State v. Ali ( 2012 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Ali, 
    2012-Ohio-2510
    .]
    Court of Appeals of Ohio
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    No. 97612
    STATE OF OHIO
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
    vs.
    OSIRIS ALI
    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
    JUDGMENT:
    AFFIRMED
    Criminal Appeal from the
    Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court
    Case No. CR-465969
    BEFORE: S. Gallagher, J., Stewart, P.J., and Sweeney, J.
    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: June 7, 2012
    FOR APPELLANT
    Osiris Ali, pro se
    Inmate #503-171
    501 Thompson Road
    P.O. Box 8000
    Conneaut, OH 44030
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    William D. Mason
    Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
    By: Katherine Mullin
    Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
    The Justice Center, 8th Floor
    1200 Ontario Street
    Cleveland, OH 44113
    SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.:
    {¶1} Defendant Osiris Ali appeals from the trial court’s decision to deny his
    motion to correct a void sentence, based on an alleged improper notification of Ali’s
    postrelease control (“PRC”) obligations. For the following reasons, we affirm.
    {¶2} In 2006, the trial court sentenced Ali to concurrent terms of life in prison
    for various rape charges, to be served after Ali served four years in prison on several
    counts of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor but concurrent with four-year prison
    terms on several other charges.         Postrelease control was part of the sentence for a
    mandatory five-year term based on the felony sex offenses.             The trial court, however,
    failed to include the appropriate notifications in the 2006 sentencing entry. Recognizing
    this deficiency, Ali and the state both filed separate motions to correct the void judgment.
    On December 17, 2010, the trial court conducted a de novo resentencing hearing and
    issued a new sentencing entry with the PRC notification that reincorporated the original
    prison terms.1
    {¶3} In the December 17, 2010 sentencing entry (“sentencing entry”), the trial
    court stated as follows:
    Post release control is part of this prison sentence for 5 years for the above
    felony(s) under R.C. 2967.28. Defendant advised that if post release
    1
    The trial court held the de novo resentencing hearing pursuant to State v. Bezak, 
    114 Ohio St.3d 94
    , 
    2007-Ohio-3250
    , 
    868 N.E.2d 961
    . The Ohio Supreme Court overruled Bezak on
    December 23, 2010, to the extent that the resentencing hearing was no longer a de novo sentencing.
    See State v. Fischer, 
    128 Ohio St.3d 92
    , 
    2010-Ohio-6238
    , 
    942 N.E.2d 332
    .
    control supervision is imposed following his/her release from prison and if
    he/she violates that supervision * * *, parole board may impose a prison
    term as part of the sentence of up to one-half of the stated prison term
    originally imposed upon the offender.
    On October 11, 2011, Ali again filed a motion to correct the void judgment. Ali argues
    that the PRC notification, given both orally and in the sentencing entry, failed to notify
    him of the mandatory nature of the five-year term of PRC because the court omitted the
    word “mandatory,” and additionally, the trial court erred by not orally notifying him of his
    appellate rights. Ali’s arguments are without merit.
    {¶4} As pertinent to this discussion, R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c) requires the trial
    court to notify a defendant that he is subject to supervision for a period of five years,
    based on his convictions on the felony sex offenses. Further, R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(e)
    requires the trial court to notify the defendant of the consequences of violating the PRC,
    if imposed. Accordingly, a trial court is simply required to notify the defendant of the
    “mandatory nature” and length of the PRC term and the consequences for violating the
    PRC term if imposed. State v. Bloomer, 
    122 Ohio St.3d 200
    , 
    2009-Ohio-2462
    , 
    909 N.E.2d 1254
    , ¶ 69; R.C. 2929.19.       The trial court need not recite the magic word
    “mandatory” to convey the mandatory nature of the term of PRC.                See State v.
    Holloman, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-454, 
    2011-Ohio-6138
    , ¶ 9 (the word “mandatory” is not
    necessary to convey the mandatory nature of PRC when the court used similar words such
    as “will”).   The important inquiry is whether the trial court’s language conveyed the
    mandatory nature of the PRC term. 
    Id.
           There is a distinction between Ali’s argument
    that the trial court should have told him the PRC term was mandatory and the requirement
    that he be notified of the mandatory nature of the PRC term. Ali seeks to expand the
    notification from one conveying the mandatory nature to one that expressly states that the
    PRC term is mandatory. We decline to adopt this overly formulaic requirement.
    {¶5} In this case, Ali was subject to a mandatory five-year term of PRC pursuant
    to R.C. 2967.28(B)(1).     The trial court’s notice in the sentencing entry tracked the
    statutory requirements. The trial court notified Ali that PRC was part of his prison
    sentence for five years.    There was no equivocation in the notice.          The failure to
    include the word “mandatory” in the notification did not render the notice insufficient.
    Further, the trial court’s advisement of the consequences of any violation of PRC “if
    imposed” elaborated upon the court’s prior notice that Ali’s sentence included an
    unequivocal five-year term of PRC.     The second advisement did not create an ambiguity
    in the mandatory nature of Ali’s PRC term.
    {¶6} Finally, any argument regarding the trial court’s failure to orally notify Ali
    of the mandatory nature of his PRC term or of his appellate rights pursuant to Crim.R. 32
    at the December 2010 de novo resentencing hearing is without merit.        As recognized by
    this court in State v. Williams, 8th Dist. No. 96323, 
    2011-Ohio-3267
    , ¶ 9:
    In Ohio, the appellant has the duty to file the transcript or such parts
    of the transcript that are necessary for evaluating the lower court’s decision.
    See App.R. 9(B); Knapp v. Edwards Laboratories (1980), 
    61 Ohio St.2d 197
    , 199, 
    400 N.E.2d 384
    . The failure to file the transcript prevents an
    appellate court from reviewing the appellant’s assignments of error. State
    v. Turner, Cuyahoga App. No. 91695, 
    2008-Ohio-6648
    , ¶ 13, appeal not
    allowed, 
    121 Ohio St.3d 1476
    , 
    2009-Ohio-2045
    , 
    905 N.E.2d 655
    . Thus,
    absent a transcript or alternative record, we must presume regularity in the
    proceedings below. Knapp at 199.
    The transcript of the proceedings was not included in the record and is necessary for our
    determination of whether the trial court orally notified Ali of his PRC term and appellate
    rights.     The sentencing entry indicates that both notices were provided during the
    December resentencing hearing.         Absent the transcript, we must presume regularity of
    the proceedings below, and any argument to the contrary is without merit.
    {¶7} The trial court complied with the statutory sentencing requirements by
    providing notice of the mandatory nature of his five-year PRC term, and Ali’s
    assignments of error are accordingly overruled.           The decision of the trial court is
    affirmed.
    It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed.
    The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
    pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. Case remanded to the trial court for
    execution of sentence.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
    the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
    MELODY J. STEWART, P.J., and
    JAMES J. SWEENEY, J., CONCUR
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 97612

Judges: Gallagher

Filed Date: 6/7/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/3/2016