . In assessing such
    claims, “a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within
    the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must
    overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might
    be considered sound trial strategy.’” 
    Id. at 689
    , quoting Michel v. Louisiana (1955), 
    350 U.S. 91
    , 101, 
    76 S.Ct. 158
    , 164.
    {¶23} “There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given
    case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in
    Richland County, Case No. 10-CA-106                                                  7
    the same way.” Strickland, 
    466 U.S. at 689
    . The question is whether counsel acted
    “outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” 
    Id. at 690
    .
    {¶24} Even if a defendant shows that his counsel was incompetent, the
    defendant must then satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test. Under this “actual
    prejudice” prong, the defendant must show that “there is a reasonable probability that,
    but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
    different.” Strickland, 
    466 U.S. at 694
    .
    {¶25} We find nothing in the record indicating that trial counsel acted
    ineffectively, nor has Appellant provided any credible evidence outside the record to
    support his claims.
    {¶26} For the foregoing reasons, Appellant’s arguments are overruled.
    {¶27} The judgment of the Richland County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
    By: Delaney, J.
    Wise, P.J. and
    Edwards, J. concur.
    HON. PATRICIA A. DELANEY
    HON. JOHN W. WISE
    HON. JULIE A. EDWARDS
    [Cite as State v. Lampley, 
    2011-Ohio-1204
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO
    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    STATE OF OHIO                                 :
    :
    Plaintiff-Appellee     :
    :
    :
    -vs-                                          :    JUDGMENT ENTRY
    :
    THOMAS LAMPLEY                                :
    :
    Defendant-Appellant     :    Case No. 10-CA-106
    :
    For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion on file, the
    judgment of the Richland County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Costs assessed
    to Appellant
    _________________________________
    HON. PATRICIA A. DELANEY
    _________________________________
    HON. JOHN W. WISE
    _________________________________
    HON. JULIE A. EDWARDS
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 10-CA-106

Judges: Delaney

Filed Date: 3/9/2011

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014