State v. Gales , 2011 Ohio 2682 ( 2011 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Gales, 
    2011-Ohio-2682
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY, OHIO
    STATE OF OHIO                                       :
    Plaintiff-Appellee                          :        C.A. CASE NO.        24059
    v.                                                 :         T.C. NO.    09CR807/2
    JERITT GALES                                       :         (Criminal appeal from
    Common Pleas Court)
    Defendant-Appellant                  :
    :
    ..........
    OPINION
    Rendered on the    3rd    day of     June     , 2011.
    ..........
    JOHNNA M. SHIA, Atty. Reg. No. 0067685, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, 301 W. Third
    Street, 5th Floor, Dayton, Ohio 45422
    Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
    BYRON K. SHAW, Atty. Reg. No. 0073124, 4800 Belmont Place, Huber Heights, Ohio
    45424
    Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
    ..........
    DONOVAN, J.
    {¶ 1} This matter is before the Court on the Notice of Appeal of Jeritt Phillip Gales,
    filed May 24, 2010. On April 6, 2009, Gales was indicted on one count of aggravated
    robbery (deadly weapon), in violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(1), a felony of the first degree;
    2
    one count of aggravated burglary (deadly weapon), in violation of R.C. 2911.11(A)(2), a
    felony of the first degree; one count of felonious assault (serious physical harm), in violation
    of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), a felony of the second degree; two counts of theft ($500)(without
    consent), in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(1), felonies of the fifth degree; and one count of
    theft (R.C. 2913.71 property), in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(1), a felony of the fifth
    degree. Each of the indicted offenses included four firearm specifications. Gales pled not
    guilty.
    {¶ 2} On April 28, 2009, Gales filed two motions to suppress. One of the motions
    contested the identification of Gales by means of a photo spread, and the other sought to
    suppress statements Gales made to the investigating police officer. After separate hearings
    on each motion, the trial court overruled both of them. Following a jury trial, Gales was
    found guilty of all offenses charged in the indictment and 11 of the 12 accompanying
    specifications. The trial court sentenced him to four years for aggravated robbery, five years
    for aggravated burglary, three years for felonious assault, all to be served consecutively, and
    one year for each theft offense, to be served concurrently with each other and the other
    offenses. The firearm specifications were merged into a single three year term to be served
    consecutively and prior to the definite term of imprisonment, for an aggregate term of 15
    years.
    I
    {¶ 3} At the hearing on the first motion to suppress, Detective Kristine Beane
    testified. At the time, Beane had been a detective for 17 years. According to Beane, on
    March 17, 2009, she showed two of the victims herein, Theodore Bemis and Colin Hisey,
    3
    separate copies of a photo spread in their University of Dayton (“UD”) apartment at 312 East
    Stewart Street.   Beane was accompanied by Officer Harry Sweigart of the UD police
    department and Officer Randy Beane of the City of Dayton department. Beane stated that
    Gales became a suspect in the incident at issue following a Crime Stopper’s tip received by
    the police department. Beane testified that she used the “JusticeWeb program” to assemble
    the photo spread. After entering Gales’ photograph, Beane obtained multiple photographs
    of individuals with features similar to Gales’. Beane then selected five of the photographs
    and printed the photo spread. The computer program randomly arranged the photographs,
    and Gales’ photo was in the fourth slot.
    {¶ 4} According to Beane, she “went into the room and made contact with the
    victims. * * * I showed the photo spread to Theodore Bemis first, and I had Colin Hisey
    leave the room, go back into a bedroom, while I did this.” Beane instructed the victims “not
    to talk about it.” She testified that she had previously shown the victims another photo
    spread, which did not include a photograph of Gales. According to Beane, “We’d been
    through this before, and I told them we needed to keep them separated.” After Bemis
    indicated that he remembered the procedure from the previous photo spread, Beane “went
    through the photographic show-up instructions with him. And I laid the photo spread on the
    coffee table in front of him, and he pointed to photo number 4, and he told me he was the
    person that had come to the apartment. * * * .” Bemis circled the photo of Gales, and he
    and Beane signed the photo spread.
    {¶ 5} According to Beane, after Bemis completed the identification, she “had him
    leave the room, and had Colin Hisey come out of the bedroom, and Theodore Bemis went
    4
    back into the bedroom. And I went through the same procedure again. I asked him if he
    remembered doing this on the other occasions.           He said, ‘Yes.’     I went through the
    instructions with him, and placed the photo spread on the table in front of him. He pointed
    to photo number 4 and indicated that this was the person who had come to his door and force
    (sic) his way in. And he was also the person he had seen at the party the Saturday before.”
    Hisey circled Gales’ photo and signed the second photo spread. The photo spread that
    Bemis circled and signed was not visible to Hisey when Hisey made his identification.
    {¶ 6} Beane testified that the apartment is small, and she “told [Bemis and Hisey]
    not to talk before we did this. They understood that. I watched them as the[y] passed.
    They made no motions to each other. * * * No comments at all.” Beane stated, “It was very
    quiet, and actually, they just pointed to the photo. They didn’t even say the number out
    loud.” Beane stated that each victim’s identification of Gales was immediate, and she did
    not employ promises, threats or coercion to obtain the identifications. Beane testified that,
    based on the identifications, she obtained a warrant for Gales’ arrest.
