State v. Clark , 2011 Ohio 6623 ( 2011 )

[Cite as State v. Clark, 2011-Ohio-6623.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 96207
STATE OF OHIO
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
DARIUS CLARK
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT:
REVERSED AND REMANDED
Criminal Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-536300
BEFORE: Sweeney, J., Blackmon, P.J., and E. Gallagher, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: December 22, 2011
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Robert Tobik, Esq.
Chief Public Defender
By: Nathaniel McDonald, Esq.
Assistant Public Defender
310 Lakeside Avenue, Suite 400
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
William D. Mason, Esq.
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
By: Jennifer A. Driscoll, Esq.
Mark J. Mahoney, Esq.
Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys
The Justice Center
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
JAMES J. SWEENEY, J.:
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Darius Clark (“defendant”) appeals his multiple
convictions for felonious assault, child endangerment, and domestic violence regarding his
girlfriend’s two children, and his associated 28-year prison sentence. After reviewing the
facts of the case and pertinent law, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
{¶ 2} During the time pertinent to this case, defendant was living with his
girlfriend (“mother”) and her two children, L.P., who was born on September 26, 2006,
and A.T., who was born on May 17, 2008. From March 8 through March 12, 2010, the
children were under the care of defendant while mother was staying with a friend. On
March 16, 2010, mother again left the children in defendant’s care. At all other times
pertinent to this appeal the children were under the care of defendant and mother.
{¶ 3} On March 17, 2010, L.P.’s preschool teachers noticed bruises on him and
reported possible abuse to the authorities. On March 18, 2010, a social worker found the
children at defendant’s mother’s house, where they were being looked after by two
teenagers. After awhile, defendant’s mother arrived at the house, and eventually, the
social worker took the children to the hospital. According to the doctor who examined
the children, L.P. had multiple bruises in various stages of development and abrasions
consistent with being whipped with a belt. A.T. had multiple bruises and burn marks, a
swollen hand, and a pattern of sores at her hairline consistent with braids being ripped out
of her head. The doctor suspected child abuse and estimated that the injuries occurred
between February 28 and March 18, 2010. In response to questions from several adults,
L.P. stated that “Dee did it.” It is undisputed that defendant’s nickname is “Dee.”
{¶ 4} On April 15, 2010, defendant and mother were charged with the following:
five counts of felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), two counts of
endangering children in violation of R.C. 2919.22(B)(1), and two counts of domestic
violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A). Mother pled guilty to three of the counts, and
the court postponed her sentencing until after defendant’s trial.
{¶ 5} On November 16, 2010, the court held a hearing and found four-year-old
L.P. incompetent to testify. The court also summarily denied defendant’s motion in
limine requesting that evidence of L.P.’s out-of-court statements identifying defendant be
excluded from trial. On November 22, 2010, a jury found defendant guilty of all counts
except one of the felonious assault charges concerning A.T. The court sentenced
defendant to eight years in prison for each felonious assault conviction, four years in
prison for each count of endangering children, and six months in prison for each count of
domestic violence. The court ran three assault sentences and one endangering children
sentence consecutively for an aggregate of 28 years in prison.
{¶ 6} Defendant appeals and raises nine assignments of error for our review. We
address the assignments of error out of order where appropriate, starting with assignments
of error three and four.
{¶ 7} III. “The trial court violated Mr. Clark’s confrontation clause rights
pursuant to the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section
10 of the Ohio Constitution by admitting prejudicial out-of-court statements by [L.P.].”
{¶ 8} IV. “The trial court violated Mr. Clark’s confrontation clause rights
pursuant to the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section
10 of the Ohio Constitution when it erroneously found that the requirements of Ohio Rule
of Evidence 807 had been satisfied.”
{¶ 9} In the instant case, the court denied defendant’s motion in limine and ruled
admissible L.P.’s out-of-court statements that “Dee did it.” Seven witnesses testified as
to what L.P. stated: Cleveland police detective Jody Remington; Cuyahoga County
Department of Children and Family Services [CCDCFS] social worker Sarah Bolog;
CCDCFS social worker Howard Little; L.P.’s assistant preschool teacher Ramona
Whitley; L.P.’s lead preschool teacher Debra Jones; the children’s maternal grandmother;
and the children’s maternal great aunt.
