State v. Dzelajlija , 2012 Ohio 913 ( 2012 )

[Cite as State v. Dzelajlija, 2012-Ohio-913.]
[Please see original opinion at 2011-Ohio-6445.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 95851
STATE OF OHIO
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
JAMES DZELAJLIJA
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT:
REVERSED; CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCE VACATED
Criminal Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-478630
BEFORE: Kilbane, P.J., Boyle, J., and Rocco, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 8, 2012
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Robert L. Tobik
Chief Public Defender
Cullen Sweeney
Assistant Public Defender
310 Lakeside Avenue - Suite 200
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
William D. Mason
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
Sanjeev Bhasker
T. Allan Regas
Assistant County Prosecutor
The Justice Center - 8th Floor
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
ON RECONSIDERATION
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, P.J.:
{¶1} The plaintiff-appellee, the state of Ohio has asked this court to reconsider its
December 15, 2011 decision in which we concluded that due to recent changes in the
controlling case law, defendant-appellant, James Dzelajlija, was not entitled to a new trial
due to structural error caused by his indictment. That opinion recognized, however, that
in defendant’s prior appeal on the merits, his challenge to the manifest weight of the
evidence supporting his robbery convictions was deemed moot and was not addressed.
Consequently, this court determined that the trial court committed reversible error and
acted beyond its mandate in reinstating Dzelajlija’s sentences for those convictions.
{¶2} Since the release of the December 15, 2011 opinion, the panel that heard
defendant’s prior appeal has denied the State’s motion to reopen the appeal in order to
weigh the evidence supporting defendant’s 2008 robbery convictions.1 Therefore, upon
reconsideration, we note that despite the change in controlling case law, the record of this
particular matter compels us to apply the structural error analysis herein. Under that
structural error analysis, defendant’s 2008 robbery conviction and sentence must be
vacated due to defective indictments.2
In this connection, we note that App.R. 26(B) states that “A defendant in a
1
criminal case may apply for reopening[.]” (Emphasis added.)
The original decision in this appeal, State v. Dzelajlija, 8th Dist. No. 95851,
2
2011-Ohio-6445, 2011 WL 6314200, released December 15, 2011, is hereby vacated.
{¶3} On March 23, 2006, defendant was indicted on two counts of robbery and
receiving stolen property, in connection with the September 30, 2005 robbery of a
furniture store employee who was making a night deposit. Defendant was convicted of
the robbery charges and sentenced to concurrent seven-year terms of imprisonment, plus
five years of postrelease control. This court determined that the trial court admitted
inadmissible and prejudicial opinion evidence as to a witness’s truthfulness and reversed
and remanded for a new trial. State v. Dzelajlija, Cuyahoga App. No. 88805,
2007-Ohio-4050, 2007 WL 2269464 (“Dzelajlija I”).
{¶4} Defendant was again convicted of both robbery charges following the retrial,
and on February 21, 2008, he was sentenced to a seven-year term of imprisonment and a
concurrent five-year term of imprisonment, plus three years of postrelease control. The
court additionally ordered this sentence to be served consecutively to an unrelated
conviction in Case No. CR-475938.
{¶5} Defendant appealed to this court. This court concluded that the indictments
were defective under State v. Colon, 118 Ohio St.3d 26, 2008-Ohio-1624, 885 N.E.2d
917 (“Colon I”) and State v. Colon, 119 Ohio St.3d 204, 2008-Ohio-3749, 893 N.E.2d
169 (“Colon II”), for failing to charge defendant with the requisite mens rea of
recklessness. This court therefore again reversed defendant’s convictions, stated that they
were “vacated,” and remanded the matter to the trial court. This court additionally
This opinion, issued upon reconsideration, is the court’s journalized decision in this
appeal. See App.R. 22(C); see also S.Ct.Prac.R. 2.2(A)(1).
determined that since the defective indictments constituted structural error, defendant’s
additional challenge to the weight of the evidence supporting his convictions was moot.
State v. Dzelajlija, 8th Dist. No. 91115, 2009-Ohio-1072, 2009 WL 626326 (“Dzelajlija
II”).
{¶6} On May 20, 2009, the matter was returned to the docket of the trial judge.
At this time, however, defendant was imprisoned in connection with Case
No. CR-475938. Retrial was scheduled for September 14, 2010. On August 27, 2010,
however, the Ohio Supreme Court decided State v. Horner, 126 Ohio St.3d 466,
2010-Ohio-3830, 935 N.E.2d 26. In Horner, the court overruled Colon I and Colon II,
and held that where an indictment charges an offense by tracking the language of the
criminal statute, it is not defective for failure to identify a culpable mental state when the
statute itself fails to specify a mental state.
{¶7} On September 14, 2010, the trial court held a hearing in this matter to
determine the effect of the Horner decision in relation to our prior mandate in Dzelajlija
II. Thereafter, the trial court concluded that defendant was not prejudiced by the delay
in scheduling a retrial, and that the Horner decision constituted extraordinary
circumstances that justified the reimposition of the sentence that had been imposed on
February 21, 2008, without holding another trial. The court then reimposed two
concurrent seven-year sentences.
{¶8} On appeal to this court, defendant maintained that this court’s prior mandate
and principles of res judicata barred further proceedings on the original indictment, and
that the trial court acted without jurisdiction and in derogation of his right to due process
in reimposing sentence without a valid finding of guilt. This court concluded that due to
recent changes in the controlling case law, the original indictment could no longer be
deemed structurally defective, but because the challenge to the manifest weight of the
evidence supporting his conviction had not been decided, the trial court committed
reversible error and acted beyond its mandate in reinstating Dzelajlija’s sentences.
