Luton v. Ohio Unemp. Revision Comm. , 2012 Ohio 3963 ( 2012 )


Menu:
  • [Cite as Luton v. Ohio Unemp. Revision Comm., 
    2012-Ohio-3963
    .]
    Court of Appeals of Ohio
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    No. 97996
    BRYAN LUTON
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
    vs.
    STATE OF OHIO UNEMPLOYMENT
    REVISION COMMISSION, ETC., ET AL.
    DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES
    JUDGMENT:
    AFFIRMED
    Civil Appeal from the
    Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
    Case No. CV-766212
    BEFORE: E. Gallagher, J., Rocco, P.J., and Kilbane, J.
    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED:                        August 30, 2012
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
    Bryan Luton, pro se
    3764 East 127th Street
    Cleveland, Ohio 44105
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
    Mike DeWineAttorney General of Ohio
    State Office Tower
    30 E. Broad Street, 17th FloorColumbus, OH 43215-3428
    Laurel Blum Mazorow
    Laurence R. Snyder
    Assistant Attorney Generals
    State Office Building, 11th Floor
    615 W. Superior Avenue
    Cleveland, Ohio 44113-1899
    EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J.:
    {¶1} Bryan Luton appeals from the decision of the trial court dismissing his
    administrative appeal from the Ohio Unemployment Review Commission (“Review
    Commission”). Luton argues the trial court erred when it found he did not comply with
    the requirements of R.C. 4141.282 in filing his appeal. For the following reasons, we
    affirm the decision of the trial court.
    {¶2} This is an administrative appeal from the Review Commission pursuant to
    R.C. 4141.282.       On June 27, 2011, the Review Commission denied Luton’s
    unemployment benefits, finding that he was discharged from employment with LNE &
    Associates, LLP (“Employer”) for just cause in connection with work. Luton sought
    review of the Revision Commission’s decision, which was denied.
    {¶3} On October 7, 2011, Luton filed a notice of appeal in the Cuyahoga County
    Court of Common Pleas. In filing the appeal, Luton named the Review Commission,
    Michael B. Colbert, Director of the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services and
    Robert Wachunas, the hearing officer for the Review Commission; he did not name his
    former employer, LNE & Associates, LLP.
    {¶4} On October 31, 2011, the Director of the Ohio Department of Job and
    Family Services (Director) filed a motion to dismiss Luton’s appeal. In its motion, the
    Director argued that Luton failed to follow the mandates of R.C. 4141.282(D) when he
    failed to name all interested parties in his notice of appeal, i.e., his former employer.
    Luton opposed the motion. However, on January 24, 2012, the common pleas court
    granted the Director’s motion finding as follows:
    Pending before the court is a motion to dismiss filed by appellee Ohio
    Unemployment Compensation Review Commission. The Commission
    argues that the court does not have the subject matter jurisdiction to hear
    appellant Bryan Lutton’s [sic] appeal because h[e] failed to name all
    interested parties in his notice of appeal to the court as required by R.C.
    4141.282(D). Mr. Lutton [sic] opposed the motion positing numerous
    arguments as to why the court has the jurisdiction to hear his appeal. The
    arguments advanced by Mr. Lutton [sic] lack merit because the
    requirement that a claimant name all interested parties in his notice of
    appeal is mandatory, and his failure to strictly comply with the terms of
    statute deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction to hear his appeal.
    See Sydenstricker v. Donato’s Pizzeria, 11th Dist. No. 2009-L-149,
    
