State v. Jackson , 2014 Ohio 5137 ( 2014 )

[Cite as State v. Jackson, 2014-Ohio-5137.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 100877
STATE OF OHIO
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
HARRISON JACKSON
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART,
AND REMANDED
Criminal Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-13-574810-A
BEFORE: E.T. Gallagher, J., Kilbane, P.J., and Stewart, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 20, 2014
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Robert L. Tobik
Cuyahoga County Public Defender
BY: Jeffrey Gamso
Assistant Public Defender
310 Lakeside Avenue
Suite 200
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Timothy J. McGinty
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
BY: Denise J. Salerno
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
The Justice Center, 8th Floor
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J.:
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Harrison Jackson (“Jackson”), appeals his conviction and
sentence. We find some merit to the appeal and affirm in part and reverse in part, the trial
court’s judgment.
{¶2} In May 2013, Jackson was charged with rape, in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2),
and kidnaping, in violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(4), as a result of an incident that occurred on
June 7, 1993. At a bench trial, the victim (“A.G.”) testified that in 1993 she was a 35 year-old
drug addict, who sold and used drugs. She knew Jackson, who was then 19 years old, because
they sometimes smoked crack together, but she did not know him by any other name but “Cool
Man.”
{¶3} Sometime after midnight on June 7, 1993, while A.G. was sleeping, Jackson
knocked on the door of the apartment where A.G. was temporarily living. He was looking for
drugs, and A.G. told him she had none. A.G. testified that Jackson entered the apartment to use
the bathroom, and A.G. went back to bed. Jackson subsequently entered A.G.’s bedroom and
raped her. After the rape, A.G. walked to her sister’s house, and her sister took her to the
hospital where a nurse completed a rape kit. A.G. gave a statement to police while she was in
the hospital, and the police report was admitted into evidence at trial.
{¶4} Jackson testified and told a different story. Jackson admitted that he came to
A.G.’s apartment on the night of June 7, 1993, and that they had sexual intercourse. However,
he stated that he came to A.G.’s apartment with some crack he had stolen and traded some of the
crack for sex. He maintained the sex was consensual. After having sex, Jackson slept on the
couch and left in the morning.
{¶5} Jackson further testified that he saw A.G. with another woman named Diane the day
after the alleged rape, and Diane told Jackson that A.G. accused him of raping her. Jackson
testified that he confronted A.G., who was nearby, about the accusation, and she denied it.
According to Jackson, the three of them then got high together. Jackson acknowledged he has
been known as “Cool Man” all his life.
{¶6} Two other witnesses testified at trial. Timothy Clark (“Clark”), an investigator in
the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office, testified that he investigates “cold cases” in which
DNA evidence was collected years ago but no suspect was identified at that time. He explained
that many suspects now provide DNA samples in buccal swabs when they are arrested, and their
DNA information is collected in the Combined DNA Index System (“CODIS”) database. As
DNA tests are performed in both new and cold cases, the results of these tests are entered into the
same database. If the DNA from a recently tested sample matches DNA previously entered into
the CODIS database, there is a “CODIS hit,” which means the recently tested DNA matches an
individual in the database.
{¶7} In this case, DNA from A.G.’s rape kit was sent to the Ohio Attorney General’s
Bureau of Criminal Investigation (“BCI”) for DNA testing in 2011. In 2013, there was a
CODIS hit. The DNA test results indicated that DNA contained in A.G.’s rape kit matched the
DNA of “Harrison Jackson, a.k.a. Tyrone Jackson, Desmond Moss, and Harrison Moss.”
{¶8} Once the CODIS hit was made, the case was assigned to Clark, who reviewed the
police report of the rape. Clark also called and interviewed A.G., who had stopped using drugs
and started a new life in Atlanta, Georgia. After A.G. confirmed the allegations, Clark sent a
photo array of suspects to Cynthia Nwokocha (“Nwokocha”), who was an investigator in the
Fulton County District Attorney’s Office in Atlanta, Georgia. Nwokocha testified that she did
not know any of the individuals pictured in the line up. When Nwokocha presented the line up
to A.G., A.G. immediately identified Jackson as the man who raped her and called him “Cool
Man.” Nwokocha subsequently mailed the line up back to Clark.
{¶9} Clark interviewed Jackson following his arrest. Jackson admitted that he knew
A.G. and that he had sex with her on June 7, 1993. Clark took another buccal swab that
confirmed the results of the earlier DNA testing.
