Niki D'Atri Ents. v. Hines , 2014 Ohio 803 ( 2014 )


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  • [Cite as Niki D'Atri Ents. v. Hines, 
    2014-Ohio-803
    .]
    STATE OF OHIO, MAHONING COUNTY
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    SEVENTH DISTRICT
    NIKI D’ATRI ENTERPRISES,                               )
    )      CASE NO.     13 MA 57
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,                            )
    )         OPINION
    - VS -                                         )           AND
    )      JUDGMENT ENTRY
    JAMES HINES,                                           )
    )
    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.                           )
    CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS:                                  Civil Appeal from Common Pleas Court,
    Case No. 11CV1116.
    JUDGMENT:                                                  Dismissed as Moot.
    APPEARANCES:
    For Plaintiff-Appellee:                                    Attorney Christopher Sammarone
    20 West Federal Street, Suite M6
    Youngstown, Ohio 44503
    For Defendant-Appellant:                                   James Hines, Pro se
    427 Catalina Avenue
    Youngstown, Ohio 44504
    JUDGES:
    Hon. Joseph J. Vukovich
    Hon. Cheryl L. Waite
    Hon. Mary DeGenaro
    Dated: February 21, 2014
    [Cite as Niki D'Atri Ents. v. Hines, 
    2014-Ohio-803
    .]
    PER CURIAM:
    ¶{1}     On January 21, 2014, this appeal was dismissed as untimely.             On
    January 31, 2014, appellant filed a “brief in support of reconsideration and
    reinstatement” of this appeal. He does not cite App.R. 26(A)(1), which allows for an
    “application for reconsideration,” but we construe his filing as being made under this
    rule.
    ¶{2}     The standard for reviewing an application for reconsideration is whether
    the application calls to the attention of the court a legally unsupportable holding or an
    obvious error in its decision or points to an issue that should have been but was not
    fully considered. State v. Himes, 7th Dist. No. 08MA146, 
    2010-Ohio-332
    , ¶ 4, citing
    Juhasz v. Costanzo, 7th Dist. No. 99CA294 (Feb. 7, 2002).             An application for
    reconsideration is not designed for use in instances where a party simply disagrees
    with the conclusion reached and the logic used by an appellate court.             
    Id.,
     citing
    Victory White Metal Co. v. N.P. Motel Syst., 7th Dist. No. 04MA245, 
    2005-Ohio-3828
    ,
    ¶ 2; Hampton v. Ahmed, 7th Dist. No. 02BE66, 
    2005-Ohio-1766
    , ¶ 16.
    ¶{3}     The entry at issue here clearly was entered in the journal by the clerk.
    Appellant does not dispute this but makes a misguided argument suggesting that the
    date the judgment entry was journalized is unknown and that the clerk served a
    “docketed” time-stamped entry on him rather than the journalized entry. He cites a
    case about a computerized system that a trial court used in place of a clerk, which
    system is not relevant here. He cites a case involving electronic submission to a clerk
    by a trial court at one time with later stamping by a clerk. However, the time-stamp on
    the entry here is the stamp placed upon the entry by the clerk (not the court).
    ¶{4}     Appellant also relies on statements that the docket is not the journal.
    This is true. See State ex rel. White v. Junkin, 
    80 Ohio St.3d 335
    , 337, 
    686 N.E.2d 267
     (1997). Yet, the judgment entry here was not only listed in the docket; it was also
    date-stamped by the clerk on that same day. The time-stamp is the indication that the
    entry was entered in the clerk’s journal. See 
    id.
     (time-stamp as indicator that judgment
    entry was journalized); Kaine v. Marion Prison Warden, 
    88 Ohio St.3d 454
    , 455, 
    727 N.E.2d 907
     (2000) (using the date entry was filed as the date it was entered on the
    -2-
    journal by the clerk). See also State v. Smith, 8th Dist. No. 99428, 
    2013-Ohio-315
    , ¶
    10 (disagreeing with argument that clerk’s time-stamping and journalizing are
    separable acts).
    ¶{5}   Appellant also disagrees with our use of the rule that the day of the act
    from which the time period begins to run shall not be included and the next part of the
    same rule that when the period is less than seven days, intermediate Saturdays and
    Sundays shall be excluded. See App.R.14(A); Civ.R. 6(A). He believes that these
    provisions should not be applied to Civ.R. 58(B), which is utilized by App.R. 4(A).
    ¶{6}   However, both App.R. 14(A) and Civ.R. 6(A) begin with the statement:
    “In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these rules * * *.” We
    explained our decision in a full dismissal opinion with analysis of the rules and citations
    to other pertinent cases.        Our decision could not be described as legally
    unsupportable, and we find no obvious error. Nor is there an issue that should have
    been addressed but was not.
    ¶{7}   In accordance, this request for reconsideration is denied.
    Vukovich, J., concurs.
    Waite, J., concurs.
    DeGenaro, P.J., concurs.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 13 MA 57

Citation Numbers: 2014 Ohio 803

Judges: Per Curiam

Filed Date: 2/21/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014