{¶ 10} Defendant argues that the court erred by admitting L.P.’s statements at trial,
because the statements were testimonial in nature, L.P. was declared incompetent to
testify, and defendant did not have the opportunity to cross-examine L.P.
The Confrontation Clause
{¶ 11} We review issues concerning Confrontation Clause violations under a de
novo standard. State v. Babb, Cuyahoga App. No. 86294, 2006-Ohio-2209. Pursuant to
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, out-of-court statements that are
testimonial in nature are inadmissible unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant
was given a prior opportunity for cross-examination. Crawford v. Washington (2004),
541 U.S. 36, 52, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177. This test does not apply to
nontestimonial hearsay. Id. See, also, Michigan v. Bryant (2011), 562 U.S. , 131
S. Ct. 1143, 1167, 179 L. Ed. 2d 93 (holding that the statements at issue were not testmonial
and “leav[ing] for the [state] courts to decide on remand whether the statements’
admission was otherwise permitted by state hearsay rules”).
{¶ 12} Thus, as a threshold matter, courts must determine whether statements are
testimonial before subjecting them to Crawford standards. Id. at 51-52. Testimonial
statements are, among other things, “statements that were made under circumstances
which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be
available for use at a later trial.” Id. (Internal citations omitted.)
{¶ 13} The definition of testimonial statements was further scrutinized in Davis v.
Washington (2006), 547 U.S. 813, 822, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 165 L. Ed. 2d 224, where the
United States Supreme Court held the following: “Statements are nontestimonial when
made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that
the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing
emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is
no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.”
{¶ 14} In Davis, the victim’s statements to a 911 operator were found to be
nontestimonial, as their primary purpose was “to enable police assistance to meet an
ongoing emergency.” Id. at 828. However, the victim’s statements to police officers
who responded to the domestic-violence call were held to be testimonial, because “the
primary, if not indeed the sole, purpose of the interrogation was to investigate a possible
crime.” Id. at 830.
{¶ 15} The Ohio Supreme Court applied this body of law to statements made to a
medical professional in State v. Stahl, 111 Ohio St. 3d 186, 2006-Ohio-5482, 855 N.E.2d
834. The Stahl court distinguished Davis, and held that a rape victim’s statements to a
nurse practitioner during a medical examination were nontestimonial, because the primary
purpose was receiving medical treatment. Id. at ¶25. “In determining whether a
statement is testimonial for Confrontation Clause purposes, courts should focus on the
expectation of the declarant at the time of making the statement; the intent of a questioner
is relevant only if it could affect a reasonable declarant’s expectations.” Id. at paragraph
two of the syllabus.
{¶ 16} In State v. Siler, 116 Ohio St. 3d 39, 2007-Ohio-5637, 876 N.E.2d 534, ¶30,
the Ohio Supreme Court further addressed this issue, holding that “to determine whether a
child declarant’s statement made in the course of police interrogation is testimonial or
nontestimonial, courts should apply the primary-purpose test” enunciated in Davis. The
court also stated that the objective-witness test found in Stahl applies when the
interrogator is not in law-enforcement. Siler at ¶28. The distinction between the two
tests is “based on the identity of the interrogator and the purpose of the questioning.” Id.
Additionally, the court concluded that “the age of a declarant is not determinative of
whether a testimonial statement has been made during a police interrogation.” Id. at ¶41.
{¶ 17} The issue of child victims’ testimony was addressed most recently by the
Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Arnold, 126 Ohio St. 3d 290, 2010-Ohio-2742, 933 N.E.2d
775, ¶11, where the court determined the following: “whether, in a criminal prosecution,
the out-of-court statements made by a child to an interviewer employed by a
child-advocacy center violates [sic] the right to confront witnesses * * *.” Arnold
recognized that the child advocate who interviewed the victim worked in a “dual
capacity,” such that the questioning “might produce both testimonial and nontestimonial
statements.” Id. at ¶41. The court explained the child advocate’s dual capacity as
follows: “she was both a forensic interviewer collecting information for use by the police
and a medical interviewer eliciting information necessary for diagnosis and treatment.”