{¶9} Our opinion therefore reflected that the failure to include a mens rea in an
indictment is no longer deemed to create structural error where it tracks the language
language of the criminal statute, but also reflected that we were without authority and
lacked the record to determine the manifest weight of the evidence issue raised Dzelajlija
II. Following release of our December 15, 2011 opinion, the panel that heard Dzelajlija
II declined to reopen the appeal for consideration of that issue.
{¶10} Moreover, indictments that track the relevant statutory provisions are now
generally reviewed for plain error, rather than structural error. State v. Andera, 8th Dist.
No. 92306, 2010-Ohio-3304, 2010 WL 2783688; State v. Segines, 191 Ohio App.3d 60,
2010-Ohio-5112, 944 N.E.2d 1186 (8th Dist.); State v. Dunlap, 129 Ohio St.3d 461,
2011-Ohio-4111, 953 N.E.2d 816. However, we believe that the unresolved issue
regarding the evidentiary support for defendant’s convictions renders the plain error
analysis inappropriate to this matter. Therefore, due to the unique procedural posture of
this matter, we again apply the structural error analysis set forth in Colon I, in order to
address defendant’s assignments of error.
{¶11} Defendant’s second, third, and fourth assignments of error are interrelated
and state:
II. The trial court lacked jurisdiction to affect this court’s judgment in
Dzelajlija II.
III. Res judicata and collateral estoppel preclude the State from
relitigating the validity of Dzelajlija’s indictment when it failed to
appeal that issue to the Ohio Supreme Court.
IV. The state failed to present extraordinary circumstances to justify the
trial court’s deviation from the mandate of Dzelajlija II.
{¶12} In Hedgpeth v. Pulido, 555 U.S. 57, 129 S.Ct. 530, 172 L.Ed.2d 388 (2008),
the United States Supreme Court noted that where error is structural, the verdict must be
set aside without regard as to whether it prejudiced the defendant.
{¶13} In addition, a trial court must follow a mandate from a reviewing court.
State v. Gates, 8th Dist. No. 82385, 2004-Ohio-1453, 2004 WL 584004. In State v.
Carlisle, 8th Dist. No. 93266, 2010-Ohio-3407, 2010 WL 2857806, we explained the
appellate mandate as follows:
An appellate mandate works in two ways: it vests the lower court on
remand with jurisdiction and it gives the lower court on remand the
authority to render judgment consistent with the appellate court’s judgment.
Under the “mandate rule,” a lower court must “carry the mandate of the
upper court into execution and not consider the questions which the
mandate laid at rest.”
{¶14} New judicial rulings may be applied to cases if they are pending on the
announcement date. Ali v. State, 104 Ohio St.3d 328, 2004-Ohio-6592, 819 N.E.2d 687;
State v. Lynn, 5 Ohio St.2d 106, 108, 214 N.E.2d 226 (1966). However, there is no
authority to extend or vary the mandate of the appellate court. State v. Bell, 8th Dist.
No. 92037, 2009-Ohio-2138, 2009 WL 1243769.
{¶15} In this matter, the court in Dzelajlija II determined that the robbery charges
were structurally defective and it vacated the convictions. The mandate from this court
ordered that the matter be remanded to the trial court “for the limited purpose of vacating
the convictions.” The State did not appeal this decision and it became final. The
matter was not reindicted and the matter was no longer a pending case at the time the
Horner decision was announced. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court erred in
considering the matter as pending under the original indictment and in applying Horner
rather than Colon herein. Moreover, because the matter was no longer a pending case,
given Dzelajlija II’s reversal and remand for vacation of the convictions, we further
conclude that the trial court committed reversible error in failing to follow the mandate
ordering the convictions vacated.
{¶16} The second, third, and fourth assignments of error are well taken.
{¶17} Defendant’s first assignment of error states:
I. The trial court erred and violated Dzelajlija’s state and federal due
process rights when it imposed a sentence without a valid finding of guilt.
{¶18} Within this assignment of error, defendant asserts that the trial court erred in
reimposing the February 21, 2008 sentence in the absence of a determination that
defendant was guilty of robbery.
{¶19} The mandate in Dzelajlija II ordered that the matter be remanded to the trial
court “for the limited purpose of vacating the convictions.” This court did not authorize
the trial court to resentence defendant on those charges. The prior appeal of this matter
did not address the manifest weight argument raised by defendant, so this challenge has
not been resolved and the conviction has not become final. Therefore, the trial court
erred in reimposing the sentence announced on February 21, 2008.
{¶20} The first assignment of error is well taken.
{¶21} The matter is reversed; convictions and sentence are vacated.
It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, PRESIDING JUDGE
MARY J. BOYLE, J., CONCURS
KENNETH A. ROCCO, J., CONCURS (SEE SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION)
KENNETH A. ROCCO, J., CONCURRING:
{¶22} Although I fully concur with the majority, I write separately to state once
again that based upon Horner and this court’s inherent authority, I believe that the panel
of Dzelajlija II, 8th Dist. No. 91115, 2009-Ohio-1072, should sua sponte reconsider its
decision in order to review the appellant’s manifest weight of the evidence issue.