State v. Valentine ( 2011 )

[Cite as State v. Valentine, 2011-Ohio-5828.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 96047
STATE OF OHIO
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
MICHAEL E. VALENTINE
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED
Criminal Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-336465
BEFORE: Blackmon, P.J., Stewart, J., and Cooney, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 10, 2011
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ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Robert L. Tobik
Cuyahoga County Public Defender
Erika B. Cunliffe
Assistant County Public Defender
310 Lakeside Avenue
Suite 200
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
William D. Mason
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
Matthew E. Meyer
Daniel T. Van
Assistant County Prosecutors
The Justice Center, 8th Floor
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
Also Listed:
Michael Valentine, Pro Se
Inmate No. 324-635
S.O.C.F.
P.O.Box 45699
Lucasville, Ohio 45699-0001
PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, P.J.:
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{¶ 1} Appellant Michael Valentine appeals his convictions on various grounds,
and through his assigned counsel, the following errors are raised:
“I. The trial court erred by failing to merge Mr. Valentine’s convictions
for rape and felonious sexual penetration where they were allied
offenses of similar import.”
“II. The trial court failed to conduct an adequate classification hearing
as required by State v. Eppinger (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 168 and in
violation of appellant’s state and federal due process rights.”
{¶ 2} Valentine also assigns the following pro se error for our review:
“I. Defendant was denied due process of law when he was allowed to be
convicted upon indictments which did not specify a date or distinguish
between conduct on any give date.”
{¶ 3} Having reviewed the record and pertinent law, we affirm the trial court’s
decision. The apposite facts follow.
{¶ 4} On May 25, 1996, the Cuyahoga County Grand Jury indicted Valentine on
20 separate counts of rape of his stepdaughter, a minor under the age of 13, each with an
offense date of March 1, 1995 to January 16, 1996. In addition, the grand jury indicted
Valentine on 20 separate counts of felonious sexual pene-tration of the child, each with an
offense date of March 1, 1995 to January 16, 1996. On August 16, 1996, after a jury
trial, Valentine was found guilty of all 40 counts. The trial court immediately sentenced
Valentine to 40 consecutive life terms, and he appealed.
{¶ 5} During the pendency of Valentine’s direct appeal, the General Assembly
passed Ohio’s version of Megan’s Law. Consequently, on June 26, 1997, the trial court
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conducted a hearing to determine Valentine’s sexual offender classification. On July 17,
1997, we affirmed Valentine’s conviction for the 20 counts of rape, but because of
insufficient evidence, reduced the 20 convictions for felonious sexual penetration to 15.
State v. Valentine (July 17, 1997), Cuyahoga App. No. 71301.
{¶ 6} Thereafter, Valentine sought collateral review in the federal court on the
remaining 35 convictions. The federal district court granted Valentine’s petition for
habeas corpus relief and issued a writ, finding the indictment in the case violated
Valentine’s due process rights. Valentine v. Huffman (N.D. Ohio 2003), 285 F.Supp.2d
1011. Specifically, the federal district court held that the identical counts in the
indictment violated his due process right to be notified of the crime charged with
reasonable certainty so that he could fairly protect himself from double jeopardy.
{¶ 7} The federal district court vacated all but one count of rape and one count of
felonious sexual penetration. Id. The warden challenged the granting of the writ, but the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court’s decision. Valentine v. Konteh
(C.A. 6, 2005), 395 F.3d 626.
{¶ 8} On October 12, 2005, the trial court held a hearing to resentence Valentine
in accordance with the federal court’s decision. At the hearing, Valentine argued that his
conviction for rape and felonious sexual penetration were allied offenses and should be
merged. Valentine also challenged his 1997 classification as a sexual predator. The
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trial court concluded that the offenses were not allied and proceeded to impose two
concurrent life sentences.
{¶ 9} On August 19, 2010, Valentine filed a motion for resentencing on the
grounds that the trial court had failed to advise him of his appellate rights. The trial
court granted the motion and, on October 20, 2010, held a resentencing hearing.
Valentine again raised the issue of allied offenses and argued that the convictions for rape
and felonious sexual penetration should merge. The trial court again disagreed, imposed
two concurrent life sentences, and advised Valentine of his appellate rights. Valentine
now appeals.
