Foreman v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr. , 2014 Ohio 2793 ( 2014 )


Menu:
  • [Cite as Foreman v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2014-Ohio-2793.]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    Keith R. Foreman,                                   :
    Plaintiff-Appellant,                :
    No. 14AP-15
    v.                                                  :              (Ct. of Cl. No. 2013-00566)
    Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and               :           (ACCELERATED CALENDAR)
    Correction,
    :
    Defendant-Appellee.
    :
    D E C I S I O N
    Rendered on June 26, 2014
    Keith R. Foreman, pro se.
    Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Stacy Hannan, for
    appellee.
    APPEAL from the Court of Claims of Ohio
    CONNOR, J.
    {¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Keith R. Foreman, appeals from a judgment of the
    Court of Claims of Ohio, granting the motion to dismiss of the Ohio Department of
    Rehabilitation and Correction ("ODRC"). Because the Court of Claims did not possess
    jurisdiction to address plaintiff's constitutional claims or to alter the sentencing court's
    determination as to jail-time credit, and because plaintiff failed to state a claim for false
    imprisonment, we affirm.
    I.      FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    {¶ 2} Plaintiff is an inmate incarcerated at North Central Correctional
    Institution. On September 25, 2013, plaintiff filed a pro se complaint against ODRC in
    No. 14AP-15                                                                               2
    the Court of Claims. The complaint stated that it was a form complaint "for declaratory
    judgment and for equitable relief incorporated with a 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983." (Complaint,
    1.) In the complaint, plaintiff asserted that, when the Hancock County Court of Common
    Pleas sentenced plaintiff in 2007, the sentencing court credited him with "only 301 Days
    of Jail Time Credit." (Complaint, 1.) Plaintiff claims that he is entitled to 3,010 days of
    jail-time credit. Plaintiff thus asserted in his complaint that the sentencing court abused
    its discretion in its calculation of jail-time credit. Plaintiff further asserted in his
    complaint that, under a proper calculation of his jail-time credit, he would have been
    released from prison on August 17, 2013. Plaintiff alleged in the complaint that his rights
    under the First, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
    Constitution had been violated by the improper calculation of his jail-time credit.
    {¶ 3} On October 17, 2013, plaintiff filed a motion to transfer the case to the
    Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. As support for the motion, plaintiff asserted
    that the Court of Claims did not have the "power and authority to Determine the
    Plaintiff's Federal Constitutional Rights." (Motion to Transfer, 1.)
    {¶ 4} On October 25, 2013, ODRC filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint
    pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(1) and Civ.R. 12(B)(6). ODRC noted that "[t]he proper remedy
    for a denial of jail-time credit by a criminal sentencing court is a direct appeal of the
    criminal case," and that plaintiff had therefore failed to state a claim for relief in the
    Court of Claims. (Motion to Dismiss, 2.) ODRC further alleged that the Court of Claims
    lacked jurisdiction over plaintiff's constitutional claims. Plaintiff filed an opposition to
    the motion to dismiss on November 5, 2013.
    {¶ 5} On December 20, 2013 the court issued an entry granting ODRC's motion
    and dismissing plaintiff's complaint. The court determined that it lacked subject-matter
    jurisdiction to consider plaintiff's constitutional claims. The court then construed
    plaintiff's claims regarding jail-time credit as a claim for false imprisonment. The court
    concluded that plaintiff had failed to state a claim for false imprisonment, as plaintiff
    was in ODRC's custody pursuant to valid orders from the Hancock County Court of
    Common Pleas. The court also noted the Court of Claims lacked jurisdiction to review
    criminal proceedings from the courts of common pleas.
    No. 14AP-15                                                                                   3
    II.    ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    {¶ 6} Plaintiff appeals, assigning the following errors:
    I. THE JUDGE WAS BIAS AND THE PLAINTIFF WAS
    PREJUDICE. WHEN THE JUDGE FAIL TO DETERMINE
    INITIALLY WHETHER THE STATE OFFICIALS WERE
    ENTITLED TO PERSONAL IMMUNITY. WHEN, THE STATE
    FAIL TO RESPOND TO THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
    TRANSFER.
    II. THE JUDGE WAS IN ERROR AND THE PLAINTIFF WAS
    PREJUDICE. WHEN THE JUDGE FAIL TO DETERMINE
    INITIALLY WHETHER THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS'
    HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE PLAINTIFF'S STATE LAW
    CLAIMS.
    III. PLAINTIFF WAS PREJUDICE. WHEN THE JUDGE
    ACKNOWLEDGE AND/OR CONCEDED THAT PLAINTIFF'S
    CLAIMS LIES IN THE FEDERAL COURT, BUT, FAIL TO
    DETERMINE PLAINTIFF'S STATE LAW CLAIMS IN THIS
    COURT ACCORDING TO LAW.
    (Sic. passim.)
