State v. Lagese , 2013 Ohio 5773 ( 2013 )

[Cite as State v. Lagese, 2013-Ohio-5773.]
STATE OF OHIO, MAHONING COUNTY
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
SEVENTH DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO ) CASE NO. 11 MA 198
)
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE )
)
VS. ) OPINION
)
ANTHONY LAGESE )
)
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT )
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Criminal Appeal from the Court of
Common Pleas of Mahoning County,
Ohio
Case No. 10 CR 1274A
JUDGMENT: Affirmed.
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee: Atty. Paul J. Gains
Mahoning County Prosecutor
Atty. Ralph M. Rivera
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
21 West Boardman Street, 6th Floor
Youngstown, Ohio 44503
For Defendant-Appellant: Atty. Andrew R. Zellers
Richard G. Zellers & Associates, Inc.
3810 Starrs Centre Dr.
Canfield, Ohio 44406
JUDGES:
Hon. Cheryl L. Waite
Hon. Joseph J. Vukovich
Hon. Mary DeGenaro
Dated: December 19, 2013
[Cite as State v. Lagese, 2013-Ohio-5773.]
WAITE, J.
{¶1} Appellant Anthony Lagese appeals a decision of the Mahoning County
Common Pleas Court not to suppress testimony given by the two officers who
arrested him for possession of crack cocaine following a traffic stop made in
Youngstown, in November 2010. On appeal, Appellant, who pleaded no contest
after his motion to suppress failed, contends that the officers were incompetent to
testify concerning the stop because it was made using an unmarked car. Appellant
also contends that the crack cocaine found in plain view during the traffic stop should
be suppressed because it was identified only as the result of an unreasonable traffic
stop. Appellant’s arguments are without merit. The judgment of the trial court is
affirmed.
Factual and Procedural History
{¶2} Both Appellant and the state agree as to the facts of the occurrence on
the evening of November 5, 2010. Two police officers, Josh M. Kelly and Patrick
Mulligan, were patrolling the south side of Youngstown as part of a street crimes unit.
Their responsibilities include “anything from tall grass to drug complaints to loitering
in certain areas. Basically our main goal is to get drugs and guns off the street.”
(Suppression Hrg. Tr., pp. 27-28.) On the evening of November 5, 2010, around 7:00
p.m., the two officers were on patrol in a “white Crown Vic, basically a police car
without markings. It is the same unit we drive with the actual overhead-lights and
police on the side. It hasn’t been detailed.” (Suppression Hrg. Tr., p. 11.) Officer
Kelly, who ordinarily patrols in a K-9 unit, was with Officer Mulligan that night without
his dog, but wearing his K-9 patrol uniform. Officer Mulligan was wearing a standard
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task force uniform, which differs from the standard patrol uniform. The unmarked car
the two were using did not have a cage separating the front and back seats. The car
does not have lights mounted on the roof, but instead has both blue and red lights
mounted inside the grill and colored dashboard lights.
{¶3} The two officers were traveling west on Ravenwood when they noticed
a gold-colored 1994 Buick turn into the driveway of 270 East Ravenwood without
using a turn signal. The officers then activated the various lights in the unmarked
car, pulled into the driveway behind the vehicle, and initiated a traffic stop. The
officers could see that the Buick had two occupants. The officers exited their cruiser.
Officer Mulligan approached the vehicle on the driver’s side, and Officer Kelly
approached on the passenger side. As he approached the car, Officer Kelly
observed the driver move his hand down to his waist, pull an object away from his
body, and appear to place it on the floor of the car. The officer later testified that he
was initially concerned that the object might be a weapon, but continued to approach
when the driver appeared to place it on the floor. (Suppression Hrg. Tr., pp. 19-20.)
At this point, the passenger abruptly opened the door, nearly hitting Officer Kelly
(who believed she did not see him) and threw her purse out of the car into the yard or
bushes next to the driveway, before exiting the car. The woman, later identified as
Debra Silvers, was then instructed by the officers to sit on the ground. (Suppression
Hrg. Tr., p. 21.)
{¶4} Officer Kelly, standing outside the car’s open passenger door, shone
his light into the vehicle and observed on the hump between the driver and
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passenger seats a plastic bag containing what he believed, due to his experience as
a drug enforcement officer and through K-9 training, to be crack cocaine.
(Suppression Hrg. Tr., pp. 7-8.) Appellant was then instructed to exit the vehicle and
placed under arrest for possession of crack cocaine. Appellant was also issued a
traffic citation for failure to use his turn signal. Silvers, who was sitting on the ground
during Appellant’s arrest, stated to the officers that she also had crack cocaine in her
handbag. She was then arrested for possession.
