State v. Warren ( 2012 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Warren, 
    2012-Ohio-4721
    .]
    Court of Appeals of Ohio
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    No. 97837
    STATE OF OHIO
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
    vs.
    DERRICK WARREN
    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
    JUDGMENT:
    REVERSED AND REMANDED
    Criminal Appeal from the
    Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
    Case No. CR-551985
    BEFORE:          Celebrezze, P.J., Jones, J., and Cooney, J.
    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED:                     October 11, 2012
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
    Rick L. Ferrara
    2077 East 4th Street
    Second Floor
    Cleveland, Ohio 44114
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Timothy J. McGinty
    Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
    BY: Maxwell M. Martin
    Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
    The Justice Center
    1200 Ontario Street
    Cleveland, Ohio 44113
    FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., P.J.:
    {¶1} Defendant-appellant, Derrick Warren, appeals from his sentence imposed in
    the common pleas court. After careful review of the record and relevant case law, we
    reverse and remand for a limited resentencing hearing.
    {¶2} On July 7, 2011, appellant was indicted in an 11-count indictment alleging
    two counts of attempted murder, in violation of R.C. 2903.02 and 2923.02; two counts of
    felonious assault, in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2); four counts of kidnapping, in
    violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(1); aggravated burglary, in violation of R.C. 2911.11;
    aggravated robbery, in violation of R.C. 2911.01; and assault, in violation of R.C.
    2903.13. The attempted murder, felonious assault, kidnapping, aggravated burglary, and
    aggravated robbery counts had notices of prior convictions and repeat violent offender
    specifications attached.
    {¶3} On December 5, 2011, appellant pled guilty to one count of attempted
    murder, along with the notice of prior conviction and repeat violent offender
    specification. Appellant also pled guilty to aggravated burglary, felonious assault,
    aggravated robbery, and kidnapping. The remaining counts were dismissed.
    {¶4} On December 22, 2011, the trial court sentenced appellant to ten years on the
    attempted murder charge, plus five years on the repeat violent offender specification, to
    run consecutively to the underlying charge. Appellant was sentenced to five years each
    on the remaining counts. The trial court ran the sentences for the remaining counts
    concurrently to each other, but consecutively to the 15 years imposed on the attempted
    murder charge and repeat violent offender specification, for an aggregate term of
    imprisonment of 20 years.
    {¶5} Appellant now brings this timely appeal, raising one assignment of error for
    review.
    Law and Analysis
    {¶6} In his sole assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred
    when it failed to make statutorily necessitated findings of fact before imposing an
    enhanced penalty on a repeat violent offender.
    {¶7} The General Assembly, through the enactment of House Bill 86 (“H.B. 86”),
    recently amended Ohio’s sentencing statutes. Since H.B. 86 took effect on September
    30, 2011, and appellant was sentenced on December 22, 2011, the trial court was required
    to sentence appellant according to the revisions implemented in H.B. 86.1
    {¶8} Preliminarily, we note that appellant does not challenge the constitutionality
    of the revised portions of R.C. 2929.14(B)(2)(a) following the enactment of H.B. 86.
    Accordingly, we limit our review to appellant’s arguments concerning whether the trial
    court adequately complied with the requirements of R.C. 2929.14(B)(2)(a).
    1 We note, however, that pursuant to Section 4 of H.B. 86 and R.C. 1.58, the
    revisions made by H.B. 86 to the felony sentencing guidelines in Section (A) of R.C.
    2929.14 do not apply to appellant in this matter. Appellant committed the
    underlying offenses before September 30, 2011, and was not subject to a “reduced”
    penalty under the H.B. 86 revisions. Therefore, the maximum sentence appellant
    could receive for his felony of the first degree was ten years in prison and not eleven
    years, as revised.
    {¶9} Pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(B)(2)(a), in addition to the longest prison term
    authorized for the offense, the sentencing court may impose an additional definite prison
    term of one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, or ten years for the repeat
    violent offender specification, if all of the following criteria are met:
    (i) The offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification of the
    type described in section 2941.149 of the Revised Code that the offender is
    a repeat violent offender.
    (ii) The offense of which the offender currently is convicted or to which the
    offender currently pleads guilty is * * * any felony of the first degree that is
    an offense of violence and the court does not impose a sentence of life
    imprisonment without parole.
    (iii) The court imposes the longest prison term for the offense that is not life
    imprisonment without parole.
    (iv) The court finds that the prison terms imposed * * * are inadequate to
    punish the offender and protect the public from future crime, because the
    applicable factors under section 2929.12 of the Revised Code indicating a
    greater likelihood of recidivism outweigh the applicable factors under that
    section indicating a lesser likelihood of recidivism.
    (v) The court finds that the prison terms imposed * * * are demeaning to the
    seriousness of the offense, because one or more of the factors under section
    2929.12 of the Revised Code indicating that the offender’s conduct is more
    serious than conduct normally constituting the offense are present, and they
    outweigh the applicable factors under that section indicating that the
    offender’s conduct is less serious than conduct normally constituting the
    offense.
    {¶10} In the case at hand, appellant pled guilty to attempted murder, a first-degree
    felony that is an offense of violence, and its accompanying repeat violent offender
    specification. At sentencing, the trial court sentenced appellant to the maximum term of
    imprisonment on the attempted murder count.            Thus, the criteria contained in R.C.
    2929.14(B)(2)(a)(i), (ii), and (iii) are met in the instant matter.
    {¶11} In addressing the finding requirements of R.C. 2929.14(B)(2)(a)(iv) and (v),
    the trial court stated the following:
    Defendant has a prior history here. Much violence, activities in the past.
    In 1990, in 2003. I believe the seriousness of this offense warrants an
    additional five years. Repeat violent offender specification, that’s 15 years
    total on count one.
    {¶12} On this record, we find that the trial court’s statements failed to comply with
    the finding requirements of R.C. 2929.14(B)(2)(a)(iv) and (v). Although the trial court
    noted that appellant committed a serious offense and that he had a violent criminal
    history, the court did not find on the record that the maximum sentence was inadequate to
    protect the public from future crime or to punish appellant because those factors indicated
    a greater likelihood of recidivism. Additionally, the trial court did not find on the record
    that the maximum sentence was demeaning to the seriousness of the offense because one
    or more of the factors under R.C. 2929.12 indicated that appellant’s conduct was more
    serious than conduct normally constituting the offense. Accordingly, we are constrained
    to reverse and remand for a resentencing hearing on the repeat violent offender
    specification only.
    {¶13} Appellant’s assignment of error is sustained.
    {¶14} Appellant’s sentence is reversed in part, and this cause is remanded to the
    lower court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.
    The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
    pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. Case remanded to the trial court for
    sentencing.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
    the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE
    LARRY A. JONES, SR., J., and
    COLLEEN CONWAY COONEY, J., CONCUR
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 97837

Judges: Celebrezze

Filed Date: 10/11/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014