State v. Miller , 2012 Ohio 6147 ( 2012 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Miller, 
    2012-Ohio-6147
    .]
    COURT OF APPEALS
    FAIRFIELD COUNTY, OHIO
    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    JUDGES:
    STATE OF OHIO                                   :       Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, P.J.
    :       Hon. W. Scott Gwin, J.
    Plaintiff-Appellee    :       Hon. William B. Hoffman, J.
    :
    -vs-                                            :
    :       Case No. 2012-CA-25
    ANITA JO MILLER                                 :
    :
    Defendant-Appellant        :       OPINION
    CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                            Criminal appeal from the Fairfield Municipal
    Court Case No. 2011TRC11881
    JUDGMENT:                                           Reversed and Remanded
    DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                             December 26, 2012
    APPEARANCES:
    For Plaintiff-Appellee                              For Defendant-Appellant
    ANDREW MAKOSKI                                      AARON CONRAD
    Assistant Prosecutor                                Conrad Law Office
    City of Lancaster                                   120 ½ E. Main Street
    121 E. Chestnut St.                                 Lancaster, OH 43130
    Lancaster, OH 43130
    [Cite as State v. Miller, 
    2012-Ohio-6147
    .]
    Gwin, J.,
    {¶1}     Defendant-appellant Anita J. Miller [“Miller”] appeals the March 29, 2012
    Judgment Entry of the Fairfield County Municipal Court denying her motion to suppress
    evidence. Plaintiff-appellee is the State of Ohio.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    {¶2}     On November 27, 2011, Miller was charged with violating R.C.
    4511.19(A)(1)(a), operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol. Subsequently she
    filed a motion to suppress arguing, among other things, that there was no reasonable
    and articulable suspicion to stop and detain her. On March 26, 2012, an oral hearing
    was held on Miller's motion to suppress. At that hearing, the following testimony was
    presented.
    {¶3}     On November 27, 2011, Officer David Thompson and Officer Marla
    Morehouse of the Lancaster Police Department were investigating a report of an open
    door at an address in Fairfield County, Ohio. While crossing the street, Officer
    Thompson heard the revving of the engine of Miller’s vehicle that was one block away
    stopped at a traffic signal. Officer Thompson testified he heard the revving of the engine
    for approximately 2 seconds. Officer Thompson was standing in the roadway as Miller’s
    vehicle approach him. Officer Thompson visually estimated the speed of the vehicle to
    be greater than the posted speed limit of 25 miles per hour. Officer Thompson used his
    flashlight to signal Miller to stop her vehicle. Miller stopped pursuant to the officer's
    directives and informed the officer that she did not have a license. Officer Thompson
    then instructed Miller to pull to the side of the road. Officer Thompson proceeded to cross
    Fairfield County, Case No. 2012-CA-25                                                     3
    the street to conclude the open door investigation. Officer Morehouse began interacting with
    Miller. Miller was thereafter arrested for OVI and operating with a suspended license.
    {¶4}   On March 29, 2012, the Court filed a Journal Entry overruling Miller's
    motion to suppress because Miller’s revving the engine of her stick shift vehicle while
    stopped at an intersection allowed Officer Thompson to pull Miller’s vehicle over to
    conduct an investigatory stop.
    {¶5}   On May 10, 2012, Miller changed her plea from "not guilty to "no contest"
    to the OVI charge and was sentenced by the trial court to a jail sentence of 30 days, a
    fine of $600.00 and court costs. The court further suspended Miller’s driver’s license for
    two years, and to serve two years probation.
    ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
    {¶6}   Miller raises one assignment of error,
    {¶7}   “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING DEFENDANT'S
    MOTION TO SUPPRESS.”
    ANALYSIS
    {¶8}   Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law
    and fact. State v. Burnside, 
    100 Ohio St.3d 152
    , 154-155, 
    2000-Ohio-5372
     
    797 N.E.2d 71
    , ¶8. When ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier of
    fact and is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and to evaluate witness
    credibility. See State v. Dunlap, 
    73 Ohio St.3d 308
    , 314, 
    652 N.E.2d 988
    (1995); State v.
    Fanning, 
    1 Ohio St.3d 19
    , 20, 
    437 N.E.2d 583
    (1982). Accordingly, a reviewing court
    must defer to the trial court's factual findings if competent, credible evidence exists to
    support those findings. See Burnside, supra; Dunlap, supra. However, once an
    Fairfield County, Case No. 2012-CA-25                                                          4
    appellate court has accepted those facts as true, it must independently determine as a
    matter of law whether the trial court met the applicable legal standard. See Burnside,
    supra, citing State v. McNamara, 
    124 Ohio App.3d 706
    , 
    707 N.E.2d 539
    (4th Dist. 1997);
    See, also, United States v. Arvizu, 
    534 U.S. 266
    , 
    122 S.Ct. 744
    , 
    151 L.Ed.2d 740
    (2002);
    Ornelas v. United States, 
    517 U.S. 690
    , 
    116 S.Ct. 1657
    , 
    134 L.Ed.2d 911
    (1996). That
    is, the application of the law to the trial court's findings of fact is subject to a de novo
    standard of review. Ornelas, 
    supra.
     Moreover, due weight should be given “to
    inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement
    officers.” Ornelas, 
    supra at 698
    , 
    116 S.Ct. at 1663
    .
