State v. Shorts ( 2011 )

[Cite as State v. Shorts, 2011-Ohio-6202.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF LORAIN )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 11CA009965
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
TERRENCE T. SHORTS, JR. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO
Appellant CASE No. 09CR079495
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: December 5, 2011
WHITMORE, Presiding Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Terrence Shorts, Jr., appeals his conviction in the Lorain
County Court of Common Pleas. This Court affirms.
I
{¶2} On November 3, 2009, Detectives Corey Middlebrooks and Miguel Baez of the
Lorain Police Department were patrolling in the Fulton Homes area of Lorain in an unmarked
cruiser. Fulton Homes is a high crime, high drug trafficking area that had recently been the
subject of many citizen complaints regarding the level of drug trafficking, trespassers, and gang
activity. The detectives observed a black male exit the rear of a suspected drug house at 3195
Victory Avenue (“Victory”). The house was the residence of Troy Wardell, a known drug dealer
who had been previously arrested for possession of drugs.
{¶3} The officers then circled around Fulton Homes and observed an individual fitting
the same description walking south on Victory toward Factory Avenue (“Factory”). As the
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individual came to the intersection of Victory and Factory, he turned left and began walking
eastbound in the middle of Factory. The officers initiated their lights and pulled up next to the
individual. The individual then “bladed,” or shielded, his body from the officers and continued
walking around the rear passenger side of a vehicle that was parked on the south side of the street
in front of 1310 Factory. After the officers exited the cruiser and yelled at the individual to stop,
the individual threw his hands in the air. As he threw his hands in the air, an object left his right
hand and landed nearby in the tree lawn. While Detective Baez escorted the individual to the
cruiser, Detective Middlebrooks retrieved the object, which turned out to be a pill bottle. The
pill bottle contained foil packaging, which Detective Middlebrooks recognized to be consistent
with the way drug dealers and drug abusers package heroin. At that juncture, Detective Baez
handcuffed the individual for safety while Detective Middlebrooks field tested the contents of
the bottle. He received a positive result for heroin.
{¶4} The individual was then identified as Shorts and arrested for possession of drugs
in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), a felony of the fifth degree, and one count of possession of drug
paraphernalia in violation of R.C. 2925.14(C)(1), a misdemeanor of the fourth degree. Shorts
was also issued a citation for walking in the roadway in violation of the Codified Ordinances of
Lorain (“COL”) § 371.05, a minor misdemeanor. The officers also learned that the parked
vehicle belonged to Shorts.
{¶5} On December 16, 2009, Shorts was indicted by the Lorain County Grand Jury and
charged with one count of possession of drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), and one count of
possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of R.C. 2925.14(C)(1). Shorts entered a not guilty
plea. On April 1, 2010, Shorts filed a motion to suppress. The trial court denied Shorts’ motion
on June 22, 2010. On November 18, 2010, Shorts pleaded no contest to count one of the
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indictment and count two was dismissed. On February 9, 2011, Shorts was sentenced to one
year of community control. Shorts’ driver’s license was also suspended for six months. The trial
court stayed the execution of the sentence pending appeal.
{¶6} Shorts now appeals from his conviction and raises four assignments of error for
our review. For ease of disposition, we combine our analysis of Shorts’ first two assignments of
error.
II
Assignment of Error Number One
“THE TRIAL COURT’S FINDINGS OF FACT WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY
COMPETENT CREDIBLE EVIDENCE.”
Assignment of Error Number Two
“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE POLICE HAD
REASONABLE ARTICULABLE SUSPICION TO STOP THE APPELLANT.”
{¶7} In his first two assignment of error, Shorts argues that the trial court erred by
denying his motion to suppress. We disagree.
{¶8} As this Court has consistently recognized, the Ohio Supreme Court has held that:
“Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and
fact. When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of
trier of fact and is therefore in the best position to resolve factual questions and
evaluate the credibility of witnesses. State v. Mills (1992), 62 Ohio St. 3d 357,
366. Consequently, an appellate court must accept the trial court’s findings of fact
if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. State v. Fanning (1982), 1
Ohio St. 3d 19. Accepting these facts as true, the appellate court must then
independently determine, without deference to the conclusion of the trial court,
whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard. State v. McNamara
(1997), 124 Ohio App. 3d 706.” State v. Johnson, 9th Dist. No. 25525, 2011-
Ohio-3941, at ¶5, quoting State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St. 3d 152, 2003-Ohio-
5372, at ¶8.
“[T]he weight to be given the evidence and the credibility of witnesses are primarily for the trier
of the facts.” State v. Brooks, 9th Dist. No. 07CA009137, 2007-Ohio-6208, at ¶12, quoting State
4
v. DeHass (1967), 10 Ohio St. 2d 230, paragraph one of the syllabus. Thus, the trial court is in
the best position to make credibility determinations and is free to choose which witnesses to
believe. State v. Kurjian, 9th Dist. No. 06CA0010-M, 2006-Ohio-6669, at ¶10. Accordingly,
this Court reviews the trial court’s factual findings for competent, credible evidence and
considers the court’s legal conclusions de novo. State v. Conley, 9th Dist. No. 08CA0009454,
2009-Ohio-910, at ¶6, citing Burnside at ¶8.
{¶9} The State conceded that the encounter between the Detectives and Shorts was not
a consensual encounter and constituted a stop for Fourth Amendment purposes. Shorts maintains
that the Detectives did not have the requisite reasonable suspicion to stop him. “An investigatory
stop must be justified by some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to
be, engaged in criminal activity.” United States v. Cortez (1981), 449 U.S. 411, 417. Reasonable
suspicion requires only that the officers “be able to point to specific and articulable facts which,
taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.”
Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 21.
“The Ohio Supreme Court has identified certain specific and articulable facts that
would justify an investigatory stop by way of reasonable suspicion, factors which
fall into four general categories: (1) location; (2) the officer’s experience, training
or knowledge; (3) the suspect’s conduct or appearance; and (4) the surrounding
circumstances. No single factor is dispositive; the decision must be viewed based
on the totality of the circumstances.” (Internal citation omitted.) State v. White,
9th Dist. No. 05CA0060, 2006-Ohio-2966, at ¶16, citing State v. Bobo (1988), 37
Ohio St. 3d 177, 178-80.
{¶10} Furthermore, “[a] police officer may conduct a constitutionally valid traffic stop
when there is a reasonable suspicion that the individual violated a traffic law. State v. Lloyd
(1998), 126 Ohio App. 3d 95, 102; see, also, Knowles v. Iowa (1998), 525 U.S. 113 (concluding
that the stopping of an individual for a misdemeanor traffic offense is ‘analogous to a so-called
‘Terry stop’)” State v. Price (Sept. 21, 2000), 10th Dist. No. 99AP-806, at *1; Accord State v.
5
Salas, 9th Dist. No. 21891, 2004-Ohio-6274, at fn. 4 (reasonable suspicion standard applies
when analyzing the violation of a city ordinance that prohibited jaywalking).
{¶11} COL § 371.05, WALKING ALONG HIGHWAYS, appears under Title Nine of
the Lorain Traffic Code (Pedestrians, Bicycles and Motorcycles) and reads in relevant part as
follows: “(a) Where a sidewalk is provided and its use is practicable, no pedestrian shall walk
along and upon an adjacent roadway.” The trial court, based on the facts recited above,
concluded that:
“Detective Middlebrooks testified that he observed [Shorts] walking in the middle
of Factory Avenue in an eastbound direction. *** It must be noted that during this
incident it was discovered that [Shorts’] vehicle was parked at or about 1310
Factory Ave. This address is not near the corner of Factory Ave. where an
unmarked crosswalk may have been used. [T]here was no testimony offered that
would suggest that the use of the sidewalk was not practicable under the
circumstances. The testimony only supports a finding that [Shorts] was walking
within the roadway, outside of any crosswalk. Thus, the officers had more than
reasonable suspicion, as they had probable cause that [Shorts] had committed a
violation of Lor Cod Ord § 371.05(e)[(sic)]. Although the offense was not an
arrestable offense, clearly [Shorts] may be stopped and cited for said violation.
Therefore the stop of [Shorts] was lawful.”
The Court further concluded that once the pill bottle was retrieved and its contents field tested
positive for heroin, the Detectives had probable cause to arrest Shorts.
{¶12} Shorts first takes issue with certain of the trial court’s findings of fact and
contends that they are not supported by competent, credible evidence; namely, that Detective
Middlebrooks observed a black male exiting a suspected drug house; that the officers circled
around Fulton Homes and observed an individual fitting the same description walking from
Victory toward Factory; and that as the individual came to Factory, he began walking eastbound
in the middle of Factory. We disagree and conclude that there was competent, credible evidence
to support those findings.
6
{¶13} Detectives Baez and Middlebrooks testified at the suppression hearing. Both
detectives testified that they were familiar with Wardell, a known drug dealer who had been
previously arrested for drug activity, and that they knew 3195 Victory was Wardell’s residence.
It was certainly rational for the trial court to infer that drug activity might take place at the
residence of a known drug dealer. Thus, the trial court’s finding that Wardell’s residence was a
“suspected drug house” was supported by competent, credible evidence.
{¶14} Detective Baez, who was driving the cruiser, testified that he “observed a black
male walking from – directly from the rear of the residence [at 3195 Victory Ave.] *** Now he
began walking southbound on Victory Avenue on the sidewalk towards Factory.” Detective
Middlebrooks testified that “we observed [a male] exit [Wardell’s] residence” and that he
“watched him exit from the back door and walk towards Factory.” He further testified that
“[t]he same male that I identified exiting from [Wardell’s] residence at some point I did see
walking through the lawn back toward Fulton Homes or toward Factory Avenue.” Detective
Middlebrooks identified the male as being “African American” but did not recognize him as a
regular resident or visitor to the area. Therefore, based on the foregoing testimony we conclude
that there was competent, credible evidence to support the trial court’s finding that a black male
exited Wardell’s residence and that he was the same male that was later apprehended on Factory.
{¶15} Shorts contests the foregoing findings because he argues that the officers stopped
him primarily on suspicion of trespassing after he was seen exiting the residence of a known
drug dealer in a high crime area, and that those facts, standing alone, do not constitute a lawful
basis for concluding he was engaged in criminal conduct. In support of his argument, he relies
on Brown v. Texas (1979), 443 U.S. 47, 52 (appellant observed walking in a high crime, public
area and Court concluded officers lacked reasonable suspicion because there was no evidence
7
appellant was involved in criminal conduct or that he appeared suspicious). Yet, Shorts’
argument that he was stopped primarily on suspicion of trespassing is not supported by the
testimony presented at the suppression hearing. Detectives Baez and Middlebrooks both testified
that they were initially interested in following and possibly speaking with Shorts after observing
him exit the rear of Wardell’s residence, which was located in a high crime, high drug activity
area that had been the subject of citizen complaints. However, the testimony of both detectives
was consistent that as the sequence of events unfolded, they did not initiate the stop until after
Shorts was seen walking in the roadway on Factory, a citable violation under COL § 371.05(a).
{¶16} Detective Baez testified as follows on direct examination:
“Q: *** I believe you said at that point in time you felt [Shorts] could be
summoned. What do you mean by that?
“A: He could actually be issued a citation for walking in the roadway.
“Q: Was that your objective, your goal, when you turned on the lights?
“A: Yes.
Detective Baez later testified on cross-examination:
“A: *** He was walking in the roadway. We didn’t stop him until he was
stopped into the roadway, sir.
“Q: So you stopped him for trespassing in the roadway?
“A: No, walking in the roadway.
Detective Middlebrooks testified as follows on cross-examination:
“Q: *** Was it your decision to charge Mr. Shorts with allegedly walking in the
road?
“A: I have a partner and we discussed the whole situation. And like I - - when we
observed Mr. Shorts and he was walking down the middle of the road, at some
point before we initiated the stop, which was turning on our lights, we discussed,
Hey, he’s walking down the middle of the road. Let’s stop this guy.”
8
{¶17} Thus, while the officers may have had other reasons for following Shorts, such as
the fact that he was seen walking in a high crime area after leaving a known drug house, and that
he was not familiar to the officers, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, he was stopped for
violating a traffic law. “[T]raffic stops based on probable cause, even if other motivations
existed, are not illegal.” Dayton v. Erickson (1996), 76 Ohio St. 3d 3, 10. Accord State v.
Copeland, 5th Dist. No. 2004CA00208, 2005-Ohio-1067, at ¶16. (appellant observed in a high
crime, high drug, high prostitution area walking in the middle of the roadway; officers stopped
him and issued a ticket for walking in the roadway; court concluded these facts established
reasonable suspicion of criminal behavior and stop was valid). Accordingly, the essential
question before us now is whether the trial court correctly concluded that “the officers had more
than reasonable suspicion, as they had probable cause that [Shorts] had committed a violation of
[COL] § 371.05[].”
{¶18} As previously noted, COL § 371.05(a) prohibits a pedestrian from walking along
and upon an adjacent roadway where a sidewalk is provided and its use is practicable. Shorts
argues that the trial court erred in concluding that the detectives had reasonable suspicion to
detain him for violating COL § 371.05(a) because there were discrepancies in the testimony of
the detectives as to whether he was “walking in the middle of Factory Avenue in an eastbound
direction,” and therefore, “along and upon an adjacent roadway” in violation of the ordinance.
Specifically, Shorts contends that the testimony of the two detectives was broadly disparate on
this fact and that Detective Baez’ testimony was more credible than Detective Middlebrooks’
testimony. He also maintains that the trial court erred in concluding that there was no evidence
presented that the use of the sidewalk was “not practicable under the circumstances.” He further
argues that because the trial court did not explain why it chose to believe the testimony of one
9
officer over the other, it is reasonable to conclude that its findings are not entitled to deference.
We disagree.
{¶19} Our review of the hearing transcript reveals that any discrepancies between the
detectives’ testimony were minor, and we conclude that their testimony was essentially
consistent on the relevant points. Detective Baez testified repeatedly that Shorts was walking “in
the roadway.” Detective Middlebrooks also testified repeatedly that Shorts walked “in the
middle of the roadway.” The discrepancy to which Shorts refers is the detectives’ testimony as
to the distance that Shorts walked eastward from the intersection of Victory and Factory to his
vehicle. Detective Baez testified that Shorts angled just “catty corner” off the intersection about
three or four feet outside the unmarked crosswalk toward his vehicle, which he claimed was
parked about twelve feet from the intersection. However, Detective Baez admitted to being
unsure as to the exact distance that the vehicle was parked from the intersection. Shorts argues
that COL § 371.05(a) does not prohibit walking across the road at a little bit of an angle.
Detective Middlebrooks testified that he disagreed with Detective Baez and that Shorts actually
walked further east “down the middle of the roadway” approximately eighty feet to where his
vehicle was parked, and that he only angled off the intersection to get to the middle of the road.
{¶20} Most significant to this Court’s analysis on this discrepancy is the fact that the
detectives’ testimony agreed on one key piece of evidence, and that is, that Shorts’ vehicle was
parked in front of 1310 Factory and that this marked the point at which Shorts walked around the
rear passenger side of the vehicle toward the tree lawn. Detective Middlebrooks testified that
this address was also recorded in the police report that he completed just a few hours after the
encounter. The photographs of the area that were introduced into evidence reveal that 1310
Factory is situated approximately four addresses east of the intersection, at least one-half block
10
away from the intersection, significantly farther east down Factory than the point identified by
Detective Baez as being just “catty corner” from the intersection. This photographic evidence
was consistent with Detective Middlebrooks’ testimony that the vehicle was parked
approximately eighty feet from the intersection. Therefore, we conclude that there was
competent, credible evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that Shorts was walking “in
the middle of Factory Avenue,” and thus, “along and upon an adjacent roadway” pursuant to
COL § 371.05.
{¶21} Furthermore, our review of the testimony reveals that the use of the sidewalks was
“practicable.” The term “practicable” is defined in Merriam-Webster online as “capable of being
used.” Both detectives testified that the condition of the sidewalks was such that they were
available and capable of being walked upon. When asked specifically about the condition of the
sidewalks, Detective Baez testified that “[s]eems like you can walk on them.” Also, Detective
Baez testified that he saw Shorts walking along the sidewalk on Victory as he was headed
towards Factory, which further corroborates the fact that walking on the sidewalks in that area
was practicable. Moreover and most compelling, however, is the photographic evidence
introduced into evidence at the suppression hearing which shows that it was practicable to walk
on the sidewalks. While there is grass growing between the cracks and they are slightly uneven,
they definitely appeared to be practicable. Shorts points to Detective Middlebrooks’ testimony
that the sidewalks were “pretty ratty” and that if he had his choice he might walk on the tree
lawn instead of in the street. Yet, in that same line of questioning, Detective Middlebrooks
testified that “[t]he sidewalk is not that tore [(sic)] up.” Thus, based on the foregoing testimony
and evidence, the trial court correctly concluded that there was no evidence that the sidewalks
were not practicable.
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{¶22} Finally, we note that Shorts did not cite to any legal authority supporting his claim
that the trial court was required to state as part of its written findings why it believed the
testimony of one witness over the testimony of another. Accordingly, we disregard his
argument. State v. Raber, 9th Dist. No. 09CA0065, 2010-Ohio-4066, at ¶30 (appellant bears the
burden of setting forth an argument on appeal and pointing this Court to applicable legal
authority in support of that argument.)
{¶23} Accordingly, based on the foregoing, we conclude that based on the detectives’
experience, training, and knowledge gained from working for many years in a high crime area;
Shorts’ conduct; and the totality of the circumstances surrounding this incident, a reasonably
prudent officer in that situation would have acted in the same manner. Therefore, the trial court
correctly concluded that the officers had reasonable suspicion, as well as probable cause, to stop
Shorts and issue a citation for violation of COL § 371.05(a), which prohibits walking in the
roadway. Shorts’ first and second assignments of error are without merit and are overruled.
Assignment of Error Number Three
“THE OFFICERS DID NOT HAVE PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE
SHORTS HAD VIOLATED THE LAW BY CROSSING FACTORY STREET.”
{¶24} Shorts argues under his third assignment of error that the police did not have
probable cause to believe that he violated Lorain’s jaywalking ordinance because he was merely
crossing the street to his parked vehicle. In support of his argument, Shorts cites to State v.
Salas, 9th Dist. No. 21891, 2004-Ohio-6274. In Salas, the appellant was cited for a violation of
Akron City Ordinance (“ACO”) 77.05 which provides, in relevant part:
“(A) Every pedestrian crossing a roadway at any point other than within a marked
crosswalk or within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection shall yield the right-
of-way to all vehicles, trackless trolleys, or streetcars upon the roadway.
“***
12
“(C) Between adjacent intersections at which traffic control signals are in
operation, pedestrians shall not cross at any place except marked crosswalk[s].”
Salas at ¶20.
{¶25} We concluded in Salas that the State failed to meet its burden of proving that
there was either reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe the appellant was jaywalking.
Id. at ¶23. Shorts cites to COL § 371.03, which is nearly identical to the Akron ordinance at
issue in Salas and argues that, similarly, he did not commit the offense of jaywalking. However,
contrary to Shorts’ assertion, Salas is not on point with the case at bar. As previously
established, this case involves a violation of a city ordinance that prohibits walking in the
roadway where a sidewalk is available. Salas involved a jaywalking offense. Accordingly,
Shorts’ reliance on Salas and the similar language of COL § 371.03 is completely irrelevant and
inapplicable to this case. Accordingly, Shorts’ third assignment of error has no merit and is
overruled.
Assignment of Error Number Four
“THE OFFICERS DID NOT HAVE PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE
SHORTS HAD VIOLATED THE LAW BY ALLEGEDLY POSSESSING A
PILL BOTTLE CONTAINING DRUGS.”
{¶26} In his fourth assignment of error, Shorts contends that the trial court erred in
concluding that the officers had probable cause to arrest him for possessing a pill bottle
containing drugs and drug paraphernalia. We disagree.
{¶27} Shorts was arrested for possession of heroin in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), a
felony of the fifth degree pursuant to R.C. 2925.11(C)(6)(a), and possession of drug
paraphernalia, i.e., foil, in violation of R.C. 2925.14(C)(1).
{¶28} “Officers have probable cause to justify an arrest if ‘from the information known
to the arresting officers based on reasonably trustworthy information, a reasonably prudent
13
person would be warranted in believing that the arrestee had committed or was committing an
offense.’” State v. McCraney, 9th Dist. No. 09CA0079-M, 2010-Ohio-2667, at ¶9, quoting State
v. Scott, 9th Dist. No. 08CA009446, 2009-Ohio - 672, at ¶11.
“In order to effectuate an arrest, the arresting officer must have probable cause to
believe that the person to be arrested is engaging in criminal activity. Kurjian at
¶18, quoting State v. Tejada, 9th Dist. No. 20947, 2002-Ohio-5777, at ¶8.
(Internal citation omitted.) The amount of evidence necessary for probable cause
to suspect a crime is being committed is less evidence than would be necessary to
support a conviction of that crime at trial. Tejada at ¶8, quoting State v. Young
(2001), 146 Ohio App. 3d 245, 254. It is necessary to show merely that a
probability of criminal activity exists, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or
even proof by a preponderance of evidence that a crime is occurring.” State v.
McGinty, 9th Dist. No. 08CA0039-M, 2009-Ohio-994, at ¶11.
{¶29} Detective Middlebrooks testified that when Shorts threw his hands in the air,
Detective Middlebrooks saw an object fly from Shorts’ right hand to the east toward the tree
lawn and land within approximately two feet from where Shorts was standing. Upon retrieving
and examining the object, Detective Middlebrooks discovered that it was a pill bottle. The pill
bottle was “warm to the touch” despite the fact that it was only thirty-five degrees outside.
Detective Middlebrooks testified that in his training and experience, if it is cold outside and an
object has been in someone’s hand, it will typically be warm to the touch. He did not notice any
other objects in close proximity, and thus, concluded the pill bottle belonged to Shorts. Upon
further examination of the bottle, he noticed that it contained a foil packet. Based on his training
and experience, such foil packaging is consistent with how drug traffickers and abusers package
heroin. Detective Middlebrooks then field tested the contents of the bottle and received a
positive result for heroin.
{¶30} Shorts contends that he was arrested before the contents of the pill bottle were
field tested for drugs, thus suggesting that the detectives lacked probable cause to arrest him for
drug possession in the absence of a field test of the suspected drugs. In State v. Johnson, 4th
14
Dist. No. 06CA34, 2007-Ohio-4662, a deputy observed the defendant in plain view packaging
mason jars in a manner consistent with the production of methamphetamine. Id. at ¶13. The
court concluded that the defendant’s arrest for the manufacture of methamphetamine was
supported by probable cause, absent any field tests, based on the deputy’s observations that the
contents of the jars were indicative of methamphetamine production. Id. We conclude that the
case at bar is similar to Johnson and that based on his twelve years of experience and training,
Detective Middlebrooks possessed the necessary probable cause to arrest Shorts for possession
of drugs and drug paraphernalia based on his familiarity with the packaging of heroin.
{¶31} The State brings to our attention the case of State v. Barton, 2d Dist. No. 21815,
2007-Ohio-2348, which is directly on point with the scenario in the instant case. In Barton, one
of the officers observed the appellant leave a house which was a known drug house. Id. at ¶2.
After that officer radioed another officer, both officers observed the appellant jaywalking across
the street. Id. One of the officers turned his cruiser around and repositioned it with the intention
of talking to the appellant about the jaywalking offense. Id. As the officer approached the
appellant from behind, the appellant looked back and then threw a baggie over a wall. Id. The
officer observed what he believed to be crack cocaine in the baggie. Id. The officer then exited
his vehicle, stopped the appellant, patted him down for weapons, and placed him in the cruiser.
Id. The second officer arrived at the scene and the baggie was recovered. The officers
conducted a field test on the contents of the baggie, which tested positive for cocaine. Id. The
Second District held that the officers had probable cause to detain the appellant for the minor
misdemeanor jaywalking offense, reasonable articulable suspicion to detain him for the
investigation of the crime of drug possession, and probable cause to arrest the appellant after the
test of the cocaine. Id. at ¶12. The appellant’s motion to suppress was denied. Id. at ¶14.
 15
{¶32} We conclude that as in Barton, Shorts’ actions of walking in the roadway in
violation of a city ordinance after leaving a known drug house and tossing an object onto the tree
lawn gave Detectives Baez and Middlebrooks probable cause to detain Shorts to issue a citation
for the offense of walking in the roadway, reasonable suspicion to investigate for the crime of
drug possession, and probable cause to arrest Shorts after the positive test for heroin. Shorts’
fourth assignment of error is overruled.
III
{¶33} Shorts’ assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Lorain County
Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of
this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(E). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
BETH WHITMORE
FOR THE COURT
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MOORE, J.
DICKINSON, J.
CONCUR
APPEARANCES:
BRENT L. ENGLISH, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
DENNIS P. WILL, Prosecuting Attorney, and SHERRY GLASS, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for Appellee.