{¶10} The trial court found Jackson guilty of both the rape and kidnaping charges and
referred him to the Court Psychiatric Clinic for a H.B. 180 classification assessment. At the
sentencing hearing, the court sentenced Jackson to 8-25 years in prison and classified him as a
sexual predator. Jackson now appeals and raises four assignments of error, which we discuss
out of order for the sake of economy.
Manifest Weight of the Evidence
{¶11} In the third assignment of error, Jackson asserts his convictions are not sustained
by the manifest weight of the evidence. He argues the evidence produced at trial demonstrates
that A.G. was lying when she claimed she was raped.
{¶12} “A manifest weight challenge * * * questions whether the prosecution met its
burden of persuasion.” State v. Thomas, 70 Ohio St.2d 79, 80, 434 N.E.2d 1356 (1982). The
manifest weight of the evidence standard of review requires us to review the entire record, weigh
the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses, and determine
whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created
such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial
ordered. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997).
{¶13} The trier of fact “has the best opportunity to view the demeanor, attitude, and
credibility of each witness, something that does not translate well on the written page.” Davis v.
Flickinger, 77 Ohio St.3d 415, 418, 674 N.E.2d 1159 (1997). Therefore, the discretionary
power to grant a new trial should only be exercised in exceptional cases where the evidence
weighs heavily against the conviction. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 386, 678 N.E.2d 541.
{¶14} Jackson argues that discrepancies between A.G.’s testimony and the statement she
gave police proves A.G. was lying. At trial, A.G. testified that she only knew Jackson by the
name “Cool Man.” However, in her statement to police, she identified the rapist as “Henderson
Jackson.” Therefore, Jackson argues, A.G. was lying when she stated she only knew him as
“Cool Man.”
{¶15} However, A.G. made her statement to police over 20 years ago. Since that time,
A.G. has stopped using drugs, moved out-of-state, and obtained employment, which she has
maintained for many years. She testified that she “put this incident behind her,” tried to forget
it, and had no recollection of the statement she gave to police.
{¶16} In addition, “Henderson Jackson” is not Jackson’s real name; it is one of several
aliases he has used over the years. And Jackson admitted at trial that he has been called “Cool
Man” all his life. After over 20 years, it is conceivable that A.G. would forget some details of
the incident, including a false name the defendant rarely used. Moreover, the police report
indicates that A.G. identified the suspect as “Cool Man,” in addition to “Henderson Jackson.”
Therefore, A.G.’s testimony that Cool Man raped her has been consistent since the day the rape
occurred.
{¶17} Jackson argues A.G.’s testimony that the rape occurred after midnight conflicts
with the timing evidenced in the police report because the police report was not completed until
7:30 a.m. However, A.G. testified that Jackson came into the apartment “sometime after
midnight.” She had been sleeping and was not sure of the exact time. After midnight could
mean several hours after midnight. Just because A.G. did not know the exact hour and minute
the rape occurred, does not prove she was lying.
{¶18} Jackson also contends A.G.’s testimony that she did not know her daughter had
been dating Jackson and was pregnant with his child until shortly before trial also proves she was
lying. Perhaps the defense considered the pregnancy of A.G.’s daughter relevant to show a
motive to lie, but the court had practically no information regarding A.G.’s relationship with her
daughter upon which the court could draw such conclusion. Any motive, such as revenge, is
speculative. It is not clear how the pregnancy of A.G.’s daughter is relevant. The trial court
was in the best position to assess A.G.’s credibility and found her testimony credible
{¶19} Moreover, the consistencies in A.G.’s story far outweigh any discrepancies. The
police report indicates she told police on the day the rape occurred that the suspect was known as
“Cool Man.” Jackson admitted that he has been called “Cool Man” all his life. When Clark
interviewed her about the rape in 2013, her statements were consistent with her statements in the
police report. When Nwokocha presented A.G. with a photo array of suspects, she immediately
identified Jackson as the rapist. As it turned out, the DNA of the suspect she identified matched
the DNA found in A.G.’s rape kit. Jackson admitted he had sex with A.G., but claimed it was
consensual. Yet A.G. described how the rape occurred in detail. Although she did not
remember a false name Jackson may have used 20 years ago, she remembered the more traumatic
aspects of the incident.
{¶20} The court found A.G.’s testimony more credible than Jackson’s. Under these
circumstances, we cannot say the trier of fact clearly lost its way. Therefore, the third assignment
of error is overruled.
