State v. Coleman ( 2011 )

[Cite as State v. Coleman, 2011-Ohio-2633.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 25537
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
MICHAEL L. J. COLEMAN COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
Appellant CASE No. CR 09 12 3581
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: June 1, 2011
DICKINSON, Judge.
INTRODUCTION
{¶1} Michael Coleman broke into a church and into a teacher training center.
Following a bench trial, the court convicted him of three counts of breaking and entering and
sentenced him to 12 months in prison. Realizing that, with credit for time served, he would be
released in December, the trial court extended his prison term to 18 months. We affirm the trial
court’s sentence because it did not abuse its discretion in increasing Mr. Coleman’s sentence and
because Mr. Coleman did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel.
BACKGROUND
{¶2} Officer Karleton Starks and Officer Charles Artis responded to an alarm at a
church. While Officer Starks performed a sweep of the property, Officer Artis set up a
perimeter. Officer Artis testified that he noticed someone by the building next door and
investigated. He found Mr. Coleman standing on a loading dock and escorted him to the police
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cruiser. According to Officer Starks, Mr. Coleman told him that he had been there for about half
an hour and was trying to get warm. Mr. Coleman was arrested and, later, released on bond.
{¶3} James Dyer, a custodian for the Akron Public Schools, testified that he reported
for work one morning and found Mr. Coleman asleep on a couch. He testified that he also
discovered the glass front door had been broken by a large rock. When he confronted Mr.
Coleman, Mr. Coleman responded, “I’m cold, man.” The police arrested Mr. Coleman, and
Detective Steven Snyder interviewed him. Mr. Coleman told Detective Snyder that he was just
looking for a place to sleep. Mr. Coleman had posted his bond from the church break-in the day
before the teacher training center break-in.
SENTENCE
{¶4} Mr. Coleman’s assignment of error is that the trial court abused its discretion in
extending his sentence “on the sole basis that [he] is homeless.” When reviewing felony
sentencing, an appellate court must examine the sentencing court’s compliance with all
applicable rules and statutes in imposing the sentence to determine whether the sentence is
contrary to law. If the sentence is not contrary to law, it is then reviewed for an abuse-of-
discretion. State v. Kalish, 120 Ohio St. 3d 23, 2008-Ohio-4912, at ¶4.
{¶5} Mr. Coleman has conceded that his sentence is not contrary to law. In his brief,
he wrote that “it seems arguable that a trial court abuses its discretion in basing the term of
imprisonment on appellant’s homeless status and the desire to provide him with room and
board.” He has also noted that “[e]nhancing a sentence on such a basis may raise constitutional
issues of due process and equal protection[,] . . . [but these issues] were not raised [at] the trial
court [level][.]” Mr. Coleman has not cited any cases in support of his position.
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{¶6} The overriding purposes of felony sentencing are “to protect the public from
future crime by the offender and others and to punish the offender.” R.C. 2929.11(A). “To
achieve those purposes, the sentencing court shall consider the need for incapacitating the
offender, deterring the offender and others from future crime, rehabilitating the offender, and
making restitution to the victim of the offense, the public, or both.” Id. Section 2929.11(B)
requires that a sentence “be reasonably calculated to achieve the two overriding purposes of
felony sentencing . . . commensurate with and not demeaning to the seriousness of the offender’s
conduct and its impact upon the victim, and consistent with sentences imposed for similar crimes
committed by similar offenders.” Further, “[t]he sentencing court shall consider all of the
following that apply regarding the offender, and any other relevant factors, as factors indicating
that the offender is likely to commit future crimes: . . . At the time of committing the offense, the
offender was under release from confinement before trial or sentencing . . . .” R.C.
2929.12(D)(1).
{¶7} The trial court considered the facts before it, including that Mr. Coleman had
committed both of his offenses in an attempt to find warm shelter. He committed one of the
offenses while he was out on bond awaiting trial for the other one. The trial court realized that,
if he served a 12 month sentence, he would be released at the beginning of winter, essentially
setting up the same scenario that led to his convictions. In fact, Mr. Coleman’s entire defense
strategy was based on demonstrating that he committed his offenses out of necessity because he
was in need of shelter due to the cold. Further, when the trial court asked Mr. Coleman if he
preferred jail or probation, Mr. Coleman said that he wanted to go to jail.
{¶8} Accordingly, given Mr. Coleman’s own stated preferences and the circumstances
surrounding his offenses, the trial court’s decision to have his sentence continue through the
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winter in order to prevent new offenses was not unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. His
first assignment of error is overruled.
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
{¶9} Mr. Coleman’s second assignment of error is that his trial lawyer was ineffective
because he advocated a longer sentence for Mr. Coleman. In order to prevail on a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, Mr. Coleman must demonstrate that “[his] counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and “that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome.” State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St. 3d 136, 142 (1989) (quoting Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694 (1984)).
{¶10} Mr. Coleman has argued that his lawyer’s statement that a 12 month sentence
“puts him back out in December, right [back] where we started” fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness. He has not cited any cases to support his argument. Instead, through a string
of questions, he has argued that, even if prison were an acceptable substitute for the social
services available to the homeless, “the prudent attorney [would] require that his . . . client
affirmatively state on the record that he . . . desires a longer prison term.” He has also argued
that, if his lawyer’s representation was deficient, he clearly suffered prejudice in the form of a
longer sentence.
{¶11} After the trial court found Mr. Coleman guilty, it stated, “the court is in a
quandary with what to do with . . . Mr. Coleman. . . . I guess what I’d like to know before I
sentence Mr. Coleman is a little bit more about him . . . because I’m just not confident that he’s
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going to be able to be successful on probation. That’s my concern. He has no place to live and
he’s not going to be compliant. He may prefer to go to prison.”
{¶12} When the trial court asked Mr. Coleman whether he preferred jail or probation, he
responded that he wanted to go to jail. The trial court stated, “[a]ll right. . . . I don’t want to set
him up to fail[.]” Mr. Coleman’s attorney told the trial court, “Well . . . I would just ask that the
court give him a sentence that would probably outlast the winter.” The trial court responded,
“All right.”
{¶13} The trial court then sentenced Mr. Coleman to 12 months in prison. Without
prompting, it noted that, because of the time required for Mr. Coleman’s competency evaluation,
he would receive credit for over six months served. The trial court said, “I’m concerned. I’m
wondering if maybe I should give him a little bit more time.” Mr. Coleman’s attorney
responded, “Yeah, that puts him back out in December, right where we started.”
{¶14} The trial court had proceeded directly to sentencing following the trial. Its
statements during sentencing indicate that it realized that it had not considered the effect Mr.
Coleman’s credit for time served would have on the timing of his release. Mr. Coleman’s
lawyer’s statement that a 12-month sentence returns him to the same situation that led to his
offenses merely echoed the trial court’s concerns. Prior to the statement at issue, the trial court
had questioned whether it should give Mr. Coleman a longer sentence.
{¶15} Mr. Coleman has focused his arguments on his lawyer’s statement concerning his
December release and has not argued that his lawyer’s earlier statements prejudiced him. Given
all the facts surrounding Mr. Coleman’s arrests and the trial court’s expressed concern for Mr.
Coleman’s living situation, this Court cannot conclude that, but for Mr. Coleman’s lawyer’s
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statement, there is a reasonable probability that his prison term would have been for less than 18
months. His second assignment of error is overruled.
CONCLUSION
{¶16} The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced Mr. Coleman to 18
months in prison, and he did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel. The judgment of the
Summit County Common Pleas Court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(E). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
CLAIR E. DICKINSON
FOR THE COURT
BELFANCE, P. J.
CONCURS
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CARR, J.
CONCURS IN JUDGMENT ONLY
APPEARANCES:
JEFFREY N. JAMES, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and HEAVEN R. DIMARTINO, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.