    {¶ 7} On cross-examination, Beane stated that the victims attended a party on
    March 7, 2009, and the incident occurred on March 9, 2009.           According to Beane, Hisey
    told her that he observed Gales at the party on March 7th, and that Hisey identified Gales as
    “Little Jerry,” or “Little Jeritt.” Beane stated that Bemis initially told her that he did not see
    Gales at the party, but “[l]ater on he said he did, but the first time I talked to him he said he
    did not.” Beane stated that Bemis told her, when he identified Gales’ photo, that Gales was
    not armed when the incident occurred. Hisey told Beane that he “did see [Gales] with a
    weapon.”
    5
    {¶ 8} In overruling Gales’ motion to suppress the identifications, the trial court
    made factual findings consistent with Beane’s testimony. The court noted that “the record
    is silent as to the reasons why the identification is improper. The State, however, has
    presented the following evidence to show that the testimony is reliable: 1) the witnesses who
    identified the Defendant as the perpetrator had an opportunity to see the Defendant at the
    time of the crime; 2) one witness noted that he had had contact with the Defendant two days
    prior to the incident and at a party; 3) that same witness stated the assailant was called ‘Little
    Jerry’ or ‘Little Jeritt,’ 4) each witness made his identification of the Defendant 8 days after
    the incident and 5) each witness made an immediate identification of the Defendant upon
    being shown the photographic array.”
    {¶ 9} The court concluded that “the process of creating the photo spread is not
    tainted or unreliable. The evidence indicates that the other photos were selected from the
    hundreds of photographs suggested by the computer. The place of the Defendant on the
    photo spread was the result of a random selection by the computer.
    {¶ 10} “The manner in which the photographic arrays were shown to the witnesses
    was also not unduly suggestive. The witnesses were separated and given no opportunity to
    compare testimony. Then the detective read to (sic) a list of instructions to each witness
    before showing them the spread. Once shown the individual photo spreads the record
    reflects that each witness made a positive and immediate identification of the Defendant as
    their assailant. There was no stumbling and no hesitation.”
    II
    {¶ 11} At the second suppression hearing regarding Gales’ statements, Kristine
    6
    Beane again testified. According to Beane, she interviewed Gales on April 6, 2009 in the
    detective section on Third Street. Beane testified that at the start of the interview, she wrote
    Gales’ identifying information on the top left portion of a pre-interview form. Beane stated
    that Gales was 20 years old at the time of the interview, had a GED and was able to read and
    write. Beane instructed Gales to read the first two lines of the pre-interview form to her to
    confirm his ability to read. Beane then read each of Gales’ rights to him from the card, and
    after each one, Gales indicated his understanding thereof. When Beane read the waiver of
    rights paragraph, Gales indicated that he did not understand the word “coercion.” Beane
    defined the word for him, and Gales acknowledged his understanding. Gales, and then
    Beane, signed the form.
    {¶ 12} According to Beane, “when I asked him if he wanted to talk to me without a
    lawyer present, he told me that he’d already been contacted by a lawyer over at the jail.
    And he pulled out a business card for Patrick Mulligan.” Beane asked Gales what he
    wanted to do, and she testified that Gales responded, “‘I really want to talk to you.’” Gales
    told Beane that his mother had contacted Mulligan for Gales. Beane gave Gales her cell
    phone in the interview room, and Gales phoned Mulligan’s office. According to Beane, she
    “could actually hear part of the conversation. I could tell that a female answered the phone,
    and he explained to her why he was calling. And they put him on the phone with - - it was a
    male voice. It sounded like it might have been an attorney. And they were telling him that
    he - - that Jeritt had not retained them yet as their attorney. And, you know, they weren’t
    coming over. And they also told him, ‘You shouldn’t talk to the d - - they asked him where
    he was at, and he said he was at the jail. And they told him he shouldn’t talk without a
    7
    lawyer being there.” When the phone call ended, Beane again asked Gales what he wanted
    to do, and she testified that Gales responded, “‘I really want to talk to you.’” Beane advised
    him that he could “come back and talk” to her once he retained a lawyer, or that one could
    be appointed for him. Beane testified that Gales again told her that he wanted to talk to her,
    and that Gales stated, “‘I’m tired of waiting.         I’m going to do it now.’” Gales then
    proceeded to make statements.
    {¶ 13} According to Beane, in the course of the interview, she did not make any
    promises to Gales or threaten him. Beane stated that she left the room at one point and
    returned after about 15 minutes, and she did not read Gales his rights again upon her return.
    Gales did not terminate the interview or ask for an attorney, but at “the very end, he didn’t
    want to write out a statement without his attorney.”
    {¶ 14} On cross-examination, the following exchange occurred:
    {¶ 15} “Q. And additionally, while Jeritt was on the phone with Mr. Mulligan’s
    office, according to your report, Jeritt told the attorney that he wanted an attorney to come
    over while he talked with a detective; isn’t that right?
    {¶ 16} “A. That’s correct.
    {¶ 17} “Q. So that was Jeritt’s request to the attorney, was to have an attorney
    present while he spoke with you?
    {¶ 18} “A. He was asking them to come over, yes.
    {¶ 19} “Q. Right. And you heard him ask that, correct?
    {¶ 20} “A. That’s correct.
    {¶ 21} “Q. Okay. And no attorney ever came, correct?
    8
    {¶ 22} “A. No, they told him they were not coming.
    {¶ 23} “Q. * * * Well, was Jeritt saying, ‘I want an attorney to come and sit with me
    while I’m interviewed by this detective,’ and you knowing that they hadn’t been retained, or
    you finding that out at that time, why didn’t you seek to get him a Public Defender at that
    time?
    {¶ 24} “A. I explained to him that I didn’t have an attorney there at that time, and
    we could wait until he got one. And his - - he continually would say, ‘I really want to talk
    to you.’ And I - - I told him we could wait until he got an attorney. And he just says, ‘I’m
    going to talk to you. I want to talk to you now.’
    {¶ 25} “* * *
    {¶ 26} “Q. Well, on the phone he asked an attorney [to] come over and be with
    him, and in your rights form number 3 says, ‘You have a right to have a lawyer with you
    during questioning,’ and number 4 says, ‘If you don’t have the money to hire a lawyer,
    Public Defender’s Office or some Court-appointed attorney can be appointed to - - will be
    provided for you during questioning.’ You knew that his desire was to have an attorney
    with him during the questioning, yet you took no steps to get him an attorney; is that right?
    {¶ 27} “A. I did. I gave him my phone so he could call the attorney that had gone
    to see him at the jail. And even after all that, I told him we could wait until he either hired
    one, and I told him a Public Defender could be appointed to him, and we could wait until
    that happened.
    {¶ 28} “ * * *
    {¶ 29} “A.      And he still continued to say, ‘I want to talk to you.’
    9
    {¶ 30} “Q. Well, you knew that he wanted an attorney to be with him.
    {¶ 31} “A. He didn’t want to wait.
    {¶ 32} “Q. Well - -
    {¶ 33} “A. It was his decision.”
    {¶ 34} In overruling Gales’ motion to suppress his statements, the trial court made
    factual findings consistent with Beane’s testimony. The court determined that Gales was in
    custody at the time of the interview and entitled to the protections articulated in Miranda v.
    Arizona (1966), 
    384 U.S. 4436
    , 
    86 S.Ct. 1602
    , 
    16 L.Ed. 2d 694
    .             The court further
    concluded that Gales “suffered no constitutional deprivation when he was interviewed by
    Detective Beane.” According to the court, the “evidence shows that Detective Beane took
    considerable time going over the pre-interview form with Mr. Gales.            Although, she
    ascertained that he could read, the Detective read and explained to Gales each right before
    moving on [to] the next. She defined words that she thought he might not understand such
    as ‘coercion’ before moving on. And the Defendant was given an opportunity to ask
    questions about his specific rights prior to asking him if he desired to waive those rights.
    Mr. Gales gave an express waiver of his constitutional rights by signing the document.
    {¶ 35} “Although, the record shows that Mr. Gales hesitated when asked if he
    wished to talk to Detective Beane, the record also makes clear that Detective Beane gave Mr.
    Gales ample opportunity to get an attorney. Beane gave the Defendant her cell phone to call
    the office of the attorney whom Gales wanted to hire to represent him. When it was
    revealed that this attorney had not been retained, the Detective offered to get a member of
    the Public Defender’s Office to represent him. After these actions occurred, the Defendant
    10
    decided he did not want to wait any longer and made his statement.
    {¶ 36} “Based upon a careful review of the facts concerning the interrogation, this
    Court finds that the Defendant, Jeritt Gales, was given Miranda rights warnings prior to his
    interrogation by Detective Beane. The rights were explained to him in depth. The Court
    further finds that after receiving the rights by the police officer, the Defendant made an
    express waiver of his rights. And that statement was the result of a knowing, intelligent and
    voluntary waiver.”
    III
    {¶ 37} At the trial, Colin Hisey testified that he was a chemical engineering student
    at UD. According to Hisey, on the date of the incident, he and Theodore Bemis resided at
    312 East Stewart St., Apartment 3-C, which is on the UD campus. On the evening of
    March 9, 2009, Hisey testified that he and Bemis were at home, and that their friends, Brian
    Titgemeyer and John Shockey, were visiting the apartment. Hisey was setting up a video
    game, and all the men had been smoking marijuana. They ordered pasta for delivery, and at
    approximately 9:00 p.m., when the buzzer from the secured front door of the apartment
    building sounded, Hisey assumed that it was the delivery man. Hisey unlocked the front
    door without asking who was there. He then observed Gales and someone else he did not
    recognize through the peephole in his apartment door. Hisey stated that in the past he had
    purchased “fairly large amounts of low grade marijuana” from an acquaintance, and that
    Gales had been present at the home of the acquaintance once or twice during Hisey’s
    marijuana buys.
    {¶ 38} Hisey stated that he opened the door a couple of inches and braced it with his
    11
    right foot. According to Hisey, he asked Gales, “what’s going on,” and at that point “a third
    person came from around the stairwell right next to my door and had a rifle and began to
    force his way into the door. He originally had the barrel pointed directly at my face, so I
    still had the door braced and I grabbed it with my left hand and just kind of pushed it
    towards the ceiling instinctively to get it away from my face.” Gales and the other man
    began to push on the door, and Hisey stated that he was pushed back into his apartment.
    According to Hisey, the three intruders came into the apartment, and the one with the rifle
    struck Hisey’s forehead with the weapon, knocking him to the ground. The man with the
    rifle yelled at Hisey not to look at him and to turn his face toward the floor.
    {¶ 39} From the floor, Hisey observed another of the intruders, with a pistol in his
    hand, proceed to one of the bedrooms, accompanied by Gales. The man with the rifle told
    Hisey to crawl forward and keep his head down, and Hisey complied. Hisey then observed
    Shockey laying down next to him, along with Titgemeyer. According to Hisey, Bemis was
    sitting in a corner, “bleeding profusely from his forehead and the guy with the pistol was
    standing over him.” Hisey stated, when “we were laying there, [Gales] originally went back
    into my bedroom and started rummaging around.” Hisey continued, “after [Gales] went
    through my room, he came out here and yelled at us where is it. And I kept saying, I don’t
    know what you’re talking about, I don’t have anything. And then he went over into Teddy’s
    room.” As Gales ransacked the bedrooms, the man with the rifle instructed the men on the
    floor to empty their pockets. After they did so, the three intruders ran out of the apartment.
    Hisey stated that the intruders were in the apartment for about five minutes. Hisey testified
    that throughout the incident, he did not observe a weapon in Gales’ possession.
    12
    {¶ 40} After the intruders left the apartment, Hisey stated that he locked the door and
    “everyone kind of got up and was just freaked out. No one understood what had happened
    or why.” Hisey observed that Bemis had a large laceration near his hairline with “blood
    pouring down the side of his face,” and he gave Bemis a towel and told him to apply
    pressure to the wound.
    {¶ 41} Hisey stated that he did not immediately contact the police because he “knew
    that my apartment smelled like weed from when we smoked earlier and I was afraid I was
    going to get in trouble.” Hisey first “made sure that [Bemis] went to the hospital” with a
    neighbor downstairs.     According to Hisey, Shockey and Titgemeyer left the apartment
    because “we thought if they weren’t there they wouldn’t get in any trouble.” Hisey stated
    that he felt the incident was “largely my fault,” because he “had been selling marijuana for
    three or four months to my friends and from what I had seen that was the reason that they
    were there.”
    {¶ 42} After Bemis, Shockey and Titgemeyer left the apartment, Hisey eventually
    called the police. Officers arrived within two to three minutes, and in speaking to them,
    Hisey stated that he “left out how I knew Jeritt and I left out that I had been selling. I left
    out that [Titgemeyer] and [Shockey] were there.” Regarding Gales, Hisey told the police
    that he “had met him at a party that weekend and that I had told him that we should hang out
    or something.” Hisey “lied because I was scared.” Hisey testified that he provided written
    statements to the University of Dayton Police and the Dayton Police Department that were
    consistent with his oral statements to the officers. Hisey later wrote a third statement in
    which he purportedly provided an accurate account of the crimes.
    13
    {¶ 43} Hisey stated that his laptop computer, for which he paid $2000.00, his wallet
    containing $50.00, his cell phone and his keys were taken from him. He stated that the
    police found the power cord from the missing computer in the bushes across the street, but
    that the other items were not found. Hisey testified that he identified Gales in a photo spread.
    {¶ 44} On cross-examination, Hisey stated that at the time of the incident, he
    smoked marijuana on a daily basis and had been doing so for two hours when Gales arrived
    at the apartment. He testified that he had been to a party on March 7, 2009, at Titgemeyer’s
    apartment, and that he told the investigating officers that “somebody named Little Jerry had
    been at that party,” and that he told “Little Jerry” that he lived upstairs and that “Little
    Jerry” could stop by and “smoke weed.” In his third statement to the police, six months
    after the incident, Hisey admitted that Gales had not been at Titgemeyer’s party, and he
    admitted to the police that he had “left out a lot of things” in his initial statements.
    {¶ 45} Titgemeyer testified that he was a political science student at UD at the time
    of the incident, living in apartment 2-D at 312 East Stewart Street. Titgemeyer stated that
    one of the intruders had a handgun, and that that man pushed Titgemeyer to the floor, where
    Titgemeyer remained. When he looked up, the man with the handgun pointed the weapon
    to Titgemeyer’s head and told him to turn around. Titgemeyer stated that he was kicked in
    the side. After the incident, Titgemeyer left the apartment and walked around campus to
    calm down. When he returned to his apartment building, he went upstairs where the police
    were investigating, and he testified that he “just made everything up on the spot.”
    Titgemeyer denied being in the apartment at the time of the incident and he denied
    knowledge of the robbery. Titgemeyer stated that he told the truth to the police six months
    14
    later. He stated that he was shown a photo spread and did not identify Gales, but that he did
    identify the man who pointed the handgun at him.
    {¶ 46} Shockey testified that he was a sophomore at UD, living in a dorm at the time
    of the incident. Shockey stated he was in Hisey’s room when he heard the knock on the
    door, followed by Hisey yelling. Shockey looked into the living area and observed the tip
    of a rifle sticking into the room. Shockey initially turned back into the bedroom, but then
    he walked into the living area slowly with his hands in the air. He observed the three
    intruders, whom he did not recognize, in the room. One of them, who carried a pistol,
    pointed the weapon at Shockey, grabbed him with his other hand, turned him around, and
    told him to get on the floor and put his hands on his head. Shockey complied. After the
    men left, Shockey returned to his dorm. According to Shockey, he spoke to the police in
    September, 2009, and he made a statement to them that was consistent with his trial
    testimony.
    {¶ 47} Bemis also testified.    According to Bemis, also a chemical engineering
    student, he was packing books in his bedroom when the incident occurred. Bemis heard a
    “loud smack,” and when he peered out of his room, he observed Hisey trying to keep the
    front door closed, and also the barrel of a rifle protruding into the room. When Hisey fell
    backwards, Bemis stated that the man with the rifle, a man with a pistol, and another man,
    entered the room. Bemis ran to the bathroom with his cell phone in his hand, and the man
    with the pistol ran after him. Upon entering the bathroom, the man with the pistol struck
    Bemis in the head. The man then told Bemis to get down on the floor outside of the
    bathroom. Bemis felt blood “rushing” down his face, and he was in pain and confused.
    15
    Bemis observed Gales ransacking his bedroom, and he testified that when the men left,
    Bemis’ laptop computer, for which he paid $1600.00, and his cell phone were missing. He
    stated that he received “21 stitches, three layers deep,” at the hospital for his head wound.
    {¶ 48} Bemis stated that he was contacted by the police while he was at the hospital,
    and that he initially “left out that John Shockey and Brian Titgemeyer were in there. I also
    didn’t inform them that we were smoking and selling drugs.” Bemis stated that he told
    police “everything” in September, 2009. Bemis stated that he identified Gales in a photo
    spread as the unarmed man, and that he did so while Hisey was in another room. Bemis
    stated that he was not present in the room when Hisey viewed the photo spread. Bemis
    testified that the night of the incident was the first and only time he had seen Gales.
    {¶ 49} Jonathan Pease, a UD police officer, testified that he responded to 312 East
    Stewart Street based upon a City of Dayton police department robbery broadcast around
    10:00 p.m. According to Pease, the “living room was in total disarray, stuff scattered all
    over. Blood in the middle of the floor. It was ransacked from the front to the back.”
    Pease noticed the smell of “unburned marijuana.” Pease spoke to Hisey, and he observed
    marks on his head and face. Hisey clearly answered Pease’s questions and did not appear
    confused. Pease also spoke to Titgemeyer, as well as a witness at 341 East Stewart Street
    named Cara Perlow.
    {¶ 50} Patricia Lehan testified that she was a senior at UD, and that at the time of the
    incident, she was on her way to a dance marathon meeting. As she walked through the
    parking lot of 312 Stewart Street, she “saw three men run across Stewart Street and get into a
    car. They dropped a few things in the bushes and were frantically picking them up.”
    16
    Leehan thought the behavior she observed was suspicious, but she did not call police and
    continued to her meeting. As she later walked home an hour later, she observed “police
    cars everywhere.” On cross-examination, Lehan stated that she was not close enough to the
    men to observe their facial features, hairstyles or what they were carrying. She stated that she
    could not identify any of the men.
    {¶ 51} Cara Perlow testified that she was student at UD, and at the time of the
    incident,   she was packing her car.       According to Perlow, she walked to a nearby
    convenience store to get a bottle of water, and as she walked back up Stewart Street to her
    apartment, Perlow heard noise coming from Apartment Building 312. She turned around
    and observed “three black males running out.” One of the males carried “a big box.” Two
    of the men were “around the same height, average height. One was a little bit smaller,
    shorter.” According to Perlow, the men were wearing dark clothing. Perlow stated that it
    was dark outside, but the parking lot was well-lit. The men ran to a “sedan-like” car, and
    two “of them got into the car and the one carrying the box tripped and fell, spilling some of
    the items.” Perlow described the men as “flustered” and “in a hurry.” Perlow observed the
    barrel of a gun under one of the arms of the men. Perlow was unable to see the license plate
    of the vehicle, and she did not identify Gales.
    {¶ 52} Officer Sean Humphrey of the City of Dayton Police Department testified
    that he was dispatched to 312 East Stewart Street on the night of the incident. Humphrey
    spoke to Hisey, and he testified that Hisey “seemed very agitated, upset. We tried to talk to
    him, tried to get him to do a written statement, and he was kind of getting up and down,
    unable to really focus on what we asked him to do.” Humphrey stated that the apartment
    17
    appeared “like somebody came in there and * * * ransacked it looking for something.”
    After learning that Bemis was at the hospital, Humprey proceeded there.
    {¶ 53} Humphrey stated that Bemis “was able to focus a little bit more and provide
    me with some statements and a written statement of what occurred.”                Humphrey
    photographed Bemis’ injury. Humphrey stated that he then returned to the scene, and from
    there he walked to Perlow’s apartment. After speaking with Perlow, Humphrey went to an
    area in the parking lot almost directly across from 312 East Stewart Street, where he
    observed “power cords to some type of electronic device, maybe a computer.” Humphrey
    collected the cords, took them to the apartment and gave them to Hisey.
    {¶ 54} Finally, Detective Beane testified for the State.           She described her
    investigation, and she testified that she showed the photo spreads containing Gales’
    photograph to Hisey and Bemis on March 17, 2009. Beane testified that she read the
    instructions and showed the photo spread to Hisey first, and that she “had Ted go back into
    the back bedroom so they would be separated.” Hisey circled Gales’ photograph and signed
    the photo spread. Then Beane “had Colin go back in the bedroom and Ted sat down at the
    couch.” She stated that Bemis and Hisey were told not to speak to each other as they passed
    by, and Beane stated that they did not speak. Beane again read the instructions to Bemis,
    who circled Gales’ picture and signed the photo spread. Beane stated that she received
    additional information involving the case in September, 2009, and she accordingly
    re-interviewed some of the witnesses.
    {¶ 55} On cross-examination, Beane indicated that there were no fingerprints found
    that linked Gales to the scene. She stated that when she re-interviewed Hisey and Bemis,
    18
    the students “added things” to their original version of events and also recanted part of their
    statements.
    {¶ 56} Gales asserts three assignments of error. His first assignment of error is as
    follows:
    {¶ 57} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT SUPPRESSING JERRITT (sic)
    GALES’        PHOTO     SPREAD       IDENTIFICATION         EVIDENCE        BY     TWO      KEY
    PROSECUTION WITNESSES WHEN THE PHOTO SPREAD PROCEDURE WAS
    UNDULY SUGGESTIVE WITH WITNESSES BEING NEARBY EACH OTHER OR
    WITHIN LISTENING RANGE ALONG WITH ADMITTED DRUG USAGE DURING
    THE TIME OF THE IDENTIFICATION BESIDES BOTH IDENTIFICATIONS BEING
    UNRELIABLE AND CONTRADICTORY TO EACH OTHER.”
    {¶ 58} “Appellate courts give great deference to the factual findings of the trier of
    facts. (Internal citations omitted). At a suppression hearing, the trial court serves as the trier
    of fact, and must judge the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence. (Internal
    citations omitted). The trial court is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and
    evaluate witness credibility.    (Internal citations omitted).     In reviewing a trial court’s
    decision on a motion to suppress, an appellate court accepts the trial court’s factual findings,
    relies on the trial court’s ability to assess the credibility of witnesses, and independently
    determines whether the trial court applied the proper legal standard to the facts as found.
    (Internal citations omitted). An appellate court is bound to accept the trial court’s factual
    findings as long as they are supported by competent, credible evidence. (Internal citations
    omitted).” State v. Purser, Greene App. No. 2006 CA 14, 
    2007-Ohio-192
    , ¶ 11.
    19
    {¶ 59} We summarized the guidelines for determining the admissibility of
    identification testimony in State v. Marshall, Montgomery App. No. 19920, 
    2004-Ohio-778
    ,
    ¶ 11,as follows: “Due process requires suppression of pre-trial identification of a suspect
    only if the identification procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very
    substantial likelihood of misidentification. (Citation omitted). To establish a due process
    violation, a defendant must prove that the out of court confrontation was ‘unnecessarily
    suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification.’ (Citation omitted).
    However, even where the identification procedure is suggestive, so long as the challenged
    identification itself is reliable, it is still admissible.” (Citations omitted).
    {¶ 60} “When an eyewitness to a crime is shown a series of photographs in an effort
    to identify a perpetrator, and the manner or mode of the presentation suggests that one
    individual is more likely than the others to be the perpetrator - such as when the photograph
    of one individual is in some way emphasized - undue suggestions may occur, increasing the
    likelihood of misidentification and violating the due process rights of a defendant so
    identified. (Citations omitted). * * * Reliability of the identification is the linchpin in
    determining admissibility. (Citation omitted).          * * * Reliability is determined from the
    ‘totality of the circumstances,’ which includes the witness’ opportunity to view the criminal
    at the time of the crime, the witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of his prior description
    of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated, and the time between the crime and the
    identification procedure.” (Citation omitted).           State v. Robinson (Jan. 26, 2001),
    Montgomery App. No. 17393.
    {¶ 61} According to Gales, his “identification through the photo array was unduly
    20
    suggestive since the Police questioned witnesses that already knew Appellant from a campus
    party the previous night.” Further, Gales asserts, the “key witnesses” were questioned
    “within listening range” of each other.      Also, Gales argues that the witnesses “were
    influenced by drug usage” when they identified Gales. Finally, Gales asserts, “Bemis told
    Police that there was no gun and that he didn’t see Appellant at the party the previous night.
    However, * * * Hisey told Police that he saw Appellant with a gun and that he recognized
    Appellant from being at the campus party the previous night.”
    {¶ 62} We agree with the State that the record before us establishes that the
    identifications were reliable and the procedure utilized by Detective Bean was not suggestive
    in any fashion. Beane testified that she included Gales in the photo spread based upon a
    Crime Stoppers tip. The computer program randomly placed Gales’ photograph in the fourth
    slot, and Gales’ image was not emphasized in the array.         The remaining photos were
    selected by the computer program based upon comparable physical characteristics. Bemis
    and Hisey had the opportunity to observe Gales at the time of the incident, and they
    identified him just eight days later. Bemis and Hisey “immediately” and separately identified
    Gales by silently pointing to his photograph, and they did not communicate with each other
    during the process. Hisey did not view the photo spread marked by Bemis before making
    his identification. Beane did not employ threats, promises or coercion to obtain the
    identifications.   There was no evidence adduced at the suppression hearing regarding
    alleged “drug usage” by Bemis and Hisey at the time of the identifications. Hisey identified
    Gales by name as “Little Jerry” or “Little Jeritt.” The fact that Bemis and Hisey told Beane
    that they had seen Gales before the incident at a party, and the fact that their testimony was
    21
    inconsistent regarding whether Gales was armed in the course of the robbery, does not
    undermine the reliability of their separate, immediate and certain identifications of him in
    the photo spread as one of the intruders.
    {¶ 63} Since, under the totality of the circumstances, reliability is demonstrated and
    the photo identifications were not unduly suggestive, the trial court properly overruled
    Gales’ motion to suppress the identifications, and Gales’ first assigned error is overruled.
    {¶ 64} Gales’ second assigned error is as follows:
    {¶ 65} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT SUPPRESSING JERRITT (sic)
    GALES’ STATEMENTS SINCE THE STATEMENTS WERE RETRIEVED AFTER THE
    DEFENDANT HAD TOLD LAW ENFORCEMENT THAT HE WAS REPRESENTED
    BY AN ATTORNEY AND THAT HE HAD BEEN ADVISED NOT TO SPEAK WITH
    THE POLICE WITH OFFICER(S) OVER-HEARING APPELLANT’S PHONE CALL
    WITH THE ATTORNEY STATING NOT TO TALK TO THEM.”
    {¶ 66} The United States Supreme Court determined that the State may not use
    statements arising from a defendant’s custodial interrogation unless it establishes that
    procedural safeguards were employed to protect the defendant’s privilege against
    self-incrimination.   Miranda.    The State must establish that the defendant knowingly,
    voluntarily and intelligently waived his rights. Id.; State v. Edwards (1976), 
    49 Ohio St.2d 31
    , 38, overruled on other grounds, (1978), 
    438 U.S. 911
    , 
    98 S.Ct. 3147
    , 
    57 L.Ed.2d 1155
    .
    {¶ 67} “In deciding whether a defendant’s confession is involuntarily induced, the
    court should consider the totality of the circumstances, including the age, mentality, and
    prior criminal experience of the accused; the length, intensity, and frequency of the
    22
    interrogation; the existence of physical deprivation or mistreatment; and the existence of
    threat or inducement.” Edwards, at syllabus. “And while an express written statement
    waiving the right to remain silent or the right to counsel is not necessarily sufficient in all
    cases (citation omitted), such a written waiver does provide considerable weight to the
    ‘totality of circumstances’ which must be examined in determining if statements made by an
    accused during custodial interrogation are admissible in evidence.” State v. Williams (Jan.
    28, 1987), Montgomery App. Nos. 9597, 9815.
    {¶ 68} “Police officers must immediately stop questioning a suspect who clearly
    asserts his right to counsel. (Citation omitted). But ‘[i]f the suspect’s statement is not an
    unambiguous or unequivocal request for counsel, the officers have no obligation to stop
    questioning him.’ Davis v. United States (1994), 
    512 U.S. 452
    , 461-462, 
    114 S.Ct. 2350
    ,
    
    129 L.Ed.2d 362
     (further citation omitted). A suspect ‘must articulate his desire to have
    counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police office in the circumstances
    would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney.’ Davis, 
    512 U.S. at 459
    .
    {¶ 69} “In Davis, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the statement ‘Maybe I should
    talk to a lawyer’ did not invoke the right to counsel. 
    Id.
     Similarly, the Supreme Court of
    Ohio has found that statements such as ‘I think I need a lawyer,’ ‘don’t I supposed to have a
    lawyer present,’ and ‘could I call my lawyer’ (followed by an affirmative response) do not
    invoke a right to counsel.” (Citation omitted). State v. Wild, Clark App. No. 2009 CA 83,
    
    2010-Ohio-4751
    , ¶ 49-50.
    {¶ 70} As the State notes, Gales does not dispute that he was advised of his rights,
    and he does not assert that he did not understand them. Beane confirmed that Gales could
    23
    read, she allowed him to ask questions, and when he indicated that he did not understand the
    word “coercion” in the waiver of rights paragraph, she defined it for him. Gales signed the
    waiver of rights.
