State v. Boyd , 2012 Ohio 1836 ( 2012 )

[Cite as State v. Boyd, 2012-Ohio-1836.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 97234
STATE OF OHIO
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
SHANNON N. BOYD
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED
Criminal Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-547328
BEFORE: S. Gallagher, J., Blackmon, A.J., and Kilbane, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 26, 2012
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Susan J. Moran
55 Public Square
Suite 1616
Cleveland, OH 44113-1901
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
William D. Mason
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
By: Ronni Ducoff
Mark J. Mahoney
Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys
The Justice Center, 9th Floor
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, OH 44113
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.:
{¶1} Appellant Shannon N. Boyd appeals the sentence she received for attempted
endangering children. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm.
{¶2} Boyd was indicted on two counts of endangering children in violation of R.C.
2919.22(A). Following plea negotiations, Boyd entered a plea of guilty to Count 1 as
amended to attempted endangering children in violation of R.C. 2923.02 and 2919.22(A),
a felony of the fourth degree. Count 2 was nolled.
{¶3} The transcript reflects that at the time of the incident, Boyd was a single
mother with six children under the age of ten. At the time of the underlying incident, her
youngest two children were six-month-old twins. On the evening of February 6, 2010,
Boyd was cooking dinner. Her six-month-old child S.B. was sleeping upstairs. After a
period of time, Boyd went upstairs to check on S.B. Boyd claimed she discovered S.B.
lying on a heating vent unresponsive. S.B. was taken to the Cleveland Clinic, but was
transferred to MetroHealth Medical Center because of the severity of the burns.
{¶4} The hospital confronted Boyd when it was determined that S.B. had scalding
burns, not contact burns. As such, Boyd’s account of what occurred was not consistent
with the injuries. Boyd claimed she inquired further and discovered that her
seven-year-old daughter tried to give the child a bath with water that later measured 150
degrees. Upon investigation, it was determined that at 155 degrees Fahrenheit, a child
will sustain a scalding burn injury in one-half of one second.
{¶5} Images of S.B. depicted the severity of the burn injuries she sustained to her
buttocks, genital area, back of the thighs, and inner thighs. S.B. will likely have scarring
for the rest of her life and is going to have problems with some normal functions for some
time.
{¶6} Defense counsel represented that Boyd felt horrible about the incident, she
cooperated with the investigation, she has only one prior misdemeanor offense, she has
sought to maintain a relationship with her children who have been removed from her
custody, and she has been compliant with the requests of Children and Family Services.
Defense counsel claimed Boyd is an overwhelmed mother who needs to find help with
her situation. When Boyd addressed the court, she apologized for the incident and
expressed her love for her children.
{¶7} The state argued that it was not until Boyd was confronted at the hospital that
the true nature of the burns was revealed. It further argued such injuries do not occur
from being “overwhelmed.” The state noted Boyd’s prior misdemeanor for endangering
children was for leaving her children home alone. The state further indicated that a
number of resources could have been made available to Boyd if she had chosen to use
them.
{¶8} The primary investigator on the case, Detective Charlie McNeeley, indicated
that the initial report of the child having been burned from a heater was clearly not what
happened. He further found that resources were available to Boyd that had not been
taken advantage of for the care of her children. He believed the children were at risk
under her care.
{¶9} The trial court considered the purposes and principles of sentencing under
R.C. 2929.11, as well as the serious and recidivism factors under R.C. 2929.12. The
court reviewed the presentence investigation report and noted Boyd’s prior conviction for
endangering children. The court expressed that the prior conviction should have served
as a wake-up call and that Boyd had failed to avail herself of opportunities and support
with regard to being overwhelmed with the care of her children. The court found that the
injuries sustained by S.B. were severe, “the worst I have seen in my days here on the
bench.” The court considered that this was Boyd’s first felony offense, but found that to
be insignificant because of the level of harm perpetrated on the young child. The court
indicated that “this is certainly one of the worst cases of child neglect that I have seen.”
