State v. Kanner ( 2011 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Kanner, 2011-Ohio-6198.]
    STATE OF OHIO                     )                 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    )ss:              NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF MEDINA                  )
    STATE OF OHIO                                       C.A. No.       10CA0131-M
    Appellee
    v.                                          APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
    ENTERED IN THE
    MARK M. KANNER                                      COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
    COUNTY OF MEDINA, OHIO
    Appellant                                   CASE No.   10-CR-0207
    DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
    Dated: December 5, 2011
    CARR, Presiding Judge.
    {¶1}     Appellant, Mark Kanner, appeals his conviction in the Medina County Court of
    Common Pleas. This Court affirms.
    I.
    {¶2}     On May 19, 2010, Kanner was indicted on one count of trafficking in a
    counterfeit controlled substance in violation of R.C. 2925.37, a felony of the fifth degree; and
    one count of trafficking in cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1)(C)(4)(a), a felony of the
    fifth degree. He pleaded not guilty to the charges at arraignment. The matter proceeded to trial.
    At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Kanner not guilty of trafficking in a counterfeit
    controlled substance and guilty of trafficking in cocaine. The trial court sentenced Kanner
    accordingly. Kanner filed a timely appeal, raising one assignment of error for review.
    2
    II.
    ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
    “THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE JURY’S
    VERDICT[] OF ‘GUILTY’ AS TO THE CHARGED TRAFFICKING IN
    DRUGS (COCAINE) COUNT OF THE INDICTMENT, AND DEFENDANT-
    APPELLANT’S CONVICTION WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT
    OF THE EVIDENCE.”
    {¶3}    Kanner argues that his conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence and
    was against the manifest weight of the evidence. This Court disagrees.
    {¶4}    A review of the sufficiency of the State’s evidence and the manifest weight of the
    evidence adduced at trial are separate and legally distinct determinations. State v. Gulley (Mar.
    15, 2000), 9th Dist. No. 19600. “While the test for sufficiency requires a determination of
    whether the state has met its burden of production at trial, a manifest weight challenge questions
    whether the state has met its burden of persuasion.” 
    Id., citing State
    v. Thompkins (1997), 
    78 Ohio St. 3d 380
    , 390 (Cook J., concurring). When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this
    Court must review the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether
    the evidence before the trial court was sufficient to sustain a conviction. State v. Jenks (1991),
    
    61 Ohio St. 3d 259
    , 279.
    “An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to
    support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to
    determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind
    of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is
    whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution,
    any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
    proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
    Id. at paragraph
    two of the syllabus.
    {¶5}    A determination of whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the
    evidence, however, does not permit this Court to view the evidence in the light most favorable to
    3
    the State to determine whether the State has met its burden of persuasion. State v. Love, 9th Dist.
    No. 21654, 2004-Ohio-1422, at ¶11. Rather,
    “an appellate court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all
    reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and determine
    whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way
    and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be
    reversed and a new trial ordered.” State v. Otten (1986), 
    33 Ohio App. 3d 339
    ,
    340.
    “Weight of the evidence concerns the tendency of a greater amount of credible
    evidence to support one side of the issue more than the other. 
    Thompkins, 78 Ohio St. 3d at 387
    . Further when reversing a conviction on the basis that it was
    against the manifest weight of the evidence, an appellate court sits as a ‘thirteenth
    juror,’ and disagrees with the factfinder’s resolution of the conflicting testimony.
    Id.” State v. Tucker, 9th Dist. No. 06CA0035-M, 2006-Ohio-6914, at ¶5.
    This discretionary power should be exercised only in exceptional cases where the evidence
    presented weighs heavily in favor of the defendant and against conviction. Thompkins, 78 Ohio
    St.3d at 387.
    {¶6}     Kanner was charged with trafficking in cocaine in violation of R.C.
    2925.03(A)(1)(C)(4)(a), which states, in relevant part: “No person shall knowingly *** [s]ell or
    offer to sell [cocaine].” R.C. 2901.22(B) states: “A person acts knowingly, regardless of his
    purpose, when he is aware that his conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably
    be of a certain nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances when he is aware that such
    circumstances probably exist.”
    Sufficiency of the evidence
    {¶7}     At trial, Agent Donald Hahn of the Medway Drug Enforcement Agency
    (“Medway”), a covert organization, testified that the agency uses confidential informants to buy
    drugs from suspected drug traffickers.      Agent Hahn explained that confidential informants
    generally have criminal histories which facilitate their covert activities within the criminal
    4
    culture. He testified that confidential informants are compensated either financially or by being
    allowed to “work[] off” pending criminal charges. Agent Hahn further testified as to the rules
    and procedures relevant to the use of confidential informants as follows. Confidential informants
    are prohibited from using drugs, carrying weapons, coercing others to sell drugs, and breaking
    any other laws. They must maintain contact with their controlling agents during undercover
    operations. Confidential informants are searched immediately prior to and after a covert drug
    purchase to ensure that the informants have no weapons, or additional money or drugs. They are
    also equipped with an audio wire for safety and to allow the controlling agents to monitor and
    record the transactions. Agent Hahn testified that it is not unusual for participants involved in
    illicit drug transactions not to speak or to speak in code.
    {¶8}    Agent Hahn testified that Medway employed Aaron Sudyk as a confidential
    informant for purposes of Kanner’s case. He testified that all proper procedures were followed
    when Sudyk engaged in an undercover drug transaction with Kanner on January 7, 2010. The
    substance that Sudyk purchased from Kanner tested positive for cocaine during a field test.
    {¶9}    Aaron Sudyk testified that he was employed as a confidential informant for
    Medway when he told his controlling agent that he thought he could buy drugs from Kanner.
    Sudyk described Kanner as a “bar friend, acquaintance” for approximately one year. Sudyk
    testified that, on January 7, 2010, he arranged to meet Kanner to buy drugs. After being
    searched and wired for sound, Sudyk waited for Kanner at a Circle K store. Video surveillance
    captured Sudyk and Kanner separately entering the store. Sudyk’s audio wire captured the two
    men greeting one another and agreeing to meet in the back of the store by the beer coolers.
    Sudyk testified that he gave Kanner $100 and that Kanner gave him a small plastic bag of
    5
    cocaine. He testified that he turned the drugs over to his controlling agent, Agent McCann,
    immediately upon leaving the store and entering her vehicle.
    {¶10} Sudyk acknowledged that he never specifically mentioned drugs during his
    conversations with Kanner before and during the transaction. He further admitted that he has
    prior felony convictions for which he served two prison terms. He admitted that he works as a
    confidential informant because his criminal history makes it difficult for him to find alternate
    employment. Sudyk testified, however, that he looks at the situation as a way to turn his
    negative history into a positive, legal career.
    {¶11} Medway Agent James Ascherel testified that he is in charge of technical
    surveillance. He testified that he recorded Kanner as he arrived to meet Sudyk at the Circle K on
    January 7, 2010. Agent Ascherel testified that he found Kanner’s actions unusual. He testified
    that Kanner parked in the lot of a KFC restaurant, but not near the door. He testified that Kanner
    then walked across the street to the Circle K, entered, and left the store shortly thereafter. Agent
    Ascherel testified that Kanner never entered KFC, but drove away immediately after leaving the
    Circle K. The agent found Kanner’s actions particularly odd given that it was very cold and
    snowing at the time.
    {¶12} Medway Agent Therese McCann testified that she was Sudyk’s controlling agent
    when he worked as a confidential informant for the agency. She testified that she was with
    Sudyk when he made a controlled phone call to Kanner to arrange to purchase drugs on January
    7, 2010. She testified that Sudyk was searched, wired, and given $100 of “controlled buy
    money,” i.e., bills which had been photocopied for identification. She dropped Sudyk off at the
    front door to the Circle K and watched him enter. She testified that she saw Kanner enter the
    Circle K after leaving a vehicle registered to Wanda Kanner, who the agent assumed was
    6
    Kanner’s mother. Agent McCann testified that Sudyk exited the Circle K approximately one
    minute later, entered her vehicle, and turned a packet of cocaine over to her. She testified that
    she and Sudyk drove to their designated secure location where Agent Hahn field tested the
    substance which tested positive for cocaine. Agent McCann testified that she then placed the
    drugs in an evidence envelope for future laboratory testing.
    {¶13} Agent McCann testified that there is no standard operating procedure for counting
    out money during an undercover drug purchase. She testified, however, that Medway prefers
    that its confidential informants merely say, “Here’s the money[,]” “Thanks[,]” or “Good looking
    out” to indicate that the sale has been completed. She testified that Kanner was never “busted”
    immediately after the sale, so there is no record of his having any controlled money on his
    person.
    {¶14} Keith Taggart, a chemist with the Bureau of Criminal Identification and
    Investigation (“BCI”), testified that he tested the substance received by the confidential
    informant on January 7, 2010. It weighed .85 grams. Mr. Taggart testified that both a color test
    and gas chromatograph mass spectrometer test verified that the substance was cocaine. He
    testified that the tests utilized are readily accepted within the field and that the results are
    accurate within a reasonable degree of scientific certainty.
    {¶15} Reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, this Court
    concludes that any rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the charge
    of trafficking in cocaine were proved beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jenks at paragraph two of
    the syllabus. The State presented evidence that Medway utilized the services of a confidential
    informant pursuant to proper procedures and safeguards to facilitate a controlled drug buy on
    January 7, 2010. The evidence demonstrates that Sudyk arranged a meeting with Kanner, that
    7
    the two met very briefly, and that Sudyk returned to his controlling agent with a substance that
    tested positive for cocaine. Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence to establish that Kanner
    knowingly sold cocaine to the confidential informant.
    Manifest weight of the evidence
    {¶16} Kanner testified in his own defense. He admitted spending time with Sudyk at
    bars, giving him rides, visiting his home, and lending him some money to pay a bar tab on one
    occasion. He denied selling drugs to Sudyk.
    {¶17} Kanner testified that Sudyk asked to meet him on December 29, 2009, to give him
    some money for gas in exchange for the many rides he had received. Kanner believed that
    Sudyk owed him $15. The two met briefly at a bar where Sudyk gave him $35 and left quickly.
    Kanner testified that he was confused by the extra money, so he called Sudyk the next day.
    Kanner testified that Sudyk told him he had gotten a good job and not to worry about it.
    {¶18} Kanner testified that Sudyk contacted him again on January 7, 2010, requesting to
    meet so Sudyk could repay him for lending Sudyk money for a bar tab. Kanner testified that he
    planned to get something to eat at KFC and suggested that the two meet there, but Sudyk insisted
    on meeting at Circle K. Kanner admitted parking in the KFC lot and walking to the Circle K.
    He testified that he greeted Sudyk inside and then walked to the beer cooler where Sudyk
    directed him to meet with him. Kanner testified that Sudyk gave him the $20 he owed, plus an
    additional $55, and left quickly. Kanner testified that he bought some beer and returned to his
    car but that he was too “shocked” and “distraught” to buy food at KFC as he originally planned.
    Kanner testified that he tried to call Sudyk to ask about the additional money, but Sudyk did not
    answer his call. Kanner testified that he then drove to Sudyk’s home and left the additional
    8
    money under an empty forty-ounce beer bottle near the trash for Sudyk. He again denied selling
    any drugs to Sudyk.
    {¶19} This Court will not overturn the trial court’s verdict on a manifest weight of the
    evidence challenge only because the trier of fact chose to believe certain witness’ testimony over
    the testimony of others. State v. Crowe, 9th Dist. No. 04CA0098-M, 2005-Ohio-4082, at ¶22.
    {¶20} A review of the record indicates that this is not the exceptional case, where the
    evidence weighs heavily in favor of Kanner. A thorough review of the record compels this Court
    to find no indication that the trial court lost its way and committed a manifest miscarriage of
    justice in convicting Kanner of trafficking in cocaine.
    {¶21} The weight of the evidence supports the conclusion that Kanner knowingly sold
    cocaine to the confidential informant. Kanner admitted receiving a large sum of money from
    Sudyk, although he denied selling any drugs to Sudyk. The evidence demonstrates that Kanner
    agreed to meet with Sudyk, that Sudyk had money but no drugs on his person before the two
    met, that the two met for approximately a minute, and that Sudyk was immediately searched by a
    Medway agent after the meeting. The evidence demonstrates that Sudyk no longer had any
    money but had a small packet of cocaine after his brief meeting with Kanner. Accordingly, his
    conviction for trafficking in cocaine is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Kanner’s
    sole assignment of error is overruled.
    III.
    {¶22} Kanner’s assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Medina County
    Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
    Judgment affirmed.
    9
    There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
    Pleas, County of Medina, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
    of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
    Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
    judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
    period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(E). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
    instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
    mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
    Costs taxed to Appellant.
    DONNA J. CARR
    FOR THE COURT
    WHITMORE, J.
    DICKINSON, J.
    CONCUR
    APPEARANCES:
    JOSEPH F. SALZGEBER, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
    DEAN HOLMAN, Prosecuting Attorney, and MATTHEW A. KERN, Assistant Prosecuting
    Attorney, for Appellee.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 10CA0131-M

Judges: Carr

Filed Date: 12/5/2011

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014