State v. Blackley , 2014 Ohio 3140 ( 2014 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Blackley, 
    2014-Ohio-3140
    .]
    Court of Appeals of Ohio
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    No. 100574
    STATE OF OHIO
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
    vs.
    MATTHEW BLACKLEY
    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
    JUDGMENT:
    AFFIRMED
    Criminal Appeal from the
    Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
    Case No. CR-13-572013-A
    BEFORE: Rocco, J., Jones, P.J., and S. Gallagher, J.
    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: July 17, 2014
    -i-
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
    Robert L. Tobik
    Chief Public Defender
    By: Cullen Sweeney
    John T. Martin
    Assistant Public Defenders
    310 Lakeside Avenue
    Cleveland, Ohio 44113
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Timothy J. McGinty
    Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
    By: Kristin Karkutt
    Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
    The Justice Center
    1200 Ontario Street
    Cleveland, Ohio 44113
    KENNETH A. ROCCO, J.:
    {¶1} Defendant-appellant Matthew Blackley appeals from the sentence he received
    after he pleaded guilty to a charge of gross sexual imposition and a charge of interference
    with custody.
    {¶2} Blackley presents one assignment of error. He argues that the sentence
    imposed is contrary to law because the trial court imposed a prison term of the same
    length on him as the court did on his codefendant, Devon McIntyre, who pleaded guilty to
    a charge of rape. Blackley asserts that his sentence is disproportionate to the crime
    committed.
    {¶3} Upon a review of the record, this court cannot find error. Consequently,
    Blackley’s sentence is affirmed.
    {¶4} Blackley and McIntyre originally were charged in this case on four counts,
    viz., forcible rape of a child under the age of 13, which carried a penalty of life in prison,
    kidnapping with a sexual motivation specification, interference with custody, and
    contributing to the delinquency of a child. Both men pleaded not guilty to the charges.
    {¶5} The record reflects McIntyre subsequently changed his plea to guilty to the
    rape count and one of the misdemeanor counts in exchange for the state’s dismissal of the
    others. While McIntyre awaited sentencing, Blackley chose to reject the same offer from
    the state and to take the case to a jury trial.
    {¶6} After the victim’s mother testified, the state proposed a second offer to
    Blackley.    The state offered to amend the rape charge to a charge of gross sexual
    imposition and to dismiss two counts if Blackley would plead guilty to the charge of gross
    sexual imposition and to the charge of contributing to the delinquency of a child.
    Blackley decided to accept the state’s offer.
    {¶7} The trial court conducted a thorough colloquy with Blackley. Blackley
    acknowledged that he understood that the trial court could impose a prison term from one
    to five years. The trial court thereafter accepted his pleas and dismissed the other two
    counts. The trial court then scheduled Blackley’s sentencing to take place at the same
    time as McIntyre’s, requested the prosecutor to provide any background information she
    possessed about Blackley, and also requested the defendants’ attorneys to prepare
    sentencing memoranda.
    {¶8} When the trial court called the case for sentencing, it stated that it had
    reviewed the items provided by counsel. The court heard from the prosecutor, who
    stated that the victim “always maintained that both defendants forcibly raped her,” and the
    victim’s family members, one of whom read a statement that the 11-year old victim
    composed. The court also heard from the defendants’ attorneys and family members.
    Finally, each of the defendants spoke.
    {¶9} McIntyre apologized for his behavior, although he provided an unlikely
    explanation for it and blamed it on Blackley. Blackley, however, claimed that he had
    entered his guilty plea only because he “let an 11-year old girl have sex in [his]
    apartment” and he was “ashamed of it.”          Blackley also stated his “belief” that the
    explanation for the fact that his DNA was on the victim’s underwear had to be “cross
    contamination from some point [when the victim went] in[to] the bathroom.”
    {¶10} The trial court remained unpersuaded by Blackley’s version of the incident.
    After imposing a five-year prison sentence on McIntyre for the rape conviction, the court
    also imposed a five-year prison term on Blackley for his gross sexual imposition
    conviction.
    {¶11} Blackley appeals from his sentence with the following single assignment of
    error.
    I. The trial court imposed a sentence contrary to law and violated
    Appellant’s due process rights when it imposed a maximum sentence upon
    Appellant that was inconsistent with and disproportionate to the sentence
    imposed upon his more culpable co-defendant.
    {¶12} Blackley argues that his five-year prison sentence for committing gross
    sexual imposition, a third-degree felony, is disproportionate to the five-year prison
    sentence McIntyre received for committing rape, a first-degree felony.         This court
    disagrees.
    {¶13} In reviewing felony sentences such as the one imposed in this case, the
    appellate court’s standard “is not whether the sentencing court abused its discretion”;
    rather, only if this court “clearly and convincingly” finds that “the sentence is * * *
    contrary to law,” does this court have the authority to “increase, reduce, or otherwise
    modify a sentence * * * or * * * vacate the sentence and remand the matter to the
    sentencing court for resentencing.” R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).
    {¶14} R.C. 2929.11(B) provides:
    A sentence imposed for a felony shall be reasonably calculated to
    achieve the two overriding purposes of felony sentencing set forth in
    division (A) of this section, commensurate with and not demeaning to the
    seriousness of the offender’s conduct and its impact upon the victim, and
    consistent with sentences imposed for similar crimes committed by similar
    offenders.
    (Emphasis added.)
    {¶15} Sentencing in Ohio is not accomplished according to a tightly controlled
    grid system similar to federal sentencing guidelines.     State v. Dawson, 8th Dist.
    Cuyahoga No. 86417, 
    2006-Ohio-1083
    , ¶ 31.          There is a statutory mandate for
    consistency in sentencing, however, ‘“consistency does not require that identical
    sentences be imposed for co-defendants.”’ State v. Harder, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
    98409, 
    2013-Ohio-580
    , ¶ 7, and State v. Drobny, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98404,
    
