State v. Williams , 2012 Ohio 1692 ( 2012 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Williams, 
    2012-Ohio-1692
    .]
    STATE OF OHIO, JEFFERSON COUNTY
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    SEVENTH DISTRICT
    STATE OF OHIO,                                 )
    )   CASE NO. 11 JE 3
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,                    )
    )
    - VS -                                 )         OPINION
    )
    LLOYD B. WILLIAMS, Sr.,                        )
    )
    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.                   )
    CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS:                          Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas
    Court, Case No. 10 CR 61.
    JUDGMENT:                                          Affirmed.
    APPEARANCES:
    For Plaintiff-Appellee:                            Attorney Jane M. Hanlin
    Prosecuting Attorney
    Jefferson County Justice Center
    16001 State Route 7
    Steubenville, OH 43952
    For Defendant-Appellant:                           Attorney Kristopher Haught
    Scarpone & Associates
    2021 Sunset Boulevard
    Steubenville, OH 43952
    JUDGES:
    Hon. Mary DeGenaro
    Hon. Gene Donofrio
    Hon. Joseph J. Vukovich
    Dated: March 29, 2012
    [Cite as State v. Williams, 
    2012-Ohio-1692
    .]
    DeGenaro, J.
    {¶1}     Defendant-Appellant, Lloyd Williams, appeals the decision of the Jefferson
    County Court of Common Pleas, convicting him of felonious assault and sentencing him
    accordingly. Williams argues that his conviction was against the manifest weight of the
    evidence, and that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included
    offense of assault. Williams' arguments are meritless. His conviction for felonious
    assault was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Because the evidence did
    not support a conviction on assault and an acquittal on felonious assault, the trial court
    did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of assault.
    Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
    Facts and Procedural History
    {¶2}     On July 7, 2010, the Jefferson County Grand Jury indicted Williams for one
    count of felonious assault (R.C. 2903.11(A)(1)), a second-degree felony. On July 16,
    2010, Williams was arraigned, appointed counsel, and pled not guilty.
    {¶3}     On February 15, 2011, the case came before the court for a jury trial. The
    State called Officer John Lemal, who testified that he works for the Steubenville Police
    Department in the patrol division. On May 10, 2010, he was called to a residence at 826
    Pekruhn Court around 9 or 9:30 a.m. When he arrived at the house, he saw Williams, the
    victim Sheila Thorn, and Thorn's daughter on the porch area. He described the parties as
    upset and explained that the daughter appeared the most upset. He explained that
    Williams was intoxicated and was drinking from a bottle of Wild Irish Rose. Officer Lemal
    stated that he did not see any injuries on Williams.
    {¶4}     Officer Lemal testified that Thorn had a large laceration on the left side of
    her face by her eye that was beginning to swell. He said that she was in bedclothes and
    it appeared that she had just woken up. He explained that backup arrived at some point,
    but initially he was on the scene by himself for several minutes. He separated Williams
    from Thorn and her daughter; he took Thorn and her daughter on the porch and Williams
    was inside the house. He testified that both Thorn and her daughter said that Williams
    was the cause of Thorn's injuries.
    {¶5}     After the backup officer arrived, Officer Lemal placed Williams under arrest
    -2-
    for domestic violence because Thorn told him that Williams struck her and she had
    obvious injuries. Officer Lemal testified that at that point, Williams started yelling to her,
    "Tell him that I didn't do it on purpose." Officer Lemal stated that it was clear that
    Williams knew that Thorn had been injured. The backup officer then transported Williams
    from the scene. Officer Lemal also stated that he did not locate any object in the house
    that might have been used to strike Thorn, but he explained that was not his primary
    concern.
    {¶6}     On cross-examination, Officer Lemal agreed that according to his report, his
    initial thought was that Thorn was struck by an object. He did not believe her injuries
    were from a fist and he explained that the injury looked as though something had cut her.
    He confirmed that the house did not appear to be in disarray. He explained that because
    he was the primary responding officer, he did not perform more than a brief interview with
    any of the parties.
    {¶7}     Officer Lemal testified that he was at the scene for approximately 15
    minutes, and during that time, Williams did not fight or resist the officers. He confirmed
    that while Williams was being led away, he was making accusations about Thorn using or
    selling drugs. The officer stated that he did not observe any signs of intoxication from
    Thorn. He did not ask her if she had been using drugs or drinking either that day or the
    night before.