{¶5} Both parties were arraigned in Mahoning County Common Pleas Court,
and Appellant’s counsel filed a motion to suppress the crack cocaine found during
the traffic stop. A hearing was held on Appellant’s motion and the trial court denied
his motion to suppress. Appellant pleaded no contest and was found guilty.
Appellant filed a timely appeal of his conviction.
Argument and Law
Assignment of Error No. 1
The police cruiser that stopped the Defendant-Appellant’s automobile
for a minor traffic violation was not properly marked under Ohio Revised
Code §4549.13 as required for a police cruiser that patrols for and
enforces Ohio Traffic Code, therefore rendering the seizure unlawful.
{¶6} A trial court’s decision on a motion to suppress presents a mixed
question of fact and law. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St. 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶8.
During a suppression hearing the trial court is itself the trier of fact, and “is therefore
in the best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate the credibility of
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witnesses” Id., citing State v. Mills, 62 Ohio St. 3d 357, 366 (1992). Consequently,
“an appellate court must accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported
by competent, credible evidence.” Burnside, supra, ¶8. Accepting those facts as
true, the appellate court conducts a de novo review of whether the facts satisfy the
applicable legal standards at issue in the appeal. State v. Williams, 86 Ohio App. 3d
37, 41, 619 N.E.2d 1141 (1993). R.C. 4549.13 provides in part:
Any motor vehicle used by * * * any * * * [police] officer, while said
officer is on duty for the exclusive or main purpose of enforcing the
motor vehicle or traffic laws of this state, provided the offense is
punishable as a misdemeanor, shall be marked in some distinctive
manner or color.
{¶7} R.C. 4549.14 provides:
Any officer arresting, or participating or assisting in the arrest of, a
person charged with violating the motor vehicle or traffic laws of this
state, provided the offense is punishable as a misdemeanor, such
officer being on duty exclusively or for the main purpose of enforcing
such laws, is incompetent to testify as a witness in any prosecution
against such arrested person if such officer at the time of the arrest was
using a motor vehicle not marked in accordance with section 4549.13 of
the Revised Code.
{¶8} Evid.R. 601(C) restates the provisions of R.C. 4549.14. To be found
competent to testify about a traffic stop, the officer concerned must have been using
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a “properly marked motor vehicle” and “wearing a legally distinctive uniform,” if, at the
time of the stop, the officer was “on duty for the exclusive or main purpose of
enforcing traffic laws.” Evid.R. 601(C).
{¶9} It is undisputed that Officers Mulligan and Kelly were not using a
marked police cruiser, and, although both were in uniform, neither was wearing the
regular patrol uniform used by officers solely engaged in traffic enforcement.
Therefore, the question becomes whether the officers were on duty exclusively or for
the main purpose of enforcing traffic laws. State v. King, 7th Dist. No. 05-CO-14,
2006-Ohio-894.
{¶10} In King, we upheld a trial court’s decision finding a traffic stop proper
and the officer qualified to testify. The officer in King observed a driver’s erratic
behavior and excessive speed and conducted a traffic stop, despite the fact that the
officer was driving an unmarked vehicle and out of uniform at the time. The stop and
subsequent testimony were both permitted because the officer was part of a task
force and not engaged solely in traffic enforcement. Our decision in King directly
supports R.C. 4549.14, and our reasoning in that instance is applicable in this case.
At the hearing on Appellant's motion to suppress/dismiss, both officers testified that
they were patrolling as part of a crime unit, and that traffic enforcement was not their
sole or exclusive purpose. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not err in
finding both officers competent to testify. Appellant’s belief that all traffic stops must
be conducted only by officers driving marked cars is mistaken. The marked car and
uniform requirement applies only to those engaged exclusively in traffic enforcement.
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R.C. 4945.13; Evid.R. 601. Appellant’s first assignment of error is without merit and
is overruled.
Assignment of Error No. 2
The Trial Court erred when it failed to suppress the evidence that was
the result of an unlawful search and seizure under the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, because the police
officers did not have a warrant or the requisite probable cause for an
exception to the warrant requirement to apply.
{¶11} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution provides Ohioans with the same
guarantee. The two, taken together, “require government officials to procure a
warrant based on probable cause prior to conducting searches and seizures.” State
v. Schwab, 7th Dist. No. 08 MA 78, 2009-Ohio-1312, ¶11. “The ultimate standard set
forth in the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.” Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S.
433, 439, 93 S. Ct. 2523, 37 L. Ed. 2d 706 (1973). Thus, the Fourth Amendment
protects citizens from unreasonable government searches and seizures but not those
that are “reasonable.” United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682, 105 S. Ct. 1568,
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84 L. Ed. 2d 605 (1985). “For a search or seizure to be reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, it must be based upon probable cause and executed pursuant to a
warrant.” State v. Moore, 90 Ohio St. 3d 47, 49 (2000). The probable cause and
warrant requirements both apply to automobile stops, however, “[a]s a general
matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have
probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.” Bowling Green v.
