State v. Alston , 2015 Ohio 4127 ( 2015 )

[Cite as State v. Alston, 2015-Ohio-4127.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF LORAIN )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 14CA010612
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
ELIA ALSTON COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO
Appellant CASE No. 12CR085630
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: October 5, 2015
MOORE, Judge.
{¶1} Appellant, Elia Alston, appeals his convictions by the Lorain County Court of
Common Pleas. This Court affirms.
I.
{¶2} On a summer night in 2012, L.N. ran to her next door neighbor’s house around
midnight, knocked on the door, and ran inside. L.N. was frightened and appeared to have been
attacked, so her neighbors called the police. L.N. was transported to the emergency room, and
police searched for Mr. Alston, with whom she had been living and against whom a protection
order had previously been issued. Mr. Alston was charged with felonious assault in violation of
R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), domestic violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A), and violating a protection
order in violation of R.C. 2919.27(A)(1). The charges were also accompanied by a repeat violent
offender specification pursuant to R.C. 2941.149.
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{¶3} A jury found Mr. Alston guilty of the charges, and the trial court found him to be a
repeat violent offender. The trial court merged the convictions for felonious assault and domestic
violence for purposes of sentencing and sentenced Mr. Alston to two years in prison. Mr. Alston
appealed.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW TO
SUPPORT A FINDING BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT [MR.
ALSTON] WAS GUILTY[.]
{¶4} Mr. Alston’s first assignment of error is that there was insufficient evidence to
demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that L.N. sustained serious physical harm. We disagree.
{¶5} “Whether a conviction is supported by sufficient evidence is a question of law that
this Court reviews de novo.” State v. Williams, 9th Dist. Summit No. 24731, 2009-Ohio-6955, ¶
18, citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997). The relevant inquiry is whether the
prosecution has met its burden of production by presenting sufficient evidence to sustain a
conviction. Thompkins, at 390 (Cook, J., concurring). In reviewing the evidence, we do not
evaluate credibility, and we make all reasonable inferences in favor of the State. State v. Jenks,
61 Ohio St.3d 259, 273 (1991). The State’s evidence is sufficient if it allows the trier of fact to
reasonably conclude that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id.{¶6} Mr. Alston was convicted of domestic violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A),
which prohibits any person from knowingly causing or attempting to cause physical harm to a
family or household member. In his merit brief, he combined his sufficiency argument to include
both domestic violence and felonious assault, arguing that both charges required the state to prove
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“serious physical harm.” On its face, R.C. 2919.25(A) does not require the State to prove that a
victim suffered serious physical harm, so Mr. Alston’s argument with respect to his domestic
violence conviction is misplaced.
{¶7} He was also convicted of felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1),
which provides that “[n]o person shall knowingly * * * [c]ause serious physical harm to another
or to another’s unborn[.]” “‘Physical harm to persons’ means any injury, illness, or other
physiological impairment, regardless of its gravity or duration.” R.C. 2901.01(A)(3). Under R.C.
2901.01(A)(5), “serious physical harm to persons” is defined as:
(a) Any mental illness or condition of such gravity as would normally require
hospitalization or prolonged psychiatric treatment;
(b) Any physical harm that carries a substantial risk of death;
(c) Any physical harm that involves some permanent incapacity, whether partial
or total, or that involves some temporary, substantial incapacity;
(d) Any physical harm that involves some permanent disfigurement or that
involves some temporary, serious disfigurement;
(e) Any physical harm that involves acute pain of such duration as to result in
substantial suffering or that involves any degree of prolonged or intractable pain.
The State need not present expert medical testimony to demonstrate serious physical harm, and it
can be inferred when the victim’s injuries are serious enough that the victim seeks medical
treatment. State v. Higgins, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26120, 2012-Ohio-5650, ¶ 17.
{¶8} In this case, the jury could reasonably conclude that the State proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that L.N. sustained serious physical harm. L.N.’s neighbor testified that L.N.
knocked on her door and ran into her house around midnight. According to the neighbor, L.N.
was “bloody” and “hysterically scared.” She also described L.N.’s appearance, noting that “her
eye was swollen shut. It seemed like she was missing teeth. She had knuckle imprints on her
face.” Officer Eli Andujar, the first responder to the scene, provided a similar description. He
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recalled that L.N.’s appearance was “just bludgeoned,” and he testified that “She was bleeding.
Her eyes were closed shut. It appeared she had either a slap mark or a fist mark on the right side
of her face and her left eye was totally closed.” Officer Andujar also observed that L.N. “was
bleeding from her mouth” and “was in a total disarray.” In Officer Andujar’s opinion, L.N.
“definitely * * * needed * * * emergency help.” Photographs taken by officers at the scene and
admitted into evidence vividly confirm the extent of the injuries to L.N.’s face. Following the
incident, L.N. was admitted to the hospital.
{¶9} The testimony of the witnesses who observed the extent of L.N.’s injuries at trial,
along with the photographs that depict those injuries, are sufficient to permit a trier of fact to
reasonably conclude that she suffered serious physical harm. Mr. Alston’s first assignment of error
is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
[MR. ALSTON’S] CONVICTION IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF
THE EVIDENCE[.]
{¶10} Mr. Alston’s second assignment of error is that the jury’s conclusion that he is the
person responsible for the attack on L.N. is against the manifest weight of the evidence. We
disagree.
{¶11} When considering whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the
evidence, this Court must:
review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider
the credibility of witnesses and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the
evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest
miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.