    {¶8}     On redirect, Officer Lemal testified that although Williams was not physically
    resisting, his behavior was erratic. Williams was initially charged with domestic violence,
    but that charge was elevated to felonious assault due to the injury.
    {¶9}     On recross, the officer testified that to his knowledge, Williams did not enter
    any area of the house to tamper with evidence or do anything to hinder the investigation.
    {¶10} The State then called Dr. Ravinder Chopra, who testified that he has worked
    as a physician at the Trinity Medical Center emergency room for over 25 years. Dr.
    Chopra testified that he provided care to Thorn at the West campus on May 10, 2010. He
    reviewed State's Exhibit 1, the medical record for the services provided to Thorn. He
    stated that Thorn arrived at the emergency room at 10:32 a.m. Regarding her injuries, he
    -3-
    explained that Thorn presented to the emergency department due to a laceration on the
    left side of her face, and he ordered a CT of her facial bones. Dr. Chopra further testified
    that the medical report indicated that Thorn had blunt facial injuries, a fractured orbit, a
    fractured nasal bone, and laceration to the face. He explained that the CT showed that
    the bone next to Thorn's eye was shattered and as a result, there were some bony
    fragments just below her eye.
    {¶11} Dr. Chopra testified that the report indicated that Thorn was "struck by an
    unknown object in the face." He said that Thorn was transferred from Trinity West to
    Pittsburgh.
    {¶12} On cross, Dr. Chopra testified that Thorn had a history of arthritis and
    fibromyalgia. He stated that the report showed that Thorn was taking Paxil, Xanax, and
    Lyrica at the time of her admission. Paxil is an antidepressant, Xanax is for anxiety, and
    Lyrica is for pain. Counsel then asked whether Thorn denied any drug or alcohol use as
    far as her social history, and Dr. Chopra replied that she denied any drugs or alcohol. Dr.
    Chopra also testified that Thorn had broken bones and swelling, and the swelling could
    have resulted from chronic sinus problems. However, on redirect, he stated that Thorn's
    broken bones around the nasal passages and orbit were acute.
    {¶13} The State next called Sheila Thorn. She testified that in May of 2010, she
    lived with her daughter Olivia, who is now 12, and Williams. She explained that at that
    point, Williams had been living with her for about eight months. She stated that on May 9,
    2010, which was Mother's Day, she and Williams were bickering because she drove a
    neighbor, Eric Montgomery, to buy dog food at Kroger, and Williams found out about this.
    She explained that after they got the dog food, she dropped off Eric and went to her
    house.
    {¶14} Thorn testified that when she got to her house, her neighbor Derrick Brown
    and his mother Tammy Brown were there, and Williams was cutting Derrick's hair. She
    explained that that all three were drinking liquor and she took a couple shots. She said
    that later on, Eric came over and Derrick was still there at that point. They were drinking
    vodka and beer, and she was drinking beer. She stated that Williams made sandwiches
    -4-
    for Eric and Derrick. Later in the evening, Eric and Derrick left her house, and then just
    she and Williams were there.
    {¶15} Thorn explained that Williams left the house around 10 or 10:30 p.m., and
    then she was home alone. Olivia came home around 11 or 11:30 p.m., and then she and
    Olivia went to bed in their respective bedrooms. Thorn explained that Olivia was
    supposed to go to school the next day on Monday, May 10, and she stated that usually
    she gets Olivia up at 6 or 6:30 a.m. Thorn explained that she tried to wake Olivia up, but
    she said she was sick, so Thorn decided to let her stay home from school and go back to
    sleep. She stated that Williams was not home at that point. Thorn also went back to
    sleep in her room.
    {¶16} Thorn testified that the next thing she remembers is God telling her she was
    not going to die and telling her to wake up. She stated that she sat up and blood started
    pouring out of her face. She confirmed that when she thought she heard God's voice,
    she heard it after she felt the hit, which felt like a sledge hammer to her head. She stated
    that her left eye was "crooked" and she had her comforter over her face. She also
    confirmed that when she came to, she saw Williams from his legs down and his feet were
    going out of the bedroom. She explained that he came back into the room while she was
    still in bed and hit her four more times in her cheek area. After that, she explained that
    she believed she was looking for her phone and could not find it, and then Williams told
    her to go wash herself off and to wash the comforter. Thorn stated that she got up to
    wash off and she put the comforter in water.