Godwin, 110 Ohio St. 3d 58, 61, 2006-Ohio-3563, ¶11; Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio
St.3d 3 (1996), syllabus.
{¶12} Appellant does not dispute the fact that he engaged in a turn without
giving the appropriate signal, a violation of R.C. 4511.39(A), which provides:
No person shall turn a vehicle or trackless trolley or move right or left
upon a highway unless and until such person has exercised due care to
ascertain that the movement can be made with reasonable safety nor
without giving an appropriate signal in the manner hereinafter provided.
The undisputed testimony of Officers Kelly and Mulligan also reflects that they had
probable cause to effectuate a traffic stop.
{¶13} Once we have determined that the stop itself was reasonable, the
record reflects that the officers satisfied the threshold requirement for the plain view
exception to the warrant requirement: “the initial intrusion which permitted police to
come into a position to view the object in question must be justified by a warrant or
recognized exception.” State v. Brown, 158 Ohio App. 3d 21, 27-28, 2004-Ohio-3364,
¶16. “Under the [plain-view] doctrine, an officer may seize an item without a warrant
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if the initial intrusion leading to the item’s discovery was lawful and it was
‘immediately apparent’ that the item was incriminating.” Id. at ¶17, quoting State v.
Waddy, 63 Ohio St. 3d 424, 442 (1992).
{¶14} In this instance, the officers did not need to undertake a search
because the item was in plain view, and, according to Officer Kelly, its incriminating
nature was readily apparent. However, even if the officer does not know that the item
in plain view is actually contraband or evidence of a crime, it may be “sufficient that
probable cause exists to associate the property with criminal activity before evidence
may be seized under the plain-view doctrine.” Brown, supra, at ¶16, citing Arizona v.
Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 (1987). In this instance, the lawful traffic stop, Appellant’s
movements, the placement of the object in plain view in the vehicle, the passenger’s
reaction to the stop, and the officer’s own experience and knowledge established the
necessary elements to justify the warrantless seizure of contraband in plain view.
{¶15} In his reply brief, Appellant argues for the first time that exigent
circumstances are necessary for the warrantless search or “seizure of an automobile
from the driveway of a private residence.” State v. Roaden, 98 Ohio App. 3d 500,
504, 648 N.E.2d 916 (1994). Appellant’s failure to raise this issue in the trial court
precludes him from raising it for the first time on appeal. State v. Awan, 22 Ohio
St.3d 120, 489 N.E.2d 277, syllabus. Moreover, as we have previously noted, a reply
brief is not an opportunity to raise new assignments of error or arguments, “it is
merely an opportunity to reply to the appellee's brief.” Julian v. Creekside Health
Ctr., 7th Dist. No. 03 MA 21, 2004-Ohio-3197, ¶81; App.R. 16(C).
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{¶16} However, because an issue that would otherwise be precluded by
waiver may nevertheless be brought to our attention as plain error, we note that
Appellant’s tardy argument misrepresents the caselaw and principles governing
exigent circumstances. Roaden, supra, is wholly factually distinct, and addresses an
improper pretextual trespass on to private property in the absence of a moving
violation. Roaden, and the cases on which it relies, addressed the unjustified search
and seizure of unattended vehicles parked on the private property of the owner.
Roaden is not relevant to and does not raise any new or additional conditions placed
on the conduct of a traffic stop due to a moving violation. Appellant mistakenly cites
State v. Johnson, 187 Ohio App. 3d 322, 2010-Ohio-1790, which discusses the
gravity of the underlying offense in the context of the exigent circumstance exception
to a home search, but not with regard to the search of an automobile. Automobiles,
unlike homes, are almost always subject to an exception to the warrant requirement
due to the exigency created by the “ready mobility” of the vehicle in combination with
“the pervasive regulation of vehicles capable of traveling on the public highways.”
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391-392, 105 S. Ct. 2066 (May 13, 1985).
Regardless, no “exigent circumstances” are required to seize items of contraband in
plain view. Because Appellant’s exigent circumstances argument was not raised in
the trial court or appropriately briefed on appeal, and because it does not identify an
error at all, and certainly not a plain error, it must fail. Appellant’s second assignment
of error is without merit and is overruled.
Conclusion
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{¶17} Officers Kelly and Mulligan were competent to testify concerning
Appellant’s failure to use his turn signal and the discovery of contraband resulting
from the lawful traffic stop. The officers satisfied the requirements to make a
warrantless seizure of contraband in plain view after the traffic stop. Appellant’s two
assignments of error are without merit and are overruled. The judgment of the trial
court is affirmed.
Vukovich, J., concurs.
DeGenaro, P.J., concurs.