Roberts v. Reyes ( 2011 )

[Cite as Roberts v. Reyes, 2011-Ohio-2608.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF LORAIN )
CRYSTAL ROBERTS, et al. C.A. No. 10CA009821
Appellants
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
DAVID C. REYES, et al. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO
Appellees CASE No. 03CV134243
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: May 31, 2011
CARR, Presiding Judge.
{¶1} Appellants, Chrystal Roberts and her mother (collectively “Roberts”), appeal
from a judgment of the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas that granted summary judgment
to State Farm Insurance Company, finding that State Farm had no obligation to defend or
indemnify David or Iris Reyes against Roberts’ claims against them. This Court affirms.
I.
{¶2} On July 18, 2001, sixteen-year-old Chrystal Roberts sustained physical injuries
when she was struck by a pick-up truck negligently operated by David Reyes. Reyes was
driving a vehicle that was owned by his wife, Iris Reyes. Iris Reyes insured the pick-up truck
and was the named insured under an automobile insurance policy with State Farm Insurance
Company.
{¶3} Roberts, through her mother, filed this action, seeking recovery for the injuries
she had sustained in the accident. This case has had a lengthy history, involving other parties
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and a prior appeal to this Court, much of which is not relevant to this appeal. See Roberts v.
Reyes, 9th Dist. No. 09CA009576, 2010-Ohio-1086. Roberts filed a claim against David Reyes
for negligently operating a vehicle and against Iris Reyes for negligently entrusting her vehicle to
David.
{¶4} State Farm filed a separate declaratory judgment action that was later
consolidated with Roberts’ case. State Farm sought a declaration that it had no duty to defend or
indemnify Iris or David Reyes against Roberts’ claims against them. It maintained that the
policy held by Iris Reyes included a Driver Exclusion Endorsement that explicitly excluded any
coverage for damages caused if a vehicle was operated by David Reyes and, therefore, it
excluded any coverage for David’s negligent operation of the vehicle and Iris’s alleged negligent
entrustment of the vehicle to him.
{¶5} State Farm moved for summary judgment on its declaratory judgment action,
maintaining that, pursuant to the policy’s Driver Exclusion Endorsement, it had no duty to
defend or indemnify either of the Reyeses against Roberts’ claims. Although the trial court
initially denied State Farm’s motion, it eventually granted State Farm summary judgment upon
reconsideration. After this Court dismissed Roberts’ prior appeal for lack of a final, appealable
order because Roberts’ claims against the Reyeses were still pending, the trial court issued a new
ruling on the summary judgment motion that included a finding that “there is no just reason for
delay pursuant to Civil Rule 54(B)[.]” Roberts appeals and raises two assignments of error,
which will be addressed together for ease of discussion.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
“THE INCOMPLETE AND DEFICIENT ‘DRIVER EXCLUSION
AGREEMENT’ DEMONSTRATES THAT A GENUINE DISPUTE EXISTS
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OVER A MATERIAL FACT AS TO THE VALIDITY OF THE PUTATIVE
‘DRIVER EXCLUSION AGREEMENT[.]’”
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT APPELLEE IRIS REYES’
NEGLIGENT ENTRUSTMENT OF HER CHEVROLET PICK-UP TRUCK
WAS NOT COVERED UNDER THE LIABILITY PORTION OF THE
APPELLEE IRIS REYES’ STATE FARM POLICY[.]”
{¶6} Roberts argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to State
Farm and declaring that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Iris or David Reyes in this action.
This Court reviews an award of summary judgment de novo. Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co. (1996),
77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105. This Court applies the same standard as the trial court, viewing the facts
in the case in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and resolving any doubt in favor
of the non-moving party. Viock v. Stowe-Woodward Co. (1983), 13 Ohio App.3d 7, 12. Pursuant
to Civ.R. 56(C), summary judgment is proper if:
“(1) [N]o genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it appears from
the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing
the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, that conclusion is
adverse to the nonmoving party.” State ex. rel. Howard v. Ferreri (1994), 70
Ohio St.3d 587, 589.
{¶7} Through its motion for summary judgment, State Farm pointed to the
endorsement in Iris Reyes’s policy that explicitly excluded all coverage under the policy if the
loss was caused by David Reyes driving any vehicle and argued that the exclusion relieved it of
any duty to defend or indemnify David or Iris Reyes. In opposition, Roberts did not specifically
address the applicability of the exclusion, but instead pointed to the broad coverage language of
Iris’ policy.
{¶8} On appeal, Roberts raises one argument that is not relevant, that Iris Reyes was
negligent in allowing David Reyes to drive her car, and another that she did not raise in
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opposition to State Farm’s motion for summary judgment, that there were disputed facts about
whether Iris and David agreed to a driver exclusion that explicitly excluded David Reyes and/or
whether they understood its effect. In opposition to summary judgment, Roberts failed to raise
any arguments to dispute that Iris and David Reyes agreed to the Driver Exclusion Endorsement.
She did not dispute State Farm’s evidence that Iris Reyes testified that she was aware of the
exclusion in the State Farm policy and understood its effect: “Well, the exclusion, I know that
[David] couldn’t drive the truck.”
{¶9} Although both parties now dispute whether there was evidence before the trial
court about the Driver Exclusion Agreement signed by David and Iris Reyes and the significance
of that evidence, because Roberts failed to raise that issue in opposition to summary judgment,
this Court need not address it now. “Although this Court conducts a de novo review of summary
judgment, it is nonetheless a review that is confined to the trial court record. The parties are not
given a second chance to raise arguments that they should have raised below.” (Emphasis in
original.) Owens v. French Village Co. (Aug. 18, 1999), 9th Dist. No. 98CA0038.