    {¶17} Thorn testified that Olivia saw her and screamed. She explained that
    Williams wanted Olivia's cell phone, although he ended up giving it back to Olivia and
    Thorn motioned for her to call the police. She said that Olivia went into her room and she
    must have called the police. Thorn further explained that Williams saw Olivia on her
    phone and told her to give it to him. Thorn stated that she also tried to push the panic
    button on her alarm system to call the police.
    {¶18} Thorn testified that the police arrived about 10 or 15 minutes later. She
    stated that an ambulance came to her house, but she refused to go to the hospital by
    -5-
    ambulance. The police took Williams away, and then her neighbor drove her and Olivia
    to Trinity West where she was treated in the emergency room.
    {¶19} She explained that after the doctors saw her MRIs, they said she had more
    facial damage than they expected, so she was taken by ambulance to Allegheny Trauma
    Center. She confirmed that she had a cut on her face, and she stated that she was put
    under and stitched up. She testified that the doctors could not perform surgery on the
    fractures of her eye socket and nose because the bones were shattered. She explained
    that she still has shattered bone fragments in her face today and the doctor told her that
    she might need plastic surgery.
    {¶20} Finally, when asked if she was ever able to see the object that hit her the
    first time, she replied that she did not know what hit her.
    {¶21} On cross-examination, Thorn testified that when Officer Lemal arrived at her
    house, Williams let him in and she was still inside in her underwear. She agreed that
    when she first spoke with the officer on the scene, she indicated that she was struck with
    an unknown object and she did not mention anything about being struck again to the
    officer at that time. She further confirmed that at the emergency room she said she was
    struck with an unknown object and she did not mention being struck again. Thorn
    explained that she was hit twice, but she does not know what she was hit with the first
    time because she was asleep. She further explained that she did not tell the officer that
    she was hit again because there was not much time to say anything and the officer was
    trying to get Williams out of the house and did not really care about her.
    {¶22} Thorn admitted that she was drinking and used marijuana on May 9. She
    confirmed that she was prescribed Xanax, Lyrica, and Paxil, but she did not have a
    chance to take them yet at the time of the incident. Thorn also admitted that she had
    been convicted of tampering with records, falsification, and theft.
    {¶23} She confirmed that she and Williams were already in a romantic relationship
    prior to him moving in. Furthermore, she agreed that when their friends were over before
    the incident, "things were going fairly harmoniously."
    {¶24} On redirect, Thorn agreed that the officers and hospital personnel asked her
    -6-
    what she was struck with and she told them that she did not know. She stated that the
    second time she was hit, she knew that it was a fist that struck her. She confirmed that
    she did not consume any alcohol, medication, or drugs on May 10th prior to the time she
    was struck.
    {¶25} Regarding her prior convictions, she explained that the offense was in 1998
    and involved a theft of welfare benefits.
    {¶26} Next, the State called Detective John Lelless of the Steubenville Police
    Department, who testified that he took photographs of Thorn on May 12, 2010. The
    detective identified State's Exhibit 2 as the authorization for release of medical records
    signed by Thorn for Trinity Medical Center West and Exhibit 3 as copies of the
    photographs that he took. The State then moved to admit its Exhibits 1, 2, and 3, and
    rested its case. The defense objected to part of the documents in Exhibit 1, and the court
    admitted all of the exhibits over the objection. The defense then moved for a judgment of
    acquittal pursuant to Crim.R. 29(A), which the court overruled.
    {¶27} The defense called Williams, who testified that on May 9, 2010, Derrick
    came over in the late afternoon for a haircut. He explained that he got in contact with
    Thorn over the phone to ask her to come home because they had plans for Mother's Day.
    He also explained that Thorn had previously made six to seven trays of lasagna and he
    was calling her to ask what they were going to do with the lasagna.
    {¶28} Williams testified that Thorn returned home around 5:30 or 6 p.m. He
    explained that their neighbor Tammy came over to watch Derrick get his haircut, and she
    brought a fifth of Crown Royal. He testified that at one point, he discovered Thorn and
    Eric on the porch talking, and Thorn had brought him a slice of lasagna. Williams said
    that he knew Thorn and Eric had been together earlier in the day. Williams testified that
    Eric left to go home, and then later returned to their house.