    {¶ 7} We address plaintiff's assignments of error together. Under his first
    assignment of error, plaintiff asserts that the Court of Claims had subject matter
    jurisdiction to determine whether certain unidentified state officials were entitled to
    personal immunity under R.C. 9.86. Plaintiff also asserts that that the trial court erred
    in disregarding plaintiff's motion to transfer. Plaintiff's second assignment of error
    asserts that the Court of Claims erred in failing to determine whether a court of common
    pleas had jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law claims. Plaintiff's third assignment of
    error asserts that the Court of Claims erred in failing to determine his state law claims.
    Plaintiff also asserts that the Court of Claims erred in failing to transfer the case to a
    proper court.
    {¶ 8} Plaintiff did not allege below that any state officials were entitled to
    personal immunity under R.C. 9.86. Plaintiff's contention that the court erred in failing
    to rule on his state law claims lacks merit, as the Court of Claims determined that it
    lacked jurisdiction to rule on plaintiff's state law claims and that plaintiff failed to state a
    state law claim for which relief could be granted. Regarding plaintiff's motion to
    No. 14AP-15                                                                               4
    transfer, we note that the court did not disregard the motion. At the end of the court's
    entry dismissing plaintiff's complaint, the court noted that all other pending motions
    were denied as moot. We find no error in the court's decision to deny the motion to
    transfer, and plaintiff has cited no authority to support his contention that the Court of
    Claims was obligated to transfer the case to the Franklin County Court of Common
    Pleas.
    III.     STANDARD OF REVIEW
    {¶ 9} When reviewing a judgment on a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss for
    failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, an appellate court's standard of
    review is de novo. Perrysburg Twp. v. Rossford, 
    103 Ohio St. 3d 79
    , 2004-Ohio-4362,
    ¶ 5. A Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
    be granted is procedural and tests the sufficiency of the complaint. State ex rel. Hanson
    v. Guernsey Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 
    65 Ohio St. 3d 545
    , 548 (1992). A trial court must
    presume all factual allegations contained in the complaint to be true and must make all
    reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Garofalo v. Chicago Title Ins.
    Co., 
    104 Ohio App. 3d 95
    , 104 (8th Dist.1995), citing Perez v. Cleveland, 
    66 Ohio St. 3d 397
    (1993), Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co., 
    40 Ohio St. 3d 190
    (1988), and Phung v. Waste
    Mgt., Inc., 
    23 Ohio St. 3d 100
    (1986). "[A]s long as there is a set of facts, consistent with
    the plaintiff's complaint, which would allow the plaintiff to recover, the court may not
    grant a defendant's motion to dismiss." York v. Ohio State Hwy. Patrol, 
    60 Ohio St. 3d 143
    , 145 (1991).
    {¶ 10} In ruling on a Civ.R. 12(B)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter
    jurisdiction, the trial court determines whether the claim raises any action cognizable in
    that court. Brown v. Ohio Tax Commr., 10th Dist. No. 11AP-349, 2012-Ohio-5768;
    Robinson v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 10AP-550, 2011-Ohio-713, ¶ 5.
    Subject-matter jurisdiction involves " 'a court's power to hear and decide a case on the
    merits and does not relate to the rights of the parties.' " 
    Id., quoting Vedder
    v.
    Warrensville Hts., 8th Dist. No. 81005, 2002-Ohio-5567, ¶ 14. We apply a de novo
    standard when we review a trial court's ruling on a Civ.R. 12(B)(1) motion to dismiss.
    Robinson at ¶ 5, citing Hudson v. Petrosurance, Inc., 10th Dist. No. 08AP-1030, 2009-
    Ohio-4307, ¶ 12.
    No. 14AP-15                                                                                   5
    IV.    COMPLAINT PROPERLY DISMISSED
    {¶ 11} The trial court properly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to address
    plaintiff's constitutional claims. "[T]he Ohio Court of Claims is without jurisdiction to
    consider claims for relief premised upon alleged violations of either the Ohio or the
    United States Constitutions." Peters v. Ohio Dept. of Natural Resources, 10th Dist. No.
    03AP-350, 2003-Ohio-5895, ¶ 13. Constitutional claims are not actionable in the Court
    of Claims because a plaintiff is limited to causes of action that could be brought between
    private parties. Bleicher v. Univ. of Cincinnati College of Medicine, 
    78 Ohio App. 3d 302
    ,
    306-07 (10th Dist.1992); Burkey v. S. Ohio Corr. Facility, 
    38 Ohio App. 3d 170
    , 171,
    (10th Dist.1988); R.C. 2743.02 (providing the state waived its immunity from liability
    and consented to be sued in the Court of Claims "in accordance with the same rules of
    law applicable to suits between private parties"); Webb v. Grafton Corr. Inst., 10th Dist.
    No. 03AP-1014, 2004-Ohio-3729 (holding that the Court of Claims lacked jurisdiction
    over inmate's alleged constitutional and criminal violations by the correctional facility).