Sexual Predator Classification
{¶21} In the second assignment of error, Jackson argues the trial court erred in classifying
him as a sexual predator. He contends the trial court lacked authority to make a sexual predator
determination without holding a hearing. We agree.
{¶22} The trial court classified Jackson as a sexual predator under Ohio’s former sexual
offender registration law, commonly known as “Megan’s Law.” Although Jackson committed the
rape against A.G. before the effective date of Megan’s law, Jackson does not contest the
applicability of Megan’s Law to this case. Indeed, the Ohio Supreme Court has held that the
law applies retroactively to offenses committed prior to its effective date. State v. Cook, 83
Ohio St.3d 404, 410, 700 N.E.2d 570 (1998). See also State v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344,
2011-Ohio-3374, 952 N.E.2d 1108 (explaining that the legislature intended that Megan’s Law
apply retroactively).1
{¶23} Under Megan’s Law, a convicted sex offender may be classified as a “sexually
oriented offender,” “habitual sex offender,” or “sexual predator,” depending on the offender’s
history of sex crime convictions. Megan’s Law also established different registration
requirements for each class commensurate with the seriousness of the classification. See former
R.C. 2950.07(B)(1) and 2950.06(B)(1). Sexual predators are required to register every 90 days
for the remainder of the offender’s life. See former R.C. 2950.07(B)(1) and 2950.06(B)(1).
{¶24} Under Megan’s Law, R.C. 2950.01(E)(1) defines a “sexual predator” as a person
who has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to committing a sexually oriented offense and “is
likely to engage in the future in one or more sexually oriented offenses.” Former R.C.
2950.09(B)(1)(a) requires trial courts to conduct a hearing prior to classifying a defendant as a
sexual predator, and that “the offender and the prosecutor shall have an opportunity to testify,
present evidence, call and examine witnesses and expert witnesses, and cross-examine witnesses
and expert witnesses regarding the determination as to whether the offender is a sexual predator.”
(Emphasis added.) See State v. Blake-Taylor, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100419,
2014-Ohio-3495, ¶ 4.
1 The current statutory scheme, Am.Sub. S.B. 10, was enacted in 2007, and is based on the
federal Adam Walsh Act, 42 U.S.C. 16901 et seq. Under the Adam Walsh Act, an offender is now
subject to additional reporting and registration requirements and is subject to those requirements for a
longer time.
{¶25} After reviewing all the evidence, the trial court “shall determine by clear and
convincing evidence whether the offender is a sexual predator.” Former R.C. 2950.09(B)(4).
If the court determines the offender is a sexual predator, “the judge shall specify in the offender’s
sentence and the judgment of conviction that contains the sentence that the judge has determined
that the offender is a sexual predator and shall specify that the determination was pursuant to
[R.C. 2950.09(B)].” Blake-Taylor at ¶ 4, quoting R.C. 2950.09(B)(1).
{¶26} Jackson did not object to the court’s failure to hold a hearing. The state argues
that because sexual predator classifications are civil in nature, this court must review this error
under a civil plain error standard. In civil cases, the plain error doctrine applies only “in the
extremely rare case involving exceptional circumstances where error, to which no objection was
made at the trial court, seriously affects the basic fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the
judicial process, thereby challenging the legitimacy of the underlying judicial process itself.”
State v. Gowdy, 88 Ohio St.3d 387, 399, 727 N.E.2d 579 (2000). In Gowdy, the Ohio Supreme
Court held that failure to provide the defendant with adequate notice of a sexual predator
classification hearing “involves such exceptional circumstances” that it amounts to plain error.
Id. at 399. The court in Gowdy further held that “[a]bsent compliance with the mandatory
notice provision of R.C. 2950.09(B)(1), a defendant’s classification must be vacated and the
matter remanded for the trial court to conduct a sexual offender classification hearing with proper
advance notice of the hearing to all parties.” Id. at 399.
{¶27} In this case, the trial court did not hold a classification hearing. Yet, it announced
at the sentencing hearing that it had classified Jackson a sexual predator. Since the Supreme
Court in Gowdy held that failure to provide the defendant with notice of a classification hearing
amounts to plain error, certainly the failure to actually hold the hearing in violation of a statutory
mandate is also plain error.
{¶28} Therefore, the second assignment of error is sustained.
