Daniely v. Accredited Home Lenders , 2013 Ohio 4373 ( 2013 )


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  • [Cite as Daniely v. Accredited Home Lenders, 
    2013-Ohio-4373
    .]
    Court of Appeals of Ohio
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    No. 99208
    MONICA DANIELY
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
    vs.
    ACCREDITED HOME LENDERS, ET AL.
    DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES
    JUDGMENT:
    AFFIRMED
    Civil Appeal from the
    Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
    Case No. CV-789457
    BEFORE: E.T. Gallagher, J., Jones, P.J., and Kilbane, J.
    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 3, 2013
    FOR APPELLANT
    Monica Daniely, pro se
    16781 Chagrin Blvd., Suite 197
    Shaker Heights, Ohio 44120
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
    Melissa Zujkowski
    Warren T. McClurg, II
    Ulmer & Berne, LLP
    Skylight Office Tower
    1660 West 2nd St., Suite 1100
    Cleveland, Ohio 44113
    Accredited Home Lenders
    15090 Avenue of Science
    San Diego, California 92128
    EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J.:
    {¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, Monica Daniely (“Daniely”), appeals the dismissal of her
    complaint against defendants-appellees, Accredited Home Lenders, HSBC Mortgage
    Services    (“HSBC”),       and    Mortgage      Electronic     Registration     Systems,     Inc.
    (“MERS”)(collectively referred to as “appellees”) pursuant to Civ.R. 12(C). We find no
    merit to the appeal and affirm.
    {¶2} Daniely entered into a mortgage loan with Accredited Home Lenders,
    HSBC’s predecessor-in-interest, for property located at 4650 Whitehall Road, South
    Euclid, Ohio 44121.       The mortgage was duly recorded with the Cuyahoga County
    Recorder’s Office and shows MERS as the nominee for the lender and the lender’s
    successors and assigns.
    {¶3} According to the complaint, MERS later assigned the mortgage to HSBC and
    instructed Daniely to make payments to HSBC.                  Daniely requested a declaratory
    judgment declaring that she is not obligated to make mortgage payments to HSBC
    because HSBC violated R.C. 5301.25 by failing to record its encumbrance on the property
    with the Cuyahoga County Recorder’s Office.             As a result, she alleged, “HSBC is
    committing fraud by demanding and accepting payments” from her.1 The complaint also
    Daniely used the word “fraud” in the complaint. In her response to appellees’ motion for
    1
    judgment on the pleadings, she denies asserting a fraud claim and explained that she is simply
    alleging a claim for unjust enrichment, arguing that “HSBC is unjustly enriched by demanding and
    alleged that “MERS Terms And [sic] Conditions prohibit it from exerting any actions
    and/or authority over Promissory Notes and Payments.”
    {¶4} HSBC and MERS filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to
    Civ.R. 12(C), arguing that the complaint failed to state a claim for relief. The trial court
    granted the motion and dismissed the complaint. This appeal followed.
    {¶5} In her sole assignment of error, Daniely argues the trial court erred in
    dismissing her complaint for declaratory judgment because HSBC has no right to demand
    mortgage payments from her.
    {¶6} We review a ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings de novo.
    Coleman v. Beachwood, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92399, 
    2009-Ohio-5560
    , ¶ 15. Motions
    for judgment on the pleadings are governed by Civ.R. 12(C), which states: “After the
    pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for
    judgment on the pleadings.” Unlike a motion for summary judgment where the parties
    are permitted to submit certain evidentiary materials for the court’s review, the
    determination of a motion for judgment on the pleadings is restricted solely to the
    allegations in the pleadings and any writings attached to the complaint. Peterson v.
    Teodosio, 
    34 Ohio St.2d 161
    , 165-166, 
    297 N.E.2d 113
     (1973).
    {¶7} Civ.R. 12(C) requires a determination that no material factual issues exist and
    that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Burnside v. Leimbach, 
    71 Ohio App.3d 399
    , 403, 
    594 N.E.2d 60
     (1991).
    receiving mortgage payments to which they are not entitled.”
    Under Civ.R. 12(C), dismissal is appropriate where a court (1) construes the
    material allegations in the complaint, with all reasonable inferences to be drawn
    therefrom, in favor of the nonmoving party as true, and (2) finds beyond doubt,
    that the plaintiff could prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would
    entitle him to relief.
    State ex rel. Midwest Pride IV, Inc. v. Pontious, 75 Ohio St3d 565, 570, 
    664 N.E.2d 931
    (1996).
    {¶8} Thus, the granting of judgment on the pleadings is only appropriate where the
    plaintiff has failed to allege a set of facts which, if true, would establish the defendant’s
    liability.    Chromik v. Kaiser Permanente, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 89088,
    