    {¶29} Williams testified that it was around 6 p.m. at this point and everyone was
    taking shots. He stated that they smoked a couple "weed blunts," and then Thorn went to
    the store to purchase more alcohol and pick up Olivia and her friend from the movies. He
    explained that while she was gone, he finished cutting Derrick's hair and then he, Eric,
    -7-
    and Derrick began playing cards. Then while they were playing cards, Thorn returned
    with the girls. He explained that Thorn joined the game and they played until around
    11:30 p.m. He also stated that Tammy left the house at some point. Then Derrick left,
    and he, Eric, and Thorn continued to drink and smoke marijuana. He stated that Eric left,
    and then his friend Virgil picked him up after 12 a.m. to purchase alcohol.
    {¶30} Williams explained that he and Virgil returned to his house and then sat in
    the yard for around two hours and drank vodka. They also snorted coke. He explained
    that they then left the house and split up by Market Square. Williams said that he
    returned home around 8 a.m., and he was stopped by a police officer on the way home.
    {¶31} Williams testified that when he got home, Thorn was awake, and they had a
    discussion about what she had done the day before. He claimed that he told Thorn to
    give him her marijuana and scales so that he could take it out of the house and hide it
    somewhere. Williams then testified that he "took a hit of some substance and [he]
    freaked out." He further explained:
    {¶32} "All I know is something took place in her bedroom. I didn't have nothing. I
    didn't throw anything and she said I was – she said 'I'm bleeding.' I'm like – I don't – I'm
    not – I don't know if I'm believing her or not and we just – just continued to keep talking.
    {¶33} * *
    {¶34} "I don't know – I mean, at the time I was – I was still getting high. I was
    using. Earlier that morning this had – we took – we hit us some crystal meth on some
    marijuana and I was constantly hearing voices and footsteps running behind me, this and
    that and somehow, this and that, I don't know – I don't even know where I got the – the
    Wild Irish Rose from that I had."
    {¶35} Williams testified that he then called the police and asked to speak to
    Captain Young. He told Captain Young that he was not sure if the captain was the officer
    who he spoke to on his way home. Williams said that he needed to speak to him about
    something in private because he did not want to put anyone's business out there in
    regards to what was said to him on his way home. Williams explained that he did not
    want the captain to speak Thorn's name out loud in case somebody was walking by, so
    -8-
    he asked him for another number and Captain Young gave him an extension number. He
    further explained that Thorn kept pushing the phone away when he tried to give it to her,
    and he stated that she was holding a black towel to her face.
    {¶36} Counsel then asked Williams how Thorn sustained the injuries to her face,
    and Williams responded, "I take it I must have did it. I had – I must have did it but I would
    have never threw or hit her with nothing. * * * I don't know what happened. Alls I know is
    she said 'I'm bleeding. Would you give me a rag?' And at first I didn't understand what
    she was saying." Williams confirmed that the only people in the house at this point were
    himself, Thorn, and Olivia. He also agreed that it would be "unusual, if not impossible" for
    Thorn to give herself the injuries and stated that Olivia did not cause the injuries.
    Williams further testified: "I must have swung at her, swung my hand at her or something.
    I don't know." Finally, Williams testified that on the date of the incident, he had no reason
    to be angry at Thorn.
    {¶37} On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked whether Williams was the one
    who hit Thorn, and he responded, "Not knowingly." Williams explained that when he said
    he took a hit of a substance and "freaked out," he meant that he was hearing things and
    footsteps were running behind him. When asked if these effects were due to his drug
    and alcohol consumption, he replied, "I don't know. I got a history of hallucinating. I've
    been a mental health patient since I was 20 years old. I supposed to be on medication."
    Williams confirmed that he took all the drugs and alcohol on his own.
    {¶38} Williams stated that he did not know that Thorn was hurt until the day he
    went to court and saw her. He also admitted that he had continued to talk to Thorn since
    the time he has been in jail. When asked if he told her what to say on the stand, he said,
    "I didn't tell her – I told her how – how exactly what it went, that she wasn't asleep and
    she wasn't. She was talking to me."
    {¶39} Williams confirmed that he had a prior criminal record, including a conviction
    for drugs and a conviction for attempted felonious assault.