    {¶9}   In the case at bar, Miller challenges only the stop of her motor vehicle.
    The Ohio Supreme Court has emphasized that probable cause is not required to make
    a traffic stop; rather the standard is reasonable and articulable suspicion. State v. Mays,
    
    119 Ohio St.3d 406
    , 
    2008-Ohio-4358
    , 
    894 N.E.2d 1204
    , ¶23. Further, neither the United
    States Supreme Court nor the Ohio Supreme Court considered the severity of the
    offense as a factor in determining whether the law enforcement official had a
    reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop a motorist. See, City of Dayton v. Erickson, 
    76 Ohio St.3d 3
    , 11-12, 
    665 N.E.2d 1091
    (1996); Whren v. United States, 
    517 U.S. 806
    ,
    813, 
    116 S.Ct. 1769
    , 
    135 L.Ed.2d 89
    (1996).
    {¶10} We perceive of no reason why revving the engine of a stick shift vehicle
    while alone at a stop light is “suspicious activity” sufficient to justify the investigative stop
    of the vehicle. The state points to no law that was violated by that activity. The record
    contains only the officers unaided visual estimates of speed in slight excess of the
    Fairfield County, Case No. 2012-CA-25                                                     5
    speed limit as an additional factor, which taken together with the engine revving the
    state argues justified further investigation.
    {¶11} The officers are statutorily prohibited from arresting or even charging a
    driver for a speeding violation based upon the officer’s “unaided visual estimation of the
    speed of the motor vehicle.” R.C. 4511.091(C)(1). R.C. 4511.091(C) provides in
    pertinent part:
    No person shall be arrested, charged, or convicted of a violation of
    any provisions of divisions (B) to (O) of Section 4511.21 or Section
    4511.211 of the Revised Code or a substantially similar municipal
    ordinance based on a peace officer's unaided visual estimation of the
    speed of a motor vehicle, trackless trolley, or streetcar.
    {¶12} Thus, the notion that officers may use unaided visual estimates of speed
    for arrest, charging, and conviction have been superseded and overruled by legislation.
    Allowing an officer to stop a vehicle on their subjective impressions that a vehicle is
    traveling in slight excess of the legal speed limit may permit officers to do just what the
    legislature had abolished. In other words, permitting an investigative stop when the
    officer cannot arrest or charge based upon his unaided visual estimate of speed in slight
    excess of the speed limit effectively eliminates any protection against profiling and
    arbitrary detentions.
    {¶13} Further, that the legislature did not intend to permit investigatory stops of a
    vehicle on an officer’s subjective impressions that a vehicle is traveling in slight excess
    of the legal speed limit can be found within             the specific exception in R.C.
    4511.091(C)(1)(c),
    Fairfield County, Case No. 2012-CA-25                                                       6
    (C)(1) * * * This division does not do any of the following:
    (c) Preclude a peace officer from testifying that the speed of
    operation of a motor vehicle, trackless trolley, or streetcar was at a speed
    greater or less than a speed described in division (A) of section 4511.21 of
    the Revised Code1, the admission into evidence of such testimony, or
    preclude a conviction of a violation of that division based in whole or in
    part on such testimony.
    {¶14} Accordingly, the legislature has expressly allowed for officers to testify,
    and for drivers to be convicted upon, unaided visual estimates of speed within a school
    zone. Had the legislature intended to permit investigatory stops outside the parameters
    of a school zone, they clearly would have allowed for the exception.
    {¶15} Thus, under the facts in the case at bar, the officers intruded upon
    constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate
    hunches. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 
    88 S.Ct. 1868
    , 
    20 L.Ed.2d 889
    . “And simple ‘good faith
    on the part of the arresting officer is not enough.' * * * If subjective good faith alone were
    the test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people
    would be ‘secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,’ only in the discretion of
    the police.'” Beck v. Ohio, [
    379 U.S. 89
    , 
    85 S.Ct. 223
    , 
    13 L.Ed.2d 142
    (1964] at 97, 
    85 S.Ct. at 229
    .” Terry at 22.
    {¶16} Miller’s sole assignment of error is sustained.
    1
    Speed limits; school zones; modifications.
    Fairfield County, Case No. 2012-CA-25                                              7
    {¶17} The judgment of the Fairfield County Municipal Court is reversed and this
    matter is remanded for proceedings in accordance with our opinion and the law.
    By Gwin, J.,
    Delaney, P.J., and
    Hoffman, J., concur
    _________________________________
    HON. W. SCOTT GWIN
    _________________________________
    HON. PATRICIA A. DELANEY
    _________________________________
    HON. WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN
    WSG:clw 1130
    [Cite as State v. Miller, 
    2012-Ohio-6147
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR FAIRFIELD COUNTY, OHIO
    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    STATE OF OHIO                                     :
    :
    Plaintiff-Appellee   :
    :
    :
    -vs-                                              :       JUDGMENT ENTRY
    :
    ANITA JO MILLER                                   :
    :
    :
    Defendant-Appellant       :       CASE NO. 2012-CA-25
    For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion, the judgment of
    the Fairfield County Municipal Court is reversed and this matter is remanded for
    proceedings in accordance with our opinion and the law. Costs to appellee.
    _________________________________
    HON. W. SCOTT GWIN
    _________________________________
    HON. PATRICIA A. DELANEY
    _________________________________
    HON. WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN