State v. Harris ( 2011 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Harris, 2011-Ohio-6196.]
    STATE OF OHIO                     )                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    )ss:                 NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF LORAIN                  )
    STATE OF OHIO                                          C.A. No.       09CA009689
    Appellee
    v.                                             APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
    ENTERED IN THE
    MATTHEW HARRIS                                         COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
    COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO
    Appellant                                      CASE No.   99CR054795
    DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
    Dated: December 5, 2011
    CARR, Presiding Judge.
    {¶1}     Appellant, Matthew Harris, appeals the judgment of the Lorain County Court of
    Common Pleas. This Court affirms, in part, and vacates, in part.
    I.
    {¶2}     On November 17, 1999, the Lorain County Grand Jury indicted Harris on one
    count of rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b). The case proceeded to trial and a jury found
    Harris guilty of rape. On September 5, 2000, Harris was sentenced to nine years in prison and
    classified as a sexual predator. Harris filed a direct appeal to this Court and his conviction and
    sentence were affirmed. State v. Harris (Aug. 1, 2001), 9th Dist. No. 00CA007691 (“Harris I”).
    {¶3}     Following his direct appeal, Harris filed a motion in the trial court for disclosure
    of testimony taken before the grand jury. When the trial court denied his motion, Harris filed a
    motion demanding findings of fact and conclusions of law as to the trial court’s denial of the
    motion for disclosure of grand jury testimony. This motion was also denied. On appeal, the
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    denials of both motions were affirmed by this Court. State v. Harris, 9th Dist. No. 03CA008305,
    2003-Ohio-7180 (“Harris II”). Harris subsequently filed a variety of motions in the trial court,
    including a motion to correct his sentence on the basis that he should have been given the
    statutory minimum prison sentence, as well as a petition for post-conviction relief. These
    motions were denied by the trial court. On February 16, 2007, Harris filed a motion seeking to
    vacate his sexual predator classification. The trial court denied the motion on February 22, 2007.
    The denial of Harris’s motion was affirmed by this Court. State v. Harris, 9th Dist. No.
    07CA009130, 2007-Ohio-4915 (“Harris III”).
    {¶4}    On May 13, 2009, the trial court issued a journal entry directing the Sheriff to
    return Harris to the courthouse for resentencing due to an error in his post-release control
    notification. The trial court held a resentencing hearing on Friday, August 24, 2009. At the
    hearing, the State stated on the record that Harris was “due to be released on Wednesday.” The
    trial court then sentenced Harris to a term of eight years of incarceration and notified him that he
    would be placed under post-release control for a period of five years. On the same day as the
    sentencing hearing, the trial court’s sentencing entry was journalized. Also on August 24, 2009,
    the trial court issued an order stating, “Credit for time served awarded. Defendant ordered
    released forthwith.”
    {¶5}    Harris filed a notice of appeal on October 5, 2009. On appeal, he raises one
    assignment of error.
    II.
    ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
    “THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT REQUIRED DEFENDANT TO REPAY
    COURT APPOINTED ATTORNEY FEES WITHOUT A FINDING THAT
    DEFENDANT WAS ABLE TO DO SO.”
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    {¶6}   In his sole assignment of error, Harris argues that the trial court erred when it
    required him to repay court appointed attorney fees without making a finding that he was able to
    do so.
    {¶7}   The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that an error in post-release control
    notification does not result in a void sentence. State v. Fischer, 
    128 Ohio St. 3d 92
    , 2010-Ohio-
    6238.    In Fischer, the Supreme Court held that “when a judge fails to impose statutorily
    mandated postrelease control as part of a defendant’s sentence, that part of the sentence is void
    and must be set aside.” 
    Id. at ¶26.
    The Court reasoned that “[n]either the Constitution nor
    common sense commands anything more.” 
    Id. The new
    sentencing hearing that a defendant is
    entitled to “is limited to proper imposition of postrelease control.” 
    Id. at ¶29.
    The Court also
    held that res judicata “applies to other aspects of the merits of a conviction, including the
    determination of guilt and the lawful elements of the ensuing sentence.” 
    Id. at paragraph
    three of
    the syllabus.
    {¶8}   As noted above, Harris filed a direct appeal in 2000. This Court affirmed the trial
    court’s judgment in Harris I. In the following years, Harris challenged his conviction and
    sentence by frequently filing motions in the trial court and appeals to this Court. On May 13,
    2009, the trial court ordered Harris to be returned to the courthouse for resentencing due to an
    error in post-release control notification. The trial court conducted a resentencing hearing on
    August 24, 2009, and issued a new sentencing entry. Harris received a prison sentence of eight
    years, which was one year shorter than the prison sentence he received at his original sentencing
    hearing, and he was notified that he would be subject to a five-year term of post-release control.
    In accordance with Fischer, the scope of the new sentencing hearing to which Harris was entitled
    was limited to the proper imposition of post-release control. Fischer, at paragraph two of the
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    syllabus. Likewise, the scope of Harris’s appeal from that hearing is limited solely to issues
    relating to the imposition of post-release control. 
    Id. at paragraph
    four of the syllabus. It follows
    that the trial court had authority to impose the proper term of post-release control on Harris at the
    August 24, 2009 hearing. As the lawful portion of Harris’s original sentence remained in place
    pursuant to Fischer, the trial court did not have authority to conduct a de novo sentencing
    hearing and reissue a sentence. To the extent the trial court properly imposed a mandatory five-
    year period of post-release control upon Harris at the resentencing hearing, its judgment is
    affirmed. To the extent the trial court conducted a de novo sentencing hearing and reissued a
    sentence to Harris, its judgment in that respect is vacated.
    III.
    {¶9}    The judgment of the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas is vacated to the
    extent the court exceeded its authority and resentenced Harris. The trial court’s decision to
    notify Harris that he is subject to a mandatory five-year term of post-release control is affirmed.
    The remainder of Harris’s original sentence remains in place.
    Judgment affirmed, in part,
    and vacated in part.
    There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
    Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of
    this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
    Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
    judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
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    period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(E). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
    instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
    mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
    Costs taxed to Appellant.
    DONNA J. CARR
    FOR THE COURT
    WHITMORE, J.
    DICKINSON, J.
    CONCUR
    APPEARANCES:
    ERIN A. DOWNS, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
    DENNIS P. WILL, Prosecuting Attorney, and MARY R. SLANCZKA, Assistant Prosecuting
    Attorney, for Appellee.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 09CA009689

Judges: Carr

Filed Date: 12/5/2011

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014