    {¶40} The defense next called Tammy Brown, who testified that she was at Thorn
    and Williams' house on May 9, 2010. She explained that Thorn arrived and offered her
    -9-
    some lasagna she had cooked for Mother's Day. She stated that she left around 6 p.m.,
    and there were no problems while she was there.
    {¶41} The defense then rested and moved for admission of Defendant's Exhibit 1.
    The defense requested a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of assault, which
    the court overruled.
    {¶42} Following deliberations, the jury found Williams guilty of felonious assault
    (R.C. 2903.11(A)(1)).
    {¶43} Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court issued a judgment entry on
    February 18, 2011, sentencing Williams to eight years of incarceration and ordering him
    to pay restitution of $786.63. The court also imposed a lifetime weapons disability upon
    Williams and notified him that he would be subject to post-release control for a period of
    three years upon his release from prison.
    Manifest Weight of the Evidence
    {¶44} In his first of two assignments of error, Williams argues:
    {¶45} "The trial court's finding of guilty was against the manifest weight of the
    evidence and was not supported by the sufficient evidence."
    {¶46} Although Williams labels this assignment of error as an argument regarding
    both sufficiency of the evidence and manifest weight of the evidence, he only presents an
    argument that his conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence in his brief.
    {¶47} When reviewing a judgment under a criminal manifest weight standard of
    review, "[t]he court reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable
    inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving
    conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest
    miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered."
    State v. Thompkins (1997), 
    78 Ohio St.3d 380
    , 387, 
    678 N.E.2d 541
    , quoting State v.
    Martin (1983), 
    20 Ohio App.3d 172
    , 175, 20 OBR 215, 
    485 N.E.2d 717
    .
    {¶48} This court's discretionary power to reverse on manifest weight grounds and
    grant a new trial is exercised only in the exceptional case where the evidence weighs
    heavily against conviction. Thompkins at 387. This standard is a high one because the
    - 10 -
    trier of fact was in a better position to determine credibility issues, by having personally
    viewed the demeanor, voice inflections and gestures of the witnesses. State v. Ali, 
    154 Ohio App.3d 493
    , 
    2003-Ohio-5150
    , 
    797 N.E.2d 1019
    , at ¶36; State v. DeHass (1967), 
    10 Ohio St.2d 230
    , 231, 
    39 O.O.2d 366
    , 
    227 N.E.2d 212
    . A reviewing court therefore should
    not interfere with the witness credibility and factual determinations of the jury, unless the
    record demonstrates that a reasonable juror simply could not have found the witness to
    be credible. State v. Mock, 
    187 Ohio App.3d 599
    , 
    2010-Ohio-2747
    , 
    933 N.E.2d 270
    , at
    ¶40.
    {¶49} Williams was convicted of felonious assault in violation of R.C.
    2903.11(A)(1), which prohibits knowingly causing serious physical harm to another.
    {¶50} Williams first argues that Thorn testified that she was sleeping when she
    was struck, so she was not able to identify who struck her or what she was struck with.
    While Thorn did testify that she was asleep when she was first struck, she stated that she
    saw Williams from the legs down as he was exiting the room. She also testified that
    Williams reentered the room and hit her four more times. Furthermore, Williams admitted
    that only he, Thorn, and Olivia were in the house during this incident and that it was
    unlikely that either Thorn herself or Olivia inflicted the injuries. Regarding what she was
    struck with, Thorn testified that she does not know what object initially struck her, but that
    when Williams hit her for the second time, he used his fist. While R.C. 2903.11(A)(2)
    prohibits knowingly causing physical harm by means of a deadly weapon, the provision
    Williams was convicted of, R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), does not contain a "deadly weapon"
    element that the state must prove.
    {¶51} Williams next argues that Thorn was in no position to determine whether her
    injuries were caused purposefully or if it was an accident or recklessness. Essentially,
    Williams argues that the manifest weight of the evidence did not support the finding that
    he "knowingly" hit Thorn. However, Thorn testified that she was not asleep when
    Williams reentered the bedroom and struck her an additional four times, and if believed,
    this testimony does not appear to support the conclusion that Williams' actions were
    reckless or accidental. Furthermore, while Williams testified that he did not know what
    - 11 -
    happened, a reasonable jury could have found that his testimony was not credible.
    Williams was able to describe the events leading up to the incident in detail, as well as
    the events immediately after Thorn sustained her injuries. Moreover, while Williams
    testified that he did not realize that Thorn was hurt until he saw her in court, the
    responding officer testified that it was clear to him that Williams knew Thorn had been
    injured.
    {¶52} Finally, Williams challenges Thorn's credibility, noting that she lied to the
    emergency room doctor about her drug and alcohol consumption on May 9, 2010. Thorn
    confirmed that she consumed drugs and alcohol on May 9; however, Dr. Chopra testified
    that the medical records indicated that Thorn denied drug and alcohol use. Although the
    jury could have considered Thorn's lie while judging her credibility, it does not appear that
    this lie completely undermines her credibility such that a reasonable jury could not believe
    her testimony about the incident. "While it is true that under a manifest weight analysis
    we consider the credibility of the witnesses, it must be remembered that primarily witness
    credibility is left to the trier of fact, which in this case was the jury. Or in other words,
    although an appellate court must act as a 'thirteenth juror' when considering whether the
    manifest weight of the evidence requires reversal, it must give great deference to the fact
    finder's determination of the witnesses' credibility." State v. Jackson, 7th Dist. No. 09 JE
    13, 
    2009-Ohio-6407
    , at ¶18.
    {¶53} This is not the exceptional case where the jury lost its way and created a
    manifest miscarriage of justice.     Accordingly, Williams' first assignment of error is
    meritless.
    Lesser Included Offense
    {¶54} In his second assignment of error, Williams asserts:
    {¶55} "The trial court erred in not providing a jury instruction for assault."
    {¶56} Williams argues that the trial court erred in overruling his request for a jury
    instruction regarding the lesser included offense of assault.
    {¶57} "In determining whether an offense is a lesser included offense of another,
    a court shall consider whether one offense carries a greater penalty than the other,
    - 12 -
    whether some element of the greater offense is not required to prove commission of the
    lesser offense, and whether the greater offense as statutorily defined cannot be
    committed without the lesser offense as statutorily defined also being committed." State
    v. Evans, 
    122 Ohio St.3d 381
    , 
    2009-Ohio-2974
    , 
    911 N.E.2d 889
    , at paragraph two of the
    syllabus, clarifying State v. Deem (1988), 
    40 Ohio St.3d 205
    , 
    533 N.E.2d 294
    .
    {¶58} "The decision to give or refuse to give jury instructions is within the sound
    discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless the record
    affirmatively demonstrates an abuse of discretion on the facts and circumstances of the
    particular case." State v. Bennett, 7th Dist. No. 04-MA-184, 
    2006-Ohio-3566
    , at ¶23,
    citing State v. Wolons (1989), 
    44 Ohio St.3d 64
    , 68, 
    541 N.E.2d 443
    . An abuse of
    discretion means more than an error of law or judgment; but rather implies that the court's
    attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. State v. Adams (1980), 
    62 Ohio St.2d 151
    , 157, 
    404 N.E.2d 144
    .
    {¶59} Williams was charged and convicted of felonious assault in violation of R.C.
    2903.11(A)(1), a second-degree felony:
    {¶60} "(A) No person shall knowingly do either of the following:
    {¶61} "(1) Cause serious physical harm to another * * *."
    {¶62} He argues that the trial court should have given a jury instruction on assault
    pursuant to R.C. 2903.13, a first-degree misdemeanor:
    {¶63} "A) No person shall knowingly cause or attempt to cause physical harm to
    another * * *.
    {¶64} "(B) No person shall recklessly cause serious physical harm to another * *
    *."
    {¶65} This court has previously held that simple assault is a lesser included
    offense of felonious assault. Bennett at ¶31. A trial court is required to give a jury
    instruction on a lesser included offense "only where the evidence presented at trial would
    reasonably support both an acquittal on the crime charged and a conviction upon the
    lesser included offense." State v. Thomas (1988), 
    40 Ohio St.3d 213
    , 
    533 N.E.2d 286
    , at
    paragraph two of the syllabus.
    - 13 -
    {¶66} An instruction on simple assault would be required if the jury could have
    reasonably found that either Williams recklessly, rather than knowingly, caused Thorn
    serious physical harm; or that Williams knowingly caused or attempted to cause Thorn
    physical harm, rather than serious physical harm. However, Williams does not appear to
    contest that he caused Thorn serious physical harm. Instead, he argues that "[t]he
    testimony as a whole does not show an individual who knowingly intended to inflict
    serious physical harm." Thus, the issue before us is whether the jury could have
    reasonably found that Williams acted recklessly, rather than knowingly.
    {¶67} "Knowledge", the mens rea for felonious assault, is defined in R.C.
    2901.22(B):
    {¶68} "A person acts knowingly, regardless of his purpose, when he is aware that
    his conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature. A
    person has knowledge of circumstances when he is aware that such circumstances
    probably exist."
    {¶69} "The test for determining whether a defendant acted knowingly is a
    subjective one, based on the knowledge, beliefs and circumstances of the individual
    defendant." State v. McCleod (Dec. 12, 2001), 7th Dist. No. 00 JE 8.
    {¶70} "Recklessness", the mens rea for assault under R.C. 2903.13(B), is defined
    in R.C. 2901.22(C):
    {¶71} "A person acts recklessly when, with heedless indifference to the
    consequences, he perversely disregards a known risk that his conduct is likely to cause a
    certain result or is likely to be of a certain nature. A person is reckless with respect to
    circumstances when, with heedless indifference to the consequences, he perversely
    disregards a known risk that such circumstances are likely to exist."
    {¶72} Williams argues: "Mr. Williams' testimony was not that he did not strike Ms.
    Thorn but that he has a severe alcohol and drug problem and that he suffers from
    hallucinations and mental problems." Williams is arguing that he did not act knowingly
    due to his intoxication, which he admitted during cross-examination was voluntary.
    However, voluntary intoxication is no longer a defense to intent in Ohio:
    - 14 -
    {¶73} "Before October of 2000, voluntary intoxication was an available defense if it
    was shown to have prevented the defendant from forming the intent necessary to commit
    the charged offense. State v. Johnson, 7th Dist. No. 02 CA 206, 
    2004-Ohio-567
    , ¶12,
    citing State v. Fox (1981), 
    68 Ohio St.2d 53
    , 55, 
    22 O.O.3d 259
    , 
    428 N.E.2d 410
    .
    However, as of October 27, 2000, '[v]oluntary intoxication may not be taken into
    consideration in determining the existence of a mental state that is an element of a
    criminal offense.' R.C. §2901.21(C)." State v. Love, 7th Dist. No. 02 CA 245, 2006-Ohio-
    1762, at ¶63.
    {¶74} Thus, Williams' argument that he did not act knowingly due to his voluntary
    intoxication is meritless. He further attempts to assert an insanity defense, which he did
    not raise in the trial court, and there is no evidence in the record of Williams' mental
    illness beyond his own self-serving testimony. Therefore, Williams is precluded from
    arguing an insanity defense on appeal. See State v. Taylor, 
    98 Ohio St.3d 27
    , 2002-
    Ohio-7017, 
    781 N.E.2d 72
    , at ¶64 ("The defense of not guilty by reason of insanity is an
    affirmative defense that must be proved by the accused.").
    {¶75} Williams also contends that his testimony does not show that he acted
    knowingly because he testified that he does not recall what happened. However, his
    testimony that he does not know what happened does not establish the element of
    recklessness necessary for simple assault. In fact, the only testimony regarding how the
    injuries actually occurred came from Thorn who testified that she woke up to a feeling of a
    "sledge hammer" hitting her in the head. She testified that she saw Williams from legs
    down leaving the bedroom, and then he came back in and hit her four more times. A
    reasonable juror could not find that Williams acted recklessly from the testimony in the
    record.
    {¶76} Because the evidence does not reasonably support a conviction on simple
    assault under R.C. 2903.13(B), the trial court did not err in refusing to give a jury
    instruction on the lesser included offense. Accordingly, Williams' second assignment of
    error is meritless.
    {¶77} In sum, Williams' arguments are meritless. His conviction for felonious
    - 15 -
    assault was not against the manifest weight of the evidence because the jury could have
    reasonably believed Thorn's account of the events and found Williams' testimony that he
    did not remember what happened to be incredible. Further, the trial court did not err in
    refusing to give a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of assault because the
    evidence did not reasonably support a conviction on assault or an acquittal on felonious
    assault. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
    Donofrio, J., concurs.
    Vukovich, J., concurs.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 11 JE 3

Citation Numbers: 2012 Ohio 1692

Judges: DeGenaro

Filed Date: 3/29/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014