{¶10} Roberts has never disputed State Farm’s summary judgment evidence that Iris
Reyes’s State Farm policy did, in fact, include a Driver Exclusion Endorsement. The
construction of an insurance policy is a matter of law and it is presumed that the intent of the
parties is reflected in the language of the insurance policy. Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 100
Ohio St.3d 216, 2003-Ohio-5849, at ¶11; Long Beach Assn., Inc. v. Jones (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d
574, 576. “When the language of a written contract is clear, a court may look no further than the
writing itself to find the intent of the parties.” Galatis at ¶11.
{¶11} Even if extrinsic evidence of the Reyeses’ intent had been before the trial court on
summary judgment, the court had no need to look beyond the language of the insurance policy
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unless it found it to be ambiguous on this coverage issue. Therefore, this Court must first
determine whether the trial court correctly concluded that the Driver Exclusion Endorsement in
Iris Reyes’s State Farm insurance policy unambiguously precluded State Farm’s duty to defend
or indemnify Iris or David Reyes in this action.
{¶12} The Driver Exclusion Endorsement in this policy provided:
“IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PREMIUM CHARGED FOR YOUR POLICY
ITS IS AGREED WE SHALL NOT BE LIABLE AND NO LIABILITY OR
OBLIGATION OF ANY KIND SHALL ATTACH TO US FOR BODILY
INJURY, LOSS OR DAMAGE UNDER ANY OF THE COVERAGES OF THE
POLICY WHILE ANY MOTOR VEHICLE IS OPERATED BY
“DAVID REYES”
{¶13} State Farm argued to the trial court that, because David Reyes, the excluded
driver, was operating the motor vehicle that injured Roberts, it had no liability for bodily injury,
loss or damage under any provision of the policy. State Farm cited Ohio case law to support its
argument that, given the language of the exclusion, it had no obligation to defend or indemnify
either David Reyes for his negligent operation of the vehicle or Iris Reyes for her alleged
negligent entrustment of the vehicle to him. See Brunner v. State Farm Mut. (May 20, 1994),
6th Dist. No. S-93-41; Childers v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. (Aug. 24, 1990), 11th Dist. No. 89-L-
14-030. Although Brunner and Childers include little reasoning to support their decisions, this
Court’s research revealed numerous cases from other jurisdictions that did.
{¶14} Courts in other states have consistently held that similar driver exclusions in
automobile insurance policies preclude any coverage for the excluded driver’s negligent
operation of the insured vehicle as well as coverage for the vehicle owner’s negligent
entrustment of the vehicle to the excluded driver. The Maryland Court of Appeals began its
analysis with a focus on the purpose behind the driver exclusion provision:
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“The purpose of the provision is to allow a family automobile to remain insured,
instead of having the insurance policy cancelled, by excluding from the insurance
policy a member of the household whose driving record would have warranted a
cancellation of the policy. Allowing a driver to be specifically excluded avoids
cancellation or non-renewal of policies and permits the other family members to
retain the required security on the family car.” Neale v. Wright (1991), 585 A.2d
196, 202.
Maryland’s highest court concluded that “[i]f the insurer of the family car were still liable under
the policy if the excluded driver operates the vehicle, on a theory of negligent entrustment by the
non-excluded insured spouse, the purpose of the named driver exclusion provision would be
defeated.” Id.{¶15} The Oklahoma Supreme Court followed the reasoning of Neale and several other
decisions that “to permit liability for negligent entrustment of a vehicle to the driver named in the
exclusion would be forcing an insurer to accept a risk not bargained for and for which no
additional premium had been paid.” Pierce v. Oklahoma Property and Cas. Ins. Co. (1995), 901
P.2d 819, 824. Likewise, a Louisiana appellate court reasoned that whether the claim is one for
the excluded driver’s negligence in operating the vehicle or for the owner’s negligent
entrustment of the vehicle to him, “the alleged liability arose while [the excluded driver] was
operating a covered auto and was thus excluded from coverage under the policy.” Natl.
Automotive Ins. Co. v. Castleman (2007), 968 So.2d 819, 823. To conclude otherwise “would
unjustly deprive the insurer of the benefit of its bargain to allow an insured to purchase a vehicle
liability policy with an excluded driver endorsement, proceed to permit the excluded driver to
drive the insured vehicle, and then reap the benefits of the policy.” Id.{¶16} This Court was unable to find any legal authority that has construed insurance
policy driver exclusions to the contrary, i.e. that, despite the exclusion, the insurer has a duty to
defend or indemnify either the excluded driver or the vehicle owner for negligent entrustment of
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the vehicle to him. Consequently, the trial court correctly concluded that State Farm had no duty
to defend or indemnify Iris or David Reyes and was entitled to summary judgment on its
complaint for declaratory judgment. The assignments of error are overruled.
III.
{¶17} The assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Lorain County
Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of
this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(E). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellants.
DONNA J. CARR
FOR THE COURT
WHITMORE, J.
MOORE, J.
CONCUR
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APPEARANCES:
MICHAEL J. DUFF, Attorney at Law, for Appellants.
WALTER H. KROHNGOLD, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.
CLARK D. RICE, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.
DAVID C. REYES, pro se, Appellee.