In re J.C. , 2011 Ohio 4933 ( 2011 )


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  • [Cite as In re J.C., 
    2011-Ohio-4933
    .]
    STATE OF OHIO                     )                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    )ss:                 NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF SUMMIT                  )
    IN RE: J.C. AND J.C.                                   C.A. No.   25793
    APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
    ENTERED IN THE
    COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
    COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
    CASE Nos. DN08-11-0940
    DN08-11-0941
    DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
    Dated: September 28, 2011
    WHITMORE, Presiding Judge.
    {¶1}     Appellant, Amber C. (“Mother”), appeals from a judgment of the Summit County
    Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, that placed her two minor children in the legal
    custody of their foster parents. This Court affirms.
    I
    {¶2}     Mother is the natural mother of J.C., born February 18, 2006, and J.C., born
    February 8, 2007. On November 21, 2008, Summit County Children Services Board (“CSB”)
    filed complaints alleging that J.C. and J.C. were dependent children because Mother had violated
    a no contact order by allowing them to have unsupervised contact with their father, who had a
    history of domestic violence against Mother. The father of the children later relinquished his
    parental rights and is no longer involved in this case.
    {¶3}     The children were adjudicated dependent and placed in the temporary custody of
    CSB. Less than two months later, CSB moved for permanent custody of both children, alleging
    2
    that they had been in its temporary custody for at least 12 of the prior 22 months, based primarily
    on the time they spent in its temporary custody in a prior dependency case. Following a hearing,
    the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights and placed the children in the permanent
    custody of CSB. This Court reversed that decision on appeal, however, because the record failed
    to demonstrate that the children had been in CSB’s temporary custody for the requisite 12-month
    period at the time CSB filed its permanent custody motion. See In re J.C., 9th Dist. No. 25006,
    
    2010-Ohio-637
    , at ¶12-14.
    {¶4}    On remand, CSB filed a new motion for permanent custody. Following a hearing
    on that motion, the trial court denied CSB’s request for permanent custody and instead extended
    temporary custody because Mother had substantially complied with the requirements of the case
    plan. During the next several months, Mother began intensive parent-child therapy with the
    children and eventually was given overnight visitation with them at her home. Mother worked
    with the therapist to learn appropriate ways to handle her children’s behavioral problems.
    {¶5}    Mother eventually filed a motion for legal custody of J.C. and J.C. Although
    Mother’s ability to care for the children had improved, CSB and the guardian ad litem did not
    believe that she had the necessary tools to provide a home for them on a full-time basis.
    Therefore, CSB filed an alternative dispositional motion, requesting that J.C. and J.C. be placed
    in the legal custody of their foster parents. Following a hearing on the competing motions, the
    trial court placed the children in the legal custody of the foster parents and granted Mother
    standard visitation rights. Mother appeals and raises one assignment of error.
    3
    II
    Assignment of Error
    “THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT TO GRANT LEGAL CUSTODY
    OF THE CHILDREN TO A NON-PARENT WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST
    WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.”
    {¶6}    Mother argues that the trial court erred in placing her two children in the legal
    custody of the foster parents rather than in her legal custody. We disagree.
    {¶7}    Mother’s argument focuses primarily on whether CSB developed an adequate
    plan to reunify her with her children. We will not reach that issue, however, because Mother did
    not assign error to the agency’s reunification efforts, nor did she raise that challenge in the trial
    court. Instead, her challenge is limited to whether the trial court properly granted the foster
    parents’ motion for legal custody.
    {¶8}    Emphasizing her constitutional rights as a parent, Mother implies that the trial
    court was required to give her motion for legal custody preference over the motion of the foster
    parents. Following an adjudication of neglect, dependency, or abuse, however, the juvenile
    court’s determination of whether to place a child in the legal custody of a parent or a non-parent
    is based solely on the best interest of the child. See In re D.R., 9th Dist. No. 21218, 2003-Ohio-
    2852, at ¶17; In re C.R., 
    108 Ohio St.3d 369
    , 
    2006-Ohio-1191
    , paragraph two of the syllabus
    (holding that an adjudication of abuse, dependency, or neglect is an implicit determination of the
    parent’s unsuitability). Because Mother’s parental rights were not terminated, this inquiry did
    not focus on Mother’s rights as a parent, but instead centered on how best to provide her children
    with a safe, stable, and secure home. See In re C.R. at paragraph one of the syllabus.
    {¶9}    “Although there is no specific test or set of criteria set forth in the statutory
    scheme, courts agree that the trial court must base its decision on the best interest of the child.”
    In re N.P., 9th Dist. No. 21707, 
    2004-Ohio-110
    , at ¶23, citing In re Fulton, 12th Dist. No.
    4
    CA2002-09-236, 
    2003-Ohio-5984
    , at ¶11. The juvenile court’s disposition of legal custody to a
    relative is a less drastic disposition than permanent custody to a children services agency because
    it does not terminate parental rights but instead “leaves intact ‘residual parental rights, privileges,
    and responsibilities.’” In re Shepherd (Mar. 26, 2001), 4th Dist. No. 00CA12, at *7, quoting
    R.C. 2151.011(B)(19). The trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for legal custody is
    within its sound discretion and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. In re M.S.,
    9th Dist. No. 22158, 
    2005-Ohio-10
    , at ¶11. An abuse of discretion implies that the trial court’s
    attitude is “unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.” Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 
    5 Ohio St.3d 217
    , 219.
    {¶10} J.C. and J.C. were almost four and five years old at the time of the legal custody
    hearing and had spent most of their lives outside Mother’s custody. Each child had been
    diagnosed with adjustment disorder and oppositional defiant disorder and each also suffered
    from developmental delays. Each child’s adjustment disorder stemmed from repeatedly moving
    in and out of Mother’s custody because of domestic violence and unstable living conditions.
    Each child was removed from Mother’s custody at the age of approximately three months old,
    and was later returned to her care only to be removed again. The older J.C. had been in and out
    of Mother’s custody three different times during his short life and, consequently, harbored a
    significant amount of anger toward Mother.
    {¶11} The caseworker and one of the counselors described the children as “high-
    maintenance” because they require significant patience and energy from their caregivers. They
    do not take direction very well, tend to be very demanding and defiant, and often act on their
    anger and aggression. The counselors explained that J.C. and J.C. need an environment that
    5
    provides consistent structure, firm boundaries, and caregivers that offer nurturing support and
    model appropriate behavior.
    {¶12} Mother had made gradual progress on the case plan during the two years that the
    current case was pending. She ended her violent relationship with the children’s father, obtained
    stable employment and housing, and participated in anger management classes, parenting
    classes, and counseling. At the time of the hearing, Mother was attending individual counseling
    and had recently begun intensive parent-child therapy with the children. She was attending her
    joint sessions with the children regularly, but her attendance rate at individual counseling was
    estimated at fifty percent.
    {¶13} Although the evidence demonstrated that Mother was making progress with the
    children, she was still an inexperienced parent and was not yet demonstrating that she could
    consistently implement the parenting skills that she had learned in counseling and parenting
    classes. In joint therapy, Mother was learning how to provide boundaries and appropriate means
    of discipline for the children. Mother admitted that she sometimes spanked the children when
    they misbehaved, so the counselor was working with her to use alternate forms of discipline.
    She explained that physical discipline was not appropriate or effective for children with anger
    issues because it only reinforces their anger. The counselor further testified that Mother listened
    to her suggestions and was making progress in their sessions, but Mother had met with her only a
    few times and would need continued counseling. The counselor also expressed concern that
    Mother did not have the necessary support system in place to provide ongoing care for the
    children.
    {¶14} The caseworker and guardian ad litem did not believe that Mother had the ability
    to provide day-to-day care for the children at that time. Each testified that Mother sometimes
    6
    seemed overwhelmed by the children’s inappropriate behavior and would either resort to
    physical discipline or give in to their demands, rather than standing firm in her parental role and
    providing appropriate discipline. They further noted concern about Mother’s desire to end the
    children’s relationship with the foster parents and emphasized that Mother seemed motivated by
    her own feelings of jealousy toward the foster parents, rather than what was best for her children.
    {¶15} On the other hand, several witnesses testified that the foster parents were
    providing J.C. and J.C. with a consistent and structured environment and were giving them the
    nurturing support that they needed. The children had lived with the same foster family each time
    they were removed from Mother’s custody and had spent the majority of their lives there. By the
    time of the hearing, the older J.C. had lived with the foster family for a total of 47 months of his
    58-month life and the younger J.C. had lived with them for 37 months of her 46-month life. The
    children were attached to the entire family and considered it to be their only home.
    {¶16} The foster parents had demonstrated the ability to provide a stable environment
    for J.C. and J.C. on a daily basis. The children were enrolled in counseling and an integrated
    preschool and were making improvements with both their behavioral problems and their
    developmental delays. Numerous witnesses testified about how well the children were doing in
    the foster home. In sharp contrast to their observations about Mother becoming flustered and
    responding inappropriately to the children’s misbehavior, the caseworker and guardian ad litem
    gave examples of how calm the foster mother was with both children and how effectively she
    redirected their inappropriate behavior.
    {¶17} The children had told others that they want to stay with the foster family. They
    like to visit with Mother, but look forward to returning to the foster home. The foster parents
    had been facilitating visitation between Mother and the children and would continue to do so.
    7
    The guardian ad litem recommended that the foster parents receive legal custody of the children
    and that Mother continue to have unsupervised visitation with them, provided that she remains
    involved in counseling.       She emphasized that such a placement would allow Mother’s
    relationship with the children to continue to grow, yet the children would not be uprooted from
    the environment that they clearly regard as their primary home.
    {¶18} Given the evidence presented at the hearing, the trial court reasonably concluded
    that legal custody to the foster parents was in the best interests of J.C. and J.C. The assignment
    of error is overruled.
    III
    {¶19} Mother’s assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Summit County
    Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, is affirmed.
    Judgment affirmed.
    There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
    Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
    of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
    Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
    judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
    period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(E). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
    instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
    mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
    8
    Costs taxed to Appellant.
    BETH WHITMORE
    FOR THE COURT
    DICKINSON, J.
    CONCURS
    MOORE, J.
    CONCURS, SAYING:
    {¶20} I concur with the majority, but write separately to emphasize that this case did not
    turn on the fact that Mother occasionally spanked her children. There is no evidence in the
    record that Mother’s use of corporal punishment had been excessive or caused harm to her
    children. Although CSB and its experts are of the opinion that alternate means of discipline
    would have been more appropriate, “Ohio law has long recognized that a parent has the right to
    administer reasonable and appropriate corporal punishment.” In re Jandrew (Dec. 29, 1997), 4th
    Dist. No. 97 CA 4, at *6. The state is warranted in intervening only when the punishment
    exceeds the bounds of moderation. Id.; see, also, State v. Suchomski (1991), 
    58 Ohio St.3d 74
    ,
    75 (emphasizing that a child has no “legally protected interest which is invaded by proper and
    reasonable parental discipline” and holding that a parent does not violate R.C. 2919.25 unless the
    discipline causes physical harm).
    {¶21} Notwithstanding Mother’s right to discipline her children, however, the standard
    that applied to the competing legal custody motions in this case was the best interests of the
    children. On balance, because the record supports the trial court’s finding that the best interests
    of the children are served by legal custody with the foster parents, I concur.
    9
    APPEARANCES:
    MARTHA HOM, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
    SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and HEAVEN DIMARTINO, Assistant
    Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 25793

Citation Numbers: 2011 Ohio 4933

Judges: Whitmore

Filed Date: 9/28/2011

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021