Nemcek v. Northeast Ohio Regional Sewer Dist. , 2012 Ohio 5516 ( 2012 )

[Cite as Nemcek v. Northeast Ohio Regional Sewer Dist., 2012-Ohio-5516.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 98431
THOMAS NEMCEK
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
vs.
NORTHEAST OHIO REGIONAL
SEWER DISTRICT, ET AL.
DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED
Civil Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court
Case No. CV-755787
BEFORE: S. Gallagher, J., Sweeney, P.J., and Rocco, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 29, 2012
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Patrick M. Farrell
Patrick M. Farrell Co., LPA
600 E. Granger Road, 2nd Floor
Brooklyn Heights, OH 44131
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
Warren Rosman
John S. Kluznik
Weston Hurd LLP
Tower at Erieview
1301 East 9th Street, Suite 1900
Cleveland, OH 44114
Marlene Sundheimer
Director of Law
Lawrence K. English
Regina M. Massetti
Assistant Directors of Law
N.E.O.R.S.D.
3900 Euclid Avenue
Cleveland, OH 44115
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.:
{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, Thomas Nemcek, appeals the judgment of the Cuyahoga
County Court of Common Pleas that granted summary judgment on a
hostile-work-environment claim in favor of defendants-appellees, Northeast Ohio
Regional Sewer District (“NEORSD”), et al. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm.
{¶2} Nemcek was employed by NEORSD from February 1978 until June 2010.
From September 1987 until his departure, he was employed as a shift supervisor at
NEORSD’s Southerly Wastewater Treatment Plant. During the latter part of his
employment, Nemcek applied for more than 20 shift-manager positions, but he was not
awarded any of these positions. He claims he was subjected to unwelcome verbal conduct
and harassment by management members of NEORSD.
{¶3} On May 20, 2011, Nemcek filed a complaint against NEORSD and several
1
individual employees of NEORSD. Nemcek alleged claims for hostile work
environment and age discrimination. Thereafter, Nemcek elected to bring his
age-discrimination claim under R.C. 4112.14, rather than R.C. 4112.02(N).2
1
The named employees included Julius Ciaccia, Jr., Michael Bucci, David McNeely,
Raymond Weeden, Lawrence Cinadr, John Augustine, Terry Robinson, Terry Meister, Tom Wohlfeil,
and George Schur. Defendants Meister and Wohlfeil were later dismissed from the action for failure
of service and lack of personal jurisdiction.
2
We note that R.C. 4112.14 is governed by a six-year statute of limitations, while R.C.
4112.02(N) is governed by a 180-day statute of limitations.
{¶4} Upon defendants’ motion, the trial court dismissed the age-discrimination
claim on November 30, 2011. Subsequently, the court issued a nunc pro tunc entry on
January 9, 2012. The trial court found that the age-discrimination claim failed as a matter
of law because it was based on the denial of a promotion and the scope of R.C. 4112.14 is
restricted to hirings or firings.
{¶5} After the close of discovery, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment
on the hostile-work-environment claim. Nemcek filed a motion to compel discovery and
for sanctions and submitted a brief in opposition to the motion for summary judgment.
The trial court denied Nemcek’s motion to compel discovery and for sanctions. On May
3, 2012, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. The court
found in relevant part:
Although [Nemcek] is a member of a protected class (age), [he] has failed to
prove the necessary elements to establish a claim under R.C. 4112. It is
clear from the evidence submitted by the parties, that plaintiff was not
subjected to ridicule, harassment or insults based on age * * * .
Furthermore, * * * a reasonable person would not find the alleged acts by the
defendants to be hostile or abusive.
{¶6} Nemcek timely filed this appeal. He raises two assignments of error for our
review. His first assignment of error challenges the trial court’s decision to deny his
motion to compel discovery.
{¶7} We review the denial of a motion to compel discovery for an abuse of
discretion. State ex rel. V Cos. v. Marshall, 81 Ohio St.3d 467, 469, 1998-Ohio-329, 692
N.E.2d 198. An abuse of discretion requires an unreasonable, arbitrary, or
unconscionable decision. Id.{¶8} “Ohio has a liberal discovery policy which, subject to privilege, enables
opposing parties to obtain from each other all evidence that is material, relevant and
competent, notwithstanding its admissibility at trial.” Fletcher v. Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co., 2d Dist. No. 02CA1599, 2003-Ohio-3038, ¶ 14, citing Civ.R. 26(B)(1). While
discovery should be liberally allowed, a trial court is vested with broad discretion in
discovery matters. Roe v. Planned Parenthood S.W. Ohio Region, 122 Ohio St.3d 399,
2009-Ohio-2973, 912 N.E.2d 61, ¶ 82. Moreover, a trial court has discretion to limit
pretrial discovery to prevent an abuse of the discovery process. Arnold v. Am. Natl. Red
Cross, 93 Ohio App.3d 564, 575, 639 N.E.2d 484 (8th Dist.1994).
{¶9} In his motion to compel, Nemcek sought to compel appellees to answer all
questions asked during the defendants’ depositions. Nemcek claimed that defense
counsel directed his clients not to answer certain questions posed during the depositions
and also refused to provide some information discovered during the course of the
depositions.
{¶10} A review of the questioning reflects that defense counsel objected to certain
questions on the grounds that they were irrelevant and unrelated to the remaining
harassment claim. The questions primarily pertained to the qualifications and experience
of the candidates awarded positions for which Nemcek had applied, and the criteria and
considerations for awarding the positions. While the best approach is to liberally allow
questions and answers related to the topic at hand, the subject questions here dealt with the
age discrimination claim that had been dismissed by the court.
