State v. M.S. , 2013 Ohio 828 ( 2013 )


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  • [Cite as State v. M.S., 
    2013-Ohio-828
    .]
    Court of Appeals of Ohio
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    No. 98892
    STATE OF OHIO
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
    vs.
    M.S.
    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
    JUDGMENT:
    REVERSED AND REMANDED
    Civil Appeal from the
    Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
    Case No. CR-416852
    BEFORE:           McCormack, J., Celebrezze, P.J., and Rocco, J.
    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 7, 2013
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
    Aaron T. Baker
    Aaron T. Baker Co., L.P.A.
    38109 Euclid Avenue
    Willoughby, OH 44094
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Timothy J. McGinty
    Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
    By: Diane Smilanick
    Assistant County Prosecutor
    8th Floor, Justice Center
    1200 Ontario Street
    Cleveland, OH 44113
    TIM McCORMACK, J.:
    {¶1}   This case came to be heard upon the accelerated calendar pursuant to
    App.R. 11.1 and Loc.R. 11.1. Defendant-appellant, M.S., appeals from a judgment of
    the trial court that denied her application to expunge her criminal record.        For the
    following reasons, we reverse and remand to the trial court.
    {¶2} In 2002, M.S. pleaded guilty to drug trafficking, a fourth degree felony, in
    the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas. She was sentenced to one year of
    community control sanctions for the conviction.           In 2005, she applied for an
    expungement of the record of conviction.       The state opposed the application, and the
    trial court summarily denied it, without a hearing.
    {¶3} On April 19, 2012, M.S. filed another application for expungement. The
    court ordered an expungement report/investigation, but the docket does not reflect the
    report was either completed or filed.   The state again opposed her application, alleging
    she was ineligible because she was not a first offender —      the state alleged she had an
    aggravated criminal trespass and assault conviction in Kent, Ohio in 1998, and had
    previously received an expungement of other convictions from a court in Bedford, Ohio.
    The state, however, did not present any documentation of its allegations for the trial
    court’s review.
    {¶4} On August 3, 2012, the trial court, without a hearing, again summarily
    denied M.S.’s application for expungement.
    {¶5} M.S. now appeals, raising one assignment of error. She contends the trial
    court abused its discretion in denying her application for expungement because it failed to
    hold a hearing before denying her application and also failed to liberally apply the factors
    set forth in R.C. 2953.32(C) in her favor.
    {¶6} We review a trial court’s decision to deny an application to seal a record of
    conviction for an abuse of discretion.              State v. Wright, 
    191 Ohio App.3d 647
    ,
    
    2010-Ohio-6259
    , 
    947 N.E.2d 246
    , ¶ 7 (3d Dist.). An abuse of discretion “implies that
    the court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.” Blakemore v.
    Blakemore, 
    5 Ohio St.3d 217
    , 219, 
    450 N.E.2d 1140
     (1983).
    {¶7} At the time M.S. filed her application, R.C. 2953.32(A)(1) provided that a
    “first offender” could apply to seal a record of conviction.          To be eligible, an applicant
    must be a “first offender” as that term was defined in R.C. 2953.31(A).1 Moreover, the
    offense must not be excepted by R.C. 2953.36, which excludes, among others, an
    offender who has been convicted of an offense of violence.                        Additionally, the
    application must not be filed until three years have expired if the conviction is a felony or
    one year in the case of a misdemeanor.
    We note the legislature revised the statute, and effective September 28, 2012, the statute now
    1
    refers to “eligible offender,” instead of “first offender.” Generally, an “eligible offender” means
    someone who has no more than one felony conviction, no more than two different misdemeanor
    convictions, or no more than one felony conviction and one misdemeanor conviction. R.C. 2953.31.
    See also State v. Mooney, 10th Dist. No. 12AP-376, 
    2012-Ohio-5904
    , ¶ 7.
    {¶8} Furthermore, R.C. 2953.32(B) states that upon the filing of an application to
    seal the record, “the court shall set a date for a hearing and shall notify the prosecutor for
    the case of the hearing on the application.”   (Emphasis added.)
    {¶9} Former R.C. 2953.32(C)(1) set forth factors the court must consider in an
    application to seal the record of conviction.    The court must (1) ascertain whether the
    applicant is a first offender, (2) determine whether criminal proceedings are pending
    against the applicant, (3) satisfy itself whether the applicant has been rehabilitated to the
    court’s satisfaction, (4) consider any objections raised by the prosecutor, and (5) weigh
    the interests of the applicant in having the records pertaining to his or her conviction
    sealed against the legitimate needs, if any, of the government to maintain those records.
    R.C. 2953.32(C)(1)(a)-(e).         See also State v. M.D., 8th Dist. No. 97300,
    
    2012-Ohio-1545
    , ¶ 6.
    {¶10} “R.C. 2953.32 provides for an emphasis on the individual’s interest in
    having the record sealed.”    M.D. at ¶ 7, citing State v. Hilbert, 
    145 Ohio App.3d 824
    ,
    
    764 N.E.2d 1064
     (8th Dist.2001). “The statute also acknowledges that the public’s
    interest in being able to review the record is a relevant, legitimate governmental need
    under the statute. Nonetheless, courts must liberally construe R.C. 2953.32 in favor of
    promoting the individual’s interest in having the records sealed.” (Internal citations
    omitted.)    M.D. at ¶ 7.
    {¶11} Here, the trial court denied M.S.’s application without a hearing in
    contravention of the statutory requirement for a hearing.     This court has repeatedly held
    that a hearing is mandatory in an application for expungement, and a failure by the trial
    court to hold a hearing is grounds for reversal. See State v. R.A., 8th Dist. Nos. 97550
    and 97551, 
    2012-Ohio-2507
    , ¶ 6.2 Therefore, we must reverse and remand this matter to
    the trial court for a hearing.
    {¶12} The state concedes the trial court’s error on appeal.                The assignment of
    error is sustained.3
    {¶13} This cause is reversed and remanded to the lower court for further
    proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    It is ordered that appellant recover of said appellee costs herein taxed.
    The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
    pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
    In a recent decision, State v. J.K., 8th Dist. No. 96574, 
    2011-Ohio-5675
    , a panel of this
    2
    court departed from our long line of cases and held that an expungement hearing is not necessary
    where the state raises purely an issue of law when opposing the application for expungement. This
    case is distinguishable from J.K., because in J.K., the applicant was convicted for arson, which was an
    offense of violence excepted under R.C. 2953.36 for expungement, and therefore, the application
    involved only a question of law. Here, we recognize that whether an applicant is considered a first
    offender is an issue of law. State v. Oravec, 8th Dist. No. 96654, 2011-Ohio- 5831, ¶ 5.
    However, there is a question of fact regarding what the alleged prior conviction was because the state
    did not provide any documentation for the allegation.
    Finally, we note that this is the second application filed by M.S. to seal her record of the 2002
    3
    conviction and she did not appeal the trial court’s denial of her first application. Her claim,
    however, is not barred by res judicata. See State v. Minch, 8th Dist. No. 87820, 
    2007-Ohio-158
    (where no hearing was provided in the original motion to seal the record as required by the statute, res
    judicata did not apply to bar a second request to seal the record).
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
    the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    ______________________________________________
    TIM McCORMACK, JUDGE
    FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., P.J., and
    KENNETH A. ROCCO, J., CONCUR