    {¶ 12} The remainder of plaintiff's complaint asserted that the Hancock County
    Court of Common Pleas erred in finding that plaintiff had only 301 days of jail-time
    credit. Plaintiff asserted that, under a proper calculation of jail-time credit, he was
    entitled to be released from prison immediately. As such, the trial court properly
    construed plaintiff's assertions as a claim for false imprisonment, and found that
    plaintiff had failed to state a claim for false imprisonment.
    {¶ 13} False imprisonment occurs when a person confines another intentionally
    " 'without lawful privilege and against his consent within a limited area for any
    appreciable time, however short.' " Bennett v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 60 Ohio
    St.3d 107, 109 (1991), quoting Feliciano v. Krieger, 
    50 Ohio St. 2d 69
    , 71 (1977);
    Roberson v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 03AP-538, 2003-Ohio-6473,
    ¶ 9. The state may be held liable for false imprisonment. Id.; Bennett at paragraph two
    of the syllabus. An action for false imprisonment cannot be maintained, however, when
    the imprisonment is in accordance with the judgment or order of a court, unless it
    appears such judgment or order is void on its face. Bradley v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. &
    Corr., 10th Dist. No. 07AP-506, 2007-Ohio-7150, ¶ 10; Fryerson v. Dept. of Rehab. &
    Corr., 10th Dist. No. 02AP-1216, 2003-Ohio-2730, ¶ 17.
    No. 14AP-15                                                                              6
    {¶ 14} Thus, the state is immune from a common law claim of false
    imprisonment when the plaintiff was incarcerated pursuant to a facially-valid judgment
    or order, even if the facially-valid judgment or order is later determined to be void.
    Bradley at ¶ 11; Roberson at ¶ 9; Likes v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No.
    05AP-709, 2006-Ohio-231, ¶ 10. In order to succeed on a false imprisonment claim
    based on imprisonment pursuant to a court's entry or order, the court's entry must be
    invalid on its face. Beachum v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 11AP-635,
    2012-Ohio-673, ¶ 7. Facial invalidity does not require the consideration of extrinsic
    information or the application of case law. McKinney v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr.,
    10th Dist. No. 09AP-960, 2010-Ohio-2323, ¶ 12, citing Gonzales v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab.
    & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 08AP-567, 2009-Ohio-246, ¶ 10.
    {¶ 15} Because plaintiff was sentenced pursuant to a facially-valid sentencing
    entry, and asserts only that he should be released from prison because the sentencing
    court erred in its determination of jail-time credit, plaintiff failed to state a claim for
    false imprisonment. See Pruitt v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 13AP-117,
    2013-Ohio-3743 (finding trial court properly granted ODRC's Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to
    dismiss plaintiff's claim for false imprisonment, because the plaintiff was sentenced
    pursuant to a facially-valid sentencing entry and the plaintiff's basis for the false
    imprisonment claim was that the sentencing court erred in its calculation of jail-time
    credit).
    {¶ 16} Moreover, to the extent plaintiff's complaint attempted to have the Court
    of Claims review the Hancock County Court of Common Pleas sentencing entry for
    error, the Court of Claims lacked jurisdiction to conduct such a review. The sentencing
    court must make the determination as to the number of days of jail-time credit to which
    the defendant is entitled by law. State ex rel. Corder v. Wilson, 
    68 Ohio App. 3d 567
    , 573
    (10th Dist.1991). The proper remedy for any error in the determination of jail-time
    credit is "either direct appeal or a motion for correction by the trial court, if it be a
    mistake rather than an allegedly erroneous legal determination." 
    Id. R.C. 2743.02,
    the
    statute governing actions in the Court of Claims, "does not embrace jurisdiction to
    review criminal proceedings occurring in courts of common pleas." Donaldson v. Court
    of Claims of Ohio, 10th Dist. No. 91AP-1218 (May 19, 1992); Troutman v. Ohio Dept. of
    No. 14AP-15                                                                            7
    Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 03AP-1240, 2005-Ohio-334, ¶ 10. See also Hamilton v.
    Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 06AP-916, 2007-Ohio-1173, ¶ 13 (noting
    that "a plaintiff who has had the opportunity to raise assignments of error from a
    criminal conviction in a direct appeal cannot substitute an action in the Court of Claims
    for a right of appeal in a different court").
    {¶ 17} Based on the foregoing, we find that the Court of Claims properly granted
    ODRC's motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state
    a claim upon which relief could be granted. Accordingly, plaintiff's first, second, and
    third assignments of error are overruled.
    V.     DISPOSITION
    {¶ 18} Having overruled plaintiff's first, second, and third assignments of error,
    the judgment of the Court of Claims is affirmed.
    Judgment affirmed.
    KLATT and LUPER SCHUSTER, JJ., concur.
    _________________