State v. Roundtree , 2012 Ohio 3366 ( 2012 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Roundtree, 
    2012-Ohio-3366
    .]
    Court of Appeals of Ohio
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    No. 97577
    STATE OF OHIO
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
    vs.
    DEVON ROUNDTREE
    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
    JUDGMENT:
    AFFIRMED
    Criminal Appeal from the
    Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
    Case Nos. CR-552402 and CR-545642
    BEFORE: Kilbane, J., Sweeney, P.J., and Jones, J.
    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED:                      July 26, 2012
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
    Michael P. Maloney
    24441 Detroit Road
    Suite 300
    Westlake, Ohio 44145
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    William D. Mason
    Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
    James M. Rice
    Andrew Rogalski
    Assistant County Prosecutors
    The Justice Center - 8th Floor
    1200 Ontario Street
    Cleveland, Ohio 44113
    MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J.:
    {¶1} Defendant-appellant, Devon Roundtree (“Roundtree”) appeals his sentence
    in two separate criminal cases. Finding no merit to the appeal, we affirm.
    {¶2} In Case No. CR-545642, Roundtree was indicted in January 2011 and
    charged with felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1).        The allegations
    giving rise to this indictment were that Roundtree was involved in a fight with a juvenile
    acquaintance. Roundtree pled guilty to an amended charge of aggravated assault in
    violation of R.C. 2903.12(A)(1). The trial court sentenced Roundtree to two years of
    community control sanctions in June 2011.
    {¶3} In July 2011, while on community control sanctions for Case No.
    CR-545642, Roundtree was indicted in Case No. CR-552402. Roundtree was again
    charged with felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1). This case, however,
    involved a separate incident and a different victim. The allegations giving rise to this
    indictment were that Roundtree and another male got into a fight over Roundtree’s
    girlfriend, who was dating both men at that time. In September 2011, Roundtree pled
    guilty to an amended charge of attempted felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2923.02
    and 2903.11(A)(1).
    {¶4} In October 2011, a community control violation hearing and sentencing
    hearing was held. In Case No. CR-545642, the trial court found Roundtree in violation
    of his community control sanctions and sentenced him to six months in prison. In Case
    No. CR-552402, the trial court sentenced Roundtree to two years in prison. The trial
    court ordered that the sentences be served consecutive to each other, for a total of two and
    one-half years in prison.
    {¶5} Roundtree now appeals, raising the following two assignments of error for
    review.
    ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR ONE
    The trial court erred in imposing consecutive prison terms upon [Roundtree]
    for his separate convictions.
    ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR TWO
    The trial court        erred   in   sentencing   [Roundtree]   under   O.R.C.
    2929.14(A)(3)(a).
    Standard of Review
    {¶6} In reviewing a felony sentence, we take note of R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), which
    provides in pertinent part:
    The court hearing an appeal * * * shall review the record, including the
    findings underlying the sentence or modification given by the sentencing
    court.
    The appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence
    that is appealed under this section or may vacate the sentence and remand
    the matter to the sentencing court for resentencing. The appellate court’s
    standard for review is not whether the sentencing court abused its
    discretion. The appellate court may take any action authorized by this
    division if it clearly and convincingly finds either of the following:
    (a) That the record does not support the sentencing court’s findings under
    division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of
    section 2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929.20 of the Revised Code,
    whichever, if any, is relevant;
    (b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.
    {¶7} In addition, a sentence imposed for a felony shall be reasonably calculated
    to achieve the two overriding purposes of felony sentencing: (1) “to protect the public
    from future crime by the offender and others” and (2) “to punish the offender using the
    minimum sanctions that the court determines accomplish those purposes.”              R.C.
    2929.11(A).    The sentence imposed shall also be “commensurate with and not
    demeaning to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and its impact upon the victim,
    and consistent with sentences imposed for similar crimes committed by similar
    offenders.” R.C. 2929.11(B).
    Consecutive Sentences
    {¶8} In the first assignment of error, Roundtree argues that the trial court failed
    to make the necessary findings required under R.C. 2929.14(C) for the imposition of
    consecutive sentences.
    {¶9} The General Assembly, through the enactment of House Bill 86 (“H.B.
    86”), recently amended Ohio’s sentencing statutes.          Since H.B. 86 took effect on
    September 30, 2011 and Roundtree was sentenced on October 20, 2011, the trial court
    was required to sentence him under the new statutes.          Relevant to this appeal, the
    revisions under H.B. 86 now require a trial court to make specific findings when
    imposing consecutive sentences. Specifically, R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) provides as follows:
    If multiple prison terms are imposed on an offender for convictions of
    multiple offenses, the court may require the offender to serve the prison
    terms consecutively if the court finds that the consecutive service is
    necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender
    and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of
    the offender’s conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public,
    and if the court also finds any of the following:
    (a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the
    offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed
    pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or
    was under post-release control for a prior offense.
    (b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or
    more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the
    multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single
    prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses
    of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s conduct.
    (c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that
    consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime
    by the offender.
    {¶10} In the instant case, Roundtree was sentenced to six months in prison for his
    community control sanctions violation in Case No. CR-545642 and two years in prison
    for attempted felonious assault in Case No. CR-552402, to be served consecutively, for a
    total of two and one-half years in prison. Roundtree argues that the record is deficient
    with respect to the trial court’s findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). We disagree.
    {¶11} The trial court’s specific findings prior to imposing consecutive sentences
    are as follows:
    [Y]ou know, my job isn’t just to punish you, but it’s to make sure that the
    community is protected.
    So when I look at your record, going back to May 11, 2006, you were
    adjudicated delinquent on a criminal trespass. Then January 26th of 2007,
    it looks like you were adjudicated delinquent on an adult assault with
    disorderly conduct. You were on probation for that, and you were ordered
    to participate in anger management because of the violence in that case.
    In June 2008, you were adjudicated delinquent of disorderly conduct. You
    were put back on probation. And then it looks like in July 2008[,] there’s
    another disorderly conduct.
    In September 2009, it looks like you were adjudicated delinquent of
    domestic violence.
    And then December 26th of 2010, you were picked up for felonious assault
    [in Case No. CR-545642] that you did plead to aggravated assault, and I
    placed you on probation. And then the day after your probation or later
    that day, you picked up another felonious assault [in Case No. CR-552402]
    of which you pled guilty to an attempted felonious assault, a felony of the
    third degree.
    ***
    So as a result of violating your probation, as I said, on a previous day you
    pled guilty to one count of aggravated assault, felony of the fourth degree.
    I am going to find that since you clearly violated by picking up a crime of
    violence, considering all the [relevant] serious and recidivism factors,
    ensuring that [the] public is protected, * * * I’m going to run [Roundtree’s
    six month prison term in Case No. CR-545642] consecutive to the prison
    term in Case Number 552402.
    ***
    And I’m going to find that a consecutive prison term is necessary to protect
    the community and punish the offender, and it’s not disproportionate.
    I also find that the harm was so great or unusual that a single term doesn’t
    adequately protect or reflect the seriousness of this conduct. And, * * *
    you were on probation for aggravated assault and either later that day or the
    next day you went and committed another crime of violence, and attempted
    felonious assault, where someone was severely injured. And I find that
    your conduct in your history shows that a consecutive sentence is needed to
    protect the public.
    {¶12} Contrary to Roundtree’s assertion, we find that the trial court complied with
    the dictates of R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) and made all the required findings to support the
    imposition of consecutive sentences.       The trial judge found that the imposition of
    consecutive sentences would not be disproportionate to the seriousness of Roundtree’s
    conduct and to the danger that he poses to the public.          The trial judge considered
    Roundtree’s history of criminal conduct and emphasized that the first or second day that
    he was on probation in Case No. CR-545642, he committed the attempted felonious
    assault in Case No. CR-552402, where someone was severely injured. Therefore, we
    find that the trial court articulated the necessary findings consistent with the directives of
    R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).
    Attempted Felonious Assault Sentence
    {¶13} In the second assignment of error, Roundtree argues that the trial court erred
    when it sentenced him under R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(a) to two years in prison. Roundtree
    claims that the trial court should have sentenced him under R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(b)
    because none of the offenses listed in R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(a) apply to his attempted
    felonious assault conviction in Case No. CR-552402. R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(a) provides
    that:
    [f]or a felony of the third degree that is a violation of section 2903.06,
    2903.08, 2907.03, 2907.04, or 2907.05 of the Revised Code or that is a
    violation of section 2911.02 or 2911.12 of the Revised Code if the offender
    previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty in two or more separate
    proceedings to two or more violations of section 2911.01, 2911.02,
    2911.11, or 2911.12 of the Revised Code, the prison term shall be twelve,
    eighteen, twenty-four, thirty, thirty-six, forty-two, forty-eight, fifty-four, or
    sixty months.
    {¶14} R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(b) provides that: “[f]or a felony of the third degree that
    is not an offense for which division (A)(3)(a) of this section applies, the prison term shall
    be nine, twelve, eighteen, twenty-four, thirty, or thirty-six months.”
    {¶15} In the instant case, a review of the record reveals the trial court was under
    the impression that the possible prison term for Roundtree’s attempted felonious assault
    conviction was either 12, 18, 24, 30, 36, 42, 48, 54 or 60 months. At the sentencing
    hearing, defense counsel asked the trial court to give Roundtree a one-year sentence under
    the new sentencing guidelines because of Roundtree’s previous assault. The trial judge
    agreed, noting that Roundtree “gets the benefit of the lower because I feel that the longer
    sentence range applies to aggravated vehicular homicide and assaults.” The trial court
    then considered Roundtree’s criminal history and noted that Roundtree was on
    community control sanctions when he committed the new offense. The trial court stated:
    [I]n considering all of the relevant serious and recidivism factors and
    ensuring that the public is protected from future crime and you are
    punished, I do feel * * * that a prison term is appropriate and I feel like in
    this particular case, the lowest prison term of one year is not appropriate
    since you were on probation and just placed on probation at the time that
    you committed this new offense of violence.
    So I find that imposing a two-year prison term is appropriate.
    {¶16} While the trial court appeared to be under the impression that the minimum
    sentence for Roundtree’s attempted felonious assault conviction was 12 months,
    Roundtree’s two-year sentence was within the statutory range. See State v. Green, 8th
    Dist. No. 96966, 
    2012-Ohio-1941
    , ¶ 32; State v. Stein, 8th Dist. No. 97395,
    
    2012-Ohio-2502
    , ¶ 8; State v. Williams, 8th Dist. No. 96813, 
    2012-Ohio-1830
    , ¶ 43
    (where this court has found that if the sentence is within the statutory range, the sentence
    is not contrary to law). Roundtree does not claim that he was prejudiced, the trial court
    stated its reasons for imposing the two-year sentence, and the sentence does not exceed
    the maximum statutory term of 36 months. See R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(b). Therefore,
    Roundtree’s two-year prison sentence in Case No. CR-552402 is not contrary to law, and
    thus, is proper under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).
    {¶17} Accordingly, the first and second assignments of error are overruled.
    {¶18} Judgment is affirmed.
    It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
    It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
    pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
    the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    MARY EILEEN KILBANE, JUDGE
    JAMES J. SWEENEY, P.J., and
    LARRY A. JONES, SR., J., CONCUR
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 97577

Citation Numbers: 2012 Ohio 3366

Judges: Kilbane

Filed Date: 7/26/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014