The court found a prison sentence was necessary to protect the public and not demean the
seriousness of the offense. The court proceeded to impose the maximum sentence of 18
months in prison and included three years of postrelease control.
{¶10} Boyd proceeded to express her belief that she had not harmed S.B. She
placed blame on the child’s father, who she claimed had “stepped out” without telling her.
{¶11} Boyd timely filed this appeal. Her sole assignment of error asserts that
“[t]he trial court abused its discretion by sentencing the appellant to a maximum
sentence.”
{¶12} In State v. Kalish, 120 Ohio St.3d 23, 2008-Ohio-4912, 896 N.E.2d 124, the
Ohio Supreme Court, in a plurality decision, set forth a two-step approach for reviewing
felony sentences. Appellate courts must first “examine the sentencing court’s
compliance with all applicable rules and statutes in imposing the sentence to determine
whether the sentence is clearly and convincingly contrary to law.” Id. at ¶ 4. If the first
prong is satisfied, then “the trial court’s decision shall be reviewed under an
abuse-of-discretion standard.” Id. at ¶ 4 and 19.
{¶13} In the first step of our analysis, we review whether Boyd’s sentence is
contrary to law as required by R.C. 2953.08(G). As the Kalish court noted, post-Foster
“trial courts have full discretion to impose a prison sentence within the statutory range
and are no longer required to make findings and give reasons for imposing maximum * *
* or more than the minimum sentence.” Id. at ¶ 11, quoting State v. Foster, 109 Ohio
St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470, ¶ 100. The Kalish court held that although
Foster eliminated mandatory judicial fact-finding, the trial court still must consider R.C.
2929.11 and 2929.12 when imposing a sentence. Kalish at ¶ 13.
{¶14} R.C. 2929.11(A) provides that
[A] court that sentences an offender for a felony shall be guided by the
overriding purposes of felony sentencing[:] * * * to protect the public from
future crime by the offender and others and to punish the offender. To
achieve those purposes, the sentencing court shall consider the need for
incapacitating the offender, deterring the offender and others from future
crime, rehabilitating the offender, and making restitution to the victim of
the offense, the public, or both.
{¶15} R.C. 2929.12 provides a nonexhaustive list of factors a trial court must
consider when determining the seriousness of the offense and the likelihood that the
offender will commit future offenses.
{¶16} The record in this case reflects that the trial court properly considered the
applicable sentencing statutes when imposing Boyd’s sentence. The court stated in its
judgment entry that Boyd’s prison term is consistent with R.C. 2929.11. Further, Boyd’s
sentence was within the statutory range. On these facts, we do not find that the sentence
was contrary to law.
{¶17} We next consider whether the trial court abused its discretion. An “abuse
of discretion” is more than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the court’s attitude
is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d
217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983).
{¶18} We find nothing in the record to suggest that the trial court’s decision was
unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. As outlined above, a review of the record
indicates that the trial court considered all required factors of the law and found that
prison was consistent with the purposes and principles of R.C. 2929.11. The court
allowed defense counsel the opportunity to advocate for mitigation of any penalty and
also allowed Boyd to address the court. Before imposing sentence, the court discussed
Boyd’s prior conviction for endangering children, Boyd’s failure to avail herself of
opportunities and support for the care of her children, the severity of the injuries sustained
by the young child, and the nature of the offense herein. While Boyd argues that she is
an overwhelmed mother of six children, the record clearly supported the trial court’s
determination that this was not an excuse in this case. Further, while Boyd claims the
court was focused on the severity of the injuries to the child, as opposed to her
responsibility for the burns, the record reflects otherwise. The court clearly considered
Boyd’s neglect of her child, finding this to have been “one of the worst cases of child
neglect” the court had seen. Finding no abuse of discretion, we overrule Boyd’s sole
assignment of error.
{¶19} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction having
been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court
for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, A.J., and
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., CONCUR