Sentence
{¶29} In the fourth assignment of error, Jackson argues the trial court lacked authority to
sentence him to an indefinite prison term of 8-25 years under pre-S.B. 2 sentencing law. He
contends that although he committed the rape and kidnaping offenses in 1993, he should have
been sentenced under Am.Sub.H.B. 86 (“H.B. 86”), which became effective on September 30,
2011. The state, on the other hand, contends that because H.B. 86 did not repeal Am.Sub.S.B.
No. 2 (“S.B. 2”) and S.B. 2 only applies to offenses committed on or after July 1, 1996,
Jackson’s rape and kidnaping offenses, which were committed in 1993, are not subject to the
sentencing amendments in H.B. 86.
{¶30} Section 5 of S.B. 2 states:
The provisions of the Revised Code in existence prior to July 1, 1996, shall apply
to a person upon whom a court imposed a term of imprisonment prior to that date
and, NOTWITHSTANDING DIVISION (B) OF SECTION 1.58 OF THE
REVISED CODE, to a person upon whom a court on or after that date and in
accordance with the law in existence prior to that date, IMPOSES a term of
imprisonment for an offense that was committed prior to that date.
(Emphasis sic.)
Thus, in S.B. 2 the General Assembly specifically declared that all defendants who committed
crimes on or before July 1, 1996 had to be sentenced under the law in existence at the time of the
offense, “notwithstanding division (B) of section 1.58 of the Revised Code.” Section 3,
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 269, 146 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 11099, amending Section 5 of S.B. 2. See State
v. Rush, 83 Ohio St.3d 53, 697 N.E.2d 634 (1998).
{¶31} However, H.B. 86 does not include this exclusionary language. In fact, in
Sections 3 and 4 of the act, the General Assembly expressly provides that certain specified
offenses and certain sentencing provisions are subject to H.B. 86 sentencing amendments even
though the subject offenses were committed prior to its effective date. As relevant here, Section
4 states, in relevant part:
SECTION 4. The amendments to * * * division (A) of section 2929.14 of the
Revised Code that are made in this act apply to a person penalized under th[at]
section[] on or after the effective date of this section and to a person to whom
division (B) of section 1.58 of the Revised Code makes the amendments
applicable.
{¶32} Division (A) of R.C. 2929.14, which governs basic prison terms, states in relevant
part:
[I]f the court imposing a sentence upon an offender for a felony elects or is
required to impose a prison term on the offender pursuant to this chapter, the court
shall impose a definite prison term that shall be one of the following:
(1) For a felony of the first degree, the prison term shall be three, four, five, six,
seven, eight, nine, ten, or eleven years.
{¶33} Jackson was convicted of rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2) and kidnaping in
violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(4). Both are first-degree felonies. Pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(A),
as amended by H.B. 86, the trial court was required to impose a definite prison term of “three,
four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten, or eleven years,” for first-degree felonies. Section 4 of
H.B. 86 specifically states that the basic prison terms outlined in R.C. 2929.14(A), as amended
by the act, apply to a person who is penalized under that section.
{¶34} In contrast to Section 5 of S.B. 2, which excluded application of R.C. 1.58(B) from
its provisions, Section 4 of H.B. 86 expressly states H.B. 86 amendments apply “to a person to
whom division (B) of section 1.58 of the Revised Code makes the amendments applicable.”
R.C. 1.58(B) states:
If the penalty, forfeiture, or punishment for any offense is reduced by a
reenactment or amendment of a statute, the penalty, forfeiture, or punishment, if
not already imposed, shall be imposed according to the statute as amended.
{¶35} These provisions are consistent with the legislative intent behind H.B. 86. In
State v. Limoli, 140 Ohio St.3d 188, 2014-Ohio-3072, 16 N.E.3d 641, the Ohio Supreme Court
examined the effect of H.B. 86 on a defendant who was convicted of an offense specified in
Section 3 of H.B. 86 prior to its effective date but was not sentenced until after its effective date.
The specified offense was possession of crack cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.11. The court
noted that Section 3 of H.B. 86, which is very similar to Section 4, specifically identified R.C.
2925.11 and stated that R.C. 1.58(B) makes the amendments to that code section applicable.
