Chardon Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Chardon Edn. Assn. , 2013 Ohio 4547 ( 2013 )

[Cite as Chardon Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Chardon Edn. Assn., 2013-Ohio-4547.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
GEAUGA COUNTY, OHIO
CHARDON LOCAL SCHOOL : OPINION
DISTRICT BOARD OF
EDUCATION, :
Appellee, :
CASE NO. 2012-G-3110
- vs - :
CHARDON EDUCATION :
ASSOCIATION/OEA/NEA,
:
Appellant.
Administrative Appeal from the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas, Case No.
12A000345.
Judgment: Affirmed.
Eric J. Johnson and Susan Keating Anderson, Walter & Haverfield, LLP, The Tower at
Erieview, 1301 East Ninth Street, Suite 3500, Cleveland, OH 44114 (For Appellee).
Charles W. Oldfield and Ira J. Mirkin, Green, Haines & Sgambati Co., L.P.A., 100
Federal Plaza East, Suite 800, Youngstown, OH 44503 (For Appellant).
THOMAS R. WRIGHT, J.
{¶1} Appellant, Chardon Education Association/OEA/NEA (“Association”),
appeals the judgment of the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas, granting the
application of the Chardon Local School District Board of Education (“District”) to
vacate the arbitration award determining that teacher, Amanda Stechschulte
(“Amanda”), should be compensated for “back pay,” and denying the Association’s
motion to confirm the arbitration award. For the following reasons, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
{¶2} This case involves the termination of Amanda’s employment, a Chardon
High School teacher who was convicted of vehicular assault, a fourth degree felony,
after causing a serious motor vehicle accident and significant injuries to the driver of
the vehicle she hit by driving on the wrong side of a divided highway. Amanda and her
husband had been dining locally after school on the evening of March 4, 2010 to
celebrate her husband’s birthday. Amanda consumed two and one-half beers. She
and her husband left the restaurant in separate vehicles. Her husband witnessed the
accident because he was following her.
{¶3} Amanda and her husband initially lied to the investigating officer by telling
him that Mr. Stechschulte was driving the car involved in the collision. They did so to
prevent Amanda from losing her job. However, Amanda eventually admitted she was
the driver and that she had been drinking. She was charged with operating a vehicle
while under the influence of alcohol. She was eventually acquitted of that charge.
{¶4} Amanda was found guilty of vehicular assault on October 29, 2010, and
was sentenced to two years of community control that included 90 days of residential
community control in the Lake County jail. Additionally, her driver’s license was
suspended and she was ordered to pay restitution and perform 200 hours of
community service.
{¶5} On April 30, 2010, Amanda returned to work for the District for the
remainder of the 2009-2010 school year, taught summer school, and her limited
teaching contract was renewed for the 2010-2011 school year. On October 4, 2010,
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after she was found guilty of vehicular assault, the District placed her on administrative
leave with full pay and benefits. After the sentencing hearing, however, the District
suspended her without pay. On November 15, 2010, the District terminated Amanda’s
teaching contract for good and just cause under R.C. 3319.16 (Termination of contract
by board of education; hearings; appeals).
{¶6} Amanda completed her sentence on January 18, 2011. On March 22,
2011, more than a year after the accident and four months after the District terminated
her employment, the Ohio Department of Education (“ODE”) notified both the District
and Amanda that it may take action against her teaching license. Subsequently, in
August 2011, Amanda entered into a Consent Agreement with the ODE that her
teaching license would be suspended until June 30, 2013, the date her five-year
teacher’s license would have expired. The Consent Agreement also provided that the
suspension of her license would not be considered with respect to her future license
applications.
{¶7} The Association and the District, previously entered into a collective
bargaining agreement (“CBA”) that included a grievance procedure which culminated in
binding arbitration. Pursuant to the CBA, the Association filed a grievance against the
District after the District first suspended Amanda without pay and then terminated her
as a member employed by the District and the Association. The grievance proceeded
to arbitration over the specific issue of whether the District properly and with “good and
just cause” suspended without pay and ultimately terminated Amanda’s employment.
The arbitrator concluded the District lacked good and just cause to suspend and
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terminate Amanda’s employment and that she should be compensated for the “back
pay” period beginning with her release from jail until August 15, 2011.
