State v. Watkins ( 2011 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Watkins, 
    2011-Ohio-2979
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF CLARK COUNTY, OHIO
    STATE OF OHIO                                   :
    Plaintiff-Appellee                      :   C.A. CASE NO. 10CA0088
    vs.                                            :    T.C. CASE NO. 08CR0965
    JON A. WATKINS                                  :
    Defendant-Appellant                     :
    . . . . . . . . .
    O P I N I O N
    Rendered on the 17th day of June, 2011.
    . . . . . . . . .
    Andrew D. Wilson, Prosecuting Attorney, Atty. Reg. No.0073767;
    Andrew R. Picek, Asst. Prosecuting Attorney, Atty. Reg. No.
    0082121, 50 E. Columbia Street, 4th Floor, P.O. Box 1608,
    Springfield, OH 45501
    Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee
    Charles W. Slicer, III, Atty. Reg. No.0059927, 111 W. First Street,
    Suite 205, Dayton, OH 45402
    Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
    . . . . . . . . .
    GRADY, P.J.:
    {¶ 1} This appeal is from a final judgment of the court of
    common pleas that imposed sentences for two felony offenses,
    following our reversal of sentences the court previously imposed
    2
    and a remand for resentencing.         State v. Watkins, 
    186 Ohio App.3d 619
    , 
    2010-Ohio-740
    .
    {¶ 2} Defendant, Jon A. Watkins, was found guilty following
    a jury trial of aggravated robbery, R.C. 2911.11, a first degree
    felony, and kidnapping, R.C. 2905.01, as a second degree felony.
    The trial court imposed maximum sentences of ten years for the
    aggravated robbery and eight years for the kidnapping.               The court
    further ordered that the two terms would be served consecutively,
    for an aggregate prison term of eighteen years.         Watkins appealed.
    {¶ 3} We reversed the sentences the court imposed on findings
    “that the facts in the record in this case do not justify maximum
    consecutive sentences for a first time offender and that the trial
    court abused its discretion by imposing maximum consecutive
    sentences.”      ¶46.    We sustained Watkins’s third assignment of
    error    “because   we     conclude   that   the   imposition   of    maximum
    consecutive sentences is not warranted by the evidence in this
    record, resulting in an 18-year sentence for a first-time offender
    . . .”    ¶47.    Pursuant to App.R. 27, we reversed the sentences
    imposed by the trial court and ordered the cause “remanded for
    resentencing.”      ¶57.
    {¶ 4} On remand, after acknowledging our decision and order
    of remand, and discussing the reasons for the eighteen year sentence
    it previously imposed, the trial court stated:
    3
    {¶ 5} “I can’t just do something that I don’t think is right;
    and if I think the facts in the record do justify maximum consecutive
    sentences, I think that’s not just within my discretion but it’s
    my duty to impose sentences I see fit.”      (Tr. 40.)
    {¶ 6} The court then imposed the same maximum, consecutive
    eighteen-year sentences we previously reversed.      Defendant filed
    a notice of appeal.
    ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
    {¶ 7} “THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR WHEN IT ABUSED ITS
    DISCRETION AND IMPOSED A MAXIMUM CONSECUTIVE SENTENCE.”
    {¶ 8} In Blust v. Lamar Advertising of Mobile, Inc. (2009),
    
    183 Ohio App.3d 478
    , we wrote, at ¶10:
    {¶ 9} “The law-of-the-case doctrine holds that the decision
    of the reviewing court in a case remains the law of that case on
    the questions of law involved for all subsequent proceedings at
    the trial and appellate levels.      Nolan v. Nolan (1984), 
    11 Ohio St.3d 1
    , 11 OBR 1, 
    462 N.E.2d 410
    .   The doctrine functions to compel
    trial courts to follow the mandates of reviewing courts.    Thatcher
    v. Sowards (2001), 
    143 Ohio App.3d 137
    , 
    757 N.E.2d 805
    .   ‘Moreover,
    the trial court is without authority to extend or vary the mandate.’
    Id. at 142, 
    757 N.E.2d 805
    .”
    {¶ 10} Our decision in the prior appeal is an unappealed final
    order.   It determined a question of law: that the trial court abused
    4
    its discretion when it imposed maximum, consecutive sentences
    totalling eighteen years.    That decision was the law of the case
    for purposes of the remand for resentencing we ordered pursuant
    to App.R. 27.    The trial court was then required to execute our
    mandate.     The court instead varied our mandate by imposing the
    same maximum, consecutive sentences we previously reversed.
    {¶ 11} We did not find in the prior appeal that the court abused
    its discretion by failing to state cogent reasons for the sentence
    the court previously imposed.     We found that the eighteen-year
    sentence the court imposed was not justified by “the facts in the
    record of this case.”     ¶46.   That concluded the issue of law
    concerned.    The trial court might disagree with our decision, but
    the court was not thereby authorized to fail to execute our mandate.
    {¶ 12} From the statement quoted above, it appears that the
    trial court judge was unable to reconcile his views with our prior
    decision.      When a judge’s impartiality might reasonably be
    questioned, the judge has an obligation to recuse himself or
    herself.     Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 2.11(A).     By instead
    refusing to execute our mandate due to his contrary personal views,
    the judge did not comply with the law of the case.      Rule 1.1 of
    the Code of Judicial Conduct states: “A judge shall comply with
    the law.”
    {¶ 13} Defendant’s assignment of error is sustained.    Because
    5
    we lack confidence that the trial court judge, Hon. Douglas M.
    Rastatter, will execute another mandate to resentence Defendant,
    we will exercise the authority conferred on us by Section 3(B)(2),
    Article IV of the Ohio Constitution to modify the judgment from
    which this appeal is taken.
    {¶ 14} As we pointed out, Defendant Watkins is a first offender.
    The victim of his kidnapping offense was subjected to degrading
    behavior, but suffered no physical harm.    In consideration of the
    matters in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, we will order the sentences
    the trial court imposed modified, to instead impose a sentence
    of six years for the aggravated robbery conviction and four years
    for the kidnapping conviction, to be served consecutively.        As
    modified, the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.
    {¶ 15} Further, and pursuant to App.R. 27, the case will be
    remanded to the trial court for the limited purpose of notifying
    the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction and any other
    relevant authority of the modified sentence, to do so in no less
    than thirty days, and to thereafter report its compliance with
    our mandate.
    FAIN, J. And FROELICH, J., concur.
    6
    Copies mailed to:
    Andrew R. Picek, Esq.
    Charles W. Slicer, III, Esq.
    Hon. Douglas M. Rastatter
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 10CA0088

Judges: Grady

Filed Date: 6/17/2011

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014