Res Judicata
{¶ 10} We address Valentine’s assigned errors together, and review them under the
doctrines of res judicata and law of the case. Collectively, Valentine argues that the
trial court erred when it failed to merge his rape and felonious sexual penetration
convictions; failed to conduct an adequate sexual predator classification hearing; and that
the indictments failed to specify a date or distinguish between conduct on any given date.
{¶ 11} “Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment of conviction bars the
convicted defendant from raising and litigating in any proceeding, except an appeal from
that judgment, any defense or any claimed lack of due process that was raised or could
have been raised by the defendant at the trial that resulted in that judgment of conviction
or on an appeal from that judgment.” State v. Carter, Cuyahoga App. Nos. 96338, 96339,
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96340, 96342, 96343, 96344, 96345, 96346, 2011-Ohio-4509, citing State v. Perry
(1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 175, 226 N.E.2d 104, paragraph nine of the syllabus. By the
plain language of Perry, “‘the doctrine of res judicata is directed at procedurally barring
convicted defendants from relitigating matters which were, or could have been, litigated
on direct appeal.’” State v. Barclay, 9th Dist. No. 25646, 2011-Ohio-4770, quoting State
v. Widman (May 16, 2001), 9th Dist. No. 00CA007681.
{¶ 12} Regarding Valentine’s claim that his convictions for rape and felonious
sexual assault should have been merged at his resentencing, we have held that the analysis
of merger constituted a review of the defendant’s underlying convictions, and thus was
not within the scope of the trial court’s limited review of sentencing issues on remand.
State v. Marshall, Cuyahoga App. No. 89409, 2007-Ohio-6830. See, also, State v.
McCauley, Cuyahoga App. No. 86671, 2006-Ohio-2875 (finding that the defendant’s
allied offense argument was barred by res judicata because it was not raised on direct
appeal).
{¶ 13} Further, in Valentine’s collateral attack of his conviction in the federal
court, the Sixth District Court of Appeals specifically stated:
“The deficient charging of the prosecution and the management failure
of the trial court, however, should not disturb the verdicts for Count 1
(the first rape count) and Count 21 (the first felonious sexual
penetration count) of this case. The prosecutor presented substantial
evidence of ongoing abuse, against which Valentine had notice and
opportunity to defend. The jury heard the witnesses, evaluated the
evidence, and was convinced of Valentine’s guilt. Had this case been
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tried in two counts, the convictions would clearly stand.” Valentine v.
Konteh, supra at 637
{¶ 14} The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed and settled the issue of
whether Valentine’s rape and felonious sexual penetration convictions should merge.
The Sixth Circuit specifically concluded that if the case had been tried in two counts, the
convictions would stand. As such, Valentine is barred by res judicata from relitigating
this issue.
{¶ 15} Valentine’s pro se claim about the lack of specificity of the indictments has
also been addressed in Valentine’s direct appeal of his convictions and in his collateral
attack in federal court. The Sixth Circuit addressed in great detail this specific issue
and found all but two counts invalid. Id. As such, this issue is also barred by res
judicata.
{¶ 16} In addition to the foregoing issues being barred by res judicata, they are also
barred by the law of the case doctrine. The law of the case doctrine provides that the
decision of a reviewing court in a case remains the law of the case on the legal questions
involved for all subsequent proceedings in the case at both the trial and reviewing levels.
State v. Bobo, Cuyahoga App. No. 95999, 2011-Ohio-4503, citing Nolan v. Nolan (1984),
11 Ohio St.3d 1, 3, 462 N.E.2d 410. Thus, in accordance with the law of the case
doctrine, we have no discretion nor inclination to disregard the Sixth Circuit’s ruling on
the above matters.
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{¶ 17} Finally, Valentine’s challenge to his classification as a sexual predator is
also barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The record indicates that Valentine failed to
raise this issue on his direct appeal. Accordingly, we overrule all assigned errors.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into
execution. The defendant’s convictions having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is
terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, PRESIDING JUDGE
MELODY J. STEWART, J., and
COLLEEN CONWAY COONEY, J., CONCUR