{¶8} The District moved to vacate the arbitrator’s award, and the Association
opposed the motion, filing an application to confirm the award. After a briefing
schedule, the trial court entered judgment granting the District’s motion to vacate, and
denying the Association’s application to confirm the award. The trial court also ordered
the Association to pay the costs of the arbitration. The rationale of the trial court’s
decision was as follows:
{¶9} “The Arbitrator stated that the matter before him ‘should be evaluated in
accordance with the only factor enunciated in the [CBA] as warranting termination of a
teaching contract during its term: whether or not the grievant’s conduct, under all the
circumstances presented by the evidence, amounted to “egregious acts and/or
behavior.”’ In making such a statement, the Arbitrator based his decision to award Ms.
Stechschulte back pay solely on his conclusion that the School District could not
suspend or terminate her teaching contract unless her conduct was egregious.
{¶10} “An Arbitrator may not add terms or provisions to a collective bargaining
agreement, nor may an Arbitrator ignore or delete terms or provisions within that
agreement. By concluding that the only factor enunciated in the [CBA] as warranting
termination of a teaching contract during its term was whether or not Ms.
Stechschulte’s conduct, under all the circumstances presented by the evidence,
amounted to ‘egregious acts and/or behavior,’ the Arbitrator went beyond
misinterpreting the [CBA], he added terms or provisions to the [CBA].”
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{¶11} The Association filed a timely notice of appeal and raises the following two
assignments of error for our review:
{¶12} “[1.] The trial court erred when it granted the Appellee’s motion to vacate
the arbitration award and denied Appellant’s application to confirm the award.
{¶13} “[2.] The trial court erred when it modified the award to order Appellant to
pay the costs of arbitration.”
{¶14} The standard of appellate review of an arbitrator’s award has been
recently set forth by this court in Eastlake v. Fraternal Order of Police/Ohio Labor
Council, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2010-L-057, 2011-Ohio-2201:
{¶15} “We are mindful that ‘Ohio public policy encourages the resolution of
disputes through arbitration.’ Dayton v. Internatl. Assn. of Firefighters, Local No. 136,
2d Dist. No. 21681, 2007 Ohio 1337, at ¶9. Generally, ‘arbitration awards are
presumed valid, and a reviewing court may not merely substitute its judgment for that
of the arbitrator.’ Id. at ¶10 (Citations omitted.)
{¶16} In reviewing an arbitrator’s award, courts are bound by R.C. 2711.10. As
noted by the trial court, the relevant statutory provision at issue is R.C. 2711.10(D),
which provides in part:
{¶17} “‘In any of the following cases, the court of common pleas shall make an
order vacating the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration if:’
{¶18} “* * *’
{¶19} “(D) The arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed
them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not
made.’
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{¶20} “‘[G]iven the presumed validity of an arbitrator’s award, a reviewing court’s
inquiry into whether the arbitrator exceeded his authority, within the meaning of R.C.
2711.10(D), is limited. Once it is determined that the arbitrator’s award draws its
essence from the collective bargaining agreement and is not unlawful, arbitrary, or
capricious, a reviewing court’s inquiry for purposes of vacating an arbitrator’s award
pursuant to R.C. 2711.10(D) is at an end.’ (Emphasis sic.) Dayton v. Internatl. Assoc.
of Firefighters, Local No. 136, supra, at ¶16.
{¶21} “* * *’
{¶22} “The arbitrator is confined to the interpretation and application of the
collective bargaining agreement, and although he may construe ambiguous contract
language, he is without authority to disregard or modify plain and unambiguous
language.” Eastlake, at ¶24-32. “‘Accordingly, it is our duty to determine whether the
arbitrator’s award was reached in a rational manner from the collective bargaining
agreement.’” Id.
{¶23} “An Arbitrator’s award departs from the essence of a collective bargaining
agreement when: (1) the award conflicts with the express terms of the agreement,
and/or (2) the award is without rational support or cannot be rationally derived from the
terms of the agreement.” Ohio Office of Collective Bargaining v. Ohio Civil Serv. Emp.
Assn., Local 11, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 59 Ohio St.3d 177, syllabus (1991).
{¶24} Based on the foregoing, the question before us is whether the trial court
had the authority to interpret the CBA between the parties in a way that differed from
that of the arbitrator. Specifically, we must determine if the trial court properly found
that the arbitrator exceeded his authority in interpreting the relevant portions of the
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CBA. For the reasons that follow, we agree with the trial court that the arbitrator
misinterpreted the CBA when such interpretation was not justified or necessary, and
that the trial court properly vacated the award.
