Mickey v. Rokakis , 2012 Ohio 273 ( 2012 )

[Cite as Mickey v. Rokakis, 2012-Ohio-273.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 97053
AUDREY (MICKEY) PRIVATE PARTY
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
vs.
MR. JAMES ROKAKIS, ET AL.
DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED
Civil Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CV-751976
BEFORE: Cooney, J., Boyle, P.J., and Rocco, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: January 26, 2012
2
FOR APPELLANT
Audrey (Mickey), private party
P.O. Box 470142
Broadview Heights, Ohio 44147
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
William D. Mason
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
By: Sara E. DeCaro
Assistant County Prosecutor
8th Floor, Justice Center
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
COLLEEN CONWAY COONEY, J.:
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Audrey Mickey (“Mickey”), pro se, appeals the trial
court’s judgment granting the motion to dismiss filed by defendants-appellees James
Rokakis, Cuyahoga County Board of Revision, and the Cuyahoga County Sheriff’s
Department. We find no merit to the appeal and affirm.
3
{¶ 2} Mickey’s complaint alleges that James Rokakis (“Rokakis”), the County
Board of Revision, and the Sheriff’s Department (collectively referred to as “appellees”)
wrongfully seized her property in foreclosure. She also alleges claims of intentional
infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, trespass, and
conspiracy, all of which relate to the alleged wrongful taking of her property in
foreclosure.
{¶ 3} Rokakis, as Cuyahoga County Treasurer, filed a complaint in foreclosure
against Mickey personally, and as executrix of the Estate of Daniel Mickey, for collection
of delinquent taxes, assessments, penalties, and interest. Mickey was properly served,
and the case proceeded to a final foreclosure hearing in March 2011. The court granted a
judgment in foreclosure in favor of Rokakis, on behalf of Cuyahoga County, and ordered
a sheriff’s sale of Mickey’s property.
{¶ 4} After two sheriff’s sales, there were no bids for the property. On July 18,
2011, the common pleas court ordered the property forfeited to the State for lack of a bid.
Mickey never appealed the judgment of forfeiture or the judgment of foreclosure, but
instead filed the complaint in the instant case. Appellees filed a motion to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief might be
granted. The trial court granted the motion, and this appeal followed.
4
{¶ 5} In her two assignments of error, Mickey argues the trial court erred in
granting the motion to dismiss. She contends the court’s bases for granting the motion
were unfounded. We disagree.
{¶ 6} Although the court’s judgment entry granting the motion to dismiss does
not expressly state its reasons for dismissal, the State argued that the court did not have
subject matter jurisdiction and that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief
might be granted.
{¶ 7} In determining whether a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to
Civ.R. 12(B)(1), the trial court must consider whether the plaintiff has alleged any cause
of action that the court has authority to decide. McHenry v. Indus. Comm., 68 Ohio
App.3d 56, 62, 587 N.E.2d 414 (4th Dist. 1990); Avco Fin. Servs. Loan, Inc. v. Hale, 36
Ohio App.3d 65, 520 N.E.2d 1378 (10th Dist. 1987). When making this determination,
the trial court is not confined to the allegations of the complaint and “may consider
material pertinent to such inquiry without converting the motion into a motion for
summary judgment. Southgate Dev. Corp. v. Columbia Gas Transm. Corp., 48 Ohio
St.2d 211, 358 N.E.2d 526 (1976), paragraph one of the syllabus. We review the trial
court’s decision on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo.
Perrysburg Twp. v. Rossford, 103 Ohio St.3d 79, 2004-Ohio-4362, 814 N.E.2d 44, ¶ 5.
{¶ 8} Mickey claims the foreclosure of her property constituted an
unconstitutional taking of her property because appellees did not have the right to take her
5
property from her. In short, Mickey is challenging the merits of her foreclosure case and
thus attempting to collaterally attack the final judgment in foreclosure. However, “[i]n
our jurisprudence, there is a firm and longstanding principle that final judgments are
meant to be just that — final.” Ohio Pyro, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, 115 Ohio
St.3d 375, 2007-Ohio-5024, 875 N.E.2d 550, ¶ 22, citing Kingsborough v. Tousley, 56
Ohio St. 450, 458, 47 N.E. 541 (1897). Collateral attacks are disfavored and succeed
only in certain very limited situations. Id., citing Coe v. Erb, 59 Ohio St. 259, 267-268,
52 N.E. 640 (1898). Therefore, subject to a few rare exceptions, a civil judgment may
only be challenged by direct attack, i.e. an appeal. Id.{¶ 9} The Ohio Supreme Court has held that the reasons for disfavoring collateral
attacks do not apply in two principle circumstances: (1) when the issuing court lacked
jurisdiction or (2) when the order was the product of fraud. Ohio Pyro at ¶ 23, citing
Coe at 271, and Lewis v. Reed, 117 Ohio St. 152, 159, 157 N.E. 897 (1927). Thus, a
collateral attack on a judgment is really an attack on the integrity of the judgment rather
than its merits. Id. “Consequently, the collateral-attack doctrine contains elements of
the same considerations that come into play when considering whether a particular
judgment is void or voidable.” Id. citing Pratts v. Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d 81,
2004-Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d 992. When a judgment was issued without jurisdiction or
was procured by fraud, it is void and is subject to collateral attack. Id. citing Coe at 271.
However, “in the absence of those fundamental deficiencies, a judgment is considered
6
‘valid’ (even if it might perhaps have been flawed in its resolution of the merits of the
case) and is generally not subject to collateral attack.” Id.{¶ 10} Mickey never alleged that the court that decided her foreclosure case lacked
jurisdiction or that the judgment in foreclosure was procured by fraud. The only method
Mickey had to challenge the merits of the judgment was by direct appeal. The trial court
had no jurisdiction to grant the relief she was seeking by collateral attack and properly
dismissed her complaint.
{¶ 11} Accordingly, we overrule both assignments of error.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellees recover of appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
______________________________________________
COLLEEN CONWAY COONEY, JUDGE
MARY J. BOYLE, P.J., and
KENNETH A. ROCCO, J., CONCUR