Therefore, the Limoli court concluded that individuals who possessed crack cocaine in violation
of R.C. 2925.11 prior to H.B. 86’s effective date, but are penalized after its effective date, must
be sentenced under the H.B. 86 amendments. Regarding the legislature’s intent, the Supreme
Court explained:
The goal of the General Assembly in enacting H.B. 86 was “to reduce the state’s
prison population and to save the associated costs of incarceration by diverting
certain offenders from prison and by shortening the terms of other offenders
sentenced to prison.” [State v.] Taylor, 138 Ohio St.3d 194, 2014-Ohio-460, 5
N.E.3d 612, at ¶ 17, citing Ohio Legislative Service Commission, Fiscal Note &
Local Impact Statement to Am.Sub.H.B. 86, at 3 (Sept. 30, 2011).
{¶36} Athough neither Section 3 nor Section 4 specify rape and kidnaping as offenses
covered by H.B. 86, Section 4 states that H.B. 86 amendments apply to defendants penalized
under R.C. 2929.14(A). Moreover, H.B. 86 expressly states that where its sentencing
provisions provide a more lenient sentence than previous sentencing statutes, then R.C. 1.58(B)
makes the H.B. 86 amendments applicable. See Sections 3 and 4 of H.B. 86.
{¶37} Jackson committed the rape and kidnaping offenses on June 7, 1993. He was
charged with these offenses, which are both first-degree felonies, on May 29, 2013. As
previously stated, R.C. 2929.14(A)(1), as amended by H.B. 86, states that the basic prison term
for a first-degree felony “shall be three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten, or eleven years.”
Yet, the trial court sentenced Jackson to an indefinite term of 8 to 25 years pursuant to the
sentencing provisions in effect in 1993, when the offense was committed. The maximum prison
term Jackson could receive for rape under R.C. 2929.14(A)(1) as amended by H.B. 86 is only 11
years, whereas the maximum the trial court imposed under pre-S.B. 2 sentencing laws was 25
years. Section 4 provides that Jackson is entitled to the more lenient sentencing provisions of
H.B. 86 by virtue of R.C. 1.58(B). Therefore, the indefinite prison sentence was not authorized
by law and violated Section 4 of H.B. 86.
{¶38} In State v. Underwood, 124 Ohio St.3d 365, 2010-Ohio-1, 922 N.E.2d 923, the
Ohio Supreme Court held that “sentences that do not comport with mandatory provisions are
subject to total resentencing.” Id. at ¶ 20, citing State v. Bezak, 114 Ohio St.3d 94,
2007-Ohio-3250, 868 N.E.2d 961, ¶ 11. Unauthorized sentences are illegal and void ab initio.
State v. Beasley, 14 Ohio St.3d 74, 75, 471 N.E.2d 774 (1984). Therefore, Jackson’s indefinite
sentence must be vacated.
{¶39} The fourth assignment of error is sustained.
Postrelease Control
{¶40} In the first assignment of error, Jackson argues the trial court erroneously imposed
a five-year period of postrelease control on him. He contends that because the offenses
occurred three years before the effective date of S.B. 2, the trial court had no authority to impose
postrelease control on him in this case.
{¶41} Prior to S.B. 2, which became effective on July 1, 1996, inmates served indefinite
sentences, and the parole authority had discretion to determine when the inmate would be
released from prison and the terms of postrelease supervision, which was then called “parole.”
Woods v. Telb, 89 Ohio St.3d 504, 508, 733 N.E.2d 1103 (2000). Postrelease control was
enacted as part of S.B. 2, which eliminated indefinite sentences. Rush, 83 Ohio St.3d 53, 54,
697 N.E.2d 634.
{¶42} Since the passage of H.B. 86, defendants are still given definite sentences with
varying periods of postrelease control depending on the severity of the convictions. Although
S.B. 2 made the change from parole supervision to postrelease control, R.C. 2967.28, which
governs postrelease control, has been amended several times and was last amended by
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 160 (“S.B. 160”), which became effective March 22, 2013. Therefore, the
General Assembly intended that postrelease control provided in R.C. 2967.28 shall apply to
sentences imposed under H.B. 86. Since Jackson should have been sentenced under the
sentencing provisions of H.B. 86, he is subject to postrelease control.
Since Jackson should have been sentenced under the sentencing provisions of H.B. 86, and H.B.
86 includes postrelease control, this assigned error is moot.
{¶43} Judgment affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. Jackson’s convictions
are affirmed, however we vacate Jackson’s sentence. We remand the case to the trial court to
hold a sexual offender classification hearing and for a new sentencing hearing to apply H.B. 86’s
sentencing provisions, including postrelease control.
It is ordered that appellee and appellant share costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas
court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction having been affirmed,
any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for resentencing.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, P.J., and
MELODY J. STEWART, J., CONCUR