    2010-Ohio-2953
    , 
    2010 WL 2557705
    . Upon review of the notice of
    appeal, Mr. Lutton [sic] failed to name [h]is employer, LNE & Associates
    LLP, an interested party to this appeal. Accordingly, appellee State of
    Ohio Unemployment Compensation Review Commission Motion to
    Dismiss (filed 10/31/2011) is granted.
    {¶5}    Luton appeals, raising the three assignments of error contained in the
    appendix to this opinion. In the assigned errors, Luton sets forth various arguments as to
    why the trial court erred in dismissing his administrative appeal.        As such, these
    assigned errors shall be addressed contemporaneously.
    {¶6} The Supreme Court of Ohio, in Zier v. Bur. of Unemp. Comp., 
    151 Ohio St. 123
    , 
    84 N.E.2d 746
     (1949), paragraph one of the syllabus, held:
    An appeal, the right to which is conferred by statute, can be perfected only
    in the mode prescribed by statute. The exercise of the right conferred is
    conditioned upon compliance with the accompanying mandatory
    requirements.
    {¶7} The court further held: “[c]ompliance with these specific and mandatory
    requirements governing the filing of such notice is essential to invoke jurisdiction of a
    Court of Common Pleas. * * *” 
    Id.,
     at paragraph two of the syllabus.
    {¶8} The Supreme Court of Ohio, when deciding In re Claim of King, 
    62 Ohio St.2d 87
    , 88, 
    403 N.E.2d 200
     (1980), relied upon Zier in determining that a party
    appealing a decision of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review to the court
    of common pleas is required to follow the statutory requirements. The appellee in King
    failed to adhere to the statutory mandate of former R.C. 4141.28(O), requiring “that the
    party appealing serve all other interested parties with notice.” The appellee did not file
    a copy of the notice of appeal with the administrator of the Ohio Bureau of Employment
    Services nor did he name the administrator as a party to his appeal. 
    Id.
     The appellee
    also failed to name his employer as a party to the appeal. 
    Id.
     The court found that the
    appellee failed to follow the directives of the statute, thus the court of common pleas
    lacked subject matter jurisdiction. 
    Id.
     The court reiterated that “where a statute confers
    a right of appeal, as in the instant cause, strict adherence to the statutory conditions is
    essential for the enjoyment of the right.” 
    Id.
     See also Sydenstricker.
    {¶9} In the present case, the pertinent portion of R.C. 4141.282, the statute
    governing the appeal process involved herein, states as follows:
    (D) The commission shall provide on its final decision the names and
    addresses of all interested parties. The appellant shall name all interested
    parties as appellees in the notice of appeal. The director of job and family
    services is always an interested party and shall be named as an appellee in
    the notice of appeal.
    {¶10} The Review Commission complied with R.C. 4141.282(D), stating in its
    September 7, 2011 correspondence to Luton:
    APPEAL RIGHTS
    An appeal from this decision may be filed to the Court of Common Pleas of
    the county where the appellant, if an employee, is a resident or was last
    employed * * * within thirty (30) days from the date of mailing of this
    decision, as set forth in Section 4141.282, Revised Code of Ohio. The
    appellant must name all interested parties as appellees in the notice of
    appeal, including the Director of Job and Family Services.
    {¶11}    The Review Commission also listed his former employer, LNE &
    Associates, his former employer’s address, and the address for the Director of the
    Department of Job and Family Services.
    {¶12}    The statute at issue unequivocally states that Luton must name all
    interested parties as appellees in the notice of appeal. Luton’s failure to name his
    former employer in his notice of appeal means that he did not comply with the
    mandatory requirements of R.C. 4141.282(D).
    {¶13}    In response, Luton argues that he substantially complied with the
    requirements of R.C. 4141.282, that R.C. 4141.282(C) requires only a timely-filed notice
    of appeal to vest jurisdiction with the court of common pleas, and that the Sydenstricker
    court relied upon an outdated subsection of the revised code, Section 4141.28(O), which
    is no longer present in the current section. We disagree with each of Luton’s arguments.
    {¶14} Luton’s claim that R.C. 4141.282(C) requires only a timely-filed notice of
    appeal to vest jurisdiction ignores the remaining portions of the statute. Contrary to
    Luton’s assertions, the timely filing of an incorrect notice of appeal does not vest the
    court of common pleas with jurisdiction. See Sydenstricker, R.C. 4141.282(C). In the
    present case, Luton admits that he failed to name his former employer in his notice of
    appeal; as such, he failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of R.C.
    4141.282(D).
    {¶15}    Next, Luton’s argument that he substantially complied with the
    requirements of R.C. 4141.282 has been specifically dealt with and overruled by the
    Sydenstricker court. In Sydenstricker, the appellee named only her former employer in
    her notice of appeal, not the Director of the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services
    or the Unemployment Compensation Review Commission. That court cited to Zier and
    In re Claim of King to reject this argument, holding that failure of a party to strictly
    comply with the statutory requirements will cause the appeal to be dismissed for lack of
    jurisdiction.
    {¶16} Additionally, Luton claims that the court in Sydenstricker relied on a
    statute that has been amended and is no longer controlling law. Specifically, he claims
    that the court relied on R.C. 4141.28(O), rather than the current statute, R.C.
    4141.282(D). This argument lacks merit as a plain reading of Sydenstricker, clearly
    reveals that the court referred to R.C. 4141.282(D) in holding that an incorrect notice of
    appeal does not vest jurisdiction in the court of common pleas.
    {¶17} Luton also cites to a series of cases involving appeals from the Industrial
    Commission of Ohio in support of his arguments. These cases are distinguishable from
    the present case as they involve differing procedural requirements and statute sections.
    {¶18} Lastly, Luton argues that the trial court erred in denying him the right to
    amend his administrative appeal to name his former employer. However, a review of
    the record reveals that Luton failed to raise this argument until this appeal. As such, he
    has waived all but plain error. We decline to find plain error in this case. Hudson v.
    P.I.E. Mut. Ins. Co., 10th Dist. No. 10AP-480, 
    2011-Ohio-908
    .
    {¶19}    Based on Luton’s failure to follow the statutory mandates of R.C.
    4141.282(D), the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas lacked jurisdiction and,
    therefore, it was not error for the court to grant the Director’s motion to dismiss.
    {¶20} Luton’s first, second and third assignments of error are overruled.
    {¶21} The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
    It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
    The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said lower court to carry this
    judgment into execution.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
    the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
    KENNETH A. ROCCO, P.J., and
    MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., CONCUR
    Appendix
    Assignments of Error:
    “I. The trial court erred in granting the appellees’ motion to dismiss
    by misapplying the 11th district court of appeals’ decision in
    Sydenstricker v. Donato’s Pizzeria, 11th Dist. No. 2009-L-149,
    
    2010-Ohio-2953
    , 
    2010 WL 2557705
    , and, thus, relied on R.C.
    4141.282(O) which has been amended and is no longer a governing
    statute.
    II. The trial court erred in granting the appellees’ motion to dismiss
    for failure to strictly comply with R.C. 4141.282.
    III. The trial court erred in granting the appellees’ motion to dismiss
    and in failing to grant appellant leave to amend his notice of appeal.”