{¶25} Article 5.05.1 of the CBA provides, in part:
{¶26} “Termination of a teacher’s contract shall be according to Section 3319.16
and related provisions of the Ohio Revised Code.” R.C. 3319.16 provides that the
contract of any teacher may not be terminated except for good and just cause.
Nowhere in R.C. 3319.16 or any related provision does it state that a teacher may not
be terminated except for egregious conduct. The direct, clear and unambiguous
language of the CBA requires that R.C. 3319.16 requires a “just cause” analysis.
{¶27} Second, the first paragraph of Section 5.05.5 of the CBA states:
{¶28} “Except for egregious acts and/or behavior, the [District] shall not abrogate
a teacher’s contractual rights provided by the [CBA] between the [District] and the
Association; nor shall a teacher be summarily suspended and terminated by the
[District] without reason and a just cause substantive and procedural due process
hearing.” (Emphasis added.)
{¶29} In making the previously noted statement that Amanda’s conduct did not
amount to “egregious acts and/or behavior,” the Arbitrator was basing his decision to
award her back pay solely on his conclusion that the District should not have
terminated or suspended Amanda’s teaching contract unless her conduct was
egregious. However, the “egregious acts and/or behavior language” referenced in
Section 5.05.5 does not apply to the termination or suspension of teacher contracts.
Rather, it applies to the contractual rights provided by the CBA between the parties.
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There is a difference between abrogating a teacher’s contractual rights provided by the
CBA between the parties, and terminating or suspending a teacher’s employment
contract for good and just cause. For example, as the trial court stated, if the District
believed that a teacher’s conduct was egregious, the District could contend that such
conduct permitted the abrogation of the teacher’s right to notice and hearing before
suspension or termination of the teacher’s employment contract as provided in the
CBA.
{¶30} Furthermore, otherwise, the language of Section 5.05.5 of the CBA would
not have made a distinction between the two procedures. If the “egregious acts and/or
behavior” language were intended to apply to teacher terminations and suspensions, it
would have been placed in the section that directly addresses the standard for teacher
terminations, i.e., Section 5.05.1. However, as noted, that section mandates that
terminations/suspensions be effectuated in accordance with R.C. 3319.16, which
provides that termination or suspension require “good and just cause.”
{¶31} In sum, the express terms of the CBA states that terminations will be
pursuant to R.C. 3319.16, i.e., for good and just cause. The District was not required
to prove that Amanda’s conduct was egregious before it could suspend or terminate
her teaching contract. Therefore, the arbitrator exceeded his authority and improperly
executed his powers when he utilized a standard not provided for in the CBA and
ignored the application of the good and just cause standard to Amanda’s termination.
{¶32} Appellant argues that the version of R.C. 3319.16 in effect in August-
September 2009 controls rather than the version that became effective October 16,
2009. However, while the former version of R.C. 3319.16 includes additional language
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that encompasses specifically enumerated personal character failures, the ending
phrase of both versions of the statute is the same, i.e., “except for good and just
cause.” Thus under either version of the statute, the basis of a teacher’s suspension or
termination must at least rise to the crest of “good and just cause.” Therefore, the trial
court’s reference to “good and just cause” refers to either the current or former version
of R.C. 3319.16 given that the phrase is contained in both.
{¶33} Accordingly, based on the foregoing, because the Arbitrator’s award was
based upon a determination that was in excess of his authority, the decision that
Amanda is entitled to be compensated for the “back pay” period must be vacated. The
Association’s first assignment of error is without merit.
{¶34} Under its second assignment of error, the Association argues that when
the trial court vacated the arbitration award under R.C. 2711.10, it improperly modified
the award by ordering the Association to pay the costs of arbitration and that it erred in
doing so. Specifically, the Association points out that the District never applied to
modify the award; instead, it simply moved to vacate it. Therefore, the trial court erred
when it sua sponte ordered the Association to pay the costs of arbitration. Again, we
disagree with the Association.
{¶35} R.C. 2711.12 provides that “[u]pon the granting of an order confirming,
modifying, correcting, or vacating an award made in an arbitration proceeding, the
court must enter judgment in conformity therewith.” The trial court’s order that the
Association pay the costs of the arbitration is in conformity with its decision to vacate
the arbitration award since the Association, not the District, was the losing party. The
CBA provides for the losing party to pay the expenses of the arbitration. Moreover,
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contrary to the Association’s argument, the imposition of costs was not a separate
modification of the arbitration award because the award itself was vacated.