State v. Otten, 33 Ohio App.3d 339, 340 (1986). A reversal on this basis is reserved for the
exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction. Id., citing State v.
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Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st.Dist.1983). In our analysis, we are mindful that
“[c]ircumstantial evidence and direct evidence inherently possess the same probative value[.]”
Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d at paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶12} At trial, a neighbor testified that L.N. ran to her house in a state that she described
as “hysterically scared” and said, “[h]e’s trying to kill me.” The neighbor recalled that as she
hurried L.N. into the kitchen to call the police, Mr. Alston approached the house and tried to enter.
The police officers who responded testified that Mr. Alston fled the scene thereafter and that when
they searched his residence, they found it empty. Police photographs admitted into evidence depict
the extent of L.N.’s injuries and that fact that they were recently inflicted at the time the
photographs were taken. Another photograph, taken to document the condition of her hands in
case it was alleged that she had been an aggressor in a physical conflict, depicts no injuries.
{¶13} Mr. Alston has argued that the injuries sustained by L.N. were not inflicted by him,
but by an unknown woman with whom she had a fight in a bar. Mr. Alston testified in his own
defense and stated that he allowed L.N. to live with him despite the protection order against him
because she did not have anywhere else to go. He testified that on the day of the attack, she bought
supplies to dye her hair and was gone when he returned home from work. According to Mr. Alston,
L.N. got home after midnight, told him that she had gotten into a fight with some women at a bar,
then ran next door when he tried to leave the house to get away from her. Mr. Alston testified that
he fled because he knew that he was in violation of the protection order. He recalled that L.N. was
intoxicated, the single point at which his testimony is consistent with that
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of Officer Andujar.
{¶14} Three of Mr. Alston’s family members also testified, although none of them
witnessed the attack or had any interaction with L.N. immediately after. Mr. Alston’s sister
testified that two weeks later, L.N. told her that she got into a fight at a bar. His cousin, on the
other hand, testified that one week later, L.N. told him that she fell while she was at a bar. Another
cousin testified that Mr. Alston sometimes walked away from L.N. during a conflict.
{¶15} This Court has reviewed the entire record in light of the credibility of the witnesses,
several of whom are related to Mr. Alston and some of whom have extensive criminal records in
their own right. Given the evidence at trial, we cannot conclude that this is the exceptional case
in which a new trial is warranted. Mr. Alston’s second assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III
[THE] TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING VICTIM’S MEDICAL
RECORDS AND THE HEARSAY WITHIN THE RECORDS.
{¶16} In his third assignment of error, Mr. Alston argues that the trial court erred by
admitting L.N.’s medical records to the extent that they contained hearsay statements describing
the extent of her injuries and implicating him as the perpetrator. We disagree.
{¶17} Under Evid.R. 803(6), business records are excepted from the hearsay rule. Mr.
Alston does not dispute that the medical records at issue were adequately authenticated or that they
are business records, but he maintains that the Court erred nonetheless in admitting the records
without the accompanying testimony of the medical professionals responsible for the diagnoses
contained therein. Mr. Alston has not directed this Court to any authority for the proposition that
the properly authenticated business records of a hospital must be accompanied by expert
testimony. To the contrary, this Court has concluded that properly authenticated medical records
are admissible as business records under Evid.R. 803(6) without offending a defendant’s right to
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confront witnesses because those records are not testimonial in nature. State v. Tolbert, 9th Dist.
Summit No. 24958, 2010-Ohio-2864, ¶ 12. Regardless, we observe that as set forth in our
discussion of Mr. Alston’s first assignment of error, the State presented sufficient evidence to
establish serious physical harm even without consideration of L.N.’s medical records.
{¶18} Mr. Alston has also argued that statements made by L.N. to her medical providers
that identified him as the perpetrator should not have been admitted. Evid.R. 803(4) provides that
“[s]tatements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history,
or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause
or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment” are exceptions
to the hearsay rule. While this exception does not permit the admission of any and all statements
made during a medical examination, this Court has concluded that statements made by a victim of
domestic violence in the course of emergency treatment fall within the medical records exception
of Evid.R. 803(4). State v. Flowers, 9th Dist. Summit No. 25841, 2012-Ohio-3783, ¶ 23-25.
{¶19} Mr. Alston’s third assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV
[MR. ALSTON] WAS NOT AFFORDED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
TRIAL COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 10 OF THE
OHIO CONSTITUTION[.]
{¶20} In his final assignment of error, Mr. Alston argues that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to introduce into evidence a letter purportedly
written by L.N. Mr. Alston’s ineffective assistance argument cannot be determined in the context
of a direct appeal.
{¶21} When an appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective based on evidence that
is outside the trial court record, it is “impossible” for this Court to determine the merits of the
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argument. State v. Gibson, 69 Ohio App.2d 91, 95 (8th Dist.1980). Such arguments are more
appropriately raised by means of a petition for postconviction relief. Id. Mr. Alston’s ineffective
assistance argument relies entirely on the purported contents of a letter that was referenced in
passing during one witness’s testimony but not admitted into evidence at trial. As such, he cannot
demonstrate whether trial counsel was ineffective in the context of this appeal. Id.{¶22} Mr. Alston’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.
III.
{¶23} Mr. Alston’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Lorain
County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of
this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period
for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to
mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the
docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
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CARLA MOORE
FOR THE COURT
HENSAL, P. J.
SCHAFER, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
KARRI A. KING, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
DENNIS P. WILL, Prosecuting Attorney, and NATASHA RUIZ GUERRIERI, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.