    {¶ 71} Although Gales phoned the Mulligan law office (with a phone provided by
    Beane), no attorney there had been retained to represent him.      When Beane learned that
    Gales did not have a lawyer privately retained, she informed him that they could talk later
    after he retained a lawyer or had one appointed. Even after being advised by someone at the
    law firm not to speak to the detective without a lawyer present, Gales repeatedly told Beane
    that he wanted to talk to her, and that he was tired of waiting. Gales stated that he wanted
    to talk to Beane “now.” In other words, Gales did not clearly assert his right to counsel
    such that Beane had an obligation to stop the interview. Gales never affirmatively indicated
    to Beane that he would not speak to her without an attorney present. Nor did he invoke his
    right to remain silent.
    {¶ 72} There being no merit to Gales’ second assigned error, it is overruled.
    {¶ 73} Gales’ third assigned error is as follows:
    {¶ 74} “APPELLANT’S CONVICTION AND SENTENCE IS AGAINST THE
    MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.”
    {¶ 75} According to Gales, he “was identified in an unduly suggestive photo
    spread by key witnesses who were admittedly using drugs at the time and whose statements
    to the Police were completely contradictory re seeing Appellant with or without a gun and
    whether they knew Appellant since they did or did not see him the previous night at a party.
    {¶ 76} “Moreover, Appellant’s constitutional rights were continually violated
    24
    through Police questioning after he advised them that he was represented by Counsel and
    spoke with an attorney over the phone in which Police could hear the attorney from Patrick
    Mulligan’s office advise Appellant not to talk to them.”
    {¶ 77} “When an appellate court analyzes a conviction under the manifest weight of
    the evidence standard it must review the entire record, weigh all of the evidence and all the
    reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of the witnesses and determine whether in
    resolving conflicts in the evidence, the fact finder clearly lost its way and created such a
    manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.
    (Internal citations omitted). Only in exceptional cases, where the evidence ‘weighs heavily
    against the conviction,’ should an appellate court overturn the trial court’s judgment.” State
    v. Dossett, Montgomery App. No. 20997, 
    2006-Ohio-3367
    , ¶ 32.
    {¶ 78} The credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony
    are matters for the trier of facts to resolve. State v. DeHass (1997), 
    10 Ohio St.2d 230
    , 231.
    “Because the factfinder * * * has the opportunity to see and hear the witnesses, the cautious
    exercise of the discretionary power of a court of appeals to find that a judgment is against the
    manifest weight of the evidence requires that substantial deference be extended to the
    factfinder’s determinations of credibility. The decision whether, and to what extent, to
    credit the testimony of particular witnesses is within the peculiar competence of the
    factfinder, who has seen and heard the witness.” State v. Lawson (Aug. 22, 1997),
    Montgomery App. No. 16288.
    {¶ 79} This court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of facts on the
    issue of witness credibility unless it is patently apparent that the trier of fact lost its way in
    25
    arriving at its verdict. State v. Bradley (Oct. 24, 1997), Champaign App. No. 97-CA-03.
    {¶ 80} After a complete analysis above, we determined that the photo spread
    identifications of Gales were reliable and also that Gales did not assert his right to counsel
    such that Beane was required to stop questioning him. Gales provides no further basis for
    his assertion that his convictions are against the manifest weight of the evidence, and having
    reviewed the entire record, weighed all of the evidence, and deferring to the jury’s
    assessment of credibility, we cannot conclude that this is an exceptional case where the
    evidence adduced weighs heavily against Gales’ convictions. Hisey stated that Gales was
    present when Hisey purchased marijuana to sell to his friends, and Hisey believed that his
    drug activity motivated the intrusion into their apartment. Hisey and Bemis described their
    injuries and the property that was taken from them. They identified Gales in a reliable
    manner, and any inconsistency in their testimony regarding whether Gales was armed is
    largely immaterial. State v. Hutchinson, Montgomery App. No. 23648, 
    2010-Ohio-5752
    , ¶
    28 (“In Ohio, it is well-established that an accomplice ‘shall be prosecuted and punished as
    if he were a principal offender.’ R.C. 2923.03(F)”). Pease’s description of the apartment’s
    appearance and the smell of marijuana corroborated the victims’ testimony. Hisey, Bemis,
    Titgemeyer and Shockey testified consistently regarding their initial and subsequent
    statements to police.    Lehan and Perlow each observed three men running from the
    apartment building with property in their possession at the time of the incident, and Perlow
    also observed the barrel of gun. Humphrey retrieved Hisey’s power cord from the area where
    Lehan and Perlow observed the intruders drop items. Gales’ convictions are not against the
    manifest weight of the evidence, and his third assigned error is overruled.
    26
    {¶ 81} The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
    ..........
    FAIN, J. and KLINE, J., concur.
    (Hon. Roger L. Kline, Fourth District Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment of the Chief
    Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio).
    Copies mailed to:
    Johnna M. Shia
    Byron K. Shaw
    Hon. Frances E. McGee
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 24059

Citation Numbers: 2011 Ohio 2682

Judges: Donovan

Filed Date: 6/3/2011

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014