Id. at ¶44.
{¶ 18} Arnold concluded that statements regarding “medical diagnosis and
treatment are nontestimonial and are admissible without offending the Confrontation
Clause. * * * We further hold that statements * * * that serve primarily a forensic or
investigative purpose are testimonial and are inadmissible pursuant to the Confrontation
Clause when the declarant is unavailable for cross-examination at trial.” Id.
Additionally, the court held that the “forensic statements” were subject to a harmless error
review. Id.
{¶ 19} In the instant case, L.P.’s statement to Detective Remington that “Dee did it”
was primarily investigative or forensic in nature, as the detective was clearly a member of
law enforcement. Detective Remington testified about her interaction with L.P. as
follows: “As long as we played, he was okay. He was pretty enamored with my badge,
like most little boys are. So I gave him the badge, and I told him I’m the police, and I’d
like to help you. I’d like to make sure nobody ever hurts you like this again. Can you
tell me who hurt you?” There is no suggestion that L.P.’s identification of defendant as
the abuser was elicited for medical purposes or to assist an ongoing police emergency.
Therefore, this testimony was improperly admitted at trial.
{¶ 20} Bolog testified that she is an investigator for CCDCFS. Her primary duties
are to “gather information to determine if, according to the Ohio Revised Code, there is
substantial evidence for child abuse or neglect or dependency issues.” She testified that
the “bottom line” purpose for her investigation is “making sure that the minors in
Cuyahoga County are safe and have stable provisions for their basic needs.” Bolog
testified that L.P. told her who abused him on two occasions:
{¶ 21} “The first time was in [defendant’s mother’s house] and it was right before
the commotion * * * and, you know, the police were there and everything was going on. *
* * I was showing him pictures of my dogs, and we were trying to gain that trust. And in
talking about things non-related, we would throw in a question about the investigation.
So it was like fun question, fun question, fun question, how did you get this mark on your
face? And his body language changed. * * * And he said — he put his head down and he
said, Daddy did it. Dee did it. And he just said Dee did it.
{¶ 22} “And then the second instance where he said it in front of me was at the
hospital. Detective Remington and her partner had come in. * * * And [L.P.] was very
interested in her badge and handcuffs, you know. * * * And at this point, she had a picture
of [defendant]. And she asked [L.P.] if he knew who this was, and he said, you know —
looked at it and * * * turned his head and said, It was daddy. It was Dee. So when
asked * * * how did you get these marks? What happened? And he said again, Dee did
it.”
{¶ 23} We analyze L.P.’s statements to Bolog under the framework of Arnold,
insomuch as Bolog, as a social worker, acted in a dual capacity. In Arnold, the court
found that some of the victim’s statements to the child advocate were made with a
primary purpose to “gather forensic information to investigate and potentially prosecute a
defendant for the offense.” Arnold at ¶33. These statements included: the “assertion
that Arnold shut and locked the bedroom door before raping her; her descriptions of where
her mother and brother were while she was in the bedroom with Arnold, of Arnold’s boxer
shorts, of him removing them, and of what Arnold’s ‘pee-pee’ looked like; and her
statement that Arnold removed her underwear.” Id. at ¶34.
{¶ 24} The Arnold court reasoned that the statements “involved a description of
past events,” specifically concerning the abuse, the victim had been discharged from the
hospital and there was no medical emergency, and “the interview was rather formal, more
akin to the videotaped, planned interview of Crawford than to the frantic 9-1-1 call or the
sequestered but spur-of-the moment interview recounted in Davis.” Id. at ¶35.
{¶ 25} The court additionally determined that other statements made during the
same interview were “medically necessary,” because, for example, certain information can
trigger the administration of a rape kit or a test for sexually transmitted diseases. Id. at
¶39. See, also, In re J.M., Pike App. No. 08CA782, 2011-Ohio-3377, ¶39 (holding that a
child-victim’s statement that the incident occurred on July 3, 2007 was not testimonial
because “placing [the] injury in a temporal context served a medical-diagnostic purpose”).