    2013-Ohio-937
    , ¶ 7, both quoting State v. Pruitt, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98080,
    
    2012-Ohio-5418
    , ¶ 26.
    {¶16} Instead, an appellate court must examine the record, not in order to decide
    whether the trial court “imposed a sentence that is in lockstep with others,” but to
    determine “whether the sentence is so unusual as to be outside the mainstream of local
    judicial practice.” Dawson at ¶ 31. “[D]istinguishing factors may justify dissimilar
    treatment.” 
    Id.
     Sentences should not be “one size fits all.” State v. Torres, 8th Dist.
    Cuyahoga No. 99596, 
    2013-Ohio-5030
    , ¶ 83.
    {¶17} If the record of this case established that the trial court failed to ensure that
    Blackley’s sentence was “consistent with sentences imposed for similar crimes committed
    by similar offenders,” then the sentence would be contrary to law. This court presumes
    that the sentence imposed by the trial court is correct absent evidence in the record to the
    contrary. State v. Sherman, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97840, 
    2012-Ohio-3958
    , ¶ 15, citing
    State v. Edwards, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 82327, 
    2003-Ohio-5503
    , ¶ 32.
    {¶18} In pleading guilty to a charge of rape, McIntyre understood that he faced a
    potential prison sentence of three to eleven years. Likewise, Blackley understood that by
    pleading guilty to a charge of gross sexual imposition, he faced possible prison terms
    ranging from one to five years. Both men thus received sentences within the statutory
    range for their convictions.
    {¶19} Yet Blackley nevertheless disputes the fairness of the sentence the trial court
    chose to impose simply because McIntyre’s sentence mirrored his own. It must be noted
    that Blackley pleaded guilty to committing gross sexual imposition upon an 11-year-old
    victim, a fact that would suggest a sentence in the higher end of the spectrum would be
    appropriate. In addition, the trial court explained its decision to treat Blackley’s offense
    as deserving of harsh punishment by stating:
    No sentence I impose here today will ever, ever resolve what
    happened to [the victim] that night. But [the defendants] will be punished
    for their conduct.
    ***
    The sentence I impose on you two gentlemen should be
    commensurate with and not demeaning to the seriousness of your conduct
    and its impact on the victim, and consistent with sentences for similar
    crimes by similar offenders. * * *
    You know, this case disturbs me. It disturbs me because we have a
    young 11 year old [girl] around in the apartment who is not smart enough to
    understand what she put herself in, and always trying to be older than what
    she is.
    And she runs into you, Mr. McIntyre. And Mr. McIntyre, she may
    have told you she was 17. * * * You’re not a dumb guy.
    You start hanging out with this girl * * * and I don’t know exactly
    what occurred in that apartment. But I do know that your DNA was found
    on her underwear. * * * [Y]ou made a few statements, you made a
    statement that it was consensual, that you had sex with her, that, yes, you
    did this. And then now today you come and tell me Mr. Blackley forced
    you to do this.
    I don’t know what occurred that night. But I do know you made a
    serious error in judgment that night. And you’re going to pay for that.
    ***
    Mr. Blackley, when I look at you, here, quite frankly, I don’t believe that you were
    just the scapegoat and all you did wrong is you pled because you let them into your
    apartment and they had sex.
    You know, you had a chance to try this case, and you accepted a plea to a felony of
    the third degree. And I think you got a great break on the deal. And I look at you * * * .
    I mean, you’re older, you’re smart, and you should have known better. * * *
    ***
    But what troubles me is your father stands here and is apologizing for you,
    apologizing to the victim.        But I don’t hear an apology from you, except
    cross-contamination and I pled and that’s it. I mean I heard more from your father than I
    did from you. And that bothers me.
    (Emphasis added.)
    {¶20} From the foregoing comments, the trial court clearly decided that Blackley needed a
    “stiffer” sentence for his conviction because, while McIntyre admitted committing a crime and
    expressed his regret for harming the victim by his behavior, Blackley lacked appropriate remorse for his
    role, whatever it was, in the incident.         State v. Perrine, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99534,
    
    2013-Ohio-5738
    , ¶ 22.
    {¶21} Under these circumstances, this court cannot find that Blackley’s sentence is contrary to
    law. His assignment of error, accordingly, is overruled.
    {¶22} The sentence is affirmed.
    It is ordered that appellee recovers from appellant costs herein taxed.
    The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
    pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction having
    been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court
    for execution of sentence.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
    the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    _____________________________________
    KENNETH A. ROCCO, JUDGE
    LARRY A. JONES, SR., P.J., and
    SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR