Johnson v. State , 2011 Ohio 3470 ( 2011 )

[Cite as Johnson v. State, 2011-Ohio-3470.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
Nos. 95842, 95843, 95844, 95845,
95846, 95847, 95848, and 95849
MICHAEL JOHNSON, ET AL.
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES
vs.
STATE OF OHIO
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED
Civil Appeals from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CV-666875, CV-648395, CV-649493, CV-655194,
CV-648100, CV-646671, CV-650694, and CV-652766
BEFORE: Boyle, J., Blackmon, P.J., and Celebrezze, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: July 14, 2011
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ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
William D. Mason
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
BY: Daniel T. Van
Assistant County Prosecutor
8th Floor, Justice Center
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
For Thomas J. Keppler, Jeffrey S. Mader,
Clemon Crawford, Joseph A. Dohar, Guy Brewer,
and Earnest Tisdel, Jr.
Robert L. Tobik
Cuyahoga County Public Defender
BY: Cullen Sweeney
Assistant Public Defender
310 Lakeside Avenue
Suite 400
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
For Alan D. Christine, Jr.
Michael V. Heffernan
75 Public Square, Suite 700
Cleveland Ohio 44113
Michael P. Shaughnessy
Thomas E. Shaughnessy
11510 Buckeye Road
Cleveland, Ohio 44104
Michael Johnson, pro se
1373 West 80th Street, #5
Cleveland, Ohio 44102
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MARY J. BOYLE, J.:
{¶ 1} This consolidated appeal arises from the trial court’s ruling in eight sex offender
reclassification cases. Defendant-appellant, the state of Ohio (“State”), appeals the trial
court’s judgments granting relief from reclassification under Ohio’s Adam Walsh Act
(“AWA”) for the plaintiffs-appellees, Michael Johnson, Jeffrey Mader, Alan Christine, Jr.,
Clemon Crawford, Joseph Dohar, Thomas Keppler, Guy Brewer, and Earnest Tisdel, Jr.
(collectively referred to as “appellees”). We affirm.
{¶ 2} All eight appellees were initially classified by operation of law under Ohio’s
Megan’s Law. But after Ohio enacted the AWA, the appellees were reclassified, subjecting
them to new reporting and notification requirements. Consequently, in 2008, each of the
appellees filed a petition with the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, contesting their
reclassification and the application of the AWA. While appellees’ petitions were pending,
the Ohio Supreme Court issued its decision in State v. Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 266,
2010-Ohio-2424, 933 N.E.2d 753, wherein the Court held that, “R.C. 2959.031 and 2950.032,
the reclassification provisions in the AWA, are unconstitutional because they violate the
separation-of-powers doctrine.” Bodyke at ¶2.
{¶ 3} Consistent with the Ohio Supreme Court’s holding in Bodyke, the trial court
subsequently granted the appellees’ individual petitions and restored each appellee to his
previous sex offender status under Megan’s Law.
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{¶ 4} The State appeals, raising the following two assignments of error:
{¶ 5} “I. The trial court erred in applying State v. Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 266,
2010-Ohio-2424, to a petitioner who was not classified under Megan’s Law by an Ohio court
because under these circumstances there is no violation of the separation of powers doctrine.
{¶ 6} “II. The trial court erred in applying State v. Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 266,
2010-Ohio-2424, to a petitioner who did not demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence
that they were previously classified by an Ohio court.”
{¶ 7} The gravamen of the State’s appeal is that (1) Bodyke is not applicable to the
appellees because their original classifications arose by operation of law — not a
court-ordered classification; and (2) absent evidence that they were originally classified by an
Ohio court, they were not entitled to relief.
{¶ 8} Recently, however, this court has addressed and overruled these same
arguments and issues that the State raises in the instant appeal, recognizing that Bodyke
applies when an offender’s classification under Megan’s Law arose by operation of law. See,
e.g., Speight v. State, 8th Dist. Nos. 96041-96405, 2011-Ohio-2933; Hannah v. State, 8th Dist.
Nos. 95883-95889, 2011-Ohio-2930; Rollins v. State, 8th Dist. Nos. 96192-96194,
2011-Ohio-3264. Indeed, “regardless of the manner in which appellees were originally
classified, R.C. 2950.031 and 2950.032 have been severed and may no longer be enforced.”
Rollins at ¶23. Consistent with this authority, we find that the trial court did not err by
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granting appellees’ petitions and reinstating their prior sex offender classifications that arose
by operation of law under Megan’s Law. The State’s assignments of error are overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellees recover of appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas
court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
MARY J. BOYLE, JUDGE
PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, P.J., and
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J., CONCUR