{¶ 26} Upon review, we find that Bolog was acting as an agent of law enforcement
when L.P. identified defendant as the person who abused him. This information
established defendant as a suspect in the investigation. Furthermore, although removing
victims from abusive situations may fall under Bolog’s duty to keep children safe, under
the circumstances of the instant case there was no evidence of an ongoing police
emergency. Accordingly, L.P.’s statements to Bolog were testimonial, and because L.P.
was not subject to cross-examination, the statements were improperly admitted at trial.
{¶ 27} Little testified that he is an intake social worker at CCDCFS, and his job
duties are “to investigate allegations of abuse and neglect, dependency, [and] emotional
maltreatment.” Asked what he talked to L.P. about when he arrived at the daycare, Little
testified as follows:
{¶ 28} “I talked to L.P. basically about how did he receive the bruising that was on
his left facial area and also about basically trying to get more information about who was *
* * Dee.
{¶ 29} “* * *
{¶ 30} “[L.P.] mentioned that Dee was his father, that he lived in the home. He
had mentioned that — first that he had sustained some marks and bruises from falling
down the stairs. But when I re-questioned him and tried to make him feel a little bit more
comfortable, he later stated that the bruises came because he didn’t put his toys back up
and they were thrown all over the floor. So that’s why he got a spanking for that.”
{¶ 31} Upon review, we find that Little’s discussion with L.P. was part of the
preliminary investigation to aid law enforcement. There is no indication that L.P.’s
statements were made in the midst of a police emergency. Additionally, there is no
evidence that the statements were made in the context of medical treatment or diagnosis.
Accordingly, L.P.’s statements to Little were testimonial and inadmissible at trial.
{¶ 32} Two of L.P.’s teachers testified at defendant’s trial about L.P.’s out-of-court
statements. It is an issue of first impression for this court whether statements made to
teachers may be testimonial in nature, and thus subject to analysis under Crawford.
{¶ 33} Ramona Whitley, who was L.P.’s assistant preschool teacher at the time the
abuse was discovered, testified that on March 17, 2010, she noticed that L.P.’s eye was
bloodshot and he had “welt marks” on his face. Whitley testified that as part of her job,
she is “supposed to always observe [the children], look for different things, what’s going
on with them.” Whitley brought L.P.’s injuries to the attention of a co-worker. Whitley
was instructed to make “the 696 call,” which she explained is “a number that you call if a
child is in need for some sort of service, if the child is hurt, being physically abused,
sexually abused, there’s a number that we call to make sure everything’s okay.” Whitley
testified that she is a “mandatory reporter,” meaning that “by law I have to report what is
going on when it comes to the safety of a child.” Whitley testified that when she asked
L.P. what happened, he gave three different answers: that he fell; that he did not know;
and that “Dee did it.” Additionally, Whitley made a statement to the Cleveland police
two to three days later.
{¶ 34} Debra Jones, who was L.P.’s lead preschool teacher, testified that on March
17, 2010, Whitley brought L.P.’s injuries to her attention. Jones took L.P. out of the
classroom and asked him what happened. L.P. looked “bewildered * * * he almost
looked uncertain, but he said, Dee did it.” Jones testified that she took L.P. to her
supervisor’s office and Whitley called 696-KIDS because “we saw enough to make the
call.” Jones testified that two days later she met with and gave a statement to a detective
from the Cleveland Police Department.
{¶ 35} Upon review, we find that the primary purpose of Jones and Whitley
questioning L.P. was to report potential child abuse to law enforcement. Both teachers
testified that their obligation to report is mandatory. We additionally find that it is
reasonable for an objective witness to expect that statements made to a teacher while she is
reporting suspected child abuse may be used at a later trial. Therefore, we conclude that
L.P.’s statements to Whitley and Jones were testimonial and improperly admitted at
defendant’s trial.
Evid.R. 807
{¶ 36} Out-of-court statements that are not testimonial in nature are considered
hearsay, which is generally inadmissible at trial, unless it falls within one of many
exceptions to the rule against hearsay and is “sufficiently reliable for admission.” See
State v. Muttart, 116 Ohio St. 3d 5, 2007-Ohio-5267, 875 N.E.2d 944, ¶25. We review
the admissibility of relevant evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. State v.
Sage (1987), 31 Ohio St. 3d 173, 510 N.E.2d 343. At issue are L.P.’s statements to
grandmother and great aunt. Asked if she ever talked to L.P. “about who did this to
him,” great aunt testified that “[h]e laid in my lap, and he told me Dee did it.” Asked
“did you ever find out who caused those injuries to the children,” grandmother testified
that “[L.P.] told me Dee.”
{¶ 37} Defendant argues that these statements are inadmissible hearsay pursuant to
Evid.R. 807(A), which states as follows:
{¶ 38} “An out-of-court statement made by a child who is under twelve years of age
at the time of trial or hearing describing * * * any act of physical violence directed against
the child is not excluded as hearsay under Evid.R. 802 if all of the following apply:
{¶ 39} “(1) The court finds that the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
making of the statement provides particularized guarantees of trustworthiness that make
the statement at least as reliable as statements admitted pursuant to Evid.R. 803 and 804.
The circumstances must establish that the child was particularly likely to be telling the
truth when the statement was made and that the test of cross-examination would add little
to the reliability of the statement. In making its determination of the reliability of the
statement, the court shall consider all of the circumstances surrounding the making of the
statement, including but not limited to spontaneity, the internal consistency of the
statement, the mental state of the child, the child’s motive or lack of motive to fabricate,
the child’s use of terminology unexpected of a child of similar age, the means by which
the statement was elicited, and the lapse of time between the act and the statement. In
making this determination, the court shall not consider whether there is independent proof
of the sexual act or act of physical violence.
{¶ 40} “(2) The child’s testimony is not reasonably obtainable by the proponent of
the statement.
{¶ 41} “(3) There is independent proof of the sexual act or act of physical violence.
{¶ 42} “(4) At least ten days before the trial or hearing, a proponent of the statement
has notified all other parties in writing of the content of the statement, the time and place
at which the statement was made, the identity of the witness who is to testify about the
statement, and the circumstances surrounding the statement that are claimed to indicate its
trustworthiness.”
{¶ 43} Defendant essentially argues that, under the circumstances in the instant
case, L.P.’s statements were not reliable under the first element of Evid.R. 807(A), and
that, under the third element, there was no independent proof that he was the perpetrator of
the act of physical violence.
{¶ 44} In State v. Silverman, 121 Ohio St. 3d 581, 2009-Ohio-1576, 906 N.E.2d
427, ¶34, the Ohio Supreme Court held that “a hearsay statement of a child declarant can
be admitted under Evid.R. 807 without a determination of the child’s competence to
testify.”
{¶ 45} In Silverman, the child victim was killed; thus, the court did not determine
whether she was competent to testify. Silverman limited the holding in State v. Said
(1994), 71 Ohio St. 3d 473, 644 N.E.2d 337, which required a finding of competency prior
to admitting a statement under Evid.R. 807. Silverman at ¶30.
{¶ 46} The instant case is distinguishable from Silverman and Said, because, after a
hearing, the court found L.P. incompetent to testify.
{¶ 47} “Counsel, * * * I believe — I’ve heard enough out of — this child is not
competent to testify. Watching the — he’s gone already. Watching his demeanor on
the stand — and it’s, by the way, perfectly understandable to deal with this kind of
behavior, but he’s definitely not competent in this Court’s opinion. So that’s my ruling.
He will not be able to testify as a witness.”
{¶ 48} In applying the circumstances of the case at hand to Evid.R. 807, we must
determine whether L.P. “was particulrly likely to be telling the truth” when stating that
“Dee did it.” First, the evidence is inconclusive as to whether these statements were
spontaneous declarations by L.P. or answers to questions posed by others. Second, L.P.
repeatedly stated that Dee abused him; however, L.P. also stated that a fall down the stairs
caused the bruises and that he did not know how he got the bruises. Third, the evidence
in the record shows that L.P.’s mental state was understandably somewhat unstable and
that he was undergoing counseling. Fourth, the record is silent on L.P.’s “motive or lack
of motive to fabricate.” Fifth, L.P. used terminology expected of a four-year-old — “Dee
did it.” Sixth, “the means by which the statement was elicited” is unclear from the
record. We note, however, that all of L.P.’s statements previously analyzed under
Crawford were made in response to investigative questions asked by adults. Seventh, the
record does not establish when L.P. identified defendant as his abuser to his grandmother
and great aunt.
{¶ 49} We turn to the third element of Evid.R. 807, which generally questions
whether there is independent proof of the act of physical violence. However, in the
instant case, the question is not whether the abuse occured; rather, it is “Who abused
L.P.?” Under a similar fact pattern, the United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit,
found that admission of evidence identifying the abuser was not harmless error:
{¶ 50} “In the instant case, L.B.’s taped statements contained the only evidence that
she had been raped by Mr. Gaston. While there was physical evidence that L.B. had been
the victim of sexual abuse, the physical evidence did not support an inference that Mr.
Gaston was the perpetrator. The denial of the right to cross-examine L.B. had a
substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s verdict. Accordingly we conclude that the
trial court’s errors were not harmless.” Gaston v. Brigano (C.A. 6, 2006), 208 Fed.Appx.
376, 392.
{¶ 51} Pursuant to Crim.R. 52(A), “[a]ny error * * * which does not affect
substantial rights shall be disregarded.” In State v. Cooper, Cuyahoga App. No. 86437,
2006-Ohio-817, ¶19, we held that “[t]he defendant has a constitutional guarantee to a trial
free from prejudicial error, not necessarily one free of all error. Where there is no
reasonable possibility that unlawful testimony contributed to a conviction, the error is
harmless and therefore will not be grounds for reversal.”
{¶ 52} Upon review, we find that L.P.’s statements lacked the “particularized
gurantees of trustworthiness” outlined in Evid.R. 807. Although Ohio law is not clear on
this precise point, we are concerned with reconciling the court’s finding L.P. incompetent
to testify in November of 2010 with the court’s finding that statements L.P. made eight
months prior were reliable enough to be admitted at trial. Compare State v. Street (1997),
122 Ohio App. 3d 79, 85, 701 N.E.2d 50 (opining that finding a child witness incompetent
to testify requires the “conclusion that any earlier statements he made were inadmissible
under Evid.R. 807. * * * We find it unreasonable to presume that [the child witness] might
have been more competent at an earlier age, such as when the statements in question were
made”) (emphasis in original).
{¶ 53} Additionally, we find that the only direct evidence that defendant was the
perpetrator was L.P.’s statements identifying him. The evidence shows that when mother
left L.P. in defendant’s care, L.P. was staying at defendant’s mother’s house with various
family members. Therefore, we conclude that L.P.’s statements to grandmother and great
aunt are inadmissible hearsay under Evid.R. 807. Coupled with L.P.’s improperly
admitted testimonial statements under Crawford, we find prejudicial error in the court’s
ruling regarding L.P.’s statements that “Dee did it.” We are aware of the sensitive nature
of this case and any case concerning victims of child abuse. The injuries to these
children are reprehensible, and the perpetrator deserves punishment. Notwithstanding,
we must recognize and ensure “the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee that, ‘[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right * * * to be confronted with the witnesses
against him.’” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 38. The right to a fair trial is paramount to the
delivery of a just verdict.
{¶ 54} Accordingly, defendant’s third and fourth assignments of error are sustained.
{¶ 55} Defendant’s first assignment of error states as follows:
{¶ 56} I. “Mr. Clark’s convictions with respect to counts 1 and 6 are not
supported by legally sufficient evidence as required by state and federal due process.”
{¶ 57} Specifically, defendant argues that the state failed to present sufficient
evidence of serious physical harm to support the felonious assault and endangering
children convictions regarding L.P. Both of these offenses contain an element of
“serious physical harm,” which is defined in R.C. 2901.01(A)(5) as follows:
{¶ 58} “(a) Any mental illness or condition of such gravity as would normally
require hospitalization or prolonged psychiatric treatment;
{¶ 59} “(b) Any physical harm that carries a substantial risk of death;
{¶ 60} “(c) Any physical harm that involves some permanent incapacity, whether
partial or total, or that involves some temporary, substantial incapacity;
{¶ 61} “(d) Any physical harm that involves some permanent disfigurement or that
involves some temporary, serious disfigurement;
{¶ 62} “(e) Any physical harm that involves acute pain of such duration as to result
in substantial suffering or that involves any degree of prolonged or intractable pain.”