Accordingly, the trial court properly charged the Association with the costs of the
arbitration. The Association’s second assignment of error is without merit.
{¶36} For the reasons stated in the opinion of this court, it is the judgment and
order of this court that the judgment of the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas is
affirmed.
DIANE V. GRENDELL, J., concurs,
COLLEEN MARY O’TOOLE, J., dissents with a Dissenting Opinion.
____________________
COLLEEN MARY O’TOOLE, J., dissents with a Dissenting Opinion.
{¶37} I respectfully dissent.
{¶38} This court has held that a trial court’s role in reviewing an arbitration award
to determine whether to vacate or confirm the award is limited. Kent State Univ. v. Am.
Assn. of Univ. Professors, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2010-P-0064, 2011-Ohio-5597, ¶20,
citing Madison Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. OAPSE/AFSCME Local 4, AFL-CIO
and its Local #238, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2008-L-086, 2009-Ohio-1315, ¶9. An arbitrator
is the final judge of law and facts and, as a result, a court may not substitute its
judgment for the arbitrator. Madison at ¶9. Judicial deference in arbitration cases is
based on the recognition that the parties have bargained and contracted for dispute
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resolution via arbitration in lieu of court proceedings. Id. at ¶10. As such the parties
have agreed to accept the arbitrator’s view of the facts and the meaning of the contract
regardless of the outcome. Id.
{¶39} The trial court held that the arbitrator went beyond misinterpreting the
collective bargaining agreement (Agreement) to the point that he added terms or
provisions to the Agreement. The basis of the trial court’s holding is that the arbitrator
improperly used section 5.05.5 of the Agreement in making his decision regarding the
termination of Ms. Stechschulte’s employment. Section 5.05.5 states in part:
{¶40} Except for egregious acts and/or behavior, the Board shall not
abrogate a teacher’s contractual rights provided by the agreement
between the Board and Association; nor shall a teacher be
summarily suspended and terminated by the Board of Education
without reason and a just cause substantive and procedural due
process hearing.
{¶41} The trial court stated that section 5.05.1 of the Agreement contains the
appropriate provision on teacher terminations. Section 5.05.1 state in part:
{¶42} Termination of a teacher’s contract shall be according to Section
3319.16 and related provisions of the Ohio Revised Code.
{¶43} According to the trial court, since R.C. 3319.16 does not contain any
provision stating that a teacher may not be terminated except for egregious conduct, the
arbitrator exceeded his authority by including provisions in the Agreement that do not
exist.
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{¶44} The fact remains that both provisions of the Agreement reference the
standards to be used in the case of teacher terminations. When provisions in a
collective bargaining agreement are subject to more than one reasonable interpretation,
it is the arbitrator’s interpretation of the contract that governs the rights of the parties.
“The arbitrator’s interpretation must prevail regardless of whether his or her
interpretation is the most reasonable under the circumstances.” Hillsboro v. Fraternal
Order of Police, Ohio Labor Council, Inc., 52 Ohio St.3d 174, 177-178 (1990).
{¶45} “‘The arbitrator may not ignore the plain language of the contract; but the
parties having authorized the arbitrator to give meaning to the language of the
agreement, a court should not reject an award on the ground that the arbitrator misread
the contract.’” Field Local Teachers Assn., OEA/NEA v. Field Local School Dist. Bd. of
Edn., 11th Dist. Portage No. 2010-P-0086, 2012-Ohio-862, ¶22, quoting Stow
Firefighters v. City of Stow, 193 Ohio App.3d 148, 2011-Ohio-1559, quoting Summit
Cty. Bd. of Mental Retardation & Dev. Disabilities v. Am. Fedn. of State,Cty. & Mun.
Emp., 39 Ohio App.3d 175, 176 (9th Dist.1988). “‘(A)s long as the arbitrator is even
arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority,
(* * *)’ a court may not vacate the arbitrator’s determination.” Madison, supra, at ¶12,
quoting United Paperworkers Internatl. Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987).
Requests for judicial intervention should be resisted even where the arbitrator has
ostensibly made “‘“serious,” improvident” or “silly” errors in resolving the merits of the
dispute.’” Madison, supra, at ¶12, quoting Michigan Family Resources, Inc. v. Service
Employees Internl. Union Local 517M, 475 F.3d 746, 753 (6th Cir.2007).
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{¶46} As the arbitrator based his decision upon a provision of the Agreement
that concerns teacher terminations he has therefore acted within the scope of his
authority.
{¶47} For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.
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