    2007-Ohio-5856
    , ¶ 8, citing Walters v. First Natl. Bank of Newark, 
    69 Ohio St.2d 677
    ,
    
    433 N.E.2d 608
     (1982).
    {¶9} Daniely argues MERS lacked authority to assign the mortgage to HSBC and
    that, therefore, HSBC has no right to receive mortgage payments from her. Daniely cites
    numerous out-of-state cases in support of her argument. However, we are not bound by
    authorities outside of our jurisdiction. Moreover, Ohio courts have consistently held that
    MERS has authority to assign a mortgage when it is designated as both a nominee and
    mortgagee.     BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P. v. Hall, 12th Dist. Warren No.
    CA2009-10-135, 
    2010-Ohio-3472
    , ¶ 5-25 (concluding that BAC was entitled to judgment
    as the real party in interest where MERS, as a nominee, assigned the mortgage at issue to
    BAC); Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, L.P. v. Shifflet, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-09-31,
    
    2010-Ohio-1266
    , ¶9-17 (concluding that Countrywide was entitled to judgment as the real
    party in interest where MERS, as a nominee, assigned the mortgage to Countrywide);
    Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v. Ingle, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92487, 
    2009-Ohio-3886
    ,
    ¶ 4-18 (concluding Deutsche was entitled to judgment as the real party in interest where
    MERS, as a nominee, assigned a mortgage deed to Deutsche).
    {¶10} Although Daniely failed to attach a copy of the mortgage to the complaint,2
    she concedes the mortgage designates MERS as the mortgagee, “solely as nominee for
    Lender.” Under Ohio law, MERS had authority to assign the mortgage to HSBC, and
    Daniely is obligated to make her mortgage payments to HSBC rather than Accredited
    Home Lenders, the original lender.
    {¶11} Daniely also argues that, pursuant to R.C. 5301.25, HSBC is not entitled to
    payment from her because it failed to properly record its mortgage on the property. R.C.
    5301.25 provides, in relevant part:
    (A) All deeds, land contracts referred to in division (A)(2)(b) of section
    317.08 of the Revised Code, and instruments of writing properly executed
    for the conveyance or encumbrance of lands, tenements, or hereditaments,
    other than as provided in division (C) of this section and section 5301.23 of
    the Revised Code, shall be recorded in the office of the county recorder of
    the county in which the premises are situated. Until so recorded or filed
    for record, they are fraudulent insofar as they relate to a subsequent bona
    fide purchaser having, at the time of purchase, no knowledge of the
    existence of that former deed, land contract, or instrument.
    (Emphasis added.)
    The court may not consider the unauthenticated copy of the mortgage attached to
    2
    appellees’ motion for judgment on the pleadings because, as previously explained, the determination
    of a motion for judgment on the pleadings is restricted solely to the allegations in the pleadings and
    any writings attached to the complaint. Peterson v. Teodosio, 34 Ohio St.2d at 165-166.
    {¶12} The purpose of recording mortgages and other encumbrances on property is
    to give notice to bona fide purchasers of the mortgage holder’s lien. In this way, the
    lienholder may claim that all subsequent purchasers of the property have been
    constructively notified of the lien. R.C. 5301.25 provides that if a lienholder fails to
    record an encumbrance on real property, the lienholder will not have the benefit of being
    able to claim constructive notice of the lien against a subsequent purchaser.           The
    recorded mortgage also protects the lienholder by giving the lienholder priority of interest
    in the secured property.     See, e.g., Swallie v. Rousenberg, 
    190 Ohio App.3d 473
    ,
    
    2010-Ohio-4573
    , 
    942 N.E.2d 1109
     (7th Dist.).           R.C. 5301.25 has no effect on a
    mortgagor’s obligation to pay the mortgagee, whether or not the mortgage was recorded.
    {¶13} Therefore, Daniely failed to state a claim for relief, and the trial court
    properly dismissed the complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(C).
    {¶14} The sole assignment of error is overruled.
    {¶15} Judgment affirmed.
    It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
    The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to the common pleas court to carry this
    judgment into execution.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
    the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
    LARRY A. JONES, SR., P.J., and
    MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., CONCUR