{¶11} Nonetheless, Nemcek argues that defense counsel committed certain
discovery violations and prevented the discovery of relevant evidence. However, he fails
to show how the proffered questions were relevant to the establishment of his
hostile-work-environment claim. Furthermore, the record reflects that the depositions
were completed on March 1, 2012, yet Nemcek waited over a month to file his motion to
compel, which was also after the defendants’ motion for summary judgment had been
filed.
{¶12} Civ.R. 26(B), which sets forth the scope of discovery, provides that in
general, “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action * * *.” Because Nemcek
failed to demonstrate the relevance of the objected matter, we find no abuse of discretion
by the trial court. See Baynard v. Oakwood Village, 8th Dist. No. 71711, 1997 Ohio App.
LEXIS 4652 (Oct. 16, 1997). Nemcek’s first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶13} Nemcek’s second assignment of error challenges the trial court’s decision to
grant summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Appellate review of summary
judgment is de novo, governed by the standard set forth in Civ.R. 56. Comer v. Risko,
106 Ohio St.3d 185, 2005-Ohio-4559, 833 N.E.2d 712, ¶ 8. Accordingly, we afford no
deference to the trial court’s decision and independently review the record to determine
whether summary judgment is appropriate. Hollins v. Shaffer, 182 Ohio App.3d 282,
2009-Ohio-2136, 912 N.E.2d 637, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.). Under Civ.R. 56(C), summary
judgment is proper when the moving party establishes that
(1) no genuine issue of any material fact remains, (2) the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) it appears from the evidence
that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and construing the
evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, that conclusion is
adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is
made.
State ex rel. Duncan v. Mentor City Council, 105 Ohio St.3d 372, 2005-Ohio-2163, 826
N.E.2d 832, ¶ 9, citing Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327, 364 N.E.2d
267 (1977).
{¶14} To establish a claim under R.C. Chapter 4111 for hostile work environment,
a plaintiff must establish: (1) the employee was a member of a protected class; (2) the
employee was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was based on the
employee’s status as a member of a protected class; (4) the harassment had the purpose or
effect of unreasonably interfering with the employee’s work performance or creating an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and (5) the existence of respondeat
superior liability. Simmons-Means v. Cuyahoga Cty. Dept. of Justice Affairs, 8th Dist.
No. 87303, 2006-Ohio-4123, ¶ 22. A hostile work environment exists “[w]hen the
workplace is permeated with ‘discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult,’ * * * that
is ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and
create an abusive working environment.’” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21,
114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993), quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57, 67, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986). For there to be an actionable claim, a
hostile work environment “must be both objectively and subjectively offensive, one that a
reasonable person would find hostile or abusive, and one that the victim in fact did
perceive to be so.” Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141
L.Ed.2d 662 (1998), citing Harris at 21-22. Furthermore, “no matter how severe or
pervasive the conduct, harassment does not constitute a discriminatory practice under R.C.
4112.02(A) unless based on a prohibited classification.” Hampel v. Food Ingredients
Specialties, Inc., 89 Ohio St.3d 169, 184-185, 2000-Ohio-128, 729 N.E.2d 726.
{¶15} Nemcek states that he is a member of a protected class because of his age.
He claims he was subjected to unwelcome verbal conduct and harassment by appellees.
Nemcek asserts that he was denied a promotion over 20 times during the latter part of his
career and that he was equally, if not more, qualified than those promoted over him. He
argues that there were several instances in which appellees urged him to get further
education or take further hours of continuing education to enhance his chances for
promotion. He also claims he was excluded from management classes that were offered.
Further, he states that he was told to get a bachelor’s degree when he was near the age of
60, yet younger persons were promoted without bachelor’s degrees. Among other
conduct, the alleged harassment also included being told he had no chance of becoming a
shift manager, being called a union steward when he had not held that position in years,
being told he had deficiencies without being told what the deficiencies were, and not being
responded to when he inquired about what he could improve upon. Nemcek also argues
his claims of a hostile-work-environment were never addressed by appellees, despite being
repeatedly raised.
{¶16} A review of Nemcek’s compiled list of alleged harassing conduct does not
show any actions that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive. Nor does the
evidence show that the alleged harassment, which spanned several years, was severe or
pervasive, or permeated the workplace. In large part, the complained conduct reflects
Nemcek’s dissatisfaction with appellees’ actions in promoting others over him and with
their responses to his efforts to obtain a shift-manager position.
{¶17} Additionally, there was no evidence that Nemcek was harassed based on any
protected status. As appellees argue, there were no statements made concerning
Nemcek’s age. More significantly, while Nemcek may have been dissatisfied with the
actions of appellees and frustrated by his failure to be awarded a shift-manager position,
there is an utter lack of evidence that the complained conduct occurred because of
Nemcek’s age. To the contrary, there was evidence concerning Nemcek’s workplace
performance and his communication issues to explain why he was not deemed a viable
candidate for a promotion.
{¶18} Because there is no genuine issue of fact regarding Nemcek’s
hostile-work-environment claim, the trial court properly granted summary judgment in
favor of appellees. Nemcek’s second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶19} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellees recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
JAMES J. SWEENEY, P.J., and
KENNETH A. ROCCO, J., CONCUR