{¶ 63} When reviewing sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court must
determine, “after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution,
whether any reasonable trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St. 3d 259, 273, 574
N.E.2d 492.
{¶ 64} Upon review, we find the following evidence in the record:
{¶ 65} Dr. Jeffrey Pennington, who is an emergency medicine physician, testified
that he examined L.P. and A.T. for suspected child abuse on March 18, 2010. He
observed “linear vertical abrasions with [bruising] on the upper torso, left chest, [and]
bilateral medial thighs” of L.P. According to Dr. Pennington, these bruises were typical
of “being beaten with objects that leave particular marks,” and meant “that you were
struck with something that left a very sharp mark” such as “a belt or something of that
nature.” L.P. also had two separate bruises near his left eye and “conjunctival
hemorrhage,” which is “bleeding in the white part of the eye which can result from minor
trauma as well as being hit.” L.P. had a mark on his left cheek, the size and shape of
which indicated it might have been caused by a bite, and bruising on his arm, which was
consistent with “finger marks from being grabbed.”
{¶ 66} At the hospital, L.P. was given an acuity ranking of three on a scale of one to
five. Dr. Pennington testified that this is an “intermediate range of acuity, meaning it’s
not life-threatening, but they should be seen within a reasonable time.” L.P.’s final
assessment was multiple linear abrasions and bruising “in different stages of development
indicative of non-accidental trauma.” Dr. Pennington explained that some of the bruising
appeared brand-new and some of it was “days or longer older.”
{¶ 67} L.P. and A.T.’s great-aunt, who now has custody of the children, testified
that she saw them at the emergency room on March 18, 2010. L.P. had a black eye and
what looked like belt marks across his stomach and his back. L.P.’s black eye lasted “a
couple of weeks,” and the bruising on L.P.’s back made it uncomfortable for him to lay
down for “a little bit over a month.” According to the great aunt, L.P. continues to have
headaches and nightmares and is in counseling once a week.
{¶ 68} According to the children’s maternal grandmother, who also testified at trial,
“it took a while” for L.P.’s bruises to go away, and “[m]entally, he’s really messed up.”
{¶ 69} Defendant argues that the instant case is analogous to State v. Snyder,
Cuyahoga App. No. 94755, 2011-Ohio-1062 and State v. Ivey (1994), 98 Ohio App. 3d
249, 648 N.E.2d 519, in which this court found insufficient evidence of serious physical
harm in relation to child abuse. Upon review, however, we find that the facts of the case
at hand are distinguishable in one substantial aspect: Snyder and Ivey involved single
incidents of corporal punishment, while the evidence in the instant case suggests that L.P.
was the victim of recurrent abuse.
{¶ 70} Evidence in the record suggests that L.P. was whipped, hit, bit, and grabbed
with enough force to leave lasting marks, some of which were located in and around his
left eye. Dr. Pennington testified that L.P.’s injuries were in various stages of
development, suggesting that L.P. was abused on more than one occasion. L.P.’s
relatives testified that his bruises lingered, and the physical pain affected him for
approximately one month after the injuries were inflicted. Additionally, there is evidence
that L.P. suffers from nightmares and headaches, for which he receives counseling. L.P.
was three and one-half years old when the abuse at issue occurred.
{¶ 71} We find that reasonable minds could have found that L.P. suffered serious
physical harm as defined in R.C. 2901.01(A)(5)(a)-(e), in that he is undergoing counseling,
he was incapacitated, he suffered temporary, serious disfigurement, and had chronic
bruises. A reasonable trier of fact could infer that this abuse would result in acute pain to
a three-and-a-half-year-old child. Defendant’s first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 72} Pursuant to App.R. 12(A)(1)(c), defendant’s remaining assignments of error
are made moot by our disposition of assignments of error three and four. Defendant’s
convictions are reversed and this case is remanded for a new trial.
{¶ 73} This cause is reversed and remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is, therefore, considered that said appellant recover of said appellee his costs
herein.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into
execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
JAMES J. SWEENEY, JUDGE
PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, P.J., and
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR